Opinion
A146135
12-21-2016
In re C.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.G., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ52488201)
C.G., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court's disposition order, arguing the juvenile court erred in admitting eyewitness identification and the court's true findings lack substantial evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A June 2015 juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleged that C.G., already a ward of the court, drove in willful disregard for safety while fleeing from a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), committed auto theft (id., § 10851), knowingly received a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and resisted arrest (id., § 148, subd. (a)).
Appellant moved to suppress a peace officer's identification of appellant on the grounds that it was the result of an unduly suggestive identification procedure. After hearing testimony from the officer, the juvenile court denied the motion. This testimony, along with additional testimony at the jurisdictional hearing, was as follows.
Shortly after midnight on June 19, 2015, California Highway Patrol Officers Michael Diehl and Zachary Trzesniewski were driving a marked black and white police vehicle. Diehl observed a car with its headlights off. When Diehl activated the patrol vehicle's lights, the car initially began to pull over but then sped away. The officers pursued the car, which drove above the speed limit, ran several red lights and stop signs, and eventually stopped after colliding with another vehicle. During this pursuit, Diehl observed three occupants in the car.
A videotape from the police car's dashboard camera was played at the hearing.
The parties stipulated that the car was stolen and appellant did not have permission to drive it.
As the car was coming to a stop after the collision, the driver exited and fled on foot. While exiting the car, the driver looked at Diehl, who saw him from about five feet away. Trzesniewski also saw the driver's face as he exited the vehicle. As the driver ran on the sidewalk, Diehl chased him, running parallel to him in the street. During the chase, Diehl was about 10 yards from the driver and saw his face at least five times in a well-lit intersection as the driver looked back at the officer. Eventually the driver ran through residential back yards and Diehl lost him.
One of the passengers was detained. Diehl testified that the passenger identified the driver as going by the nickname "Bear," and said he thought the driver's real name was appellant's name. Diehl requested records on appellant from the local police department, which emailed Diehl a juvenile hall booking photograph of appellant. After examining the photograph, Diehl identified appellant as the driver. Diehl and Trzesniewski both identified appellant as the driver during their testimony in court.
The juvenile court admitted this evidence for the limited purpose of explaining Diehl's subsequent conduct. The passenger did not testify at the jurisdiction hearing.
At the end of the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court stated it was giving "very little weight" to Trzesniewski's identification, but found Diehl's identification credible. The court found true all of the petition's allegations.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of Diehl's Identification
Appellant contends Diehl's pretrial identification was unreliable and tainted his in-court identification, and the admission of the identifications violated appellant's due process rights. We reject the challenge.
The People assert the trial court excluded Diehl's pretrial identification and only admitted his in court identification. The trial court's ruling on this issue, while not entirely clear, appears to be excluding the passenger's identification of appellant as the driver, not Diehl's pretrial identification. In any event, the People do not suggest our analysis is materially different if appellant's challenge was solely to Diehl's in-court identification.
"In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence violates a defendant's right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification. [Citations.] [¶] The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an unreliable identification procedure." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989.)
We need not decide whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary because, even so assuming, it was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. (See People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 610 [omitting suggestiveness analysis because "the identification evidence was admissible as reliable under the totality of circumstances"], disapproved of on another ground by People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.) Diehl testified he saw the driver's face at least five times, from a distance of between five and ten yards, in a well-lit area. Diehl was not a civilian witness but rather a trained police officer pursuing an individual he had seen committing several traffic violations in an attempt to flee a peace officer; his degree of attention was high. (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 115 [eyewitness "was not a casual or passing observer," but "a trained police officer on duty" who "could be expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail, for he knew that subsequently he would have to find and arrest [the defendant]" and knew further "that his claimed observations would be subject later to close scrutiny and examination at any trial"].) Diehl testified only one to one and a half hours elapsed between the time he saw the driver's face and the time he identified appellant from the photograph. Although Diehl did not testify to the degree of certainty of his identification, there is no indication in the record that he was uncertain. Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant has not met his burden of demonstrating the identification was unreliable. The admission of Diehl's identification was not error.
II. Substantial Evidence
Appellant next argues there was insufficient evidence that appellant was the driver. We disagree.
" 'In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .' [Citation.] 'Apropos the question of identity, to entitle a reviewing court to set aside a [factfinder's] finding of guilt the evidence of identity must be so weak as to constitute practically no evidence at all.' " (People v. Mohamed (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 515, 521.) "[W]hen the circumstances surrounding the identification and its weight are explored at length at trial, where eyewitness identification is believed by the trier of fact, that determination is binding on the reviewing court." (In re Gustavo M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1497; see also ibid. ["the evidence of a single witness is sufficient for proof of any fact"].)
Diehl identified appellant as the driver. Appellant challenged the identification below; after hearing evidence on the issue, the juvenile court found the identification reliable and credible; and we have rejected appellant's challenge to its reliability. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that appellant was the driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.