Summary
In People v. Chamberlin (Nov. 26, 2003, F041358) [nonpub. opn.], appellant raised a single issue on appeal: that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted certain crime scene and autopsy photographs.
Summary of this case from People v. ChamberlinOpinion
F041358.
11-26-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PARKER WILLIAM CHAMBERLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey D. Firestone and Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Appellant Parker William Chamberlin was convicted of the first degree murder of his mother, Torie Knapp. He contends the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting certain crime scene and autopsy photographs into evidence and therefore his conviction should be reversed. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
On July 3, 2001, at approximately 3:25 a.m., Bakersfield Police Department Officer Luera and his partner responded to a 911 call and report of a stabbing. Luera knocked on the front door of Knapps home. Knapps then 15-year-old son, Chamberlin, opened the door. He had a bloody rag wrapped around his right hand.
Chamberlin told the officers there was a man with a knife in the house. The officers entered and found Knapp dead on the floor of her bedroom. To help preserve the crime scene, the officers placed Chamberlin in the back of their patrol car. Luera asked Chamberlin if he could describe what had happened in the home.
According to Chamberlin, he had been at a friends house when he began to have a bad feeling that something had happened to his mother. He decided to go home. Upon arriving home, he noticed the gate to his backyard was open. As he entered the house, he heard his mother say, "Please help me." Chamberlin walked toward his mothers bedroom where he saw a man holding a knife standing inside the room. The man cut Chamberlin with the knife, the knife fell, and the man ran out the back door of the house. Chamberlin said he chased the man for some distance before he lost sight of the man. Chamberlin then returned home and called 911.
In securing the crime scene, Detective Ramsey found a white rag next to drops of blood on the sidewalk in front of the house. There were drops of blood in the driveway and a bloody bath towel in the trash can at the side of the house. A pair of sandals was outside the back door of the house.
Inside the house, Detective Ramsey found a knife on the floor in Knapps bedroom; the tip was broken. It appeared to match the knives that were in a knife holder in the kitchen. Knapps body was on the floor of the bedroom, with her feet nearer the bed and her head near the nightstand.
Detective Krueger observed a large amount of blood on the bed and the floor and blood spatter on the walls. The nightstand was covered with dried blood and there was blood on the ceiling. Knapps nude body was covered with blood and several cuts were evident. There were drops of blood on the floor and sink of the hall bathroom.
Krueger observed Chamberlin while he was in the patrol car. He noticed that Chamberlin had a deep cut on his right hand and blood droplets on his stomach and chest that appeared to be cast-off blood. Chamberlin was taken to the hospital, where Krueger and Detective Adair advised Chamberlin of his Miranda rights. Chamberlin told Krueger essentially the same story he had told Luera. He told Krueger that he had grabbed a towel to wrap his hand prior to chasing the unknown man and then discarded the towel in the trash can.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Krueger and Adair interviewed Chamberlin a second time that afternoon at the police station and recorded the interview. This time Chamberlin admitted he killed his mother. Chamberlin stated that he was angry with his mother because she owed him money and she was asking him to do chores; Chamberlin verbally argued with Knapp when she asked him to unload the dishwasher.
The idea of killing his mother did not come to him on the spur of the moment, but he claimed he was not sure what he was going to do when he left his friends house. He took off his shoes before entering his home so as not to make any noise. He grabbed the knife and was thinking bad things about his mother. He went to his mothers bedroom and began stabbing her through the covers. He continued to stab her after she fell to the floor. Chamberlin said he was thinking about money and wanting to hurt somebody when he stabbed Knapp.
Chamberlin was charged with first degree murder and tried as an adult.
Prior to the commencement of the trial, defense counsel moved to exclude certain photographs taken at the crime scene and during the autopsy; the photographs were numbered 192, 198, 303, 412, 414, 422, 423, 425, 427, 432, 433, 436, 443, 444, 452, 453 and 454. The trial court excluded the photographs numbered 192, 412, 423, 425, 443, 452 and 454. The remaining photographs objected to by the defense were admitted.
Doctor Donna Brown conducted the autopsy. The prosecutor used a series of photographs to "describe and explain" Browns testimony. Brown testified that the blood was cleaned from Knapps body before the autopsy was performed so that the injuries could be seen and examined. Knapps body had a total of 35 stab, slash and incise wounds and a small piece of metal was lodged in one of her ribs. While the human body normally contains five to six quarts of blood, Knapp had less than one-half cup of blood remaining in her body.
In Browns opinion, a sharp single-edged instrument caused the wounds. The location of the various wounds indicated that Knapp moved as she was being attacked. Knapp sustained the wounds rapidly, but bled to death relatively slowly over a period of approximately five minutes.
Knapp had several defensive wounds, including one to her right hand that severed the tendon to the thumb and rendered it useless; another defensive wound severed tendons around her left wrist and rendered her unable to use her left hand.
Brown noted a total of nine wounds on Knapps face and head in a front-to-back pattern. There were four wounds to the upper chest, neck and shoulder; a wound underneath Knapps chin penetrated the fibrous covering of the brain and caused intracranial bleeding. Several stab wounds were found on Knapps back, including wounds that penetrated the left lung and chest wall, causing the lung to collapse. The wounds to Knapps back also cut arteries and veins, causing substantial blood loss. There were wounds to the lower abdomen, including one that ruptured the abdominal wall and was large enough that about six feet of intestine protruded from Knapps body. Many of the wounds by themselves would have been fatal; the number of wounds was in excess of those needed to kill her.
Criminalist Jeanne Spencer arrived at the scene shortly after the killing. She testified that the blood spatter on the walls, side of the bed, a chair, the ceiling and a dresser was probably sprayed by arterial pressure. There were nine "knife-like cuts" in the sheet. The large pool of dried blood on the top of the nightstand indicated that Knapp had gotten out of bed after being stabbed and stood bleeding over the nightstand before collapsing. The phone on the nightstand was not plugged into the electrical outlet; there was smeared blood around the outlet plate, indicating it was unplugged during or after the attack. The pattern of blood outside the house indicated that someone may have been standing and bleeding at one point; there was no indication that anyone was running and bleeding. There were no signs of forced entry into the house and no signs of any struggle other than in Knapps bedroom.
A .357 magnum was found in the nightstand next to Knapps bed, and a shotgun was in Chamberlins bedroom. According to Krueger, both a shotgun and a .357 magnum would have been heard outside the home if fired inside Knapps bedroom.
Chamberlin had left a note for his mother telling her he was going to spend the night at a friends house.
David Vance, the father of Chamberlins friend, testified that Chamberlin had spent the night three to five times before July 2, 2001. Vance returned home around 10:00 p.m. His son, Matt, and Chamberlin were in the spa. Vance and his wife went to bed around 11:00 p.m.
Matt testified that Chamberlin went to sleep on the couch around 12:30 a.m.
Vance awoke around 5:45 a.m. on July 3 and thought someone was sleeping under the blanket on the living room couch. When he approached, he discovered that the couch pillows and sleeping pillow had been arranged under the blanket in a manner that resembled a person sleeping.
Generally speaking, friends of Vances children usually had to be home by midnight. Vances house rule was that anyone who had not headed home by midnight needed to stay the night and not leave; Chamberlin was aware of the rule. Chamberlin had never left the Vance home before without being driven home.
An investigator was able to run the 2.1 mile distance between Knapps house and Vances house in 17 minutes 30 seconds. Walking that same distance took 37 minutes.
Defense witnesses testified that Knapp, an elementary school teacher, and Chamberlin appeared to have a close and loving relationship, even after Chamberlin took Knapps ATM card and stole $1,200 from her bank account. When Knapp found out, she took away Chamberlins privileges and placed him on restriction, which made Chamberlin unhappy.
Chamberlin was an excellent student in the GATE (Gifted and Talented Education) program and was in the top one percent of students. He was described as ambitious, methodical, very intelligent and respectful of others. Two of Chamberlins friends testified that he ordinarily removed his shoes before entering their homes so as not to dirty the carpet.
On June 28, 2002, the jury found Chamberlin guilty of first degree murder. Chamberlin was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for the first degree murder conviction.
DISCUSSION
Chamberlins sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting 10 autopsy and crime scene photographs, specifically numbers 198, 303, 414, 422, 427, 432, 433, 436, 444, and 453.
For purposes of our discussion, we assume Chamberlin preserved objections to all those photographs he claimed were admitted improperly.
Photographs 198 and 303 are crime scene photographs. Number 198 shows Knapps bloody feet and calves on the bedroom floor and their position in relationship to the bed; number 303 shows the bloody bed and bedding, but not Knapps body.
The remaining photographs were taken during the autopsy. Number 414 shows Knapps body lying on the gurney, after it was cleaned; the intestines are visibly protruding from her abdomen. Photograph number 422 shows a large gash in the left side of Knapps head; number 427 is a close-up of the left side of Knapps head and shows three large gashes; number 432 shows the right shoulder with a deep gash; 433 shows injuries at the base of the neck; 436 shows a wound on the neck under Knapps chin; 444 shows a deep gash near Knapps right armpit; and 453 shows a slash wound in the lower abdomen near the pubic region. Photographs 432, 433, 444 and 453 all display measuring devices near the wounds.
Chamberlin asserts it was "undisputed" that he intended to kill his mother when he stabbed her 35 times. He contends the photographs therefore were not relevant to prove any matter at issue in the trial because the only issue to be determined was whether the murder was premeditated and deliberate. Chamberlin misinterprets the record.
Chamberlin pled not guilty to the charges, thereby placing in issue all elements of a first degree murder charge. (Pen. Code, § 1019.) The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts, such as identity, intent or motive. (Evid. Code, § 210; People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973.) All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise excluded by the constitution or by statute and the trial court has broad discretion in determining relevance. (Ibid.) Thus, any evidence tending to prove that Chamberlin killed Knapp, that the killing was committed with malice aforethought, or that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated was relevant and admissible. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 188, 189.)
References to code sections are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise specified.
The photographs were relevant to illustrate that Knapp was killed, the extent of her injuries, and the savageness of the attack. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 973.) Photographs that show the manner in which a victim is wounded are relevant to a determination of malice. (Id. at p. 974.) Photographs of a crime scene are relevant to establish the fact that a murder has been committed. (Ibid.)
The photographs also illustrate the testimony of various prosecution witnesses who viewed the crime scene and performed the autopsy. (See People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 15.) A jury is entitled to see how the physical details of a scene and the body of the victim support the prosecutions theory of first degree murder. The prosecution is not obligated to present this evidence solely through live testimony. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.)
Chamberlins attorneys concession in closing argument that murder had been committed is irrelevant to the presentation of evidence. Any concession by counsel during opening statements or closing argument does not constitute evidence, could not be considered by the jury as evidence, and the jury was so instructed. (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 590.)
Opening statements were not transcribed.
Alternatively, Chamberlin argues that even if relevant, the photographs should have been excluded pursuant to section 352. Chamberlin contends the photographs were gruesome and likely to inflame the jury and therefore their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs. A trial courts ruling on the admissibility of evidence under section 352 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
The trial court, before exercising its discretion to admit some of the challenged photographs, reviewed all the proffered photographs and took the matter under submission. After considering the matter, the trial court admitted some, but not all, of the challenged photographs. It is obvious from the record that the trial judge carefully weighed and considered the probative value versus the unduly prejudicial effect of the photographs prior to ruling on their admissibility.
We subscribe to the theory that murder "`is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony, and physical evidence in such a case are always unpleasant." (People v. Thompson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966, 1973.) The photographs portray Chamberlins violent conduct. That they are graphic and unpleasant does not render them unduly prejudicial. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 976.)
Photographs of the crime scene and the victim should not be excluded, even if cumulative of witness testimony. The photographs helped to clarify and corroborate extensive and potentially confusing testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding the crime scene and the injuries suffered by Knapp. The trial court properly could conclude that the photographs were not so unpleasant as impermissibly to sway the jury in light of the testimony detailing the facts demonstrated by the photographs. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 976.)
We have independently reviewed the photographs admitted over objection and conclude they are not unduly gory or inflammatory so as impermissibly to have swayed the jury. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th at 349, 371.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged photographs into evidence.
Chamberlin also contends that counsels failure to object to the photographs on federal constitutional grounds was ineffective assistance of counsel. Chamberlin does not articulate the exact nature of this claim but, presumably, he contends a more favorable outcome would have been achieved but for counsels failure to object on constitutional grounds.
First, where evidence satisfies statutory admission standards, an objection on constitutional grounds is generally meritless. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123.) Second, even if the photographs did generate a disturbing response from the jurors, the risk of prejudice was minimal. The photographs were illustrative of testimony, thus the facts established by the photographs were already known to the jury. (People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
Further, if the only issue is whether the murder was first or second degree, there is evidence of premeditation and deliberation establishing first degree murder, independent of the photographs. Chamberlin left the Vance home in the middle of the night and arranged the pillows on the couch to make it look as though he were still sleeping on the couch; Chamberlin had between 17 to 37 minutes to contemplate his actions after leaving the Vance residence and prior to arriving at his home; he took steps to keep his actions quiet, such as removing his shoes and using a knife instead of one of the available guns; and he initially lied to authorities when questioned. Chamberlin has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice. His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel therefore fails. (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1123.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J., LEVY, J.