Opinion
E051378
10-18-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAMANTHA MARIE BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.
Gail Ganaja, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton, and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. SWF026643)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Carol D. Codrington and Mark Mandio, Judges. Reversed.
Gail Ganaja, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton, and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence and her motion to reconsider the suppression motion, defendant and appellant, Samantha Marie Brown (defendant), pled guilty as charged to one count of possessing methamphetamine for sale and one count of unlawfully maintaining a place for the purpose of selling methamphetamine. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider defendant's motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. We conclude the trial court did have jurisdiction. Therefore, we will reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the suppression motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The pertinent factual and procedural details are undisputed. Defendant joined in the motion filed by codefendant Reeves to suppress evidence recovered on January 30, 2008, during a warrantless search of their home on Haddock Street in Winchester. In that motion, defendant noted that Riverside County Deputy Sheriff James Keener stated in his report that he "conducted a probation search" at the Haddock Street residence because "[o]ne of the residents of the single-room structure, Samantha Brown, is on probation with a valid 4th Amendment waiver." Defendant asserted the search was unlawful because it was conducted without a warrant. Defendant also requested that the prosecutor produce the basis of the information Deputy Keener obtained through official channels.
Reeves is not a party to this appeal. We refer to the suppression motion as though it were prepared and filed on behalf of defendant.
At the hearing on defendant's suppression motion, Deputy Keener testified in pertinent part that he conducted a probation search at the Haddock Street residence after checking the superior court website and determining defendant was on probation, a condition of which included a Fourth Amendment waiver. Deputy Keener also obtained "personal identifying information" about defendant from that same website including, he believed, defendant's address. That address, according to his recollection "matched the same address that we would be doing the search at." Deputy Keener said that he also conducted a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records search on defendant by "[u]sing the CLETS computer, the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, which is linked to the [DMV] computer, which [gives him] the ability to run a records search through the [DMV] for address and driver's license numbers." After verifying through the DMV, Deputy Keener went to the residence on Haddock Street to conduct the search.
On cross-examination, counsel for codefendant Reeves asked Deputy Keener whether he kept any of the information he obtained in his CLETS or superior court website searches. Deputy Keener did not recall whether he kept printouts of that information but testified that he took a photo of defendant's driver's license. Later in his testimony Deputy Keener acknowledged that he had obtained the photocopy of defendant's driver's license from items recovered during the search of defendant's residence on January 30. Deputy Keener also acknowledged that although he arrested defendant on January 30, he did not prepare his report of that arrest until February 14, 2008, and that the report, which consists of a single page, does not explain how he determined defendant's probation status, probation terms, or her address.
Deputy Keener also acknowledged that on January 30, 2008, he had gone to the property on Haddock Street to arrest William Lacey on a felony warrant for domestic violence. When he arrived at the Haddock Street address, Lacey was on a backhoe that Keener suspected was stolen, so he called Deputy Sam Morovich to investigate. Keener arrested Lacey for domestic violence and for a violation of probation as reflected in the report of that arrest, which Keener prepared on February 1, 2008.
Deputy Morovich testified at the hearing on defendant's suppression motion and stated in pertinent part that he arrived at the Haddock Street property about 3:00 p.m. Although he did not put it in the report, Morovich testified he remembered that when he arrived at the location, Deputy Keener "advised they were there on a probation search and I believe they were doing a follow up on some type of DV investigation." Morovich acknowledged that in his report he stated only that he was "advised the subject at the location had an active felony warrant and they had information about a stolen tractor there."
Catherine Campbell testified in pertinent part that she was at the property on Haddock Street with defendant, Reeves, and Lacey on January 30, 2008, when law enforcement officers arrived. According to Campbell, the officers said they were there "for probation," but they did not specifically identify the person on probation. When asked, "[W]hat did [the officers] initially do at the property," Campbell answered, "They just told everybody to, um, don't move and that they were there for a probation search or something." Campbell also stated that the officers did not call defendant by name but instead directed whoever was in the house to please step outside.
Defendant argued at the suppression hearing that the search of the residence was unlawful because the prosecutor did not demonstrate that Deputy Keener knew at the time he conducted the search that defendant was on probation. Defendant asserted that Keener went to the property on Haddock Street to arrest Lacey on the felony domestic violence warrant. Once there they searched defendant's house, where they found methamphetamine, cash, and other indicia of drug sales. As added support for her assertion that Keener did not know she was on probation at the time of the search, defendant cited the fact that Keener immediately prepared a report chronicling his arrest of Lacey but he delayed two weeks in preparing his report about defendant's arrest. Defendant asserted that during the two-week delay, Keener determined defendant was on probation and subject to a search term.
Although it is unclear from the record why Lacey was at the Haddock Street property, and there is some suggestion that he lived in a second structure on the property, there was no evidence and no claim that he lived in the house Deputy Keener searched.
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The trial court found that the deputies went to the Haddock Street property to conduct two investigations, one involving the probation search of defendant, and the other involving Lacey. The trial court viewed the testimony of Deputy Morovich and Catherine Campbell as "some independent corroborating" testimony beyond that of Deputy Keener, that he knew of defendant's probation status and search term at the time he conducted the search. Therefore, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress.
Two weeks after the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant joined in codefendant Reeves's motion to reconsider their suppression motion. In the reconsideration motion, defendant asserted she had evidence that was undiscovered and unavailable at the time of the hearing on her suppression motion because Deputy Keener did not disclose in his reports of the January 30, 2008, arrests how he learned defendant was on probation. Defendant did not learn the basis for Deputy Keener's knowledge of her probation status until he testified at the hearing on the suppression motion. Deputy Keener claimed at the hearing to have learned defendant's probation status and address from the superior court website and CLETS, but he did not provide any documentation to show how and when he accessed that information. Deputy Keener also claimed that he had obtained a copy of defendant's driver's license but later in his testimony admitted the DMV paperwork he photographed had been obtained during the search of defendant's home. Defense counsel filed a declaration, which he originally said would be under seal, in which he stated that with the help of the court clerk, shortly after the hearing on defendant's suppression motion he determined that the superior court website did not show Haddock Street as defendant's address until September 22, 2008. Counsel appended copies of the pertinent "action inquires" to his declaration and to the motion.
At a hearing on August 28, 2008, the trial court issued a tentative ruling denying defendant's motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider a second suppression motion. At defendant's request, the trial court continued the hearing so that defendant could conduct additional research to determine when Deputy Keener accessed CLETS. In supplemental points and authorities, defense counsel argued the court had jurisdiction to reconsider the suppression motion because defendant had been denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the original suppression motion.
After a second continuance, the trial court conducted the continued hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider. At that hearing the prosecutor stipulated that Deputy Keener did not access the CLETS system to obtain defendant's DMV records until February 14, 2008. Consistent with its tentative ruling, the trial court found it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider defendant's suppression motion and therefore denied that request.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider the suppression motion, and in finding otherwise, it erred. The trial court relied on Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, which states that "determination of a 1538.5 motion at a special hearing in the superior court—whether in the defendant's or in the People's favor—deprives that court of jurisdiction to reconsider the matter unless the People, pursuant to [section 1538.5,] subdivision (j) seek to reopen the matter at trial upon a showing of good cause." (Id. at p. 77-78.) As the trial court correctly observed the only pretrial review of a suppression motion open to a defendant is by way of writ of review. (See § 1538.5, subd. (i) ["After the special hearing is held, any review thereafter desired by the defendant prior to trial shall be by means of an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition filed within 30 days after the denial of his or her motion at the special hearing."].)
In People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471 (Brooks), the Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule that precludes reconsideration of suppression motions when it held that on remand following reversal of a pretrial order suppressing evidence "the court has jurisdiction to entertain a new or renewed motion to suppress based on grounds raised in the initial motion but which the court declined to reach." (Brooks, at p. 474.) The Supreme Court concluded that at the first hearing on the defendant's suppression motion he "lacked opportunity for a full determination of the merits of his motion as originally made and noticed. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's renewed motion for the purpose of affording him the full hearing to which he was initially entitled." (Brooks, at p. 475.)
According to Brooks, jurisdiction to reconsider a suppression motion turns on whether the defendant had an opportunity at the original hearing for a full determination of the merits of the motion. In this case the dispositive issue raised by defendant's suppression motion was whether Deputy Keener knew at the time he conducted the search that defendant was on probation and as a condition of that probation had waived her Fourth Amendment rights. (Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1252 ["for a probation search to be valid pursuant to a search and seizure condition, the officer must know the person is on probation at the time of the search"]; See People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 335 ["an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was conducted"].)
Defendant did not have an opportunity for a full determination of that issue. Until the hearing on the suppression motion, defendant did not know and could not discover the source of information Deputy Keener claimed to have relied on prior to the search to determine defendant was on probation and had waived her Fourth Amendment rights. As previously noted, that information was not disclosed in either of Deputy Keener's reports regarding the arrests at Haddock Street on January 30, 2008. Defendant included in the suppression motion a request for the prosecution to show the basis of all information Deputy Keener acquired through official sources. Although the prosecution arguably complied with that request when Deputy Keener testified that he relied on the superior court website and CLETS, defendant could not challenge those representations at the hearing and, therefore, was denied an opportunity for a full determination on the issue of whether the search was lawful.
The Attorney General notes that CLETS was only the source from which Deputy Keener claimed he obtained defendant's current address. The Attorney General contends the prosecutor's stipulation that Deputy Keener did not consult CLETS until after the search does not undermine the deputy's testimony that he determined from the superior court website that defendant was on probation and subject to a search term. We disagree.
As set out above, in his testimony at the suppression hearing Deputy Keener offered two sources from which he obtained defendant's residence address—CLETS and the superior court website. Defendant's evidence in support of the reconsideration motion shows Deputy Keener could not have obtained the Haddock Street address from the website in January 2008 because that information was not added until September. The stipulation shows that Deputy Keener did not obtain defendant's address from the DMV via CLETS because he did not check CLETS until after the search. The issue that could not be fully litigated in defendant's suppression motion is the dispositive issue in this case—whether the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because Deputy Keener knew of defendant's probation status and Fourth Amendment waiver at the time of the search. In other words, the issue is whether the trial court would have found that Deputy Keener knew of defendant's probation status at the time of the search if the trial court had heard the evidence that Deputy Keener could not have obtained defendant's current residence address from either of the cited sources. That raises the question of whether Deputy Keener knew defendant lived at the Haddock Street address, which in turn suggests the search occurred as defendant claimed—Deputy Keener was at the Haddock Street property to arrest Lacey, who also was on probation, and Deputy Keener searched defendant's house and then later determined defendant was on probation.
In summary we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider defendant's suppression motion because defendant did not have a full opportunity in this case for a determination of the dispositive issue, namely whether the search was a valid Fourth Amendment search because law enforcement officers knew at the time of the search that defendant was on probation a term of which included a valid Fourth Amendment waiver. (People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335.)
Because we will reverse the judgment we will not address defendant's challenge to one of the conditions of her probation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new hearing on defendant's suppression motion. If the trial court again denies the suppression motion, the judgment of conviction is reinstated.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKinster
J.
We concur:
Ramirez
P.J.
Miller
J.