Opinion
A156201
05-05-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TIMOTHY ALAN CREWS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-181409-4)
Timothy Alan Crews was driving a U-Haul truck when he was stopped by a police officer who believed the license plate on the truck had been stolen from another vehicle. Only after Crews was stopped and searched did the officer learn that the information he had relied upon - from a stolen vehicle database - was incorrect. Crews asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence the police found as a result of the stop. Because we agree that the trial court's suppression ruling was erroneous, we reverse the judgment. As a result, we do not reach Crews's alternative argument that the trial court's imposition of fines and fees without holding a hearing on his ability to pay violated due process.
BACKGROUND
A.
In October 2017, police officer David Downs saw a U-Haul truck legally parked on a corner. He observed Crews and another individual adjacent to the vehicle. As Downs drove past, Crews greeted Downs through the open window of his patrol car and then got into the driver's seat of the U-Haul and started driving. Downs made a U-turn, followed the truck, and contacted his dispatch to run the truck's license plate. Downs learned that the truck's license plate "was listed as stolen and missing from a recovered stolen U-Haul vehicle."
Downs initiated a traffic stop and conducted a records check for Crews. Downs learned that Crews was on parole. Downs searched Crews's person and discovered three types of suspected illegal narcotics, as well as shaved vehicle keys and broken pieces of a spark plug commonly used to commit vehicle theft. In a search of the truck, another officer found three magazines for a semiautomatic handgun. Downs also found a semiautomatic handgun in the truck.
B.
After Crews was arrested, Downs learned that the information in the stolen vehicle database was incorrect. He learned that "the person who recovered the [previously stolen] vehicle inadvertently thought there were two license plates attached to that vehicle, when in reality, there was only one." According to Downs, the information "was inadvertently left in[] the stolen vehicle system."
In trial court, the parties stipulated that "[t]he Arizona license plate affixed to the U-Haul the defendant was driving was not, in fact, stolen at the time of the traffic stop. Dispatcher relaying information about the Arizona license plate to Sergeant Downs relied on an erroneous record in a stolen vehicle system database stating that the license plate was stolen and provided this information to the officer immediately prior to the traffic stop."
C.
The People filed an information charging Crews with possession of a controlled substance with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)); possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)); receiving a large capacity magazine (Pen. Code, § 32310, subd. (a)); and possession of burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466). The People also alleged that Crews had served prior prison terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b); was on parole for a serious or violent felony pursuant to section 1203.085, subd. (a); and had two prior strike convictions for purposes of section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c).
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Contending that the stop of his truck was unlawful, Crews filed a motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5), which the People opposed. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
Pursuant to an agreement, Crews plead no contest on all counts and admitted the strike and prison prior allegations. The trial court sentenced Crews to three years in prison with credit for 468 days. Over Crews's objection based on his inability to pay, the court also imposed a $300 restitution fine (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a $300 parole revocation fine, suspended (§ 1202.45); a $200 court operation fee (§ 1465.8); and a criminal conviction fee of $150 (Gov. Code, § 70373).
DISCUSSION
Crews contends the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving that the officer's stop of his vehicle was lawful and that the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is applicable. We agree.
We review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, under the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)
A.
The People contend that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because Officer Downs had reasonable suspicion to justify the vehicle stop. We conclude that the People have not met their burden here.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, law enforcement authorities must obtain a judicial warrant before conducting a search or seizure unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125-126.) Where a defendant challenges the lawfulness of a search or seizure, "the People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence," that one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.)
One such exception is that a warrant is not required for a brief investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion of a crime. (See, e.g., Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 779-780 ["A 'brief, investigatory stop' is justified where an officer has 'reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,' implicating the suspect."]; People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299 ["Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed."].) Here, the People assert that Downs had a reasonable suspicion that Crews was involved in criminal activity because he was driving a vehicle with an Arizona license plate that was reported by another officer as stolen.
It is well settled that an officer may make a stop or arrest "based on information received through 'official channels,' " but the stop or arrest will not be justified unless the officer who originally supplied the information had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. (People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017, 1021 (Madden); see also United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 232 (Hensley).) In Hensley, the United States Supreme Court held that where an officer makes an investigatory stop based on information provided in a police bulletin, reliance on that information justifies the stop if the "bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense." (Id., at p. 232; see also In re William J. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 72, 76.) Thus, whether the vehicle stop here was lawful turns on whether the officer who reported the license plate as stolen had reasonable suspicion to support his report.
Downs testified that the officer "who recovered the vehicle inadvertently thought there were two license plates attached to that vehicle, when in reality, there was only one." In other words, the officer who reported the license plate as stolen mistakenly believed that Arizona required two license plates for that vehicle. (See, e.g. People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 643 (White) ["Arizona law unambiguously requires only one license plate for motor vehicles."], fn. omitted; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-2354, subd. (A).) Although a mistake of law may support reasonable suspicion if the mistake is reasonable (see Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 66), the mistake here was not an objectively reasonable one. Arizona is "a contiguous sister state," so a California officer may reasonably expect to encounter Arizona vehicles, and Arizona law is "unambiguous[]" on this point. (White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at 643; see also, e.g., People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 864 [officer's mistake of law as to whether Florida requires two license plates was not reasonable].) Without knowing whether Arizona law requires one license plate or two, it was not reasonable for the officer to assume that a second license plate existed and had been stolen. Accordingly, the stop of Crews's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.
B.
We conclude that, on the record here, the People have failed to meet their burden of proving that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable. The trial court therefore erroneously denied Crews's suppression motion.
When applicable, the exclusionary rule "forbids the use . . . of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment." (People v. Pearl (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1292 (Pearl).) However, the suppression of evidence gathered as a result of an unlawful seizure "is not an automatic consequence." (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 137 (Herring).) Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, "evidence will not be suppressed if the police officer had an objectively reasonable belief the search or seizure was constitutionally permissible." (Pearl, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) The burden is on the People to establish that the exception applies. (Id., at p. 1293.)
In Herring, the United States Supreme Court considered the applicability of the good faith exception where police officers arrested the defendant based on information from a computer database indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 137.) However, after they arrested and searched the defendant, the officers learned the information in the database was incorrect. (Id. at pp. 137-138.)
Herring held exclusion of the evidence uncovered as a result of the arrest is unjustified if the officers who arrested and searched the defendant "acted 'in objectively reasonable reliance' " on the mistaken information. (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 142.) As Herring explained, " 'an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus' of applying the exclusionary rule" (id. at p. 143) and requires consideration of "the actions of all the police officers involved" (id. at p. 140).
Herring reasoned that the application of the good faith exception in cases involving police mistakes turns on whether the "mistakes are the result of negligence . . . , rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements.' " (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 147-148; People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1126 (Robinson) [in Herring, "the high court requires us to focus on whether the facts presented warrant application of the exclusionary rule 'to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or . . . recurring or systemic negligence' "].) "If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation." (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 146.) Further, "where systemic errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant system." (Id; see also id. at p. 144.)
Ultimately, Herring held that the good faith exception was applicable (and exclusion unwarranted) in that case because the error in failing to update the database to reflect recall of the warrant reflected "isolated negligence" as opposed to "systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 137, 147-148.) One of the arresting officers testified "he had never had reason to question" information about the neighboring county's warrants, and the clerks involved "could remember no similar miscommunication ever happening on their watch." (Id. at p. 147.)
Here, the record contains limited evidence concerning the source of the information in the stolen vehicle database. The parties stipulated that the "[d]ispatcher relaying information about the Arizona license plate to . . . Downs relied on an erroneous record in a stolen vehicle system database stating that the license plate was stolen and provided this information to the officer immediately prior to the traffic stop." As noted, Downs testified that "the person who recovered the vehicle inadvertently thought there were two license plates attached to that vehicle, when in reality, there was only one." In addition, he stated that "the plate had inadvertently been left in[] the system."
Although the record suggests that the error was "inadvertent," that does not resolve the question whether the error resulted from isolated negligence rather than systemic error or recklessness. (See, e.g., Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1125 [explaining that the parties agreed the error was unintentional but disagreed as to whether it resulted from systemic error that would preclude application of the good faith exception].) The People argue that the error was "specific to this case," but unlike in Herring, the record here contains no evidence indicating whether errors of this type had occurred before or whether, more generally, errors in the stolen vehicle database were infrequent or widespread. Neither does the record address whether the police department had systems in place for ensuring that data entered into the database were accurate and up-to-date or whether officers entering data received any training or were required to follow particular procedures to prevent errors. In Robinson, for example, our Supreme Court held that the good faith exception was applicable where the record demonstrated that although the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile was mistakenly included in the state's DNA database, the law enforcement employees administering the database "conscientiously tried to follow" the applicable legal requirements and "tried to keep errors at a low level" by implementing training as well as a verification process. (Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129.)
Here, in contrast, the People failed to introduce any evidence that would demonstrate that Downs's reliance on the information was objectively reasonable. It is undisputed that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the applicability of the good faith exception. (See Pearl, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284 ["Herring . . . did not alter the prosecution's burden of proof in the trial court."].) Because the People have not met their burden of proving this case involved "isolated negligence," rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional rights, they have failed to establish the applicability of the good faith exception. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is reversed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to allow Crews to withdraw his plea, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and enter a new order granting the motion.
/s/_________
BURNS, J. We concur: /s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P.J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.