Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
John E. Dobroth, Judge Superior Court County No. 2008033525 of Ventura
Susan B. Lascher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Daniel Joseph Crowley appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of four counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and found true allegations as to two of the counts that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, i.e., a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found that appellant had suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions that qualified as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (a)(2), (c)(2)) and had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subds. (a) & (b)). Appellant was sentenced to 100 years to life in state prison plus 16 years. He contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a warrantless parole search of his residence. We affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the sole issue on appeal relates to appellant's motion to suppress, the relevant facts are derived from the hearing on that motion. In July and August of 2008, two separate robberies were committed by the same individual at the Citibank branch on Moorpark Road in Thousand Oaks. On August 11, 2008, Ventura County Sheriff's Deputy Javier Chavez responded to the bank following the second robbery and was told by witnesses that the perpetrator had left the scene in a green minivan. After running a records check using the partial license plate number provided by two of the witnesses, it was discovered that a green minivan with the license plate 5DAC957 was registered to appellant's brother David Crowley, who had died in January of 2008. Deputy Javier Chavez performed a records check on appellant and discovered that he was on parole and was living at an apartment in Woodland Hills. Other officers went to appellant's apartment building that same day and saw the minivan parked in the carport.
Deputy Chavez contacted appellant's parole officer, Bryant Long. Officer Long confirmed appellant's address and said he resembled the individual depicted in surveillance photographs from the second robbery.
On August 13, 2008, Deputy Chavez, Officer Long, and FBI agents went to appellant's apartment to conduct a parole search. Deputy Chavez knocked on appellant's front door and announced his presence. After the deputy heard noises that "sounded as if someone actually walked up to the door and then walked away from it, " they forcibly entered the apartment and found appellant hiding under a bed in one of the bedrooms. Appellant's wallet, identification and clothing were found in the room along with large amounts of cash. In searching the minivan, the officers found a hat with a "Venice Beach" logo and a shirt with a "Big Dog" logo, both of which were worn by the perpetrator of the first robbery. Based on the discovery of this evidence, Officer Long placed a parole hold on appellant.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless parole search of his residence and vehicle should have been granted because the prosecution failed to establish that the law enforcement officer who initiated the search, Deputy Chavez, had actual knowledge that appellant was subject to the parole search condition, as set forth in section 3067. We disagree.
Section 3067 provides: "(a) Any inmate who is eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. [¶] (b) Any inmate who does not comply with the provision of subdivision (a) shall lose worktime credit earned pursuant to Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 on a day-for-day basis and shall not be released until he or she either complies with the provision of subdivision (a) or has no remaining worktime credit, whichever occurs earlier. [¶] (c) This section shall only apply to an inmate who is eligible for release on parole for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1997. [¶] (d) It is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment. [¶] (e) This section does not affect the power of the Director of Corrections to prescribe and amend rules and regulations pursuant to Section 5058."
"In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court defers to the trial court's express or implied findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but must independently determine the relevant legal principles and apply those principles to the trial court's findings of facts to determine whether the search was constitutionally reasonable. [Citations.] '[T]he power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court.' [Citation.] If factual findings are unclear, the appellate court must infer 'a finding of fact favorable to the prevailing party on each ground or theory underlying the motion.' [Citation.] However, if the undisputed facts establish that the search or seizure was constitutionally unreasonable as a matter of law, the reviewing court is not bound by the lower court's ruling. [Citation.]" (People v. Middleton (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732, 737-738 (Middleton).)
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall within "one of '"a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' [Citations.] As the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the California Supreme Court, police officers may make a warrantless search of the residence of a parolee subject to a valid search condition 'despite the absence of a particularized suspicion' as long as the search is not conducted for 'arbitrary, capricious or harassing purposes.' [Citation.] However, the warrantless search of a residence cannot be justified as a parole search if the police do not know of the suspect's parole status when they conduct the search. [Citations.]" (Middleton, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 738, fn. omitted.)
In Middleton, the court held that a law enforcement officer who knows that an individual is on parole has enough information to conduct a lawful parole search because every parolee is subject to a search condition under section 3067. (Middleton, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.) The court also noted that "[i]t was long ago recognized that 'every grant of parole included an implied search condition, and an officer's knowledge of parole status was equivalent to knowledge of a parole search condition.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Here, Deputy Chavez testified that he (1) conducted a records check on appellant and discovered he was on active parole out of Los Angeles; and (2) contacted appellant's parole officer, who provided the deputy with information verifying appellant's parole status; and (3) proceeded to search appellant's residence and minivan in conjunction with appellant's parole officer. Although appellant acknowledges that this evidence is sufficient to establish the legality of the search under Middleton, he urges us to reject that case in favor of United States v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064, in which the court held that the prosecution must present evidence that the officer knew the person to be searched was on parole for an offense committed before January 1, 1997, the date that section 3067 went into effect. (Id. at p. 1076.)
We believe that Middleton was correctly decided. Appellant's opening brief fails to mention that our colleagues in the Fifth District have rejected the very argument he raises here. (People v. Solórzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032 (Solórzano).) As the court in Solórzano recognized, the conclusion in Middleton was based not only on section 3067, but also on a line of California Supreme Court cases predating the statute that were premised on the conclusion that all parolees were subject to an implied search condition regardless of any express agreement to that effect. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court in Solórzano was compelled to follow those cases and conclude that "section 3067 does not abrogate the rule in force before the statute took effect[.]" (Id. at p. 1032.) We must do the same. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Even if appellant could establish that Middleton and Solórzano were wrongly decided, his claim would fail. In focusing exclusively on Deputy Chavez's knowledge regarding his parole status, appellant fails to appreciate that his parole officer also participated in the search. As appellant acknowledges, Officer Long "presumably" knew whether appellant was subject to search terms. Because Officer Long acted as "an 'adjunct[] to the law enforcement team'" in conducting the search (People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 38-39), his presumed knowledge of the terms of appellant's parole was sufficient to establish its legality.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.