Opinion
2006QN014618.
Decided September 8, 2006.
Meggan Ways, Legal Aid Society, Kew Gardens, Queens, for the defendant.
Richard Brown, District Attorney, Queens County (Kim Patel of counsel), for the People.
On March 18, 2006, the defendant was arrested at a police vehicle checkpoint on Roosevelt Avenue in Queens County and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. VTL Section 1192 (2). He moved for pre-trial suppression of his breathalyzer results on the ground that the checkpoint operated by the police department did not meet constitutional requirements. A hearing was conducted by this Court on July 18, 2006.
At the hearing, Police Officer Couloute was the sole witness presented by the People. Officer Couloute testified that he had been a police officer for approximately five years and had made over one hundred driving while intoxicated arrests. At about 1:30 a.m. on the day in question, he was in uniform and was helping from six to ten other officers operate a vehicle "checkpoint" on 99th Street and Roosevelt Avenue in Queens County. Officer Couloute received his instructions with regard to the checkpoint from his supervisors, who were also on the scene, but he could not recall who in particular supervised him that morning, nor could he recall the officer with whom he was partnered. Officer Couloute's was instructed to stop "every four or five cars" in the westbound direction. He explained on cross-examination that if the fourth vehicle happened to be an "emergency vehicle," he would instead stop the next one.
Officer Couloute estimated that before stopping the defendant he had been working the checkpoint for about an hour and had stopped approximately 20 to 25 vehicles. During each of those previous stops he would "just ask for the driver's license . . . look for registration stickers and they [were] on [their] way." Asked upon cross-examination what in particular he had been instructed to look for at the checkpoint, Officer Couloute testified, "driver's license, registration, see if the car is inspected or registered."
When the defendant's car was stopped at the checkpoint and the defendant rolled down his driver's side window, Officer Couloute's smelled "a very strong odor of alcohol" from the car and on the defendant's breath. Couloute then asked the defendant how much he had to drink, to which the defendant replied that he had had two beers. Couloute also observed that the defendant had a "red face" and "watery eyes." The defendant was told to get out of the car and when he did so he appeared "a little unsteady." He was arrested and later submitted to a breathalyzer.
At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel cited People v. Scott ( 63 NY2d 518), in support of her claim that the checkpoint in this case was illegal. Defense counsel noted that the People's evidence at the hearing left unclear the particular purpose and parameters of the checkpoint. She argued that neither Officer Couloute's instructions nor the manner in which he actually conducted stops that morning focused upon public safety issues, but instead upon whether or not each driver's license and registration were in order. Counsel contended that the checkpoint's objective was essentially to detect and prosecute "regulatory offenses of the VTL" rather than to promote public safety. In response, the People rested on the record.
In Scott, and more recently in Matter of Muhammad F. ( 94 NY2d 136, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1044) and People v. Jackson ( 99 NY2d 125), the Court of Appeals discussed the constitutional requirements applicable to so-called police roadblocks or checkpoints. The guidelines more recently discussed in Jackson reflect the United States Supreme Court's own exhaustive review of the subject in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond ( 531 U.S. 32), which built upon that Court's earlier decision in Brown v. Texas ( 443 U.S. 47).
All of these cases proceed from the initial premise that checkpoint stops come before the Court bearing a legal stigma of ostensibly violating the Fourth Amendment proscription against warrantless and suspicionless stops ( People v. Jackson 99 NY2d at 128-29). In order to remove that stigma, the People bear the burden of proving at a suppression hearing that the particular checkpoint in question was conducted in a non-discretionary manner; that is, the officers actually conducting the checkpoint did so under rigid protocols formally set out by their superiors and that the officers did not exercise individual discretion as to which cars to stop or what questions to ask ( see Matter of Muhammad F., 94 NY2d at 141, citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.543 [1976]). Additionally, however, in Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the People's proof must also establish an articulable public safety concern that in the first instance justified utilization of a checkpoint at the particular chosen location. As the Court in Jackson put it, "the People have the burden of establishing that the primary programmatic objective (not the subjective intent of the officers) for initiating a suspicionless vehicle stop procedure was not merely to further general crime control" ( People v. Jackson, 99 NY2d at 132-33).
Applying these legal principles to the case before this Court, it appears that the People have failed in their burden of proof. Missing from the skeletal evidence presented by the sole officer who testified was any mention of the actual purpose of this checkpoint, leaving the Court without any basis to assess the "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure" or "the degree to which the seizure advance[d] the public interest" ( People v. Trotter, 28 A.D.3rd 165, 168, appeal denied, 6 NY3d 839, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51). It may well have been that the checkpoint at issue was set up to prevent drunk driving in an area especially prone to that dangerous activity, which would be an appropriate safety concern ( Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444), but in order to draw that inference from the evidence here this Court would have to engage in rank speculation. Indeed, Officer Couloute's testimony revealed little or nothing about what instructions he had received from his superiors, what security or safety concerns were to be addressed by this checkpoint, why this particular location had been chosen, or what warning had been provided to approaching drivers.
True, Officer's Couloute's testimony that his orders were to stop only every fourth car suggests that there was some effort to make the seizures non-discretionary. However, even if the limited hearing evidence established that the particular procedure utilized here minimized "interference with individual liberties" ( Brown v. Texas at 50-51), it is still entirely possible that the overall purpose of the checkpoint was the general interdiction of crime, which, as noted, is impermissible ( People v. Jackson, 99 NY2d at 132). Consequently, since the People failed to shoulder their burden of proof, the officers' observations during the defendant's stop, as well as the post-arrest breathalyzer results, must be suppressed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.