Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Marin County Super. Ct. No. SC131485
Siggins, J.
Eric Christopher Daviesson admitted violating his probation. He appeals following the trial court’s imposition of a previously stayed three-year prison sentence for receiving stolen property. Daviesson contends the court lost jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1203.2a to impose execution of his sentence because he was not committed to prison within 60 days after the court was notified that he was confined in a state prison following his conviction for an unrelated offense. Daviesson also argues he was entitled to an award of custody credits in excess of those ordered by the trial court for time he was in prison and awaiting imposition of his three-year sentence. We conclude Daviesson failed to show that the court was notified as required by section 1203.2a that he was in prison for an unrelated offense. We also conclude there was no error in calculating his custody credits. We affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2003, Daviesson pled guilty in Marin County Superior Court to one count of receiving stolen property. The court imposed a three-year upper term of imprisonment, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Daviesson on five years’ probation. Daviesson agreed if he were to violate probation and be sent to state prison he would waive all local jail credits and all program credits he would otherwise have at the time of commitment. (See People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050.)
In January 2008, Daviesson admitted that he violated probation based on his August 2007 conviction in Sonoma County for second degree burglary, for which he was then serving 16 months in state prison. The Marin County Superior Court ordered execution of Daviesson’s three-year sentence for receiving stolen property to run concurrently with his Sonoma County sentence.
Daviesson moved to vacate the Marin County sentence. He argued the court lost jurisdiction because he was not sentenced within 60 days after the court was notified he was in prison on another charge as required by section 1203.2a. The court denied the motion because “the 60-day clock . . . didn’t start to run because the notice requirements of that statute weren’t complied with.” The court awarded Daviesson 30 days of custody credits beginning on December 26, 2007, the day that he was transferred from prison for probation violation proceedings. Daviesson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Alleged Loss of Jurisdiction Under Section 1203.2a.
Section 1203.2a provides, in relevant part: “Upon being informed by the probation officer of the defendant’s confinement [to prison for another offense], or upon receipt from the warden or duly authorized representative of any prison in this state or another state of a certificate showing that the defendant is confined in prison, the court shall issue its commitment if sentence has previously been imposed. . . . If the case is one in which sentence has previously been imposed, the court shall be deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does not issue its commitment or make other final order terminating its jurisdiction over defendant in the case within 60 days after being notified of the confinement.”
Daviesson argues the court lost jurisdiction because it failed to sentence him within 60 days after it signed an order to transport him from San Quentin to Marin County Superior Court in October 2007. Section 1203.2a’s 60-day clock only begins to run “[u]pon [the court] being informed by the probation officer of the defendant’s confinement, or upon receipt from the warden or duly authorized representative of any prison in this state or another state of a certificate showing that the defendant is confined in prison . . . .” Here, Daviesson argues the court received notice required by section 1203.2a when the district attorney requested the court to issue a transportation order directing that Daviesson be brought to court from San Quentin for probation revocation proceedings. But as Division Two of this court has observed in construing section 1203.2a, “ ‘[l]oss of jurisdiction over a convicted felon is a severe sanction which courts have been unwilling to apply unless the sentencing court’s jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute.’ ” (People v. Hall (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 972, 981, 983-984; People v. Davidson (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 79, 84 [“the statute provides the sole and exclusive means by which the court’s jurisdiction may be defeated”]; see also In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 999-1000.)
Daviesson argues that the holdings of Hall and Davidson “do not survive the California Supreme Court’s [decision] in Hoddinott . . . .” But Hall was decided after Hoddinott and Hoddinott did not address the issue of what constitutes valid notice under the provision of section 1203.2a that is applicable here.
Contrary to Daviesson’s argument, the trial court’s ruling did not “allow the district attorney to escape the operation of section 1203.2a on a technicality, that being that it, rather than the probation department, informed the court of a state prison commitment . . . .” Daviesson equates the district attorney’s request of the court for a transportation order with notice of his commitment to state prison pursuant to section 1203.2a. But section 1203.2a explicitly requires that notice to the court is to come from the probation officer or the prison warden, and notice by the district attorney is not specified. (See People v. Hall, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 984 [defendant’s § 1381 motion held insufficient to invoke 60-day jurisdictional time limit set forth in third paragraph of § 1203.2a].)
It is thus immaterial under section 1203.2a whether the district attorney received notice that Daviesson was in state prison on another offense before it submitted the transportation order to the Marin County Superior Court.
Daviesson is unable to show that the court received notice required by section 1203.2a, and the court did not err when it denied Daviesson’s motion to vacate his sentence and terminate jurisdiction for an alleged failure to timely commit him to prison as required by that section. (See People v. Hall, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 983; People v. Davidson, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d at p. 84.)
B. Calculation of Custody Credits.
Daviesson also contends that he “is entitled to custody credits on his current sentence at least as of September 10, 2007, when he signed and delivered his section 1381 demand to prison officials for processing.” In the superior court, defense counsel initially requested custody credit as of November 8, “the date [Daviesson] was supposed to come here on the transportation order from San Quentin but wasn’t brought over.” The People stipulated that Daviesson was entitled to credit from the time he first appeared in custody in Marin County, which was determined to be December 26. When the court stated Daviesson “gets credit from December 26th,” defense counsel responded: “Okay, the 26th of December to the 14th of January would be 20 actual, with, I guess, good time/work time for 30 days.” The court gave Daviesson 30 days’ credit as of January 14th, the date of sentencing, and defense counsel stated, “All right.”
Daviesson’s argument that he is entitled to more credits than awarded by the trial court is premised on the fourth paragraph of section 1203.2a, which provides, in relevant part: “Upon imposition of sentence hereunder the commitment shall be dated as of the date upon which probation was granted. If the defendant is then in a state prison for an offense committed subsequent to the one upon which he or she has been on probation, the term of imprisonment of such defendant under a commitment issued hereunder shall commence upon the date upon which defendant was delivered to prison under commitment for his or her subsequent offense.”
The People say it is unclear whether the fourth paragraph of section 1203.2a applies to a case like Daviesson’s, where sentence was imposed and execution suspended at the time defendant was granted probation. But we need not resolve this question. Assuming for the sake of argument that it applies, the record does not show when Daviesson was delivered to prison on the Sonoma County conviction. Moreover, Daviesson did not raise this argument to the trial court, where his claim could have been factually determined. His opening brief in this court states he “is in the process of obtaining prison records reflecting the date of his delivery to state prison on the Sonoma County burglary conviction,” but his reply brief makes no further reference to any error concerning his custody credits. Daviesson has thus failed to show the trial court erred when it computed his custody credits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P.J., Jenkins, J.