Opinion
H036032 H036681
09-13-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KEVIN MICHAEL DANLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS081124A)
Defendant Kevin Michael Danley committed his offenses on March 14, 2008. Arrested the next day, he remained in local custody until his release on bail in September 2008. In April 2010, he pleaded no contest to battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and misdemeanor active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)); he also admitted that he had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication that qualified as a "strike" (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). He was sentenced to four years in prison. The court awarded 184 days of custody credit and 92 days of conduct credit for a total of 276 days. The court denied his postjudgment motion seeking an additional 92 days of presentence conduct credit.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Defendant filed timely notices of appeal from both the judgment and the order. His sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in calculating his conduct credit under the 1982 version of section 4019. He claims the court should have applied the amended version of the statute, which became effective on January 25, 2010. We reject his contention and, accordingly, affirm the judgment and the order.
Former § 4019, subds. (b), (c), Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, § 7. We will refer to this section as "the 1982 version" of the statute.
Former § 4019, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1), Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50. We will refer to this version as "the January 2010 version" of the statute. The statute has been amended since January 25, 2010, but those amendments are not at issue here.
II. Discussion
A defendant ordered to serve a jail term, either as a condition of probation or otherwise, or committed to state prison, is entitled to credit against the jail or prison term for all days spent in custody prior to sentencing. (§ 2900.5, subds. (a), (c).) A defendant can earn additional presentence credit for satisfactory performance of assigned labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and compliance with rules and regulations (§ 4019, subd. (c)). " 'Conduct credit' collectively refers to worktime credit pursuant to section 4019, subdivision (b), and to good behavior credit pursuant to section 4019, subdivision (c). [Citation.]" (People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 939, fn. 3.) Under the 1982 version of section 4019, a defendant could earn two days of conduct credit for every four days in actual custody. (Former § 4019, subds. (b), (c).)
In October 2009, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 18. Among other things, the bill amended section 4019 to increase conduct credit for defendants who are not required to register as sex offenders and have no current or prior convictions for serious or violent felonies. (Former § 4019, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) Under the amended version of section 4019, which went into effect on January 25, 2010, eligible defendants earned two days of conduct credit for every two days in actual custody. (Former § 4019, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).)
Defendant contends the court erred in calculating his presentence conduct credit under the 1982 version of the statute. Although he served his jail time in 2008, more than a year before the January 2010 version of the statute became effective, he claims he was "entitled to the benefit of the amended section 4019 as it existed at sentencing [on July 14, 2010] because (1) retroactive application best effectuates the Legislature's intent; (2) the equal protection clauses of the state and federal [C]onstitutions require retroactive application to all defendants meeting the statute's requirements, and (3) [his] juvenile strike did not qualify as a prior serious or violent felony."
Since we conclude that the trial court properly calculated defendant's conduct credit under the 1982 version of section 4019, we need not reach his juvenile strike argument. The 1982 version of section 4019 (unlike the January 2010 version) does not reduce the rate at which an inmate earns conduct credit if he or she has been committed for a serious felony (§ 1192.7) or previously convicted of a serious or violent felony (§§ 667.5, 1192.7). (Former § 4019, subds. (b), (c).)
A. Retroactive Versus Prospective Application
Defendant argues that retroactive application of the January 2010 version of section 4019 best effectuates the Legislature's intent. We disagree.
Section 3 states that no part of the Penal Code is "retroactive, unless expressly so declared." The California Supreme Court has interpreted section 3 "to mean '[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.]' " (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 (Alford).)"[I]n the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended a retroactive application." (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209 (Evangelatos).)
The Legislature did not expressly state to what extent the January 2010 version would apply to cases not yet final on its effective date. Thus, we must determine whether "it is very clear from extrinsic sources" (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1209) that the Legislature intended retroactive application of the statute.
"[S]ection 4019, focuses primarily on encouraging minimal cooperation and good behavior by persons temporarily detained in local custody before they are convicted, sentenced, and committed on felony charges." (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 405.) "The purpose of . . . section 4019 is to encourage good behavior by incarcerated defendants prior to sentencing." (People v. Guzman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 691, 695.) This purpose would obviously not be served by retroactive application of the January 2010 version of the statute because the more generous calculation of credit that that version provided could not possibly have affected defendant's presentence conduct. He was in jail in 2008, well before the January 2010 version of the statute became effective. "Reason dictates that it is impossible to influence behavior after it has occurred." (In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800, 806 (Stinnette).)
Defendant argues that the Legislature had an additional purpose in enacting Senate Bill No. 18. "Undisputedly," he asserts, "the purpose of the amendment to section 4019 . . . was to reduce overcrowding in prisons and jails." He contends that "the 'fiscal emergency' setting of the amendment supports a conclusion that the Legislature intended retroactivity, since applying the amendment prospectively does not address the fiscal emergency declared by the Governor." We cannot agree. Although retroactive application of the January 2010 version of section 4019 might result in greater savings to the state by allowing eligible prisoners to more quickly gain release, prospective application also produces savings.
Defendant contends that section 59 of Senate Bill No. 18 was "a strong suggestion that the Legislature intended retroactive application." That section stated that "in light of limited case management resources, it is expected that there will be some delays in determining the amount of additional time credits to be granted against inmate sentences resulting from changes in law pursuant to this act. An inmate shall have no cause of action or claim for damages because of any additional time spent in custody due to reasonable delays in implementing the changes in the credit provisions of this act." (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 59.) Defendant asserts that "[i]f the Legislature did not intend retroactive application, it would not have been concerned with 'delays in determining the amount of additional time credits to be granted against inmate sentences . . . .' " His argument appears to be that if the Legislature had intended the January 2010 version of section 4019 to apply only prospectively, section 59 of Senate Bill No. 18 would be surplusage.
We reject the contention. Section 4019 was not the only credit statute that Senate Bill No. 18 amended. Section 41 of the bill, for example, amended section 2933.3 to increase credit retroactively for certain inmates who completed training for inmate firefighter assignments. (§ 2933.3, subds. (b) & (c).) Section 59 of the bill protected the state from suits alleging undue delay in the calculation of section 2933.3 credit. Thus, even if the January 2010 version of section 4019 applied prospectively only, section 59 of the bill would not be surplusage. We reject defendant's Senate Bill No. 18, section 59 argument.
Since there is no " 'compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise' " (Alford, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 753), we conclude that the Legislature intended the January 2010 version of section 4019 to apply prospectively rather than retroactively.
It follows that the trial court properly calculated defendant's conduct credit under the 1982 version of section 4019, because that was the law in effect when defendant was in custody. The court's approach was entirely consistent with the unambiguous language of the statute.
B. Equal Protection
Defendant contends that prospective application of the January 2010 version of section 4019 violated his equal protection rights. We disagree.
Both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee the right to equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) " ' "The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." ' [Citation.]" (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) Since the amendments to section 4019 do not involve a " ' " 'suspect classification' " ' " or a " ' " 'fundamental interest,' " ' " courts apply the rational basis test to determine whether the "distinction drawn by the challenged statute bears some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose." (Stinnette, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 805.) Here, as previously stated, the state has a legitimate purpose of encouraging good behavior by inmates. Since "it is impossible to influence behavior after it has occurred" (id. at p. 806), awarding additional conduct credit only as of the effective date of the January 2010 version of the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Prospective application of the January 2010 version of section 4019 did not violate defendant's equal protection rights.
The cases on which defendant relies do not compel a different conclusion. In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542 (Kapperman)is inapposite because it addressed custody rather than conduct credit. In Kapperman, the court held that an express prospective limitation in the statute authorizing presentence custody credit violated equal protection because there was no legitimate purpose for excluding those already sentenced. (Id. at pp. 544-545.) Here, as we have explained, there was a legitimate purpose for treating prisoners whose past conduct cannot be influenced by increasing their presentence conduct credit differently from those whose present and future conduct can be influenced by doing so. Giving the conduct credit statute at issue here, a prospective only application did not violate equal protection. (Stinnette, supra, 94 Cal.App. 3d at p. 806.)
People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 (Sage)is also inapposite. In Sage, the court addressed a version of section 4019 that awarded presentence conduct credit to misdemeanants but not to felons. (Sage, at p. 508.) The court concluded that there was not "a rational basis for, much less a compelling state interest in, denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/felons." (Ibid.)Here, unlike in Sage, there was no disparate treatment of similarly-situated persons. The distinction here was a purely temporal one that did not violate equal protection.
Defendant's reliance on People v. Doganiere (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 237 (Doganiere)is misplaced. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Doganiere court did not hold "that the equal protection clause commands retroactive application of an amendment increasing credits." The holding in that case was based on the court's conclusion that the amendment at issue was intended to lessen punishment. (Doganiere, at p. 240 ["[u]nder Estrada,[] it must be presumed that the Legislature thought the prior system of not allowing credit for good behavior was too severe."].)
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.
We disagree with the reasoning in Doganiere. In enacting legislation authorizing conduct credit, the Legislature was not seeking to lessen punishment. Rather, "conduct credit[] [is] designed to ensure the smooth running of a custodial facility by encouraging prisoners to do required work and to obey the rules and regulations of the facility." (People v. Silva (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 122, 128.)
III. Disposition
The judgment and the order are affirmed.
Mihara, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: Duffy, J. Walsh, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
--------