Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County No. 113961, Loretta Murphy Begen, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Birgit Fladager, District Attorney, Carol Shipley, Assistant District Attorney, Nathan Baker and Peggy Richards, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Wiseman, Acting P.J.
This appeal is from the trial court’s order granting a motion converting a previous two-year civil commitment order under the former version of what is commonly known as the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) to an indeterminate term of commitment in light of the 2006 amendments to the SVPA brought about by the passage of Senate Bill No. 1128 (Senate Bill 1128) and Proposition 83. The trial court found that the changes to the SVPA authorized retroactive application to convert the prior two-year term to an indeterminate term without trial and without a new determination of SVP status. This appeal raises a number of statutory interpretation and constitutional challenges to the order. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to extend the initial commitment order; however, we agree with the Court of Appeal in People v. Whaley (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779, 784 (Whaley), and hold that the trial court erred when it converted retroactively the prior commitment term to an indeterminate term without a jury trial and without a current determination of sexually violent predator (SVP) status. As a result, we must reverse the commitment order and remand for a trial to determine under the new law whether appellant Jesse Calhoun is currently an SVP. If, after trial of the issue, a jury decides that Calhoun remains an SVP, as defined under the amended statute, the commitment for an indeterminate term may then be ordered.
All references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless noted.
Procedural and Factual Histories
On October 2, 1986, Jesse Calhoun was convicted of two counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 and one count of oral copulation of a child under the age of 14. He was sentenced to eight years in state prison. During his time in prison, Calhoun committed a number of violent acts upon prison staff and other inmates, as well as other disciplinary violations. He was paroled in March 1994, but his parole was revoked in November 1994 after a violent altercation and drug use. In 1996, plaintiff Stanislaus County District Attorney (Stanislaus County), on behalf of the People, filed a petition to commit Calhoun as an SVP within the meaning of the SVPA. Calhoun successfully challenged the petition in the trial court on constitutional grounds, although the California Supreme Court ultimately found the SVPA to be constitutional.
In February 1997, Stanislaus County filed a second petition to commit Calhoun under the SVPA. The petition was supported by the evaluation of two psychologists who opined that Calhoun was an SVP as defined by the SVPA. Calhoun waived jury trial and admitted that he was a sexually violent predator. He was committed to the Department of Mental Health for a period of two years commencing April 5, 1997. Subsequent petitions were filed at the end of each ensuing two-year commitment and his commitment was extended each time. The last commitment order prior to the one here at issue was to expire on April 4, 2007.
Calhoun has asked that we take judicial notice of our opinion affirming the 2005 commitment order, case No. F048062, filed on May 18, 2006. The request is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 451, subd. (a).)
In September 2006, Senate Bill 1128 was signed into law as emergency legislation. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 53-62.) Section 6604 provided: “If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for appropriate treatment and confinement .…” Shortly thereafter, the voters approved Proposition 83 (“Jessica’s Law”), which amended several statutes addressing violent sex offenses, including the SVPA. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 73D West’s Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2008 supp.) foll. § 6604, p. 134; Prop. 83, § 27, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006, eff. Nov. 8, 2006).) Like Senate Bill 1128, Proposition 83 changed the two-year civil commitment term to an indeterminate civil commitment.
In February 2007, Stanislaus County again filed a petition to extend Calhoun’s commitment. The petition was supported, as were all previous petitions, by two evaluations from psychologists who opined that Calhoun was an SVP as defined by the SVPA, concluding he would be a danger to society if released. Initially, the petition did not specify the term of the extension being sought. However, Stanislaus County later moved to convert Calhoun’s then-current two-year commitment to an indeterminate term pursuant to the statutory changes.
The trial court, over Calhoun’s objections, and without a jury trial, found the changes to the SVPA to be retroactive. It granted the motion and converted Calhoun’s prior two-year commitment to an indeterminate term. Calhoun’s motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, Calhoun challenges the legality of this order.
Discussion
I. Jurisdiction
Calhoun contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the commitment order because the statute as amended does not address extended commitments. By omitting any express provision for the filing of a petition or proceeding to extend a commitment, Calhoun claims the amendments deprive the trial court of authority to extend Calhoun’s commitment term and that he should have been granted an unconditional release.
This issue has already been decided by our court in People v. Carroll (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 503 (Carroll); by the Fourth District in People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559; and by the Third District in Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Bourquez). Since we agree with the results reached in these cases, we will not go through a detailed analysis of the issue here. In summary, although all references to an extended commitment in sections 6604 and 6604.1 were deleted (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 55, 56), the absence of an express reference to extended commitments in the statute is the result of the change from an annual, renewable two-year commitment to an indeterminate commitment. (People v. Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 563.) It is not the result of a desire or intent to allow individuals then currently committed as SVP’s to be released. “By changing SVP terms from two years to an indeterminate period of time, the Legislature unequivocally conveyed an intent to continue the confinement of persons adjudicated to be SVP’s. [Citation.]” (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 510.) Under the statute as it now reads, once a person is committed as an SVP, that individual remains in custody until it is established through use of the statutory procedural mechanisms that he or she is no longer an SVP. (See §§ 6605, 6608, subd. (i).) It would not make sense to conclude that the Legislature and the voters intended that the statutory changes generated in Senate Bill 1128 and Proposition 83 would release those committed as SVP’s under the old law. Instead, “[t]he very nature of Senate Bill 1128 and Proposition 83, to strengthen punishment and control of sexual offenders, compels the conclusion that the Legislature and the voters must have intended that the new law should operate prospectively and that those previously found to be SVP’s should remain subject to the provisions for extended commitments under the old law.” (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.)
We agree with Carroll, given the intent of the Legislature and the voters to continue and strengthen the provisions for the commitment of SVP’s, that there is an implied saving clause in the statutory changes to permit proceedings to extend commitments where individuals were committed under the former law. As a result, the superior court had jurisdiction to proceed on the petition to recommit Calhoun as an SVP.
II. Retroactivity
We face a more difficult issue when considering Calhoun’s claim that the statute has been improperly applied retroactively. This issue is separate from any constitutional challenges and involves determining only whether the intent was that the statutory changes apply prospectively or retroactively.
A recent decision out of the Sixth Appellate District, Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at page 784, is directly on point. In Whaley, a petition to extend Whaley’s most recent term of commitment was pending when the statutory changes became effective. The prosecution then brought a motion to convert Whaley’s first commitment retroactively from a two-year term to an indeterminate term, arguing that the statute now provides for an indeterminate term dating back to the “‘initial’” order of commitment without the need for a new SVP determination. The trial court agreed and, without a trial, converted the initial commitment order to an indeterminate term. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed.
In rejecting nearly identical arguments to those raised by plaintiff, the court in Whaley first considered whether the statutory amendments were to be applied retroactively. It adopted the reasoning of Bourquez and Carroll which had concluded that there is no evidence in the language or history of Proposition 83 or Senate Bill 1128 suggesting an intention that the changes be applied retroactively. (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287; Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) It is well settled that a statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless there is a clear intent expressed or implied in the legislative history or in the context of the enactment that the law be applied retroactively. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207-1210; see also Pen. Code, § 3; Civ. Code, § 3.)
We also conclude that there is no evidence the statutory changes are to be applied retroactively. The express legislative intent to eliminate the need for biannual trials, coupled with language in the legislative history of Senate Bill 1128, which states that the commitment would be changed from a two-year term to an indeterminate term, does not support a conclusion that the changes are to be applied retroactively. It merely specifies that certain changes in the law are to occur. The fact that a change is intended says nothing about whether the amendments are intended to apply retroactively. Similarly, the elimination of all references to “subsequent extended commitments” is consistent with the intended changes; it offers no insight on the issue of retroactive application of the statute.
Neither does the statutory language itself require retroactive application. Section 6604.1, subdivision (a), states that the indeterminate term of commitment “shall commence on the date upon which the court issues the initial order of commitment .…” (Italics added.) This same language appeared in the prior versions of the statute. (See former § 6604.1, subd. (a).) It cannot be read, as Stanislaus County proposes, to imply an intention that the changes be retroactive. If it is presumed that the Legislature intends to change the meaning of a law when it alters the statutory language (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 461-462), it can also be presumed that a lack of change does not signal a new meaning or intention.
Having concluded that the statutory changes were to be applied prospectively only, the Whaley court observed that, under the former versions of sections 6604 and 6604.1, before a previously committed SVP could be recommitted, he or she was entitled to an extension proceeding at which there would be a new determination of SVP status. It then concluded that the trial court erred when it retroactively converted the initial commitment order to an indeterminate term without a new SVP determination. The court reversed the commitment order, sending the matter back for a new determination of SVP status on the pending petition. (Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) We agree with the Whaley analysis and conclusion. “A statute has retroactive effect when it substantially changes the legal consequences of past events.” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243.) Application of the statutory changes to modify a previously adjudicated two-year commitment term to an indeterminate term without a new SVP determination substantially changes the legal consequences of the initial SVP determination and is an impermissible retroactive application of the statute. No new and independent proceeding was held to determine if Calhoun was currently an SVP before the indeterminate term was imposed. (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1162 [statute’s definition of mental disorder makes it clear present inability to control sexually violent behavior is what supports commitment order].) This was error.
The conclusion reached in Whaley, and the one we reach here, were forecasted in Bourquez and Carroll. In Bourquez, the court sought and relied upon the concession of the Attorney General, the leading law enforcement officer in this state (although not a party here), that previous two-year commitments could not be converted to indeterminate terms of commitment. (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288, fn. 3.) Similarly, in Carroll, we observed that “[a]ltering the length of a commitment during its term, and not at its originally scheduled expiration upon a new and current SVP determination, might very well involve an impermissible retroactive application of the amendments.” (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 515.)
None of the cases cited by Stanislaus County in support of its argument that a retroactive application is permitted persuade us that the conclusions reached in Whaley are incorrect. In People v. Superior Court (Woods) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 614 and People v. Buttes (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 116, the challenges were brought under the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution and do not address retroactivity based on statutory interpretation. In Rio Linda Union School Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 517, the issue was whether a workers’ compensation award should be calculated under an amended statute enacted after the injury and after the petition for benefits had been filed. The findings and award of the workers’ compensation judge were made after the statutory amendments had taken effect. In other words, there was no retroactive application of the statutory changes. (Id. at p. 531.) This decision is consistent with our conclusion that the changes cannot be used to convert a previously ordered two-year term to an indeterminate term without a new determination of SVP status.
In summary: The statutory amendments may not be applied retroactively to convert the initial SVP commitment or any subsequent two-year recommitment to an indeterminate term without a current determination of SVP status. This means those who were initially committed as SVP’s for two-year terms cannot have those prior commitment orders converted to indeterminate terms without a new determination of SVP status. Of course, this does not mean the amendments cannot be applied in a recommitment proceeding of someone previously determined to be an SVP under the former statute (like Calhoun). However, in order to convert a former two-year commitment to an indeterminate commitment pursuant to the statutory amendments, there must be a full recommitment proceeding, with a current determination of SVP status, to support the new commitment order. Due to the fact that, in this case, the indeterminate term was imposed without a jury trial and the procedural rights afforded under the SVPA, the commitment order must be reversed and remanded for a trial on the issue of Calhoun’s current SVP status. If after trial of the issue a jury determines that Calhoun remains an SVP as defined by the amended statute, the commitment for an indeterminate term may be ordered.
During oral argument, Stanislaus County requested that if the order converting Calhoun’s prior commitment to an indeterminate term were to be reversed, we order that the 2007 petition be reinstated. We decline to make any order concerning the status of the 2007 petition. As in Whaley, our ruling reversing the order of the trial court is made without prejudice to further proceedings on the 2007 petition or amendment of the 2007 petition to seek an indeterminate term. As the court stated in Whaley, “In general, the only act that may deprive a court of jurisdiction is the People’s failure to file a petition for recommitment before the expiration of the prior commitment. (Citations.)” (Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) Calhoun cannot dispute that a timely petition to extend his commitment was filed prior to the expiration date of his last commitment. As a result, Calhoun is not entitled to immediate release.
Our conclusion moots Calhoun’s challenge to the commitment order on the grounds that the SVPA violates due process and the separation-of-powers doctrine because, as applied here, it allows the switch of a final judicially determined two-year commitment to an indeterminate commitment without a jury trial. Likewise, Calhoun’s contention that there was inadequate notice that the earlier commitment would result in an indeterminate term becomes moot. On remand, although the 2007 petition does not expressly state that an indeterminate term is sought, a reference to the current version of the statute is sufficient notice that an indeterminate term is being sought. (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 512.) In any event, Calhoun is now on notice that if he is recommitted, it will be for an indeterminate term.
Also moot is Calhoun’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, contending that his attorney failed to raise every permutation of a constitutional challenge at trial. As we read it, this was a protective challenge to guard against waiver. There was no waiver argument raised, and Calhoun was successful on appeal in any event.
Finally, the issues raised in Calhoun’s supplemental letter brief are also moot given our decision to set aside the recommitment order.
III. Remaining challenges
Although we have determined the recommitment order to be an impermissible retroactive application of the statutory changes, on remand, we anticipate further proceedings on the February 2007 recommitment petition. Therefore, we address the remaining contentions that challenge the constitutionality of the petition itself. (See People v. McKee (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1517.)
A. Ex post facto, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment
Calhoun contends that a petition seeking an indeterminate term is unconstitutional because the SVPA, as amended, violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and violates ex post facto rules. These challenges have been addressed by other courts and have been unsuccessful because each of these constitutional protections applies to criminal penalties. It is well settled that a commitment under the SVPA is civil in nature and legally does not amount to punishment. (See Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1179 [SVPA did not violate constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws because SVPA does not impose punishment or implicate ex post facto concerns]; People v. Chambless (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 773, 776, fn. 2 [since SVPA is not punitive and does not impose liability or punishment for criminal conduct, double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment claims fail]; People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 348 [same]; People v. McKee, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th 1517 [Penal Code amendments made by Senate Bill 1128 or Proposition 83 increasing punishment for various sex offenses have little, if any, relevance to purpose or effect of amendments to Welf. & Inst. Code regarding civil commitments of SVP’s]; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 266-267 [basic purpose of ex post facto clause is to ensure fair warning of consequences of violating penal statutes and to reduce potential for vindictive legislation].)
The analysis in this case is not dependent on the term of civil commitment, as Calhoun suggests, but on the intent and effect of the statute authorizing it. (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1171 [key is whether SVPA intended by Leg. to inflict punishment].) “[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.” (United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 746.) Further, the potential for an indeterminate term has existed since the initial passage of the SVPA, and that possibility exists in similar statutes in others states. (See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)521 U.S. 346, 358, 368 [potential for indefinite term, Kansas statute].) In addition, the need to protect the community from these especially dangerous individuals does not necessarily diminish over time. (Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) 533 U.S. 678, 690.)
Calhoun argues that the SVPA is punitive because it allows detention of those who have committed a single sex offense and places the burden on the SVP to justify his release. However, in Hubbart, our Supreme Court reiterated that the SVPA detains only those who are found to be presently suffering from a mental disorder that makes them a threat to society. The qualifying offense acts as a gatekeeper, but it is not the basis for commitment. (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
The underlying purpose and intent of the SVPA has not changed. It still requires a judicial finding that the detainee is a sexually violent predator defined to mean not only that the qualifying offense has been committed, but that the person suffers from “a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) Admittedly, the changes to the SVPA make it more onerous for the detainee when the state does not concur in his or her bid for release. However, the many procedural safeguards in the act, identified in Hubbart, remain. Whether the changes in the proceedings connected to the annual review process pose constitutional problems is not an issue before us now.
The key to determining whether the listed constitutional provisions can be invoked is whether the statute is punitive in its intent and effect. Since a court ordinarily defers to the stated legislative intent in determining whether a statute is punitive, only very clear proof will override this intent and transform what the Legislature has denominated as a civil remedy into a criminal punishment. (Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84, 92.) Both the California and the United States Supreme Courts already have decided that detaining sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous to society is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective. This means acts such as the SVPA, despite their restrictive natures, are not punitive. (Kansas v. Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 363 [restraining freedom of dangerously mentally ill is historically acknowledged legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective]; Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1179.) There is nothing in the legislative history that suggests Senate Bill 1128 or Proposition 83 were intended to do anything other than make the SVPA a more effective civil scheme to protect the public from a small group of exceedingly dangerous individuals. Since the SVPA is not punitive, the listed constitutional provisions invoked by Calhoun do not apply.
For the same reason, there is no merit to Calhoun’s argument that an SVP commitment is an unlawful bill of attainder. Generally speaking, legislative acts that apply to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group so as to inflict punishment without a judicial trial are bills of attainder and prohibited by the Constitution. (Armijo v. Miles (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1419.) However, the bill-of-attainder provision applies only to statutes imposing penalties. (In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 280.) Further, although Calhoun did not receive a trial in this case, we are reversing his commitment for this reason. The SVPA has always afforded and continues to guarantee the right to a trial on an SVP determination. (§ 6605, subd. (d).)
B. Premature contentions
Calhoun contends he has been denied equal protection under the law because, as an SVP, he is treated differently than those committed under the Mental Disorder Offenders Act (MDOA) (Pen. Code, § 2960 et. seq.) or the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000, et seq.). According to Calhoun, these three groups are similarly situated, but are treated differently because the burden of proving an individual’s fitness for relief rests with the prosecution in all but those committed under the SVPA. Under the new changes, an SVP petitioning for his own release bears the burden of proving fitness. (§ 6605, subd. (d); § 6608.) Calhoun also argues that switching the burden of proof when a petition for release is brought by the SVP, as opposed to the state, and allowing the court to deny the petition summarily if it is deemed frivolous, violates federal due process and impermissibly limits a petitioner’s meaningful access to the courts. All of these contentions address the amended annual review proceedings resulting from the statutory changes. At this point, there has been no commitment under the amended statute and obviously no review process undertaken. Several courts have recognized the distinction between the standard for release and the standard of original commitment. (See People v. Buttes, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 126, citing O’Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 566-567, fn. 2; In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 146; People v. Henderson (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 475, 490-491.) Therefore, the issues raised are premature. It is not our policy to issue advisory opinions regarding constitutionality. (See Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 508, fn. 2.)
C. Single-subject rule
Lastly, Calhoun argues that Proposition 83 is invalid because it violates the single-subject rule contained in article II, section 8, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution, which provides that “[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” We disagree.
An initiative does not violate the single-subject requirement if all of its parts are reasonably germane to each other and to the general objective of the initiative. (Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1157.) Proposition 83 addressed a number of civil and criminal statutes, all related to the punishment and control of sexual predators. The proposition (1) expanded the definition of specified sex offenses; (2) increased the penalties for certain sex offenses; (3) prohibited probation for listed sex offenses; (4) eliminated custody credits for some sex offenses; (5) extended the parole period for particular sex offenses; (6) required monitoring by global positioning satellites for registered sex offenders; (7) barred registered offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or park; and (8) made the changes discussed here to the SVPA. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006), text of Prop. 83.) The initiative measure was known as “The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law.” (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 509, fn. 3; Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006, eff. Nov. 8, 2006).) The stated purpose of Proposition 83 was to “‘strengthen and improve the laws that punish and control sexual offenders.’” (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 73D West’s Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2008 supp.) foll. § 6604, p. 134; Prop. 83, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006, eff. Nov. 8, 2006).) We believe that all of the component parts of Proposition 83 bear a reasonable relationship to this purpose.
Calhoun argues that the fundamental differences between civil and criminal proceedings preclude a finding that Proposition 83 addresses a single subject. However, whether an initiative encompasses changes to both civil and criminal law has never been the test. Further, Calhoun has cited no authority to support his contention. As the California Supreme Court has explained, “the single-subject provision does not require that each of the provisions of a measure effectively interlock in a functional relationship. [Citation.] It is enough that the various provisions are reasonably related to a common theme or purpose.” (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 513 [upholding Prop. 140 which combined in single measure such disparate subjects as term and budgetary limitations and pension restrictions].) In addition, the rule does not require that the collateral parts of an initiative be equivalent, for example, all civil, all criminal, all substantive, or all procedural. Nor does it mandate that the collateral parts be tied directly in application, for example, found in a single statute or applicable in a single proceeding. The only requirement is that the provisions work together to further the initiative’s stated purpose.
In Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 347 and Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 247, the initiative measures challenged as violating the single-subject rule were upheld despite widely disparate procedural and substantive provisions, where the various elements of these initiatives united to form a comprehensive criminal justice reform package with one single unifying theme. In Brosnahan, the court upheld Proposition 8, which changed evidentiary rules; placed restrictions on bail; allowed unlimited use of prior convictions for impeachment or enhancement purposes; abolished the diminished-capacity defense; created sentence enhancements for habitual criminals; allowed consideration of statements at sentencing by crime victims and their families; placed limitations on plea bargaining; restricted commitments to what was then known as the California Youth Authority; and repealed a number of provisions governing the commitment and control of mentally disordered sex offenders. The court concluded that all of these collateral parts, both civil and criminal in nature, furthered the broad purpose stated in the initiative: to protect citizens from criminal behavior. (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 247.)
Raven addressed equally sweeping changes in an attempt to nullify particular decisions of the California Supreme Court affecting various aspects of the criminal justice system. (Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 348 [upholding Proposition 115].) Likewise, the court in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 573, upheld Proposition 21 against a single-subject challenge. Proposition 21 addressed a wide variety of criminal justice subjects, including gang violence, the sentencing of repeat offenders, and juvenile crime. It covered both juvenile proceedings, which are technically not criminal proceedings, and gang-related crimes committed by adults tried in adult criminal courts. However, the court in Manduley found the unifying theme and purpose of the initiative—to address violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs—sufficiently “single” to satisfy constitutional requirements. These initiatives, Propositions 8, 115, and 21, are no less diverse in their collateral parts than is Proposition 83.
The SVP component of Proposition 83 may be civil in nature, but it is not unrelated to the criminal justice purpose stated as the goal of the initiative. The necessary reasonable and common-sense relationship is present.
DISPOSITION
The order of recommitment for an indeterminate term is reversed. The matter is remanded for additional proceedings on the petition. Calhoun’s request that we take judicial notice of our own opinion affirming the 2005 commitment order in case No. F048062, filed on May 18, 2006, is granted.
WE CONCUR: Levy, J., Kane, J.