Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC057615
STEIN, J.
A jury found 55-year-old defendant Boping Chen guilty of 63 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The court thereafter sentenced defendant to a term of 14 years in state prison. Defendant appeals.
Defendant also has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failures.
Background
Defendant was born in Shaghai, China, and emigrated to the United States in 2000. He has taught violin and piano since the 1980’s, having approximately 30 students at the time of his arrest. Beginning in 2001, defendant gave Jane Doe weekly piano lessons. At first, Jane, who was then eight years old, had no complaints about defendant. During the second year, however, she periodically asked to get a different teacher, but did not state her reasons for making the request. Sometimes she would try to avoid lessons by staying in her room. After the family returned from a trip in the summer of 2004, Jane again told her mother she wanted a different teacher. Her mother asked Jane her reasons. Jane did not immediately say anything about defendant’s conduct, but after her mother asked if he had touched her inappropriately, Jane said he had. Jane’s mother took her to the authorities.
Jane told the police, and testified in court, that defendant had begun to touch her during the second year of her lessons with him. He touched her both over and under her clothing, sometimes on her chest, under her shirt and sometimes in her pants. He did not put his fingers inside her vagina and his hand did not linger long. He touched her during every lesson. She had not told anyone about the touching, explaining it was a hard thing to talk about.
Defendant, testifying through an interpreter, unequivocally denied the charges. After he first learned of the accusations, defendant stated he thought Jane must have misinterpreted some action by him. He said she occasionally would move her legs around, or sometimes needed to have her posture corrected, acknowledging he sometimes had to put his hand on her chest or stomach to correct her posture, or on her thigh to keep her still. Later, when it became clear Jane’s accusations could not be explained by some mistake or misinterpretation, defendant theorized they resulted from the desire to find a reason for discontinuing lessons with him that would be acceptable to her mother. He believed Jane had become frustrated by him because he had asked her to perform songs she did not like, or were too difficult, or insisted she perform “finger exercises,” which she found boring. Defendant stated that at some point in their relationship, Jane’s attitude changed. She did not practice all she was assigned and did not finish her exercises. Sometimes she would shout at him or would cry if she was unable to perform an assigned piece. He was very angry during their final lesson because she had refused to learn a piece he had assigned, insisting he had not assigned it. He threatened to tell her mother, but Jane’s mother stopped the lessons before he had a chance to do so. The defense emphasized Jane accused defendant of touching her only after her mother specifically asked if he had touched her inappropriately, hypothesizing the mother had suggested to Jane a means of avoiding further lessons with defendant.
In support of its theory, the defense called Jane’s former nanny, who testified she never had seen defendant do anything inappropriate to Jane, even though she occasionally walked through the living room during the lessons. Jane once falsely had accused her of stealing a book. On another occasion Jane had lied, asserting the nanny had excused her from doing her homework. The defense also produced evidence Jane’s Chinese language teacher had had difficulties with her. The teacher also testified, however, Jane had apologized to her and she continued to give Jane lessons until the teacher moved and her commute became too difficult. Another of defendant’s clients testified defendant had given lessons to her nine-year-old daughter. She was aware of the charges against defendant, but believed him to be honest and not the kind of person who would commit lustful or lewd acts against children.
The defense pointed out the lessons were given in the living room of the family home. Both defendant and Jane’s former nanny testified people occasionally would go into the room during the lessons and Jane’s younger sister, in particular, liked to go in and try to interact with Jane and defendant during the lessons.
There also was evidence in the form of a recorded telephone call Jane’s mother made to defendant at the suggestion of the police, and of a statement made by defendant to the police during which, among other things, he spoke about the telephone call. The evidence was somewhat problematic in that the interview with defendant was conducted in Mandarin, and the parties’ translations of some of defendant’s phrases were not wholly consistent. In any event, there is evidence that after Jane’s mother told defendant during the telephone call Jane had stated he had touched her many times, defendant responded, “[N]ot many times.” He also told her he would apologize to Jane and seek treatment. Defendant admitted he had told Jane’s mother he had not touched Jane “many times,” but explained he did not mean to imply he ever had touched her inappropriately. He had agreed to apologize and seek treatment not because he had actually done the acts, but because the mother’s emotions were running high and he wished to calm her down. He also admitted he had asked the mother not to call the police or tell her husband about the accusations, stating he thought the whole thing was a misunderstanding and did not see why the police should become involved.
The prosecution called Jane’s former piano teacher, who stated Jane had good posture and did not need to be touched to maintain good posture. Jane enjoyed her piano lessons and did not complain when they became more difficult. The prosecution also called the person who gave Jane lessons after her lessons with defendant stopped. The new teacher testified Jane loved to play the piano. Jane never complained about playing complex pieces and although she might find a piece of music boring, she still practiced it.
In sum, as in many cases of the kind, each party’s case primarily turned on the credibility of the defendant and of the prosecuting witness. The jury here found the prosecuting witness to be the more credible, convicting defendant of all 63 counts and thereby finding he had committed lewd touchings of the victim throughout their relationship as teacher and student.
After the jury returned its verdict, the court referred defendant to the probation department for a presentence report and to Dr. Marvin Firestone, a psychiatrist, for the purpose of determining whether defendant presents a danger to the safety, health, or welfare of others, and if he is amenable to psychiatric treatment. Defendant’s probation officer reported a computer check had revealed no prior criminal history. Defense counsel forwarded 26 letters from family, friends and many former students who asserted the offenses of which defendant had been convicted were completely out of character for him. Dr. Firestone reported that after extensively interviewing defendant and his wife, and performing a mental examination of defendant, he found nothing in defendant’s psychosexual history indicating sexual dysfunction or pedophilic tendencies. Dr. Firestone stated his opinion defendant “does not pose a danger to the safety, health, or welfare of others; and psychiatric treatment is not indicated. The defendant does not reveal evidence of pedophilia nor any history consistent with a paraphilic disorder. Based upon information reviewed, including collateral interview of the defendant’s wife, as well as examination of the defendant and sexual history obtained from him and his wife, there is no mental disorder that was diagnosable.”
The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of six years for the first count charged against him plus consecutive terms of one-third the middle term—two years—on the second, third, fourth and fifth counts, and concurrent terms of two years for the remaining counts, for a total term of 14 years in state prison.
This appeal followed.
Discussion
I.
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
Defendant complains the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) in the form of the testimony of clinical social worker Miriam Wolf, an expert in that field, describing the types of behavior that some abused children exhibit, and the reasons for that behavior.
It is settled that expert evidence of “syndromes” describing the reactions of crime victims may be relevant and admissible. The Supreme Court, in People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 (Bledsoe), explained evidence of “rape trauma syndrome” “may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.” (Id. at pp. 247-248.) Such evidence, however, while admissible to rebut misconceptions about the presumed behavior of rape victims, may not be admitted as a means of proving a rape did in fact occur. (Id. at p. 248.) The same considerations apply to evidence of CSAAS. An expert on CSAAS, therefore, may not apply CSAAS evidence to the facts of the case to support a conclusion the child was abused, and may not give general testimony describing the components of the syndrome in such a way as to allow the jury to apply the syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was sexually abused. (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391-393 (Bowker).)
Nonetheless, “[a]lthough inadmissible to prove that a molestation occurred, CSAAS testimony has been held admissible for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts to a molestation. [Citations.] [¶] Identifying a ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ has not been interpreted as requiring the prosecution to expressly state on the record the evidence which is inconsistent with the finding of molestation. It is sufficient if the victim’s credibility is placed in issue due to [what might seem to be] paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation. [Citations.]” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745 (Patino).)
The challenge, then, is to provide the jury with relevant, accurate information regarding CSAAS, but prevent it from misapplying the information as a predictive index. (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 393.) The court in Bowker suggested some guidelines. “First of all, the evidence must be tailored to the purpose for which it is being received. Bledsoe[, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236] does not make ‘general’ testimony on CSAAS admissible in every, or for that matter any, child abuse case. Although Bledsoe can be read to prohibit CSAAS testimony unless it is being used to rebut a defendant’s attack on the credibility of the alleged victim(s), at a minimum the evidence must be targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ suggested by the evidence. [Citation.] For instance, where a child delays a significant period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser who occupies a position of trust. . . . Where there is no danger of jury confusion, there is simply no need for the expert testimony. [Citation.]” (Bowker, supra, at pp. 393-394, fn. omitted.)
In addition, “[b]eyond the tailoring of the evidence itself, the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true. The jurors must understand that CSAAS research approaches the issue from a perspective opposite to that of the jury. CSAAS assumes a molestation has occurred and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to the experience. [Citation.] The evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394.)
The expert witness here told the jury Dr. Rollins Summit, a psychiatrist, had published an article based on his clinical observations, identifying five kinds of behavior with CSAAS. She cautioned the jury she was not about to describe “a checklist to go down and say the child exhibits these things, therefore they were or were not sexually abused. It’s more to give an idea of the kind of behaviors children might exhibit and understand the reasons behind what they were exhibiting and apply those to the facts that you are examining as a professional or juror.” The witness then summarized Dr. Summit’s observations, discussing behaviors an abused child might or might not exhibit and explaining the reasons for them. She explained Dr. Summit wrote that children in sex abuse cases generally keep the abuse a secret, and may go their entire lives without telling anyone about it. They experience a feeling of helplessness because they are dealing with a person in position of authority, and this feeling may exist even if a parent is down the hall or in the building. She pointed out that in some cases the abuser threatens the child so that the child feels the child cannot discuss the abuse with the person to whom the child normally might go. Such children feel they must keep the abuse a secret and therefore develop coping strategies. They may, for example, blame themselves when it would be dangerous, psychologically, for them to blame the perpetrator, such as when the perpetrator is somebody that “was loved by the child or in a position of authority, somebody that was supposed to take care of the child, because if the child blamed that person, then in essence they are alone in the world because the people that are supposed to take care of them don’t have [the child’s best interests] at heart.” They may try to run away, “avoid these behaviors, not go to places, things like that.” Another behavior is to make a delayed, conflicted disclosure, “test[ing] the waters” to see how an adult might respond. Finally, an abused child may retract a disclosure after the child sees or experiences the negative results it produced.
The prosecutor then asked whether those children who report abuse report over different periods of time, or if they report immediately after the incidents occur. The witness replied it varies, that not all studies of the matter agree with one another, but it generally is agreed “that there is some period of secret keeping and generally some delayed reporting, [but] the specific times vary in the studies.” The prosecutor asked whether a child might attempt to cope with the abuse by manipulating the environment. The witness replied, “It could be. It could be that kids avoid going to a place or avoid a particular person, it could be that children make some attempt to resist sexual abuse. It could also be that they try to find out in their head how to understand it or how to cope with it while it is happening if they do happen to be in a setting where it occurs.” The prosecutor asked if it was “part of the syndrome that children will continue to have ongoing contact with people who are committing sexual abuse against them, or that it’s not inconsistent with somebody who’s been sexually assaulted?” The witness pointed out most sexual abuse is committed by someone the child knows and trusts and with whom the child necessarily continues to have contact, such as a father or stepfather. Finally, the prosecutor asked whether the “partial disclosure” kind of behavior might go on over time. The witness responded children might make multiple attempts to tell “and depending on the reactions or responses they get they may choose to tell more, they may choose not to tell more.” The court later gave the jury an appropriate limiting instruction.
The court instructed:
Defendant has a number of complaints about the evidence. He contends the jury could not have had any misconceptions to dispel because the topic of child abuse no longer is taboo and it can be assumed the general public is aware of the behaviors of child abuse victims. Despite defendant’s position, the law currently recognizes the efficacy of CSAAS evidence. (See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906 (Brown).) We also do not believe the general public is so familiar with the behavior of sexually abused children and so understands the reasons behind that behavior, as to fully comprehend that a child might choose to go back to an abuser rather than report abuse to a trusted parent. “The jury need not be totally ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion to justify its admission. [Citation.] Such expert testimony will be excluded ‘ “. . . only when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that [people] of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.’ . . .” ’ ” (People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1072-1073.) Moreover, to the extent defendant is correct, it means only that the jury already knew and understood the subject of the expert’s testimony. That they were told what they already knew could not, in and of itself, prejudice defendant.
Defendant, finding support in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Dunkle (1992) 602 A.2d 830, 837-838, also argues CSAAS evidence tends to buttress the testimony of the complaining witness and impermissibly interferes with the jury’s function to judge credibility. In Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 248, the California Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in connection with evidence of rape trauma syndrome. The court also rejected the argument in connection with CSAAS, albeit somewhat indirectly, in Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 906. We reject it here.
Defendant contends even if a valid reason continues to exist for such evidence, it should not have been admitted here because defense counsel never asserted the complainant’s paradoxical behavior suggested she lacked credibility. It is, however, settled “[a]dmission of evidence such as CSAAS is not error merely because it was introduced as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal. The testimony is pertinent and admissible if an issue has been raised as to the victim’s credibility. [Citations.]” (Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1745.) Jane’s credibility was very much in issue even if, as defendant asserts, defense counsel carefully avoided raising any “myths” or “misconceptions” about her seemingly inconsistent behavior. It cannot be assumed a jury will avoid a common misconception just because defense counsel does not directly identify it or urge the jury to adopt it.
Defendant claims the Supreme Court, in Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236, effectively held evidence of rape trauma syndrome was not admissible when the defendant made no claim the complainant’s conduct or demeanor after the incident provided a basis for the jury to infer she had not been raped. (Id. at p. 248.) We do not read Bledsoe to so hold. The court there found no reason to explain rape trauma syndrome to a jury in the absence of evidence the victim acted in accordance with the syndrome, noting the complaining witness in that case reported the crime immediately after it occurred and exhibited every indication it had, in fact, occurred. It followed that the prosecution’s only purpose for introducing the evidence was for the impermissible reason of proving the crime had occurred. (Ibid.)
Defendant complains the witness was permitted to describe all of the syndrome’s manifestations, including some unquestionably not present here. For example, the expert spoke about how a child might respond to threats from the abuser and how a child might cope by blaming himself or herself rather risk losing a needed parent. The expert also spoke about the possibility an abused child would recant or retract accusations. Defendant’s complaint is built on the holding in Bowker that the evidence should be tailored to the purpose for which it is being received and therefore must be targeted to a specific myth or misconception. (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 393-394.) The danger anticipated by the court in Bowker, however, is that irrelevant evidence might in some way cause the jury to misapply it as a predictive index. (Ibid.) Here, if anything, the arguably irrelevant evidence was favorable to defendant. The uncontroverted evidence was defendant did not threaten Jane. Evidence a child might fail to report abuse when threatened by the abuser, therefore, could not have helped the prosecution. Evidence children may cope by blaming themselves, or might remain silent to protect a relationship with a parent, or might recant or retract, could have only helped defendant as Jane did none of those things.
Defendant complains the prosecutor was allowed to pose hypotheticals drawing on specific facts of this case, asking if victims of sexual abuse might cope by doing things such as hiding from the perpetrator, or if a victim’s disclosure might be triggered by a break from the abuser followed by a resumption of contact. We agree these questions went beyond permissible limits, suggesting Jane’s conduct was consistent with that of an abused child. Under the circumstance here, however, the error was harmless. The expert herself quite carefully explained the jurors were not to consider any behavior the expert identified as an indicator the child had been abused. The court instructed the jury correctly as to the proper and improper use of the evidence. The prosecutor in summing up the evidence cautioned the jury not to consider the CSAAS evidence to determine whether Jane had been sexually abused, explaining the purpose of the evidence was so that they would not disbelieve Jane simply because she failed to report the claimed abuse for several years, continued to take piano lessons with defendant, and made a detailed statement about the abuse only after she was interviewed by a detective. On the record as a whole, there was no reasonable probability the jury failed to understand it was not to use the evidence to determine whether the complaining witness had or had not suffered sexual abuse.
II.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 (Strickland); People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 422 (Pope), disapproved on another ground by People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10, itself overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) A defendant seeking to establish he or she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel must show (1) defense counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. (Strickland, supra, at pp. 687, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217; Pope, supra, at p. 425.)
Defendant contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not present, and may not have sought, expert testimony defendant was not predisposed to engage in sexual abuse of children. According to defendant, Dr. Firestone’s letter to the court establishes counsel could have sought and obtained expert testimony defendant lacked any propensity to molest children. We agree such evidence, if obtained, would have been admissible. In People v. Jones (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, the Supreme Court found prejudicial error in the exclusion of expert testimony that a defendant was not a “sexual deviate,” reasoning the interrogator’s expert analysis was character evidence allowing an inference the defendant did not sexually abuse a child. (Id. at pp. 224-226.) In People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136 (Stoll), the court found Evidence Code section 1102 allows an accused to present this type of expert opinion testimony to indicate his nondisposition to commit a charged sex offense. (Id. at p. 1153.) The court also upheld the evidence against the Kelly/Frye rule (Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014; People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30), noting the rule does not apply to expert medical testimony, “ ‘even when . . . the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of further dangerousness.’ ” (Stoll, at p. 1157, citing People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 86-87.)
That evidence of a lack of propensity to molest children would be admissible does not, in and of itself, establish that counsel’s failure to offer it fell below prevailing professional norms. “In evaluating a defendant’s claim of deficient performance by counsel, there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ [citations], and we accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions. [Citation.] . . . . Accordingly, a reviewing court will reverse a conviction on the ground of inadequate counsel ‘only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his [or her] act or omission.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 979-980.) “ ‘[I]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be rejected. [Citations.]” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936.) “[B]ecause, in general, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to speculate as to the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for a defense attorney’s course of conduct when the record on appeal does not illuminate the basis for the attorney’s challenged acts or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately made in a habeas corpus proceeding, in which the attorney has the opportunity to explain the reasons for his or her conduct.” (Ibid.) Here, counsel was not asked for an explanation for failing to offer evidence defendant lacked the propensity to molest, and it is not impossible to conceive of a tactical reason for declining to pursue that avenue of inquiry. Under the circumstances, the issue is one best left to habeas corpus proceedings.
Defendant has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (In re Chen, A119554.) By separate order filed this date, we have issued an order to show cause returnable to the superior court.
As defendant has not met his burden of showing counsel’s conduct fell below professional norms, we do not here decide whether, assuming it did, defendant suffered resulting prejudice.
III.
Limiting Questioning of Character Witness
Defendant contends the court deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a defense by limiting the questions defense counsel could ask defendant’s character witness. Defendant’s witness stated her opinion defendant was not a person disposed to lustful or lewd conduct with children, basing that opinion on personal observation of defendant as he taught her daughter. The witness had signed a declaration she was aware defendant was accused of improperly touching a former female minor student and was facing criminal charges, but would like the court to grant permission to have defendant give lessons to her daughter again. Counsel wished to question the witness about her declaration, but the prosecutor stated if he did, she wanted to ask if the witness was aware there were 63 counts of allegations that occurred over a two-and-one-half-year period against a young child. The court ruled defense counsel’s line of questioning would open the door to the prosecutor to ask if the witness was aware of the number of counts and the dates during which they were alleged to have occurred. Defense counsel chose not to question the witness any further.
Defendant points out, correctly, that evidence in the form of a lay opinion as to a defendant’s lack of propensity for lewd conduct with children is admissible character evidence to the extent it is based on the witness’s own perception. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1306, 1309.)
Defendant contends the court erred by effectively ruling the prosecutor would be allowed to ask guilt-assuming hypotheticals. In support of this argument, defendant cites federal cases holding a prosecutor may not use specific factual allegations asserted against the defendant as hypotheticals and ask if the witness’s opinion of the defendant would change if those allegations were true. These cases recognize the use of such hypotheticals undermines the presumption of innocence because they could cause the jury to infer the prosecutor has evidence of guilt beyond the evidence in the record. (E.g., United States v. Shwayder (9th Cir. 2002) 312 F.3d 1109, 1120 (Shwayder) and United States v. Oshatz (2d Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 534, 539 (Oshatz). In Shwayder, for example,the prosecutor asked questions such as, “Would it change your mind about whether [the defendant] is an honest person if he lied in a certificate claiming he wasn’t working with anyone to get his Teletek stock sold when, in fact, he was working with all kinds of people to get his Teletek stock sold?” (Shwayder, supra, at p. 1115, fn. 2.) Similarly, in Oshatz, the prosecutor asked questions such as, “ ‘If you found that [the defendant] knowingly participated in setting up a phony tax shelter that generated over half a million dollars worth of business for his law firm, would that affect your opinion?’ ” (Oshatz, supra, at p. 538.) Here, in contrast, the prosecutor stated no intention to ask if the witness’s opinion would change if she learned defendant had committed specified acts on Jane; indeed, she voiced no intention to place any kind of hypothetical before the witness. She planned to ask only if the witness was aware of the number of charges actually asserted against defendant and the time period they spanned. In addition, it has been recognized that asking a character witness whether the witness is aware of the charges against the defendant but nonetheless has a positive opinion of him, opens the door to the prosecutor to explore the extent of the witness’s knowledge of those charges. (United States v. Russo (2d Cir. 1997) 110 F.3d 948, 953.)
The trial court’s rulings were not error.
IV.
Notice and Opportunity to Present Defense
Defendant contends the 63 “generic” charges filed against him did not afford him notice of the charges adequate to give him a meaningful opportunity to defend against them. As defendant acknowledges, the same argument was raised and rejected by the Supreme Court in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 316-321. We are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
V.
Cumulative Error
Defendant’s final contention is that even if the asserted errors by the trial court are found to be harmless, when they are considered cumulatively and considered together with the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and instructions, they produced a trial setting so fundamentally unfair reversal is required. (See People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1074; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 815.) We have addressed defendant’s specific arguments, and, for the most part, have found no error. We consider defendant’s cumulative error argument no further.
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MARCHIANO, P. J. MARGULIES, J.
“Evidence has been presented to you concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. This evidence is not received and must not be considered by you as proof that the alleged victim’s molestation claim is true.
“Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome research is based upon an approach that is completely different from that which you must take to this case. The syndrome research begins with the assumption that a molestation has occurred and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to that experience.
“As distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume the defendant innocent. The People have the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You should consider the evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with her having been molested.
“During the trial certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other. That was the testimony relating to the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.”