Opinion
A145944
03-07-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RODNEY EDWARD CORSIGLIA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC077263A)
A jury convicted Rodney Edward Corsiglia of several felonies, including second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)), and reckless driving causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Corsiglia to a state prison term of 33 years and 8 months to life.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Corsiglia appeals. He contends his convictions should be reversed because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and present a "dementia" defense; (2) some statements Corsiglia made to the police should have been excluded because the police obtained them in violation of Miranda; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly object to the admission of the statements.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from a fatal car accident that occurred in July 2012 in San Bruno. Before the fatal car crash, Corsiglia was involved in seven other collisions. The Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") suspended and reinstated Corsiglia's driver's license numerous times; at the time of the collision, Corsiglia's license was suspended.
The prosecution charged Corsiglia with two counts of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)), two counts of reckless driving causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a)), and one count of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601, subd. (a)). The information also alleged certain offenses resulted in great bodily injury.
A. Prosecution Evidence
1. Corsiglia's Seizure Condition
Corsiglia has suffered from seizures since the late 1980's and had a brain tumor removed in 1986. In the 1990's, Corsiglia suffered a recurrence of seizures. Corsiglia suffered from "localization-related epilepsy." He experienced "partial complex seizures where people don't remember what happened" and where they go through "automatic or robotic types of behavior."
Corsiglia's doctors prescribed various medications, but none were successful in controlling his seizures. In 2003 or 2004, a surgical procedure to locate the part of Corsiglia's brain causing his seizures went badly when Corsiglia experienced a seizure during the procedure. As a result, he suffered subdural bleeding on the surface of his brain. Corsiglia had difficulty speaking for several months afterwards and was unwilling to attempt the procedure again.
A neurologist, Dr. Jeffrey Javerbaum, saw Corsiglia on an annual basis. There were times when Dr. Javerbaum felt that it was safe for Corsiglia to operate a motor vehicle, but, by 2011 or 2012, Dr. Javerbaum no longer felt Corsiglia had sufficient control of his seizure condition to operate a vehicle. On June 15, 2011, Dr. Javerbaum told Corsiglia he should not be driving. Dr. Javerbaum reported Corsiglia to the DMV because Corsiglia continued to drive despite Dr. Javerbaum's warning. Dr. Javerbaum sent Corsiglia a letter stating he should not drive for at least one year.
In August 2011, Corsiglia asked Dr. Javerbaum to submit a form to the DMV requesting reinstatement of his license, but the doctor refused. Dr. Javerbaum refused similar requests in September 2011 and February 2012. In May 2012, Corsiglia told Dr. Javerbaum his license had been reinstated. The doctor was stunned because he still had doubts about Corsiglia's ability to drive safely. In fact, Corsiglia's license had not been reinstated.
In 2002, Dr. Javerbaum referred Corsiglia to Dr. Everett Austin, a neurologist who specializes in epilepsy seizures. Dr. Austin also told Corsiglia he should not be driving. On June 30, 2011, Corsiglia had a seizure in Dr. Austin's presence, but afterwards Corsiglia did not understand what had occurred. Dr. Austin told Corsiglia he should not be driving because his seizures were not controlled and he did not have full awareness of them. Corsiglia had difficulty accepting the recommendation and wanted to drive because he lived alone, felt he needed a car for transportation, and had a new truck even though he did not have a driver's license. In July 2011, Corsiglia had another seizure in Dr. Austin's office. Again, Corsiglia was not aware it occurred and Dr. Austin told him not to drive.
2. Corsiglia's Prior Collisions
Corsiglia was involved in seven collisions prior to the July 2012 accident. In April 2002, Corsiglia struck a car on Highway 101 in Millbrae. The car suffered extensive damage, the driver of the car was injured, and Corsiglia had to be extracted from his pickup truck with the "jaws of life." Corsiglia did not remember the collision and stated he likely had a seizure. The California Highway Patrol ("CHP") reported the incident to the DMV.
On May 25, 2007, Corsiglia was involved in two accidents on the same day. Corsiglia's pickup truck rear-ended a car stopped at a red light in Redwood City. Before the collision, the passenger in Corsiglia's truck noticed Corsiglia became quiet and unresponsive. Corsiglia was still in a trance-like state after the collision and appeared disoriented. He did not remember the accident. Redwood City police determined Corsiglia had a seizure and submitted paperwork to the DMV.
Later that day, while his pickup truck was at a repair shop, Corsiglia rented a car. On his way home, Corsiglia drove through at least four stop signs, then ran a red light, and collided with two cars. One car suffered extensive damage and its occupants were injured. After the collision, Corsiglia appeared confused and disoriented. He told San Bruno police he passed out while driving, but later stated seizures caused the accidents and that they were his first seizures in about a year.
In May 2008, Corsiglia's pickup truck hit a parked car, a van, and a fire hydrant in Redwood City. Corsiglia told Redwood City police he was looking down at his radio when the collision occurred. Five months later, in October 2008, Corsiglia struck a vehicle from behind on Highway 101. Corsiglia did not immediately stop, but eventually did so when his car's left front tire flew off. The collision damaged three cars. Corsiglia told the police he did not know how the accident happened.
In September 2010, Corsiglia collided with two cars at an intersection in San Bruno when he turned right out of a left-turn-only lane and drove through a red light into oncoming traffic. Corsiglia denied having a seizure, but he was unable to explain why he turned right. A San Bruno police officer reported Corsiglia to the DMV.
In May 2011, Corsiglia hit a utility truck and a car on Highway 280. Corsiglia was driving at approximately 100 miles per hour and his car came to a stop in the center median of the freeway. Corsiglia appeared distracted and the CHP officer had to repeat questions. Corsiglia remembered striking the vehicles, but he did not know why he was driving so fast or how he ended up in the center median.
3. Corsiglia's DMV License Suspensions
The DMV first suspended Corsiglia's license in April 2000. Corsiglia challenged the suspension and the DMV sustained it, finding Corsiglia's ability to operate a vehicle was affected by lapse of consciousness related to chronic and/or excessive use of alcohol. In February 2001, the suspension ended and the DMV reinstated Corsiglia's license.
Corsiglia was convicted of driving under the influence in 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1997. He successfully completed a multiple offender program in 1998. Corsiglia struggled with alcoholism and depression.
The DMV suspended Corsiglia's license a second time in July 2002. Corsiglia requested a hearing and the hearing officer continued the suspension. In December 2003, a DMV hearing officer continued the suspension a second time and paperwork provided to Corsiglia indicated seizures were in part the basis for the suspension. After Corsiglia passed a written and road test, the DMV reinstated Corsiglia's driving privileges in March 2005.
Indeed, a search of Corsiglia's residence revealed documents showing he applied in 2003 for disability benefits based on his history of seizures.
In June 2007, the DMV suspended Corsiglia's license a third time. Corsiglia requested a hearing and submitted a form to the DMV stating he did not suffer from seizures. The DMV hearing officer continued the suspension. After another hearing in March 2008, the DMV reinstated Corsiglia's driving privileges in early May 2008.
When a San Bruno police officer reported Corsiglia to the DMV due to his September 2010 collision, Corsiglia called the officer and begged him not to do so stating it would jeopardize his job and driver's license privilege. As a result of the report, the DMV suspended Corsiglia's license a fourth time in October 2010. It was reinstated in late November 2010.
When Dr. Javerbaum notified the DMV Corsiglia suffered from a seizure disorder, the DMV suspended Corsiglia's license a fifth time effective June 27, 2011. At an August 2011 hearing, the DMV sustained the suspension, finding Corsiglia suffered from lapses of consciousness or control, and noting that he was "deemed to be a risk to traffic safety at this time in that he was involved in two major traffic collisions within a one-year period."
4. The Subject Offense — the July 2012 Collision
On July 28, 2012, while his license was still suspended, Corsiglia rear-ended and collided with vehicles stopped at an intersection in San Bruno. Five vehicles were involved in the collision, including a Toyota Corolla and a Dodge Ram pickup truck. The Toyota Corolla's two occupants died at the scene from multiple blunt injuries. Corsiglia was traveling between 67.5 and 82.5 miles per hour when he hit the Toyota Corolla. Occupants of the Dodge Ram pickup truck suffered injuries including a concussion and knee injury, and head injuries that required surgery.
As Corsiglia drove towards the intersection, he looked like he was in a trance. Immediately after the collision, Corsiglia appeared to be in shock; he appeared sluggish, disoriented, and he did not remember the collision. The last thing Corsiglia remembered was buying a soft drink at a 7-Eleven store in San Bruno.
5. Police Investigation and the August Interviews
At the scene, Corsiglia admitted to the police he may have had a seizure, and acknowledged he had a history of seizures. Corsiglia stated his most recent seizure occurred about two days before the accident. About an hour before the accident, Corsiglia had taken anti-seizure and pain medication. A search of Corsiglia's truck revealed, among other items, a completed advance health care directive and a disabled parking placard. During a sobriety test at the scene, Corsiglia became unresponsive and began gazing off into the distance. He did not know where he was or the date. A similar episode occurred at Stanford Hospital, where Corsiglia was taken after the collision. Soon after, Corsiglia left the hospital against medical advice.
a) The August 1 Interview
Four days after the accident, on August 1, 2012, detectives from the San Bruno Police Department interviewed Corsiglia at Fremont Hospital, where he had been admitted. Corsiglia claimed his license was reinstated in January 2012. He was surprised to learn his license was suspended. Corsiglia stated he did not recall having seizures, but he also acknowledged having a seizure two days before the accident. Corsiglia stated he had seizures about twice a year, but he also acknowledged they were occurring more frequently, up to four times a year. Corsiglia admitted his license had been suspended several times because of seizures.
b) The August 7 Interview
On August 7, 2012, San Bruno Police Department detectives arrested Corsiglia. They transported him to the San Bruno Police Department and interviewed him regarding the fatal collision. The detectives gave Corsiglia Miranda warnings. The parties dispute whether and when Corsiglia invoked his Miranda rights. Corsiglia told the police he thought he had a license at the time of the accident. He could not remember how many times his license had been suspended or how many DMV hearings he had attended. He did recall being told by his doctors he should not drive because of his seizures. He was sure DMV paperwork asked him about his seizures.
B. Defense Evidence
A clinical neuropsychologist, Stacey Wood, Ph.D., testified on behalf of Corsiglia. She reviewed records, including Corsiglia's medical records from 2002 to 2010. Dr. Wood interviewed Corsiglia on January 9, 2013, and administered psychological tests. Corsiglia scored 25 out of 30 on a screening examination where a score below 25 "is indicative of a dementia process." Corsiglia's records showed he scored 77 on I.Q. testing performed in 2002 or 2003, which is the sixth or seventh percentile, and is borderline for mental retardation. Dr. Wood noted Corsiglia had trouble producing speech and he scored low on her tests, including for memory, which she described as very weak. Dr. Wood found Corsiglia was impaired in executive functioning, which includes the ability to solve problems. Dr. Wood concluded Corsiglia "was significantly impaired across a range of areas related to producing language, memory, attention, and executive functioning."
C. Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Sentence
A jury convicted Corsiglia of two counts of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)), two counts of reckless driving causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a)), and one count of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601, subd. (a)).
After the convictions, Corsiglia — represented by a new attorney — moved for a new trial on various grounds, including that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion, and sentenced Corsiglia to state prison for a term of 33 years and 8 months to life.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Court Did Not Err in Denying Corsiglia's Motion for a New Trial Based on
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. The Court Denies the Motion for a New Trial
In his motion for a new trial, Corsiglia argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present a dementia defense. Corsiglia supported his motion with documents which he argued should have been provided to his expert Dr. Wood. They included medical records, employment records, witness declarations, and the declaration of a neurologist, Geoffrey Kerchner, M.D., who concluded Corsiglia had dementia. Later, Corsiglia filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his new trial motion, attaching additional materials, including declarations from a psychiatrist, David Spiegel, M.D., and a psychologist, William Lynch, Ph.D., both of whom diagnosed Corsiglia as suffering from dementia. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing Corsiglia's new supporting materials did not establish trial counsel's performance was deficient and Corsiglia failed to demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the absence of a dementia defense.
In denying the motion, the trial court found "the additional evidence of defendant's cognitive deficits that have been proffered via this motion notwithstanding its characterization as evidence of dementia was duplicative of the evidence actually produced." The trial court concluded, "although in hindsight it was not successful, I cannot find that the decision by defense counsel, trial counsel, to present the defendant's cognitive issues through Dr. Wood, who I found during the trial and advised the jury was a neurological expert and whose testimony . . . was — I cannot find that that was an unreasonable tactical decision when made by defense counsel."
B. Corsiglia's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Fails
On appeal, Corsiglia renews the argument trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and present evidence of dementia. Corsiglia was convicted of second degree murder, which required the prosecution to prove he acted with conscious disregard for human life. (See People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 [malice is implied " 'when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life' [citation]."].) According to Corsiglia, the issue in this case is whether he "acted with a conscious appreciation of the risk involved in his behavior." Corsiglia contends defense counsel could have argued persons with dementia tend to underestimate the risks involved in activities like driving.
We reject the People's argument that Corsiglia should have raised the ineffective assistance claim by way of a habeas corpus proceeding. Corsiglia moved for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and the court's denial of the motion is subject to appellate review. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582.)
A defendant who contends he received ineffective assistance has the burden of proving: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when measured by prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland).) Reasonable representation includes the "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." (Strickland, at p. 691.) A defendant who alleges ineffective assistance on direct appeal bears a heavy burden of proof. "If the record 'sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,' an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected 'unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.' [Citations.]" (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966, quoting People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.)
Corsiglia has not established his trial counsel's performance was deficient. Trial counsel retained Dr. Wood, who reviewed medical records, interviewed Corsiglia and testified that Corsiglia suffered from significant memory and cognitive impairments. The record does not explain why trial counsel failed to investigate and develop what Corsiglia terms a dementia defense, but there is a plausible explanation. Dr. Wood determined Corsiglia scored 25 out of 30 on a screening examination, where a score below 25 "is indicative of a dementia process." Given this finding, trial counsel could reasonably have concluded the prosecution would have been able to retain additional experts to undermine any diagnosis of dementia. On the other hand, it was also reasonable for trial counsel to rely on Dr. Wood's testimony as adequate to argue Corsiglia's memory and cognitive impairments showed he did not appreciate the risks of driving and to conclude Dr. Wood did provide evidence of a dementia impairment.
Corsiglia complains trial counsel did not furnish Dr. Wood with available documentation, including medical records from 2003 showing Corsiglia had a low I.Q., employment records from the Redwood City School District showing a decline in his performance evaluations, and witness information regarding Corsiglia's mental decline in the years before the fatal collision. Dr. Wood did review medical records including Kaiser records from 2002 to 2010, Mills Peninsula Health Services records from the same time period, and correctional health services records.
Dr. Wood also reviewed trial testimony from Corsiglia's preliminary hearing, read police reports, and reviewed records from a 2003 involuntary psychiatric hold. She spoke with Corsiglia and his sister about his medical and social history. Even if trial counsel failed to provide all available documentation to Dr. Wood, the information provided was sufficient for Dr. Wood to conclude Corsiglia suffered significant memory and cognitive impairments. It was a reasonable tactical decision for trial counsel to conclude this testimony was sufficient to persuade the jury Corsiglia did not appreciate the risks of driving. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 433-434 [finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel presented some evidence of voluntary intoxication and stating "[c]ounsel might reasonably have concluded that the available intoxication evidence conceivably could persuade the jury that defendant lacked the ability to form the required mental state for the crimes."].) Nor has Corsiglia established his trial counsel should have sought out additional experts who would present a dementia defense. "Competent representation does not demand that counsel seek repetitive examinations of the defendant until an expert is found who will offer a supportive opinion." (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 945.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that Corsiglia's trial counsel performed deficiently, Corsiglia has not shown "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) According to Corsiglia, a dementia defense "would have explained his behavior in a way that could well have negated the conscious disregard for human life that is an element of second degree murder." In this case, there was ample evidence Corsiglia was aware of his seizure condition and the dangers of driving when he drove on July 28, 2012. (See In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1079-1081 [no prejudice where, in light of other evidence already before the jury, additional mitigating evidence would not have altered result].)
First, at the scene of the fatal collision, Corsiglia admitted he may have had a seizure, acknowledged a history of seizures, admitted his most recent seizure occurred two days before and that he took seizure medication one hour before. Second, Corsiglia's history of seven prior collisions, at least some of which were attributable to seizures, and his long history of DMV suspensions, establish he was aware of his seizure condition and the risks of driving. Indeed, on cross-examination, Dr. Wood acknowledged that if someone was engaged in license suspension proceedings with the DMV a number of times, then the person would be likely to develop a more permanent, more resilient memory of the event, and more impactful memories tend to be more resilient. Third, Corsiglia's doctors repeatedly told him in 2011 and 2012 that it was not safe for him to drive and Dr. Javerbaum refused Corsiglia's requests for help to get his license reinstated. This evidence establishes Corsiglia was aware of his seizure condition and of the dangers of driving on July 28, 2012. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 430-431 [appellate court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient if there was no prejudice].)
II.
Corsiglia's Miranda Claim Fails
Corsiglia contends the trial court should have excluded statements he made to detectives on August 7, 2012 after invoking his right to remain silent.
A. The August 7 Interview
A number of different parts of the interview are relevant to our analysis. At the beginning of the interview, while detectives were providing Corsiglia with Miranda warnings, the following exchange occurred:
"[Detective]: Well, here, let me read it to you one more time just — just so you're clear, okay? You have the right to the presence of an attorney before and during any questioning.
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah, should I . . .
"[Detective]: Do you understand?
"[Corsiglia]: Should I get an attorney? Uh, would you get an attorney?
"[Detective]: Uh, it's totally up to you.
"[Corsiglia]: Well, maybe I should get an attorney. I mean, you know, you know, when you said, uh, I'm — I'm, like, you know, I — I'm — I'm — I'm a murderer. When you said murderer . . .
"[Detective]: Okay well, it — it's up to you. I just have to read this to you.
"[Corsiglia]: Okay.
"[Detective]: The decision is totally yours.
"[Corsiglia]: Right.
"[Detective]: Um, but this is your chance to talk to us if you so choose to.
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah, but I just said I'm . . .
"[Detective]: Okay so we just have to . . .
"[Corsiglia]: . . . I — I'm . . .
"[Detective]: . . . get through this if you wanna talk to us. Again, it's totally your decision.
"[Corsiglia]: Okay. Okay. Okay.
"[Detective]: So — so let me read this to you one more time. I just wanna make sure that you do understand . . .
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah.
"[Detective]: . . . it, okay?
"[Corsiglia]: I — I — I just — well, yeah, go ahead. I . . .
"[Detective]: Okay so you have the right to the presence of an attorney before and during any questioning. So do you understand that?
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah.
"[Detective]: Okay. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge before any questioning if you want; do you understand?
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah.
"[Detective]: All right so do you wanna s- talk to us and tell us a little bit about your side of the story about what happened?
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah, I sure, I mean, I — I — I, you know, I — I thought I had my license."
Corsiglia continued talking to the detectives without an attorney present. Later, about one hour into the interview, the following exchange occurred:
"[Corsiglia]: I — I should maybe just see an attorney now, I mean, cause I think, uh, you — you — you — you'd like me to g— you'd like me to go to prison. All right.
"[Detective]: Uh, I — I'm just trying to do my job. That's it. I'm trying to find out what the truth is and do my job. That's it.
"[Corsiglia]: Right and I — I just . . .
"[Detective]: I'm not the one that decides if anyone goes to prison.
"[Corsiglia]: Right. Who . . .
"[Detective]: Okay?
"[Corsiglia]: That — so who — who does that?
"[Detective]: Okay a jury — a jury decides that, okay?
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah, all right. So . . .
"[Detective]: All right?
"[Corsiglia]: All right so I'll just stop there. I'll stop there, I guess.
"[Detective]: You — you don't wanna discuss this any further?
"[Corsiglia]: I guess not. E — uh, I think you have everything there. I think you have everything there.
"[Detective]: Well, I do have a lot of stuff here. But I don't know what I don't have here.
"[Corsiglia]: Okay well, what — what don't you have?
"[Detective]: And I'm just trying to clarify some things.
"[Corsiglia]: No. I'm thinking I should just stay (unintelligible).
"[Detective]: Okay well, is there anything you wanna add? Is there anything you want people to know about you? This is your chance.
"[Corsiglia]: What? Know about me? God. What — what do you mean? Ash— I, you know, eh, eh, uh, you just — you know, I feel that you — you hate me, especially you, you know? This guy's, I mean, it's — and actually, you hate me for some reason. And I don't know. And I don't know what I did. And I'm sorry this is happening. And — and I c— I, you know, I certainly didn't mean to do this, you know." Corsiglia went on to make the following statements:
"[Detective]: But you do remember that you were at some point in your life involved in several accidents . . .
"[Corsiglia]: Well, five, uh . . .
"[Detective]: . . . which were caused as a result of you having a seizure and not being able to control your car; am I correct?
"[Corsiglia]: That — that's correct.
"[Detective]: But you chose to drive your car anyway, despite knowing you could have a seizure, okay, and not . . .
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah.
"[Detective]: . . . possibly be able to control your car. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
"[Detective]: So — so you just decide to drive even though you really knew you shouldn't. Is — is that accurate or not?
"[Corsiglia]: I don't know. I . . .
"[Detective]: And — and — and you know what? Eh, if that's the case, it's a mistake. We all make mistakes in our life.
"[Corsiglia]: Yeah, okay. Yeah, okay. It was a mistake, certainly. And — and, you know, now you know, now I have to deal with this mistake."
B. The Court's Miranda Rulings
Before trial, Corsiglia moved in limine to exclude much of the August 7 interview, but the motion in limine did not raise the issue he raises on appeal; instead, it focused on the beginning of the interview and argued the detectives failed to honor Corsiglia's request for counsel at the start of the interview. The court denied the motion in limine finding that Corsiglia's request for an attorney was not unequivocal.
Corsiglia made a different argument in his motion for a new trial. In the supplemental memorandum, Corsiglia argued he invoked his right to remain silent about one hour into the interview, that police should have stopped questioning him at that point, and the trial court should have excluded the remainder of the interview. At the hearing on the new trial motion, the trial court stated it did not find any errors in its rulings on the admissibility of Corsiglia's statements.
C. Corsiglia Failed to Preserve the Miranda Claim for Appeal
On appeal, Corsiglia claims the trial court should have excluded statements he made after he invoked his right to remain silent about one hour into the interview, but Corsiglia forfeited this issue for appeal because he raised it for the first time in his motion for a new trial. Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to exclude or strike it was "timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion." A properly directed motion in limine may satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code section 353, but the specific legal ground for exclusion must be advanced in the motion in limine. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)
Here, the motion in limine focused on Corsiglia's early invocation of the right to counsel at the outset of the interview, not his later invocation of the right to remain silent when he stated, "I should maybe just see an attorney now," and later "All right so I'll just stop there. I'll stop there, I guess." Citing People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 120-121 (Rundle), the Attorney General argues Corsiglia forfeited any Miranda claim that questioning should have stopped after Corsiglia's later invocation of the right to remain silent. In Rundle, the court held the defendant failed to preserve his Miranda claim for appeal because he made an "entirely generic motion to exclude all . . . statements to law enforcement officers" that differed from his specific claim on appeal. (Id. at p. 116.) The same reasoning applies here.
Rundle was disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.
By raising the Miranda issue regarding his later statements for the first time in his motion for a new trial, Corsiglia has not preserved the issue for appeal. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 462 [evidentiary argument made for first time in motion for new trial "came too late"]; Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 851, 865, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1272, fn. 15 [waiting until motion for new trial to challenge hearsay statements constituted waiver of objection].) "An objection to evidence must generally be preserved by specific objection at the time the evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a 'placeholder' objection stating general or incorrect grounds . . . and revise the objection later in a motion to strike stating specific or different grounds." (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 22.)
In addition, the issue is not preserved for appeal because the record does not show the trial judge ruled on this new argument. The trial judge simply stated he did not find any error in his rulings on the admissibility of Corsiglia's statements, but he had never previously ruled on the admissibility of Corsiglia's statements made about one hour into the interview after Corsiglia supposedly invoked his right to remain silent. The California Supreme Court determined a defendant failed to preserve an issue for appeal where the trial court did not rule on his motion in limine and where the defendant did not press for a ruling. (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171.) This case is similar. The trial court did not rule on the Miranda argument raised for the first time in his new trial motion and Corsiglia did not press for a ruling.
In People v. Bichara (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1261 (Bichara), the court held a defendant forfeited his Miranda issue because trial counsel did not make the specific objection raised on appeal, trial counsel withdrew objections, and the trial court made no findings regarding the Miranda objection. (Id. at pp. 1280-1281.) Corsiglia seeks to distinguish Bichara on the ground that Corsiglia's new trial counsel raised his Miranda objection in a new trial motion. Even so, Corsiglia's Miranda objection was still untimely because it was not made in a motion in limine or when the evidence was introduced, and the trial court made no findings regarding Corsiglia's Miranda objection raised for the first time in the new trial motion. (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 116; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 190.) For these reasons, Corsiglia forfeited his Miranda issue.
At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefs on the significance of Bichara, a case decided after briefing was complete.
D. The Miranda Claim Fails on the Merits
Assuming for the sake of argument that Corsiglia's preserved the Miranda issue for appeal, Corsiglia has not demonstrated the police violated Miranda by continuing to question him after he stated "[a]ll right so I'll just stop there. I'll stop there, I guess." To invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect "must unambiguously" assert his right to silence or counsel. (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459.) It is not enough for a reasonable police officer to understand the suspect might be invoking his rights. (Ibid.) Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, officers are not required to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning altogether. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535.) A defendant has not invoked the right to remain silent when the defendant's statements are merely expressions of frustration. (Ibid.)
Corsiglia's statements about one hour into the August 7 interview did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. After Corsiglia said "I'll stop there," the detective asked him if there was anything he wanted to add. Corsiglia continued talking and stated the detective hated him. The detective could reasonably have concluded Corsiglia's statement was an expression of frustration. It was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. (See In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 516 [defendant's use of the phrase "That's all I have to say" was not unambiguous invocation of right to remain silent]; see also People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 949-50 [defendant did not unambiguously invoke right to remain silent by saying, "That's all I can tell you"].)
Even if we assume the trial court should have excluded Corsiglia's subsequent statements, we would not reverse Corsiglia's conviction. When statements obtained in violation of Miranda are erroneously admitted, convictions can be affirmed only if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 447-448.) We conclude Corsiglia's statements late in his August 7 interview were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Attorney General argues that because Corsiglia failed to preserve the Miranda issue for appeal, his Miranda claim can only be evaluated through "the lens of an ineffective assistance claim," and therefore the standard for showing prejudice should be whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the erroneous admission, the result would have been more favorable to Corsiglia. In other words, the Attorney General suggests we should apply the Strickland standard when evaluating the prejudicial effect of any erroneous admission of Corsiglia's statements. We agree Corsiglia forfeited his Miranda claim. But we also analyze the Miranda claim as if it was not forfeited. When doing so, we must apply the more stringent Chapman standard of prejudice, which requires us to determine whether the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Bichara does not indicate we should apply the Strickland standard because, in Bichara, the court did not assume for the sake of argument the defendant preserved his Miranda issue. (Bichara, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1281-1282.) --------
We are not persuaded by Corsiglia's assertion he made "a confession of guilt" after invoking his right to remain silent. First, Corsiglia's statements after his ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent are not particularly damning: Corsiglia responded "I don't know" when asked if he decided to drive even though he knew he should not. Corsiglia stated it was a mistake for him to drive on the day of the accident. But this admission after the fatal accident that he made a mistake does not show Corsiglia was aware of the dangers of driving before the accident. Second, even without these statements, and as explained above, there was ample evidence to establish Corsiglia was aware of the dangers of driving before the accident, including what he told officers right after the accident, his long history of prior collisions, and his long history of DMV suspensions. Third, on August 7, before his ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, Corsiglia already admitted his doctors told him he should not be driving because of his seizure disorder and that DMV paperwork asked him about seizures. Fourth, almost a week earlier, on August 1, 2012, Corsiglia told detectives he had a seizure two days before the accident and he remembered his license had been suspended several times because of seizures. Based on this independent evidence, we conclude any error in admitting statements from the August 7 interview was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 [where facts "amply established by independent and uncontradicted evidence, the erroneous admission of . . . challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"].)
III.
Corsiglia's Claim He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Trial
Counsel's Failure to Preserve the Miranda Issue Fails
Corsiglia's final argument is trial counsel's failure to raise the Miranda issue he raises on appeal in a motion in limine deprived him of effective assistance. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Corsiglia must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) To show prejudice, Corsiglia must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Id. at p. 694.)
We are not persuaded by Corsiglia's final argument. First, as explained above, Corsiglia's statements did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. Therefore, Corsiglia's trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the evidence on that ground. Second, Corsiglia has not established a reasonable probability the result would have been more favorable to him if portions of the August 7 interview had been excluded. As explained above, applying Chapman, we conclude any possible error in admitting Corsiglia's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If Corsiglia cannot show prejudice under the more stringent Chapman standard, then he also cannot show prejudice under the less stringent Strickland formulation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Simons, J. /s/_________
Needham, J.