Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05-080840-2
Lambden, J.
A jury found defendant guilty of one count of assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and found two enhancements true (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a); 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). The morning of May 20, 2009, the trial court suspended imposition of a six-year sentence and granted defendant probation on the condition that he complete a treatment program with the Salvation Army. That same afternoon, defendant returned to court and reported that the Salvation Army had rejected him for treatment because he had undiagnosed schizophrenia. The court responded that probation was predicated on his acceptance into the Salvation Army treatment program and therefore probation was no longer an option. The court sentenced defendant to prison for six years.
All unspecified code sections refer to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of the six-year sentence. He claims that the trial court violated his due process rights by revoking the order of probation without formal notice or a hearing and that the court failed to exercise its discretion in imposing the prison sentence. We are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Defendant lived with his mother in Brentwood. Late at night on June 14, 2008, defendant’s mother asked defendant not to play his electric guitar with the speakers outside the apartment. Defendant came inside the house holding his electric guitar and struck his mother four times on her head and arm. Defendant also punched her in the nose and began choking her. Defendant’s mother, who was covered in blood, escaped to the neighbor’s house.
The facts underlying the conviction are not detailed because the appeal only concerns the sentence and the sentencing procedure.
The police and paramedics were called. An officer noticed that the shirt of defendant’s mother was saturated in blood, and she had a very large four-inch laceration on the back of her head. The officer also saw contusions and bruises on her arm, bruising to the back of her head, and swelling to her face. Defendant’s mother was taken to the hospital, and defendant was arrested.
An information filed on July 22, 2008, charged defendant with assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and that defendant used a deadly weapon pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23).
The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury found defendant guilty of the crime charged and found the two enhancements to be true.
The probation department filed its first report in May 2009. The probation department recommended that defendant be placed on three years formal probation and that he be ordered to receive and complete treatment. Paul Good, Ph.D., examined defendant for the purpose of determining defendant’s current mental state and his mental state at the time of the crime. Good indicated that defendant had drinking and drug problems and had on various occasions received substance abuse treatment. He concluded that defendant suffered from a generalized anxiety disorder, chronic depression, alcohol dependence, and borderline personality disorder with passive-aggressive and paranoid traits. He recommended that defendant “be remanded to a residential, dual-diagnosis program for a significant period of time, perhaps one to two years.”
The court held its first sentencing hearing on May 4, 2009, which was continued to allow the defense to supplement the probation report. The judge asked defense counsel to have a plan for placement because defendant would be released to the street immediately given his custody credits, and the judge expressed concern about where defendant would end up.
The next sentencing hearing occurred on May 15, 2009. The prosecution asked for a seven-year prison term for defendant. Defense counsel reported that defendant expected to enter into a dual-diagnosis program with the Salvation Army, which would help his mental health issues and provide him with substance treatment. Defense counsel agreed that “it would not be a good idea for [defendant] to be on his own for a few days[, ]” which would happen if the court placed defendant on probation. Defense counsel added the following: “So if the court is inclined to give him a residential treatment program, I would be prepared to do and would work in put sentencing over a few days [sic], such that the day he was sentenced there was a bed available....”
The court expressed its concerns about sentencing defendant to prison: “As courtesy to you [the prosecutor], to try to be as direct as possible about my concerns from my sense of what happened, if I were to commit [defendant] to state prison with the options being two, three or four years, at most it would be six years and most likely five years. Most likely the mitigated term plus three, which is fixed.
“Which to me then means that in reality with [defendant’s] credit for time served he would be out of state prison within about two years.
“I’m not certain what kind of support and assistance [defendant] could get in state prison, which then means that with virtually no rehabilitation, a now 43 and by then a 45-year-old man could very well be a greater danger to the immediate society, meaning in particular his mother and unfortunately anyone else with whom he might come into contact if he goes on another alcoholic binge.
“In contrast, if we can get him into a residential program with no gaps in between, then either [defendant] will succeed in the program or if he doesn’t, his failure will be deemed to be a failure of a term of his probation, which then means that he would be sent to prison.
“So I’m willing to take the risk in the sense that in effect he’ll remain in a custodial setting until he’s acquired the skills or awareness to ideally better control himself, and something perhaps may be done about his alcoholism.”
The court held another sentencing hearing on May 19, 2009. At the hearing, the prosecutor explained why she was urging the court to sentence defendant to a seven-year state prison commitment, which consisted of the aggravated term plus the three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The prosecutor explained that defendant’s crime involved “great violence” and it was a “very personal attack” that included acts of a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness. Further, the prosecutor pointed out other documented reports involving defendant’s attacking his mother. The prosecutor added that defendant had been out on formal probation before and did not comply with the terms of his probation.
After much discussion, the sentencing was continued for one day.
The probation department filed a supplemental probation report on May 19, 2003. The report disclosed that the probation department had made its initial recommendation for probation when it was unaware that defendant had four documented incidents of violence committed against his mother. One of the prior incidents involved his punching his mother in the face and knocking out her two front teeth. This crime resulted in defendant’s receiving probation, and on May 21, 2000, he was placed at the Diablo Valley Ranch treatment program. On August 17, 2000, he was terminated from the program because he tested positively for alcohol. Defendant violated his probation and tested positively for an illegal substance. The report advised that the department’s original decision recommending probation rather than state prison had been a “ ‘close call’ ” at that time and was based on some inaccurate and incomplete information. Consequently, the probation department advised that it was now urging defendant’s commitment to state prison and not recommending a grant of probation.
The following morning, on May 20, 2009, the court again considered defendant’s sentence. The court stated that it read and considered the original probation officer’s report, the new probation officer’s report, and the report by Good. The court noted that the new probation officer’s report recommended that “defendant be committed to state prison with that range being two, three or four years, plus three years for the great bodily injury.” The court stated that it was accepting the latter recommendation by the probation department and was sentencing defendant to state prison for the midterm of 36 months, plus three years for the great bodily injury.
The court explained its reasons for sentencing defendant to prison for the midterm of 36 months as follows: “I note that the victim was vulnerable and that, in effect, defendant held a position of confidence with the victim, his mother, and betrayed that trust. I also note the defendant used an object that must be construed as a deadly weapon.”
The court then stated that it was “now suspending imposition of that state prison and placing defendant on probation for a period of three years, subject to the condition that he serve 340 days in the county jail, with 340 days of credit for actual time served.
“As a further condition, however, defendant shall be released to the care and custody of a duly noted representative with the Salvation Army. And I’ll get into that further in a moment.
“As my reasons for placing the defendant on probation, I believe the defendant would benefit from the treatment options that are available to him now at this very moment, and only at this moment through the very well-regarded 12-month dual-diagnosis treatment program offered by the Salvation Army, followed by the six-month supplemental program.
“I also note that were defendant to be sentenced to state prison, he would likely serve only two and a half more years in custody given his current credit for time served supplemented by his conduct credit.
“After his release from prison defendant likely will not have received treatment similar to what he would receive through the Salvation Army, hence, it’s my considered view that the subsequent safety of society would be better served through defendant’s receipt of treatment through the Salvation Army rather than his immediate incarceration through state prison.”
The court specified the following: “As a condition of probation, defendant must attend and complete the 12-month dual-diagnosis residential treatment program with the Salvation Army. Defendant must then also complete the supplemental six-month program with the Salvation Army....”
The court suspended imposition of a six-year sentence and admitted defendant to probation to be released to the custody of the Salvation Army with a number of conditions and requirements. The court made the finding that the crime was committed because of a mental condition not amounting to a defense and that there was a high likelihood that defendant would respond favorably to mental health care and treatment that was being required as a condition of probation.
That same afternoon, defendant and his counsel returned to the court to report that the Salvation Army, after interviewing defendant, concluded that he suffered from undiagnosed schizophrenia and was too mentally ill for the dual-diagnosis program at the Salvation Army. Defense counsel asked for the court to take defendant back into custody and permit her 24 hours to find another program available for him. The court responded that its “willingness to grant probation was premised specifically on the availability of a position with the Salvation Army, in light of [its] dual-diagnosis program.” The court continued, “In light of that, probation is no longer on the table. The state prison sentence that I previously imposed will now be implemented.”
The court issued an order that stated that it immediately reconsidered the sentence and modified it. The court committed defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for six years.
On June 28, 2010, this court issued an order to permit defendant to file a late notice of appeal and defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2010. We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs to consider the application of section 1170, subdivision (d), and to address whether the request of defendant’s counsel for the court to take defendant into custody for 24 hours was essentially a motion for the court to reconsider its sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. Alleged Due Process Violation
A. Introduction
On the morning of May 20, 2009, the trial court imposed a suspended prison term of six years on the condition that defendant be placed in the treatment program with the Salvation Army. Defendant reappeared in the court in the afternoon of May 20 to report that the Salvation Army had refused to accept him. The court responded that probation was “premised specifically on the availability of a position with the Salvation Army, in light of [its] dual-diagnosis program” and therefore probation was “no longer on the table.” The court implemented the six-year sentence that it had previously imposed.
Defendant contends that the court improperly revoked its order of probation without giving him notice or a hearing and violated his constitutional right to due process. The People argue, among other things, that defendant waived his right to notice and to a formal revocation hearing by acquiescing by silence. (See People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 195.)
B. The Law on Due Process and Probation Proceedings
A court may revoke or modify a term of probation at any time before the expiration of that term. (§ 1203.3; People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095.) Under section 1203.2, subdivision (a), at any time during the probationary period, a “ ‘court may revoke and terminate such probation if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation....’ ”
Section 1203.3 sets forth the due process requirements and the court’s authority to revoke probation. This statute provides in relevant part: “(a) The court shall have authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence. The court may at any time when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good conduct and reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant it, terminate the period of probation, and discharge the person so held. [¶] (b) The exercise of the court’s authority in subdivision (a) to revoke, modify, change, or terminate probation is subject to the following: [¶] (1) Before any sentence or term or condition of probation is modified, a hearing shall be held in open court before the judge.... [¶] (A) If the sentence or term or condition of probation is modified pursuant to this section, the judge shall state the reasons for that modification on the record....” (§ 1203.3.)
The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 stated that minimal due process protections must be extended to defendants in parole revocation proceedings. “What is needed, ” the court explained, “is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” (Id. at p. 484.) The court declined to identify specific procedures for revoking parole, leaving to the individual states the task of devising parole revocation procedures. (Id. at p. 488.)
The same protections required for parole revocation proceedings were extended to probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778. (See also People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 457.) The essence of procedural due process is notice and an opportunity to respond. (Cleveland Board Of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546.) “The primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Consequently, due process is a flexible concept, as the characteristic of elasticity is required in order to tailor the process to the particular need. [Citations.] Thus, not every situation requires a formal hearing accompanied by the full rights of confrontation and cross-examination. [Citation.] ‘What due process does require is notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action affecting their property interest and an opportunity to present their objections. [Citation.] “ ‘Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.” [Citation.] The extent to which due process protections are available depends on a careful balancing of the interests at stake’ [Citation.]” (Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation-San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1069-1072.)
C. Waiver
In the context of a revocation of probation, a defendant can waive the formal requirements of notice and a hearing and admit a probation violation through the conduct of his attorney and his own silence. (People v. Dale, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at pp. 193-195; see also People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482, 486 [defendant waived right to a formal revocation hearing “by filing a statement in mitigation which acknowledged that he would be sentenced... and failing to object at the sentencing hearing either to the sentencing procedure or to the grounds for revocation”]; People v. Baker (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 625, 629 [“Absent objection, we will not imply inadequate notice from a record which is silent as to exactly how [the defendant] was given notice of the charges]”.) In Dale, the defendant had a hearing, but maintained that the court had to give personal advisements and receive a personal waiver from him of his rights. (Dale, at pp. 193-194.) The court noted that defendant conceded “that he was afforded an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the revocation of his probation in the manner required, ” but his counsel, “by submitting the matter upon the supplemental probation report, waived the... rights not asserted at the hearing.” (Id. at p. 194.) The appellate court concluded that probation hearings do not require the court to recite the defendant’s procedural rights or to obtain a personal waiver of these rights. (Ibid.) Thus, the court in Dale concluded that that defense counsel’s conduct resulted in waiver because counsel submitted an alleged violation of probation upon the probation report and the defendant acquiesced by his silence. (Id. at p. 195.)
Here, defendant and his counsel voluntarily appeared before the court and therefore he cannot now complain about not having formal notice of a hearing. Moreover, to preserve a claim of inadequate notice, defendant had an obligation to object to a lack of notice in the trial court. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234.) Here, the record clearly indicates that defendant waived his claim of inadequate notice when he failed to object on that basis during the afternoon hearing on May 20, 2009. (See also People v. Dale, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at pp. 194-195.)
Defendant contends that the present case is significantly different from People v. Dale, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d 191. Defendant maintains that, unlike the defendant in Dale, he did not have a revocation hearing. He asserts that his counsel’s conduct did not indicate acquiescence. Defense counsel asked for the court to take defendant back into custody and permit her 24 hours to find another program available for him. Defense counsel did not submit the matter. He also asserts that he had no notice that he would be summarily sent to prison should he be found ineligible for the Salvation Army program.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, he did have notice that his probation was conditioned on his participation in the Salvation Army’s treatment program. At one of the earlier sentencing hearings, defense counsel promised: “[W]e can make it a condition of [defendant’s] probation that he report directly to the Salvation Army, such that if he doesn’t do that he’s immediately in violation.” Moreover, at the hearing on May 20, 2009, defense counsel did not object when the court specified the following: “As a condition of probation, defendant must attend and complete the 12-month dual-diagnosis residential treatment program with the Salvation Army....” Subsequently, at the afternoon hearing on May 20, after defendant reported the Salvation Army’s rejection of him, the court reminded trial counsel that its “willingness to grant probation was premised specifically on the availability of a position with the Salvation Army, in light of [its] dual-diagnosis program.” Defense counsel said nothing, and with her silence agreed with that statement.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant waived on appeal any challenge on the basis of a due process violation.
D. No Due Process Violation
Even assuming defendant’s due process challenge was not waived, there was no due process violation in this case because defendant voluntarily appeared before the court and had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (See In re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 42 [“the essence of due process is actual notice and a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to be heard”].) Defendant had notice that a condition of his probation was placement in the Salvation Army treatment program. Accordingly, he knew that his rejection from that program would result in the revocation of the order of probation.
Defendant argues that there can be no violation of probation where the offender does not have the opportunity to perform. (See, e.g., People v. Bethea (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 917; In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.) In the present case, being admitted into the Salvation Army treatment program was not a mere condition of probation. Rather, admission to the Salvation Army was a condition precedent to the receipt of probation and therefore willful culpability was irrelevant. (See People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 936.) The court made it clear that if defendant could not participate in the Salvation Army treatment program, probation was not an option. Without participation in the program, there was no promise of any term of probation. Since defendant was not accepted into the Salvation Army treatment program, the court imposed the sentence.
Probation is an act of leniency (People v. Walmsley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 636, 638), and the defendant has the option to accept the terms of probation or reject them and face a sentence (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608). Defendant accepted probation subject to the conditions that he serve 340 days in the county jail and that he participate in the Salvation Army treatment program. Once the Salvation Army determined that he was ineligible for its program, the condition required for the grant of probation was not met and defendant’s alternative was the state prison sentence.
Defendant argues that if the court’s intent was to sentence him to state prison unless he was accepted into the Salvation Army’s program, it should have made that clear so that counsel could have him interviewed in advance to determine his eligibility. As already discussed above, the court made it clear that defendant could receive probation only if he was accepted into the Salvation Army treatment program. Moreover, defense counsel represented to the court that the program at the Salvation Army was available to defendant and the court put sentencing over because counsel promised a bed would be available for defendant within the week. Defense counsel assured the court that defendant would go straight from jail to the Salvation Army program and, as already noted, stated that the failure to got directly to the Salvation Army would be an immediate violation of probation.
At the sentencing hearing on May 20, 2009, as already stressed, the court stated that the conditions of probation were that defendant serve 340 days in the county jail and “shall be released to the care and custody of a duly noted representative with the Salvation Army....” The court provided further clarification that it was granting probation on the basis that it had confidence in the Salvation Army’s treatment program: “As my reasons for placing the defendant on probation, I believe the defendant would benefit from the treatment options that are available to him now at this very moment, and only at this moment through the very well-regarded 12-month dual-diagnosis treatment program offered by the Salvation Army....” The court emphasized, “As a condition of probation, the defendant must attend and complete the 12-month dual-diagnosis residential treatment program with the Salvation Army.” Thus, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the court did make it clear that defendant’s admission to the treatment program at the Salvation Army was a condition integral to the court’s granting of probation in the first place.
Furthermore, that afternoon, when defendant returned to the court after the Salvation Army rejected him from the program, the court stated that its “willingness to grant probation was premised specifically on the availability of a position with the Salvation Army, in light of [its] dual-diagnosis program.” The court continued, “In light of that, probation is no longer on the table. The state prison sentence that I previously imposed will now be implemented.” Defense counsel did not object or disagree with the court’s statement that probation was dependent upon his admission into the Salvation Army. Thus, defendant understood that admission to the program was a condition for receiving probation and not merely a probation condition.
E. Harmless Error
In any event, any alleged error regarding an inadequate hearing was harmless under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See People v. Martin, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 486-487 [failure to hold revocation hearing deemed harmless where defendant “admitted the fact of the probation violation in his statement to the probation officer”].) Defendant claims that the court repeatedly stated that defendant would benefit from a treatment program rather than going to prison. However, the court’s discussion of treatment in general––rather than a discussion related to the specific treatment offered by the Salvation Army––occurred prior to its receipt of the supplemental probation report. In this supplemental report the court learned that defendant had four documented incidents of violence committed against his mother and that defendant had earlier failed to comply with the terms of probation. After receiving this new information, the court consistently made it clear that probation was an option only if defendant participated in the Salvation Army’s dual-diagnosis program. Once the Salvation Army rejected defendant from its dual-diagnostic program, the court reiterated that probation had only been an option if he could participate in this program. Accordingly, no purpose would be served in remanding for another sentencing hearing and any alleged error was harmless under Chapman, supra, at page 24.
Since we reject defendant’s due process argument and conclude that participation in the treatment program of the Salvation Army was a condition precedent for the receipt of probation, we need not consider the issues and arguments raised in the supplemental briefs.
II. The Six-Year Sentence
A trial court is required to exercise its discretion when imposing sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Surplice (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 784, 791-792.) The convicted and sentenced defendant may seek appellate review on the ground of abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in imposing the prison sentence of six years and did not adequately state the reasons for its decision to sentence him to the middle term of imprisonment. He claims that the court had articulated appropriate reasons for granting probation but its reversal of that position “defies characterization as an act of discretion.” He claims that all of the court’s statements made it clear that the court believed treatment was the best solution for defendant.
Section 1170, subdivision (c) requires a statement of reasons for the court’s sentence choice to be on the record at the time of sentencing. A sentence to state prison, as an alternative to probation, is a sentence choice requiring reasons. (People v. Gopal (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 524, 547-549.) These reasons may be in the form of reasons for either denying probation or choosing state prison. (People v. Mobley (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 320, 324; see also People v. Hawthorne (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 789, 795 [when the court decides to revoke probation, it still has the discretion to continue the defendant on probation on the same or modified terms and the record must show that “the trial court understands that two separate and distinct decisions are involved: (1) to revoke; and (2) to sentence to state prison rather than to place on probation on new or modified conditions”].)
Defendant maintains that the court failed to give reasons for failing to maintain him on probation or to impose any sentence it deemed appropriate. (§ 1303.2, subds. (b), (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.435(a).) He argues that the court had made it clear that a treatment program would be better than prison, but then failed to consider an alternate treatment program when defendant could not participate in the Salvation Army program. Defendant argues, “Upon learning that, at least in the opinion of the Salvation Army, [defendant] was more mentally ill than Dr. Good’s psychiatric evaluation revealed, it made no sense whatsoever to then summarily revoke probation and sentence [defendant] to an even longer prison sentence than what the court had earlier indicated.” Defendant asserts that the court had earlier considered whether to sentence defendant to five years or to place him in a residential program.
Although at the hearing on May 15, 2009, the court indicated that it was inclined to sentence defendant to five years, it made this statement prior to receiving the supplemental probation report. Four days later, after receiving the supplemental probation report, the court decided to sentence defendant to six years, which was the midterm term of three years with an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court explained that its reasons for the sentence were “that the victim was vulnerable and that, in effect, defendant held a position of confidence with the victim, his mother, and betrayed that trust.” The court also stressed that defendant used “an object that must be construed as a deadly weapon.” When sentencing defendant to six years, the court clearly set forth its reasons and its decision was supported by the record.
The only other issue is whether the court properly exercised its discretion in imposing a state prison sentence rather than maintaining defendant on probation after the court learned that the Salvation Army would not accept defendant into the program. Defendant argues that “it is clear that in ‘taking probation off the table’ the court failed to exercise its discretion to consider what kind of sentence might be appropriate.”
The court originally suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation based on the condition that he attend the Salvation Army treatment program because it believed he would benefit from the “well-regarded 12-month dual-diagnosis treatment program offered by the Salvation Army, followed by the six-month supplemental program.” It noted that if defendant went to prison, he would not be likely to receive “treatment similar to what he would receive through the Salvation Army[.]” The court concluded that “the subsequent safety of society would be better served through defendant’s receipt of treatment through the Salvation Army rather than his immediate incarceration through state prison.” Thus, the court made it clear that “[a]s a condition of probation, the defendant must attend and complete the 12-month dual-diagnosis residential treatment program with the Salvation Army.”
That same afternoon defendant and his counsel returned to the court. Defense counsel asked the court to take defendant back into custody and give her 24 hours to try to find another program for defendant. As already stressed, the court stated that its “willingness to grant probation was premised specifically on the availability of a position with the Salvation Army, in light of [its] dual-diagnosis program. [¶] In light of that, probation is no longer on the table. The state prison sentence that I previously imposed will now be implemented.”
Thus, the trial court stated its reasons for imposing the midterm sentence. Moreover, the court’s statements made it clear that defendant was placed on probation for the sole reason that he could participate in the treatment program with the Salvation Army. The court devoted a significant amount of time to explaining its reasons for wanting defendant to participate in the Salvation Army’s program and explained that this program enjoyed a good reputation and was designed to deal with people like defendant who had mental illness and a substance abuse problem. Once that program would not accept defendant because of his serious mental illness, the court did not believe there was any viable alternative and refused trial counsel’s request for additional time to research the availability of another program. The trial court’s reasons for its decision to sentence defendant and not consider a different treatment program can readily be inferred from this record.
In any event, if the lack of a formal statement of reasons by the trial court for choosing state prison over probation was error under People v. Hawthorne, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 789, such error was harmless. When the law requires a statement of reasons for a sentencing decision, the purpose is to ensure that the appellate court can meaningfully review the exercise of discretion. (See e.g., People v. Granado (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 194, 202-203.) Here, the record clearly suggests that the trial court exercised its discretion to send defendant to prison after listening to and considering options advanced by counsel. After listening to argument, the court concluded that the interests of justice were best served by sentencing defendant to state prison once the Salvation Army would not accept him into its treatment program. The record provides an adequate basis for appellate review and establishes that the lower court exercised its discretion in imposing the prison sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Richman, J.