Opinion
A149948
01-29-2018
In re C.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JW166103)
C.R. (Minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court finding he made a criminal threat (Penal Code, § 422) and committed petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a)). At the time of the incident, Minor was 11 years old. On appeal, he makes three arguments. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence he made a criminal threat. Second, he argues the juvenile court's section 26 finding—that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct—was "mistaken on the law." Third, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's section 26 finding. We affirm.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. To protect the privacy interests of Minor and the victim, we sometimes refer to them by the initials of their first and last names. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We begin with a review of the facts relevant to the issues on appeal.
The Cellphone Theft and the Threat
On August 19, 2015, at around 10:00 p.m., three youths stole K.R.'s cellphone while she was waiting for a bus near First Street and Mission Street in San Francisco. The victim was sitting alone at a bus stop. She was wearing a backpack and using her cellphone.
Minor and another, older boy approached the victim, and the older boy began talking to her. A third youth, who was the oldest of the three, and who appeared to be about 16 or 17 years old, came from behind the victim and touched her hair and neck. The victim turned around, and the oldest boy made sexual remarks, which the victim found uncomfortable. Minor did not say anything inappropriate. The victim described him as "really polite and really nice."
The victim told the oldest boy to stop, and that he should respect her, but he did not listen, and he continued trying to touch her hair and flirting with her. The victim put her backpack on a seat next to her, placed her cellphone on top of her backpack, and she stood up to face the oldest boy. He said "deuces," which means "peace out" or "out of here," and ran off. The other two boys also starting running.
The victim wondered why the oldest boy ran, but then she saw her cellphone was missing, and she realized the boys must have stolen it. She grabbed her backpack and chased after them. While running, she screamed "Help me," and "They stole my phone."
Minor was the last of the three to run, and a bystander caught him close to Market Street. The victim never saw that he had possession of her cellphone. Minor told the victim he ran because his friends ran, but he also said he stopped running because what the other boys did was not right, and he let himself be caught. Minor said he did not know his friends were going to steal the cellphone, and he had no part in it. Minor also claimed the other two boys were not his friends.
Minor, the victim and the bystander began walking down Market Street. Minor said his friends were going to sell the phone near a Carl's Jr. restaurant. The bystander gave Minor his phone so that Minor could call his friends to persuade them to return the victim's cellphone, but they had already sold it.
Minor appeared scared, very afraid, and upset, but he was not crying. He begged the victim not to call the police. The bystander called them, but it took about 30 minutes for the police to arrive. While they were waiting, Minor looked the victim "in the eyes" and stated: "You're going to die; my dad's going to kill you." Minor did not threaten the bystander or his girlfriend. The bystander was angry, and asked Minor why he would say that.
The victim thought Minor was serious because he looked her in the eyes. She began to cry. When the police arrived, the victim was "pretty shaken up," "really scared," and she was visibly crying and shaking. Her voice had "a quivering tone," and she "seemed very frantic," and "a little bit flushed." The victim did not want to return to her own residence that night because she lived alone. The police took her to a friend's house. Petition, Jurisdiction, Disposition, and Appeal
On May 4, 2016, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleging Minor made a criminal threat (§ 422; count 1) and committed petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a); count 2).
During a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court considered whether Minor—who was 11 years old at the time of the incident—knew it was wrong to threaten the victim. The juvenile court focused on "the wrongfulness of the conduct. It is not the conduct of CALCRIM and the elements of CALCRIM. It's the conduct more generically . . . . And in regards to the 422, it's the threats. The young person -- I find based upon the totality of the circumstances -- knows it is wrongful to threaten other people whether it's to kill them, beat them up -- based upon his age and the facts of this case . . . , the Court does find that he did know the wrongfulness of the conduct of stealing and to threaten somebody." The juvenile court was disturbed by the way the Minor "directed his comments to one person -- the one person who sort of held the keys to his freedom which was the victim. . . . He was direct, and he directed it right to the victim." The juvenile court found the allegations true and sustained both counts as misdemeanors.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared Minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation in his father's home. Minor appeals.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends there was insufficient evidence he made a criminal threat. Minor also contends the juvenile court's section 26 determination was "mistaken on the law," and not supported by substantial evidence. We address each argument in turn.
I
There Was Sufficient Evidence of a Criminal Threat
"In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant 'willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the threat 'with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that the threat . . . was 'on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,' (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety . . . ,' and (5) that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
On appeal, Minor focuses on the third element of a section 422 violation. He argues there was insufficient evidence his "statement 'you're going to die; my dad's going to kill you' was . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution so as to constitute a true threat in violation of . . . section 422." We disagree.
"In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jurisdictional finding, the issue is whether there is evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the finding. In making that determination, the reviewing court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the challenged order, resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of that order, and giving the evidence reasonable inferences. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450-451.) We must affirm if we find "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof." (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 (Jerry M.).)
Relying primarily on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 (Ricky T.), Minor contends his statement, made when he was only 11 years old, did not suggest any "gravity of purpose" because it was not accompanied by a show of physical violence, and his "extreme youth, as well as the childish character of the statement, must . . . be factored in as a circumstance suggesting the absence of any gravity of purpose." According to Minor, what occurred was an "emotional and childish outburst," and "young children typically invoke or make reference to the power of their betters when they feel powerless, scared and upset."
We cannot agree there was insufficient evidence the Minor's statement constituted a criminal threat within the meaning of section 422. The statute focuses on "true threats" [which] "must express an intention of being carried out." (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 339; see also People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 801-805 (Wilson).) In Ricky T., the record did not support a finding the minor committed a true threat because he told his teacher "I'm going to get you," or "I'm going to kick your ass," when the teacher opened a door that accidentally hit the minor. (Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1135-1136.) The minor's outburst was a reaction, albeit an insolent one, to an accident. (Id. at p. 1138.) Furthermore, in Ricky T., there was no evidence the minor's statements were "designed to coerce [the teacher] to do or not to do anything." (Id. at p. 1140.)
Here, both the statement and the circumstances are different. First, unlike the ambiguous statements in Ricky T., Minor's statement was a specific, clear death threat: "You're going to die; my dad's going to kill you." On its face, Minor's statement supports the juvenile court's finding he made a criminal threat. (Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [" 'A threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury' "].)
Second, the circumstances support the juvenile court's determination the statement was a criminal threat. Minor made the remark after the victim and a bystander refused his pleas not to call the police. Minor focused his threat on the victim by looking her in the eyes, and he did not threaten the bystander or his girlfriend. By doing so, he conveyed to the victim a "gravity of purpose" and his statement was "designed to coerce" her into letting him go. (Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1138, 1140.) Section 422 "targets . . . those who try to instill fear in others." (Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 805.) In an effort to avoid an encounter with the police, Minor tried, and succeeded, in instilling fear in the victim, who was very upset when the police arrived, and too frightened to return to her own residence that night. There was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that Minor made a criminal threat.
II.
The Court Correctly Applied Section 26 of the Penal Code
Minor's second argument is that the juvenile court "misapplied the law of section 26." We reject this argument. We begin with a review of the presumption of incapacity, and how it applies in juvenile proceedings.
A. The Rebuttable Presumption of Incapacity
"All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." (§ 26, subd. One.) A "finding of capacity is a prerequisite to an adjudication of wardship for a minor under 14. [Citation.] The prosecution may rebut Penal Code section 26(One)'s presumption of incapacity by producing ' "clear proof" ' that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct when it was committed . . . . While knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the act alone, ' "the attendant circumstances of the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its concealment" may be considered.' " (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 280-281 (Cottone).) "Clear proof" requires the People to prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed." (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232 (Manuel L.).)
B. The Juvenile Court Properly Focused on Whether Minor Knew It Was Wrong to Make a Death Threat Against the Victim
In arguing the juvenile court misapplied section 26, Minor contends the juvenile court's approach was too "generic," and it erred by failing to find Minor knew the wrongfulness of the crime's "constituent elements."
We disagree. The statute provides that children under the age of 14 must know the wrongfulness of "the act charged against them." (§ 26, subd. One.) The focus of section 26 is whether the child exhibits the capacity to be held criminally responsible. (Cottone, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 280.) The prosecution may rebut the presumption of incapacity by producing clear proof "the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct when it was committed . . . ." (Ibid.)
In arguing the juvenile court's analysis was too general, Minor points out the crime of making a criminal threat consists of five distinct elements, and asks "Did 11-year-old C.R. know it was wrong to threaten, even if he didn't mean it?" and "Did C.R. know it was wrong even if he couldn't carry out the threat, even if he tried?" According to Minor, "[s]ince the juvenile court expressly excluded these matters in its consideration, it did not discharge its duty under section 26."
We are not persuaded. The California Supreme Court has carefully distinguished between the capacity determination under section 26, and the prosecution's separate burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cottone, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 280-281.) Capacity is not an element of the offense. (Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 236.) Instead, it is "a prerequisite to an adjudication of wardship for a minor under 14." (Cottone, at p. 280.) Minor cites no authority for his contention that, in making its section 26 determination, the juvenile court should have separately analyzed whether he knew the wrongfulness of each element of the offense.
The juvenile court may certainly take into account a crime's elements when determining if minors know the wrongfulness of the "act charged against them." For example, in In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, the minor was charged with a violation of former section 647a, which required proof the offender "was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent." (Id. at pp. 867-868.) The Supreme Court indicated that, on remand, it would have to be shown the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of conduct so motivated. (Id. at p. 869.)
Similarly, in a juvenile proceeding concerning a minor under 14 accused of involuntary manslaughter, the juvenile court required evidence the child appreciated "the permanence of death," and "the possibly fatal consequences of his actions" because involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being with criminal negligence, and requires a finding the accused acted with a conscious disregard of life. (In re Michael B. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1088.) But there is no requirement that, in determining if minors know the wrongfulness of the "act charged against them," the juvenile court must always analyze each and every element of the crime.
Minor also argues it was legal error for the juvenile court to focus on whether Minor had "a generic understanding that threatening someone . . . is wrong." We are not persuaded the juvenile court did so. Instead, the juvenile court stated "[t]he young person -- I find based upon the totality of the circumstances -- knows it is wrongful to threaten other people whether it's to kill them, [or] beat them up . . . ." The juvenile court was disturbed by the way the Minor "directed his comments to one person -- the one person who sort of held the keys to his freedom which was the victim." Thus, when evaluating whether Minor knew his conduct was wrong, the juvenile court focused in part on how Minor made his threat, which indicated his intention the statement be taken as a threat, an element of the crime. Section 422 targets persons "who try to instill fear in others," and who "intend for the victim to receive and understand the threat." (Wilson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 805-806.) Thus, the juvenile court considered the "act charged," and thereby properly discharged its duty under section 26.
Minor also relies on research regarding the neurological and developmental differences between children and adults. Minor's reliance on this research does not undermine our conclusion the juvenile court's rule 26 determination was correct. --------
III.
There Was Sufficient Evidence the Minor Knew His Conduct Was Wrong
Minor's final argument is that the juvenile court's section 26 finding was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
A trier of fact making a section 26 determination "does not attempt to read the mind of the minor, but considers the objective attendant circumstances of the crime—such as its preparation, the method of its commission, and its concealment—to determine whether the minor understood the wrongfulness of his or her conduct. [Citation.] 'Reliance on circumstantial evidence is often inevitable when . . . the issue is a state of mind such as knowledge.' " (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 379.)
Here, the court was disturbed by how the Minor "directed his comments to one person -- the one person who sort of held the keys to his freedom which was the victim . . . He was direct, and he directed it right to the victim. [¶] . . . [T]his was not a temper tantrum, this was not ranting . . . [W]hen I heard the statement and considered the victim's reaction to it and his directness . . . , I found that very influential in my decision." In other words, when determining if Minor knew his threat was wrong, the juvenile court focused on "the method of its commission." (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 379.) This evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's section 26 finding. (Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Needham, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.