Opinion
H051011
03-26-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARCOS CUEVAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC786779)
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Marcos Cuevas in 2011 of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true a gang allegation and a gang-murder special-circumstance allegation. Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The appellate record indicates defendant was 19 years old at the time of the charged murder.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In 2023, defendant moved the trial court for a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), at which he could collect and preserve evidence pertaining to his youth at the time of the offense. The trial court denied the motion because under section 3051, subdivision (h), a person sentenced to LWOP for a controlling offense committed after the person had attained 18 years of age is not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. On appeal, defendant contends that section 3051, subdivision (h) violates equal protection guarantees of the United States and California Constitutions, and thus this case should be remanded to conduct a Franklin hearing and to appoint counsel.
Based on the California Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Hardin (Mar. 4, 2024, S277487) ___ Cal.5th ___ (Hardin) , we find that section 3051, subdivision (h)'s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to conduct a Franklin hearing and to appoint counsel.
II. BACKGROUND
A detailed summary of the facts underlying defendant's conviction is not relevant to the issue raised in this appeal. Briefly, defendant and other people pulled their car up to two friends who were walking. Defendant's group issued a gang challenge. One of the two friends responded that he was not affiliated with a gang, but defendant pulled out a firearm and fatally shot the victim.
This brief summary of the factual background is taken from this court's opinion in defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction. (People v. Cuevas (Mar. 27, 2013, H036928) [nonpub. opn.].) Both parties' briefs rely on the statement of facts in this court's prior opinion. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court's prior opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) In taking judicial notice of this court's prior opinion, we do not rely on the statement of facts in that opinion to resolve any disputed issues of fact but rather to provide a brief orientation regarding the charged offense, based on the parties' reliance on the statement of facts in that opinion.
Nearly 12 years after being sentenced to LWOP, defendant moved the trial court in propria persona to hold a Franklin hearing and to appoint counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court first noted that because defendant was age 18 or older at the time of his offense and he was sentenced to LWOP, he was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, and thus he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. The trial court then rejected defendant's equal protection challenge to his exclusion from youth offender parole consideration. This appeal followed.
Defendant also argued to the trial court that his exclusion from youth offender parole consideration constituted cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court rejected this argument, and defendant does not raise the cruel or unusual punishment argument on appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
Section 3051 generally provides offenders under the age of 26 at the time of the controlling offense the opportunity for a youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subds. (a) & (b).) Section 3051 does not apply to a person such as defendant who is sentenced to LWOP for a controlling offense committed after the person attained 18 years of age. (Id., subd. (h).) Defendant does not dispute that he is excluded from youth offender parole consideration by section 3051, subdivision (h). However, defendant asserts that his ineligibility for youth offender parole consideration violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. He contends that "[t]here . . . is no rational basis for treating young adults convicted of special circumstance murder differently from young adults convicted of first-degree murder." Additionally, he argues that there is no rational basis to distinguish between young adults like himself sentenced to LWOP and juveniles sentenced to LWOP. We find no equal protection violation in either respect concerning section 3051, subdivision (h)'s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth offender parole consideration.
"At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification. [Citation.]" (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.) "[W]here the law challenged neither draws a suspect classification nor burdens fundamental rights, . . . [w]e find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 288-289.) "A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. [Citations.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been' "ever actually articulated"' by lawmakers, and it does not need to' "be empirically substantiated."' [Citation.] Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or sensible-rather than simply rational. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 289.)
"The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. [Citation.]" (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 (Laird); but see Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1140 ["some cases raising federal and state equal protection challenges may require a bifurcated analysis [citation]"].) "We review an equal protection claim de novo. [Citation.]" (Laird, supra, at p. 469.)
In Hardin, the California Supreme Court held that section 3051, subdivision (h) does not violate equal protection guarantees because a rational basis exists for excluding young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth offender parole consideration while providing the opportunity for such parole consideration to young adult offenders not sentenced to LWOP. (Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ .) Recognizing that rational basis review is deferential, the court held that a rational basis exists for excluding Hardin, a young adult offender sentenced to LWOP based on special circumstance murder, from youth offender parole consideration. (Id. at p. ___ .) The court stated: "Without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute, we conclude that Hardin has not demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051's exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder. Under California law, special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or life without possibility of parole. When it was considering whether to expand the youth offender parole system to include not only juvenile offenders but also certain young adults, the Legislature could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender's crimes against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison. Hardin has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses." (Id. at pp. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis at pp. 5-6].)
The court in Hardin analyzed the equal protection challenge solely under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the court stated analyzing the issue under the state Constitution's equal protection guarantee would not be likely to yield a different result. (Hardin, supra, Cal.5th at p., fn. 2 [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at p. 20, fn. 2].)
The Legislature enacted section 3051 "to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established." (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) After initially providing the opportunity for a youth offender parole hearing only to juvenile offenders incarcerated for crimes committed before the age of 18, the Legislature expanded eligibility to persons under the age of 26 at the time of the controlling offense. (Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at pp. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at pp. 17-18].) However, a person who is sentenced to LWOP for a controlling offense committed after the person had attained 18 years of age remains ineligible for youth offender parole consideration. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) The court in Hardin stated: "By excluding persons sentenced to life without parole from youth offender parole proceedings, the Legislature exercised its prerogative to define degrees of culpability and punishment by leaving in place longstanding judgments about the seriousness of these crimes and, relatedly, the punishment for them." (Id. at p. ___ .) The court in Hardin observed that "the structure and history of the expansion" of youth offender parole consideration to young adults demonstrates that the Legislature sought to balance its "primary purpose" of providing "young persons the opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated growth and rehabilitation" against "other, sometimes competing, concerns, including concerns about culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain very serious crimes." (Id. at pp. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at pp. 33-34].) Thus, the court held that a rational basis exists for "the Legislature's decision to expand youth offender parole hearings to most young adult offenders, while excluding Hardin and others similarly situated . . . ." (Id. at p. ___ .)
The California Supreme Court issued its decision in Hardin after the completion of briefing in the instant matter. We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Hardin on defendant's claim of an equal protection violation. In supplemental briefing, defendant concedes that this court "is bound by Hardin" regarding the first argument of his equal protection challenge: his assertion that a rational basis does not exist for distinguishing between young adults sentenced to LWOP and young adults not sentenced to LWOP. The Attorney General's supplemental brief also asserts that Hardin is controlling regarding the first argument of defendant's equal protection challenge. We agree that Hardin controls in this respect. We therefore follow Hardin in concluding that a rational basis exists for excluding defendant from youth offender parole consideration while maintaining youth offender parole hearing eligibility for young adults not sentenced to LWOP.
Defendant argues that Hardin does not control with respect to his second equal protection argument: that there is no rational basis to distinguish between young adults sentenced to LWOP and juveniles sentenced to LWOP. He argues that Hardin did not consider whether a rational basis exists for this distinction, and thus "the holding in Hardin does not preclude this court from finding an equal protection violation arising from section 3051 making a parole eligibility hearing available to juveniles sentenced to LWOP, but not to young adults with the same sentence." We conclude that this distinction does not amount to an equal protection violation. As the Attorney General notes, the California Supreme Court in Hardin observed that the Court of Appeal in Hardin rejected such an argument, concluding that "the Legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile offenders and young adult offenders, since a unique set of constitutional rules restricts sentencing children to life without parole. [Citations.]" (Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ .) Hardin did not challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion on this point, and thus this argument was not presented in the California Supreme Court's Hardin decision. (Ibid.) However, our Supreme Court's discussion of the deferential nature of rational basis review supports the conclusion that the distinction between young adults and juveniles sentenced to LWOP does not violate defendant's equal protection right. Numerous other Court of Appeal decisions have held that section 3051's distinction between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP does not amount to an equal protection violation. For example, in People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204, the court held: "The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. [Citation.] We agree with the other courts of appeal that the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. [Citations.]" Other Court of Appeal decisions have reached the same conclusion. (See, e.g., People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079 ["Turning to the LWOP-as-an-adult exclusion, every court has rejected an equal protection challenge aimed at this exclusion. [Citations.]"], review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 ["[T]here is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young adult LWOP offenders: their age."].) In accordance with the deferential nature of rational basis review outlined in Hardin, we agree with the numerous Court of Appeal decisions holding that no equal protection violation exists based on section 3051's distinction between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP.
Consistent with the holding of our Supreme Court in Hardin, we conclude that a rational basis exists for the Legislature's exclusion of defendant from youth offender parole consideration based on his LWOP sentence for a controlling offense committed after he had attained the age of 18. Under this exclusion, defendant is ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to conduct a Franklin hearing and to appoint counsel. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127 ["Franklin was concerned exclusively with juvenile offenders who, as such, were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing. Here, however, defendant was sentenced to LWOP for a crime that he committed when he was over 18. He is therefore categorically ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. [Citation.] It follows that there is no need for a Franklin hearing."].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying defendant's motion to conduct a Franklin hearing and to appoint counsel is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DANNER, J. BROMBERG, J.