Opinion
1-20-1376
09-30-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. ERIC CARSON, Petitioner-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County 09 CR 19310 Honorable Diana L. Kenworthy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CONNORS, JUSTICE
Held: The circuit court did not err in denying petitioner's leave to file a successive postconviction petition where petitioner's knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law.
¶ 1 Petitioner, Eric Carson, appeals from an order denying him leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief. Carson contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file a successive postconviction petition because he satisfied the "cause and prejudice test" where he alleged that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known the circuit court could not impose a sentence of more than 40 years in prison. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In 2011, Carson pled guilty to first degree murder for his role in the 2009 death of Darrion Albert. Carson was 16 years old at the time of Albert's death.
¶ 4 In 2015, Carson filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to transfer his case to juvenile court. His petition was dismissed, and this court affirmed that decision on direct appeal. People v. Carson, No. 1-16-2032 (March 23, 2018) (unpublished order pursuant to Rule 23).
¶ 5 On June 16, 2020, Carson filed a motion for leave to file a pro se successive postconviction petition alleging in pertinent part that he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. According to his petition, Carson pled guilty because his trial counsel misadvised him that he would receive a 120-year extended term sentence if he rejected the proffered plea deal. Carson alleged that the trial court's admonishments were inadequate, and the trial court did not give adequate consideration to certain factors when accepting the plea deal or pronouncing the sentence.
¶ 6 On November 18, 2020, the circuit court entered a written order denying Carson leave to file his successive petition for postconviction relief. It made several findings, including that Carson entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea because the court gave "a clear articulation of the minimum and maximum sentencing that could be imposed." The court also found that Carson's 26-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence, and therefore was not unconstitutional. Carson now appeals the denial of his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 8 On appeal, Carson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition where he satisfied the "cause and prejudice" standard for advancing his claims to second-stage proceedings. Specifically, he states he had cause because People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, had not been decided at the time of his initial pro se postconviction petition; and he was prejudiced because he was misadvised regarding the sentence he faced and would not have entered a guilty plea had he known he was not facing a life sentence. The State responds that Carson entered into a fully negotiated plea that waived any constitutional claims of error, and that a future change in the possible penalties of an offense does not negate the voluntariness of a fully negotiated plea of guilt. Moreover, the State argues, Carson's sentence does not exceed 40 years and therefore, Buffer does not apply, and he fails to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test.
¶ 9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant can assert that his federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in his original trial or sentencing hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2020). A postconviction proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal, but rather a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. "The purpose of the post-conviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal." People v. Towns, 182 Ill.2d 491, 502 (1998). Accordingly, issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues that could have been raised but were not, are considered forfeited. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14.
¶ 10 Consistent with these principles, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). "Consequently, a defendant faces immense procedural default hurdles when bringing a successive postconviction petition. Because successive petitions impede the finality of criminal litigation, these hurdles are lowered only in very limited circumstances." Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14. One such basis for relaxing the bar against successive postconviction petitions is where a petitioner can establish "cause and prejudice" for the failure to raise the claim earlier. Id. "Cause" refers to some objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding. Id. And "prejudice" refers to a claimed constitutional error that so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). Both prongs must be satisfied for the defendant to prevail. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶15.
¶ 11 Here, Carson argues that he satisfied the "cause and prejudice" test, where he alleged that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known the circuit court would later not be able to impose a sentence of more than 40 years in prison because of Buffer. Our supreme court has recently decided this issue in People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432. Carson acknowledges in his reply brief that "our supreme court's recent decision in [Jones] would foreclose relief if that decision were final." Since the filing of Carson's reply brief, the United States Supreme Court denied Jones's petition for writ of certiorari, and the Illinois Supreme Court decision became final. Jones v. Illinois, 142 S.Ct. 2731 (May 16, 2022).
¶ 12 In Jones, our supreme court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition where the defendant was 16 years old, had pled guilty to first degree murder, and was sentenced to 50 years in prison. Id. ¶ 1. Jones argued that when he entered his guilty plea, he did not anticipate that his 50-year prison term would later be considered a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 19. "In making that argument, [Jones] effectively asserts that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement." Id. Our supreme court noted, however, that "[Jones], the State, and the trial court all correctly understood the law that was applicable at the time [Jones] entered into the plea agreement. The crux of [Jones]'s claim is that none of them knew that the Supreme Court would later change the criteria for reviewing the constitutionality of the applicable law." Id.
¶ 13 The Jones court further stated that fundamentally, plea agreements are contracts, and principles of waiver apply equally to them. Id. ¶ 21. "Entering into a contract is generally 'a bet on the future.'" Id. (quoting Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2016))." '[A] classic guilty plea permits a defendant to gain a present benefit in return for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal developments.'" Id.
¶ 14 The Jones court ultimately found that the petitioner's "knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law." Id. ¶ 26. It further stated that the court was not required to accept the parties' fully negotiated plea agreement, and because the trial court had the option to accept or reject the plea agreement offered by the parties, its decision necessarily constituted an exercise of its discretion. Id. ¶ 27. We necessarily find that Carson's knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law.
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 17 Affirmed.