Opinion
G062209
04-05-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONNIE DAVID CRUZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 99NF0024, Jonathan S. Fish. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
We appointed counsel to represent Ronnie David Cruz on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf.
Counsel filed a brief following the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The court in Wende explained a Wende brief is one that sets forth a summary of proceedings and facts but raises no specific issues. Under these circumstances, the court must conduct an independent review of the entire record. When the appellant himself raises specific issues in a Wende proceeding, we must expressly address them in our opinion and explain why they fail. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 120, 124.)
Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), to assist the court with its independent review, counsel provided the court with information as to four issues that might arguably support an appeal: (1) what is the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's findings; (2) did the court err by finding the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt Cruz was guilty of the murder and the attempted murder; (3) did the court prejudicially err by permitting the prosecution to rely on a theory of implied malice murder; and (4) did the court commit prejudicial evidentiary error by allowing the prosecution to introduce the transcript of Cruz's parole suitability hearing.
We gave Cruz 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. Thirty days have passed, and Cruz has not filed any written argument.
We invited Cruz and the Attorney General (AG) to file a supplemental brief addressing People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Cruz and the AG agree Cruz was never notified his appeal could be dismissed as abandoned if no supplemental brief was received. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) Both parties therefore request this court issue new no-merits orders that comply with the procedures set forth in Delgadillo.
We exercise our discretion to independently review the record. We found no arguable issues on appeal. We affirm the postjudgment order.
FACTS
A detailed recitation of the facts is provided in our prior nonpublished opinion People v. Trejo et al. (Dec. 17, 2003, G028757) (Trejo). A brief recitation will suffice.
Johnny Julian Trejo and Rachel Seelke were dating. Rachel knew Johnny and Benito Trejo were members of the Atwood Street (AS) gang, and Edmundo Juarez was a member of the Cambridge Street gang. Johnny invited Rachel to a New Year's Eve party hosted by his gang's members, and asked her to bring her sister, Judah Seelke, and her friends, including Veronica Manzo. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
Some of the individuals in this case share family names. To avoid confusion, we use first names.
The girls drove two different cars to the street where the party was to be held. Johnny had told Rachel the street but failed to tell her the house number. Veronica drove Judah in one car while Melissa Meade drove Rachel and Paula Gano. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
That night, Veronica, who had a shaved head, wore overalls and a checkered shirt over a white T-shirt. She slowly drove down the street looking for the party, made a U-turn, spoke to Rachel in the other car, and returned to the same block searching for parking. Veronica saw several men in baggy clothing running after her car-three of them had guns in their hands, including Johnny. As Johnny rapidly gained on her car, Veronica accelerated. The men shot at Veronica's car hitting it numerous times. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
From a distance, Rachel and Paula saw Johnny and Juarez running towards Veronica's car carrying guns. Paula also saw Steven Fernandez, a known AS gang member, sitting on a fence. He whistled when Veronica's car drove past his location. Immediately after he whistled, the men in baggy clothing gave chase and started shooting at the car. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
When Veronica accelerated, another group of men emerged and began firing at her car. Rachel recognized Benito as one of the gunmen. Rachel jumped out of her car and yelled at Johnny that they were shooting at her sister. Johnny was surprised because he thought it was rival gang members. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
When Veronica was safe, she noticed her arm was bloody and bruised. She saw Judah was slumped over motionless in her seat. She touched Judah's head and discovered blood on her hand. Judah died of a single gunshot wound to the back of her head from a bullet of either a .40-caliber or 10-millimeter size. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
AS gang member Maurice Henao told the police that when Fernandez warned "vatos" were cruising the street, Johnny suggested they stop the apparent rivals' cars by shooting at them from the street. Later, Henao returned to the party and overheard Benito and Ronnie David Cruz bragging about having emptied their handguns at the car from their positions in the second group of shooters. Henao saw Cruz remove a chrome handgun from his waistband and give it to the man who hosted the party. He denied all of this at the trial, saying he failed to actually see who was doing the shooting. He also denied overhearing Benito or Cruz. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
After his arrest, Johnny told the detectives various stories regarding the events of that night. First, he said he was not an AS gang member, yet attended the gang's party that night. "He totally denied any knowledge of a shooting. He then changed his story and said he was in a nearby field with a .22-caliber semiautomatic handgun when two cars passed by, and Fernandez yelled, 'They're Vatos[;] blast them!'" But Johnny denied firing his gun. A few minutes later, he changed his story and he said he shot his gun once into the air. Next, he said he fired twice: once into the air and once at the car. He revised his story and admitted shooting twice at the car and many times into the air, in celebration of the New Year. He also admitted that his were the first shots fired and said he was drunk and stoned that night. He claimed he managed to lose the gun after the shooting before returning to the party. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
After his arrest, Johnny told the detectives various stories regarding the night's events ranging from lack of knowledge of the shooting to shooting twice at the car. Juarez also talked with the police after his arrest. Like Johnny, Juarez told the detectives various stories regarding the night's events ranging from lack of knowledge of the shooting to shooting a .38-caliber handgun about six times over the car. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
Benito told the police he arrived at the party after the shooting, but other witnesses said Benito was at the party from the very start. Cruz told the detectives various stories regarding the night's events ranging from he was with his girlfriend to firing a single shotgun blast into the air as the suspect vehicle passed his location. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
Detectives interviewed Cruz. Cruz admitted he was an AS gang member. He denied being at the party, asserting he was with his girlfriend. Later, he changed his statement, admitting he was at the party but claimed he did not participate in the shooting. He later revised his story stating that when he heard a volley of shots, he fired a single shotgun blast into the air as the suspect vehicle passed his location. "He remembers hearing Fernandez yell, 'vatos were cruising the neighborhood.' He also revealed that he saw numerous guns being handed over the backyard fence after the shooting." (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
As relevant here, a jury convicted Cruz of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ; count 1) and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). We affirmed. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In 2021, Cruz filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court ruled the petition set forth a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause. The court heard evidence and argument. Specifically, the court admitted into evidence the transcript from Benito's parole board hearing. At the parole board hearing, Cruz denied he had been drinking the night of the incident. Cruz said that when he first heard the gunshots, he did not know what was going on. From the backyard where he was standing, he saw the car coming down the street and had enemies in his mind. He grabbed a gun and ran out. He saw a friend shooting at the car, and he also shot. He said he felt like he had to be there and that he had to defend his friends and the area he was from. Cruz said he felt terrible when he realized the two victims were not enemies. He admitted that by participating in a murder he brought a lot of shame to his family. Cruz expressed remorse for his participation in both crimes and said he knew his involvement in taking someone's life was wrong. He attributed his actions the night of the crimes to his "gang mentality."
Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute. For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion.
The trial court denied the petition in a written ruling. The court issued an amended written ruling again denying the petition. The court ruled the evidence established Johnny, Benito, and Cruz responded to a perceived gang threat and responded as gang members. The court further found they were part of a machine that acted in concert to kill, although without knowing the victims' identities. The court opined that although the fatal shooter was unknown, Johnny, Benito, and Cruz aided and abetted in a classic sense with a shared intent to kill. The court reasoned their response to the warning about rivals, the immediate forming of groups to shoot at the car from two different spots, and the sheer volume of shots fired demonstrated premeditation and deliberation. The court concluded, "The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [Judah] was murdered with premeditation and deliberation and that all three petitioners aided and abetted in the murder of [Judah] as members of the mass that mobbed and shot at the car and enabled the killing. The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners had the specific intent to aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill [Judah]. The court also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners after premeditation and deliberation and with specific intent to kill did attempt to kill [Veronica]." Cruz filed a timely motion of appeal.
DISCUSSION
In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, our Supreme Court held the procedures in Wende and Anders do not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief under section 1172.6. The court instructed that on appeal from an order denying section 1172.6 relief, a counsel who finds no arguable issue should file a brief informing the appellate court of that determination and include a concise factual recitation. (Id. at p. 231.) The appellate court shall send a copy of the brief to the defendant informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief and that if one is not filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If a supplemental brief is filed, we must evaluate the contentions in it. (Id. at p. 232.) If a supplemental brief is not filed, we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned without a written opinion. (Ibid.) However, we retain discretion to independently review the record. (Ibid.) We exercise our discretion to independently review the record.
We did not provide Cruz the notice required by Delgadillo as our order predated Delgadillo. But because we exercise our discretion to independently review the record, there is no need to advise Cruz of the possibility of dismissal.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (SB 1437) amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder, and to limit the scope of the felonymurder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).) Under sections 188 and 189, as amended, murder liability can no longer be "imposed on a person who [was] not the actual killer," who "did not act with the intent to kill," or who "was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also added section 1172.6 which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure whereby a "person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences doctrine or theory" could petition for resentencing relief. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775), effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a), to expand the individuals entitled to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a), of that section now expressly permits individuals convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for resentencing relief. A section 1172.6 petition is required to make "'a prima facie showing' for relief. [Citation.]" (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 971, our Supreme Court held "[t]he record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court's prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless."
Cruz stands convicted of both second degree murder and attempted murder, and under current law, he is entitled to petition for resentencing, which he did. There is no question he made a prima facie showing for relief and the trial court appointed counsel. It is also not disputed the court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. After the filing of the petition for resentencing, the court issued an order to show cause, allowed briefing by all parties, and held an evidentiary hearing. The only issue before us is whether the court properly denied the petition on the merits.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. To sustain its burden, the prosecution may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence and the judge must determine whether the prosecution has sustained its burden of proof.
Here, the trial court held the prosecution to the proper standard of proof and found beyond a reasonable doubt Judah was murdered with premeditation and deliberation and that all three petitioners aided and abetted in her murder. The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners had the specific intent to aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill Judah. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners, after premeditation and deliberation and with specific intent to kill, did attempt to kill Veronica.
Although the trial court independently determines whether the prosecution met its burden to establish a defendant is not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.6, we review the court's findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) "Under this familiar standard, '"we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value- from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] We determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court "presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence."' [Citations.] Substantial evidence also '"includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence."' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The trial court acted as an independent fact-finder to determine Cruz's eligibility for relief. The court made its factual finding based on the record of conviction applying the proper standard and found Cruz was ineligible for relief. This finding was supported by substantial evidence.
The facts as to Cruz's involvement in the killing render him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. Relief requires a finding the petitioner was not the actual killer. The actual killer remains unknown, but the petitioner must also show he did not act with the intent to kill and that he was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Cruz cannot satisfy either of those requirements.
The evidence established that as Veronica accelerated down the street a second group of men emerged and began firing at her car. Rachel recognized Benito as one of the gunmen in this second group. Henao overheard Benito and Cruz bragging about having emptied their handguns at the car from their positions in the second group of shooters. Cruz admitted to detectives he was an AS gang member. His story changed from not being at the party to returning fire with a single shotgun blast into the air as the suspect vehicle passed his location. He also revealed that he saw numerous guns being handed over the backyard fence after the shooting. These facts demonstrate Cruz was a major participant and support a finding he acted with the intent to kill. We find the trial court's conclusion of ineligibility is supported by substantial evidence.
Counsel queries whether the trial court prejudicially erred by permitting the prosecution to rely on a theory of implied malice murder. We find no error. In People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850, our Supreme Court held second degree murder may be based on a "direct aiding and abetting theory." "Such a theory requires that 'the aider and abettor . . . know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.'" (Ibid.) "For implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied by proof that the actual perpetrator '"knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with conscious disregard for life."'" (Ibid.) The court found beyond a reasonable doubt Cruz aided and abetted in the murder of Judah with the intent to kill. The court also found Cruz aided and abetted the attempt to kill Veronica.
Counsel's last issue relates to the trial court's admission of the transcript from the parole board. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides, in part, "The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed."
In People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 705-706, the court explained the following: "The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects persons from being compelled by '"governmental coercion"' to serve as witnesses against themselves in '"any criminal case."' [Citation.] A section [1172.6] hearing, however, '"is not a trial de novo on all the original charges." [Citation.] Rather, it is a postconviction proceeding "due to the Legislature's inclusion of section [1172.6] in [SB] 1437 . . ., [as] an 'act of lenity' [citation], allowing for the retroactive application of the new law governing accomplice liability for felony murder [citation] for defendants already serving valid sentences for murder."' [Citations.] Because a sentence modification under section [1172.6] is an act of lenity and not a criminal trial, the wrongful admission of evidence does not implicate defendant's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment." Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held the Fifth Amendment applies through original sentencing but has stated that incrimination is complete in cases in which the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final. (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326.) Here, the trial court did not err by admitting the transcript of Cruz's parole suitability hearing.
We have reviewed the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and considered the possible issues raised by appellate counsel. We found no arguable issues on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J. MOORE, J.