Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD200720, Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
Federico Castaneda was one of four individuals charged with multiple counts of kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom in addition to assault, making a criminal threat, and robbery. He pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping and admitted special allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the kidnapping and committed the offense in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist in gang members' criminal conduct. The court sentenced Castaneda to 23 years in prison. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in denying Castaneda's request to strike the gang enhancement in the interest of justice and sentencing him within the range set forth in the handwritten portion of the change-of-plea form. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDCURAL BACKGROUND
Because the issue in this appeal concerns events which occurred during the criminal proceedings that followed the preliminary hearing, we only briefly summarize the facts giving rise to the charges against Castaneda. After Apolinar Lopez was kidnapped for ransom, his wife enlisted the aid of her brother-in-law, Bernardo Lopez, instead of calling the police. Castaneda and others, including Bernardo Lopez, kidnapped three people. The men quickly released one of the captives, but held and beat the other two men to obtain information about Apolinar Lopez's whereabouts.
Castaneda pleaded guilty to kidnapping and admitted the gang and gun use enhancements, stating in a handwritten portion of the change of plea form that on the dates charged he "did forcibly and by means of instilling fear, unlawfully take Jose N. to another place while personally using a firearm. [He] did so in association with the Logan Street gangs: Logan Treinta and Logan Red Steps with the specific intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members." Castaneda also initialed the following statement on the form: "I have not been induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation of any kind, except... I will be sentenced to state prison w/ a range of 23-28 years. Dismiss remaining w/ Harvey Waiver." (Portion in italics was handwritten.)
At the brief change-of-plea hearing, the trial court expressly found that Castaneda knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights, confirmed that he understood "the maximum penalty [was] 28 years in state prison and a 10, 000-dollar fine, " recited the factual basis for the plea as stated by Castaneda on the form, and corrected the citation to the kidnapping charge to read Penal Code section "207(a)."
Castaneda filed a statement in mitigation and requested that the court exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike the gang enhancement. He acknowledged that "[t]he range on the face would be 23 to 28 years, " but argued that the words written on the form were simply a "true notification of the potential sentence but not the normal language of a stipulated sentence." He maintained that the court was therefore free to exercise its discretion and strike the gang enhancement to reach a "fair and just sentence" of 13 years. Castaneda also noted that he had turned himself in and cooperated with the prosecution. Attached to the statement in mitigation were over 50 pages of letters of support from friends and family. In an interview conducted for the supplemental probation report ordered by the court, Castaneda told the probation officer that he felt the need to help Bernardo Lopez because he believed that the family would be harmed. He also stated he believed his codefendants were simply going to talk to Jose N. to determine if he had any information about Apolinar Lopez's disappearance.
At sentencing, the court expressed its disagreement with Castaneda that the "23 to 28 years" was a "probable range, " not a stipulated sentence. The court continued: "[W]hen we negotiated it, it was a stipulated range. There was no doubt in this court's mind that it was stipulated it would be a low of 23, 25, 28.... [The form] says, 'I will be sentenced.'" The prosecutor concurred, stating: "I think all of us here recognize that we had an agreement amongst all of us, and that includes Mr. Castaneda, that the range was 23 to 28 years." The court acknowledged the mitigating factors and sentenced Castaneda to the low term of three years for kidnapping. However, it declined to strike the gang enhancement and imposed consecutive 10-year terms for each of the two enhancements.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Castaneda portrays himself as a hero, maintaining that he committed kidnapping and numerous other felonies "to prevent a greater evil, " and the trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike or stay the gang enhancement. We reject Castaneda's argument that the agreed upon sentencing range was ambiguous or that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 23 years in prison. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
The principles applicable to enforcement of plea agreements are well-established. As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921 (Segura), "the process of plea negotiation 'contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. ([Pen. Code, ] §§ 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604-608....) Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged. (People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 604.) This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the imposition of such clement punishment ([Pen. Code, ] § 1192.5), by the People's acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that charged, either in degree ([Pen. Code, ] §§ 1192.1, 1192.2) or kind (People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 608), or by the prosecutor's dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-count indictment or information. Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the "bargain" worked out by the defense and prosecution. ([Pen. Code, ] §§ 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5; People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 607-608.) But implicit in all of this is a process of "bargaining" between the adverse parties to the case-the People represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his counsel on the other-which bargaining results in an agreement between them. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 929-930.)
"Because a 'negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, ' it is interpreted according to general contract principles. [Citations.] Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement. [Citations.] '"When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement."' [Citations.] [¶] "For its part, of course, the trial court may decide not to approve the terms of a plea agreement negotiated by the parties. [Citation.] If the court does not believe the agreed-upon disposition is fair, the court 'need not approve a bargain reached between the prosecution and the defendant, [but] it cannot change that bargain or agreement without the consent of both parties.' [Citations.]" (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 930-931, fn. omitted.)
In Segura, the prosecution charged the defendant with a felony, and that offense and the alleged prior offense qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes Law. Defendant and the prosecutor negotiated a plea of no contest to the current charge in exchange for dismissal of the prior and placement on probation on the condition, among others, that he serve a year in county jail. Prior to entering the plea, "defendant waived his constitutional rights and acknowledged that if he was not a citizen of the United States, the one-year jail term would qualify the offense as an 'aggravated felony' under federal law and require his deportation." (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 925.) After defendant's release from jail, federal authorities initiated deportation proceedings. Defendant sought reduction of his jail term to 360 days, effective nunc pro tunc. The trial court denied the request on grounds it lacked authority to modify the sentence prescribed in the plea agreement. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed and the Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in its initial ruling. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing authority, the Segura court reasoned that the trial court lacked authority to grant the defendant's request to modify a material term of the negotiated plea agreement -- that is, probation conditioned upon the service of a one-year jail sentence -- which was entered into by the parties and accepted by the court.
Segura applies to the case before us. Following plea negotiations, the prosecution agreed to dismiss all but one kidnapping count and all but two of the special allegations in exchange for the guilty plea -- clearly a benefit to the 22-year-old Castaneda. The court expressly found that the parties and the court understood that there was a stipulated sentencing range of 23 to 28 years and the record supports that factual finding.
Castaneda acknowledges Segura, but argues its holding is inapplicable under People v. Smith (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 46 (Smith), one of many cases remanded for resentencing to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike a prior under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. He maintains that the court's oral advisement that the maximum sentence was 28 years rendered the language of the change-of-plea form ambiguous and therefore subject to a Penal Code section 1385 request to strike. Castaneda suggests that absent any objection, the prosecution acquiesced to a sentencing range of zero to 28 years. Castaneda's reliance on Smith is misplaced because, as properly found by the trial court, there was no ambiguity in the plea agreement at issue. Castaneda stated in writing on penalty of perjury, that "I will be sentenced to state prison w/ a range of 23-28 years." And all the parties understood that the minimum sentence for kidnapping plus the two mandatory, consecutive, 10-year enhancements was 23 years. (See Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 207, subd. (a), 208, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(14), & 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)(B) & (e)(2).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J.HALLER, J.