Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. MF030928A
ROBIE, J.
Peace officers searched an apartment rented by defendant Tommy Shane Collins, based on their belief that Julius Victor Butler, a probationer subject to a search condition, lived there. As a result of this search, defendant and Butler were jointly charged with several narcotics offenses. After their joint motion to suppress was denied, defendant pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of three years in prison, execution of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation. He timely filed this appeal.
On appeal, defendant contests the legality of the search, contending that the peace officers had no reasonable grounds to believe Butler lived at defendant’s apartment.
We affirmed Butler’s conviction in an unpublished opinion, in part rejecting his claim that the search was unlawful because the police had no reasonable grounds to believe he lived at that apartment. (People v. Butler (Apr. 29, 2009, C059131) [nonpub. opn.].) We reach the same conclusion in this case and affirm.
SUPPRESSION HEARING
After Butler moved to suppress evidence, defendant filed a similar motion, and the two motions were heard and decided together.
The evidence introduced during the hearing on the motion to suppress showed that sometime prior to October 12, 2007, Detective Shawn Cavin conducted a probation search of Butler’s residence at 190 Lupton Street in Manteca. After the probation search, the building was demolished.
On October 9, 2007, a confidential reliable informant told Detective Cavin that Butler was living in an apartment with defendant where they were manufacturing methamphetamine. Several people had told the informant about the methamphetamine production at the apartment. One of the informant’s sources had been inside the apartment with Butler and defendant. The detective asked the informant to gather more information, including the apartment number.
The detective knew the informant had used methamphetamine, but observed the informant to have been sober for four to six months and had not known the person to be untruthful or unreliable. In exchange for the information, he later paid the informant $200 to $300.
On October 11, 2007, the informant told Detective Cavin that Butler was living with defendant in apartment 16 at 250 North Union Road. Police records confirmed that defendant resided at apartment 16.
To further confirm the informant’s information, the detective drove the informant by the apartment complex. The informant pointed to a second-story apartment in one of the buildings. The apartment turned out to be apartment 20, which was on the opposite side of the building from apartment 16. One apartment separates them.
The detective conducted a records check and found that Butler was on probation based on a conviction for possession for sale of drugs. The terms of probation included consent to search Butler’s residence for drugs and paraphernalia.
On October 12, 2007, Detective Cavin and three other police officers went to the apartment complex office. The police asked the two employees about who was living in apartment 16. The employees stated that defendant was the only person on the lease. When shown Butler’s photo, the employees noted seeing him around apartment 16. The employees referred to Butler by his first name.
Although the trial court quoted an employee as stating she had seen Butler “‘around the apartment a lot,’” that is an inference from the testimony: The employees said “that [they] had seen [Butler] around the apartment in the past” and it was stipulated one would testify she saw Butler “at the pool area previously” and at apartment 16 twice.
Detective Cavin informed them that Butler was on searchable probation, and asked for a key to the apartment. The employees refused to hand over a key because Butler’s name was not on the lease agreement.
The police went to apartment 20. The occupant did not know either Butler or defendant. The officers then went to apartment 16.
The officers knocked on apartment 16’s door. No one responded. A telephone rang inside the apartment, but went unanswered. The officers decided to return to the office to get the apartment key.
At the office, one employee asked the other “‘Did you call Tommy’s apartment again, we have his number.’” The officers suspected that the employees personally knew defendant and Butler, and might be trying to alert them to the officers’ presence. The officers returned to apartment 16.
Detective Cavin knocked and twice announced, “‘Police department, probation search, open the door.’” The officer repeated the announcement a third time, and added that he would kick the door in.
The detective heard movement inside the apartment, as well as the phone ringing again. The detective kicked the door open. He saw defendant and another man standing directly in front of him in the living room. Butler emerged from the southwest bedroom. The detectives encountered a woman standing at the entryway to the bathroom.
During their protective sweep of the two-bedroom apartment, the officers opened a closet in the northwest bedroom. There, they saw containers of denatured alcohol and acetone along with a trash bag containing tubing. These items are used to produce methamphetamine.
The police detained the four people in the apartment, and asked who lived in the northwest bedroom. The police sought to ascertain which areas of the apartment they could search consistent with Butler’s probation agreement. Omitting the northwest bedroom, the officers searched the southwest bedroom, living room, kitchen, and dining area.
In the southwest bedroom, the officers found Butler’s wallet and a glass methamphetamine pipe on a nightstand next to the bed. They found mail addressed to Butler. The bedroom also yielded iodine crystals and a container with numerous pseudoephedrine pills. Iodine and pseudoephedrine cold pills are commonly used to produce methamphetamine. The bedroom also contained a pocket-size scale commonly used in the sale of narcotics.
In the kitchen, the officers found a coffee grinder containing white residue and stained tubing consistent with methamphetamine production. A drawer contained surgical masks labeled “Tom” and with Butler’s initials, “JB.”
While the other officers maintained control of the apartment, Detective Cavin returned to the police department to apply for a search warrant. Detective Cavin returned with a warrant, and the officers searched the entire apartment. In the process, they discovered additional items indicating methamphetamine production.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the officers merely had a “hunch” that Butler might be in the apartment, because he “was not known to be more than an occasional guest,” and therefore the warrantless search was unlawful. We disagree.
There is a preliminary point to consider before addressing defendant’s contention regarding the warrantless search based on Butler’s probation condition. In connection with his motion to suppress, Butler provided a schedule of evidence he sought to suppress, but defendant did not, and defendant’s briefs are vague about what evidence was found during the warrantless search as opposed to the warrant search. However, the People impliedly concede that the warrant affidavit depended on evidence from the warrantless search, and if that search was invalid, the affidavit, upon retesting, would not support probable cause and the warrant search would be invalid. (See People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1076-1083.) Accordingly, both searches stand or fall on the question whether Butler’s probation condition authorized the warrantless search of the apartment rented by defendant.
The appropriate test is whether the facts known to the officers, taken as a whole, gave them objectively reasonable grounds to believe that Butler lived at the apartment.
“It is settled that where probation officers or law enforcement officials are justified in conducting a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence, they may search a residence reasonably believed to be the probationer’s.... [T]he question of whether police officers reasonably believe an address to be a probationer’s residence is one of fact, and we are bound by the finding of the trial court, be it express or implied, if substantial evidence supports it.” (People v. Palmquist (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 1, 11-12, disapproved on another point by People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 135; see People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795-796; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-682; People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301, 306-307.)
On appeal, defendant draws favorable or at least neutral inferences from each piece of evidence tending to support the conclusion that Butler lived at the apartment. But, as just indicated, we must defer to the express and implied factual findings of the trial court: “As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence [citation], the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. [Citation.] Accordingly, in reviewing the instant suppression order, we consider the record in the light most favorable to [the respondent] since ‘all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the [superior] court’s disposition on the [suppression] motion.’ [Citation.] But while we defer to the superior court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on the facts so found.” (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 673-674.)
Prior to the search, Detective Cavin checked that Butler was still on searchable probation for possession for sale of drugs. He checked defendant’s address, which matched the informant’s story. At the apartment complex, the employees identified Butler’s picture, knew Butler’s first name, and conceded they had seen Butler around defendant’s apartment. Detective Cavin knew Butler could not still live at his old address because that building no longer existed. Based on the telephone ringing in the apartment and the evasive statements by the employees, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the employees were trying to warn Butler, the subject of the officers’ inquiry. Based on all of the information known to the officers, it was objectively reasonable for them to conclude Butler lived in defendant’s apartment.
Defendant relies on People v. Tidalgo (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 301. In this case, Everett, an acquaintance of Tidalgo’s, was arrested on bad check charges. Everett was then charged with stealing jewelry from Tidalgo’s sister-in-law’s house. Everett told the police that she had recently been at that house, where Tidalgo showed her baggies of marijuana, and where she saw Tidalgo sell marijuana. (Id. at p. 303.) When officers arrived to search that house pursuant to Tidalgo’s probation condition, Tidalgo was present and told them it was not his house, but it belonged to his sister-in-law. (Id. at 304.) Before entering the house, an officer saw a parrot that he had seen a year before at Tidalgo’s parents’ house. (Id. at p. 304.) The officer also saw fishing equipment and although he did not know whether it was Tidalgo’s, he knew Tidalgo fished often. (Ibid.) The officer also saw marijuana debris and paraphernalia and entered the residence. (Id. at p. 305.) The trial court granted the motion to suppress. Acknowledging that “the evidence was susceptible of different interpretations,” the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s conclusion that it was objectively unreasonable for the officers to think Tidalgo lived at that house, noting that it was “bound by the factual resolution of the lower court.” (Id. at p. 307.)
This case is not helpful to defendant. In the same way that the Tidalgo court deferred to the trial court on factual findings, we accept the factual findings of the trial court in this case. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.) This means, however, that we draw inferences against defendant because the trial court here denied the motion to suppress. Based on all of the evidence, the officers had received reasonable confirmation that Butler resided at apartment 16, and the suspicious actions of the employees at the office gave the officers reasonable grounds to think Butler was present. (Cf. People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 478-479 [arrest warrant case, officers must have grounds to believe subject of warrant is inside residence to be searched].) That the officers could have conducted surveillance or taken additional steps to verify Butler’s residence does not undermine our conclusion that the officers acted reasonably based on the information they already had when they acted.
Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s conclusion that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to conclude Butler lived at that apartment, and therefore they had the right to enter to conduct a warrantless probation search.
The evidence shows that the officers made efforts to limit the warrantless search to the common areas of the apartment and the bedroom associated with Butler, apart from a protective sweep for officer safety. Defendant does not contend anything the officers saw or seized that went into the warrant affidavit exceeded the scope of a reasonable probation search of Butler. Accordingly, we need not address that issue. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19, limited on another ground by People v. Griffith (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P. J., HULL, J.