Opinion
No. 2014–236 S CR.
09-18-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jerome M. COOPER, Appellant.
Opinion
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Karen Kerr, J.), rendered January 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of failure of sex offender to notify of overnight location (Code of Suffolk County § 745–35[C] ). The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review so much of an order of the same court dated December 16, 2013 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) is preempted by state law.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, so much of the order dated December 16, 2013 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) is preempted by state law is vacated, and that branch of defendant's motion is granted.
Defendant was charged with violating Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C), a misdemeanor, in that he is a registered level three sex offender and had failed to report his overnight lodging “within one hour of checking in, registering, being placed, etc. in an emergency shelter or by 11:59 p.m. each day, which ever [sic ] was earlier, to the SCPD Suffolk County Police Department.” Defendant moved to dismiss the information on the ground, among others, that Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) was preempted by state law. The District Court denied the motion. On January 15, 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 90 days' incarceration.
“New York's constitutional home rule provision (see N.Y. Const, art IX, § 2 [c] ) confers broad police powers upon local governments relating to the welfare of its citizens. Yet, while local governments do possess broad authority to enact legislation that promotes the welfare of their citizens, it is well established that they cannot adopt laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution or with any general law of the State. Thus, the power of local governments to enact laws is subject to the fundamental limitation of the preemption doctrine” (Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 91 AD3d 126, 133 2011 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Diack, 24 NY3d 674, 679 2015 ). The state's preemption doctrine precludes local legislation where an express conflict exists between state and local laws, or where the state has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field (see Diack, 24 NY3d at 679–680; DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 91, 95 2001; Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377 1989; Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91 1987; Matter of Chwick v. Mulvey, 81 AD3d 161, 167 2010 ). “Although field preemption may be express as evidenced by the legislature's stated directive, it may also be implied from a declaration of State policy by the Legislature or from the fact that the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a particular area” (Diack, 24 NY3d at 679 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc., 91 AD3d at 135; Matter of Chwick, 81 AD3d at 169–170). “Intent to preempt the field may be implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the purpose and scope of the State legislative scheme, including the need for State-wide uniformity in a given area” (Diack, 24 NY3d at 679 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Where there has been field preemption, local governments are prohibited from enacting laws on the same subject matter whether or not they actually conflict with state law (see Diack, 24 NY3d at 678–679; Matter of Chwick, 81 AD3d at 172), unless there is “clear and explicit authority to the contrary” (DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 95 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
With respect to whether the legislature has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme concerning registered sex offenders, the Court of Appeals has stated:
“SORA [Sex Offender Registration Act], SARA [the Sexual Assault Reform Act], chapter 568 and SOMTA [Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act] represent [ ] a detailed and comprehensive regulatory scheme involving the State's ongoing monitoring, management and treatment of registered sex offenders, which includes the housing of registered sex offenders. The monitoring and treatment of sex offenders does not end when the sex offender is released from prison” (Diack, 24 NY3d at 685–686).
The purpose of the provision of Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) requiring a registered sex offender to notify the Suffolk County Police Department of his or her overnight location within one hour of registering in an emergency shelter or by 11:59 p.m., whichever is earlier, is to monitor the whereabouts of sex offenders. Thus, the notification requirement set forth in Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) ultimately “encroach[es] upon the State's occupation of the field, inhibit[s] the operation of this State's general law and thereby thwart[s] the operation of this State's overriding policy concerns relative to the ... monitoring ... of sex offenders” (Diack, 24 NY3d at 686 citation and internal quotation marks omitted ). In view of the State's “unmistakable intent” to preempt the field, the enactment of local sex offender monitoring laws, such as Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C), is prohibited (Diack, 24 NY3d at 686).
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed, so much of the order dated December 16, 2013 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that Code of Suffolk County § 745–35(C) is preempted by state law is vacated, and that branch of defendant's motion is granted.
IANNACCI, J.P., MARANO and GARGUILO, JJ., concur.