Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF151238. Christian F. Thierbach, Judge.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
A jury found defendant guilty of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211). Defendant admitted suffering three prior convictions that resulted in prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of nine years. Defendant contends that substantial evidence does not support his convictions. We affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Maurice worked at a Postal Etc. store in Moreno Valley, located near the intersection of Perris Boulevard and Iris Avenue. In addition to the space where customers can shop, the store has a secure room. The secure room is separated from the rest of the store by bulletproof glass and a security door. The secure room is not accessible from outside the store. The secure room is necessary because the store receives large amounts of cash and checks, due to people paying various bills at the store, such as utility bills.
On June 19, 2009, Maurice was inside the Postal Etc., in the area accessible to customers. Maurice’s wife, the owner of the store, the owner’s wife, and the owner’s daughter were inside the secure room. At approximately 11:00 a.m., two men, with guns, entered through the back door of the store. One man was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. The second man was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt. Both men were wearing masks over their faces, and their hoods were up.
It was later discovered that the guns were realistic looking toy guns.
The men approached Maurice. The men pointed their guns at Maurice and directed him to move towards the cash register. The men instructed Maurice to open the cash register, but Maurice lied and told the men he did not know how to operate the register. The men ordered Maurice to the ground, but Maurice refused. One of the men began kicking the security door, while the other man continued pointing a gun at Maurice. The man kicking the door was unable to open the door. After the unsuccessful kicking, the men ran out the back door of the store. Maurice chased after the men. The two men ran to a six-foot wall and jumped over it. On the other side of the wall was a residential area. Maurice lost sight of the men after they jumped over the wall into the residential area.
Since defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, as opposed to robbery, it appears that nothing of value was taken from the store.
The store owner’s wife, who was in the secure room, called the police while the two men were inside the store. A helicopter was immediately dispatched to the area of the Postal Etc., and arrived within “a minute or two” of the dispatch. Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Nelson was on the ground, just west of the Postal Etc. on Iris Avenue, when he was dispatched to the store. Deputy Nelson arrived at the store within two minutes of receiving the dispatch. Within minutes of arriving at the store, Deputy Nelson examined the area along the six-foot wall. Deputy Nelson found a realistic looking toy gun on the ground. When Deputy Nelson first spotted the gun, he believed it might be a real gun, but it was found to be an air gun.
A dispatch log was not entered into evidence, so an exact timeline of the events is not available.
Deputy Nelson continued to examine the area and found that the house on the other side of the wall from where the men jumped was vacant. When the men jumped over the wall, they would have landed in the back yard of the vacant house. The vacant house was on Ninya Avenue. Ninya Avenue was a smaller street that curved around and ultimately caused a driver to be back at Iris Avenue. After going east for a distance, Iris Avenue changed names and became Moreno Beach Drive. Moreno Beach Drive leads into Auto Parkway, where a Toyota dealership was located.
Satellite images of the scene were entered into evidence; however, exactly how long it would take to travel the described areas is not clear.
Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Rhodes was on Highway 60, near the Moreno Beach Drive exit, when he heard the dispatch about a possible robbery at the Postal Etc. Deputy Rhodes exited the highway at Moreno Beach Drive. After exiting, Deputy Rhodes heard that the deputies in the helicopter had spotted a pickup truck leaving the area of the Postal Etc., and the truck was headed east towards Moreno Beach Drive-in the direction of Deputy Rhodes. Deputy Rhodes continued traveling in the direction of the pickup. Eventually, the suspect pickup truck passed Deputy Rhodes, going the opposite direction. Deputy Rhodes’s trainee, who was driving, made a U-turn and tried to pursue the truck.
The following exchange occurred during Deputy Rhodes’s direct examination: “[Prosecutor]: And then the helicopter directed you that the car was leaving that area? [¶] [Deputy Rhodes]: Yes, sir.” We infer from Deputy Rhodes’s testimony that deputies were in the helicopter communicating with him; however, we note that it is not clear exactly who was in the helicopter.
Charles worked at the Toyota dealership off of Moreno Beach Drive. On June 19, 2009, Charles saw a black pickup truck traveling “very fast” along the side of the dealership. The truck was traveling approximately 30 miles per hour, but the speed limit in the dealership lot was 3 miles per hour. The truck came to a stop in the used car area where a variety of different vehicles were stored. Charles then saw a law enforcement car drive by, along the same side of the dealership. Charles moved to see who was driving the truck, because he thought it might be one of his employees. Charles saw a person in the backseat of the truck moving around, as though he were changing clothes. Charles did not see defendant in or near the truck when the person appeared to be changing clothes.
Syed also worked at the Toyota dealership, and was at the dealership on June 19, 2009. Syed saw the black pickup truck travel towards the back of the dealership. Syed lost sight of the truck, but saw it again after it was parked in the used car area. He saw that two men and a woman had been in the truck. Two men asked Syed for the restroom, and he directed them inside the dealership. The woman waited outside and spoke on her mobile phone. Syed noticed a low flying helicopter. The woman on the phone was looking at the helicopter. The two men and the woman returned to the truck. The truck traveled down the driveway of the Toyota dealership, but was stopped by Deputy Rhodes before exiting the dealership.
Deputy Rhodes found four people inside the extended cab pickup truck-three males and a female. Defendant was driving the truck. Deputy Rhodes found clothing and two masks in the backseat area of the truck. Deputy Rhodes also found a realistic looking toy gun concealed in a storage compartment on the passenger side of the truck.
Maurice, from Postal Etc., was asked to go to the Toyota dealership to view the suspects. Maurice identified the two other men-not defendant-as the men who matched the body types and heights of the men who attempted to rob the Postal Etc. Maurice noticed that the two men were not wearing the gray and black hooded sweatshirts that were worn during the robbery; however, Maurice identified the clothing found in the truck as the clothes that had been worn by the men who had tried to rob the store-it appeared to Maurice that the men had changed their clothes.
The owner of the Postal Etc., Kerry, testified that he looked at the police report concerning the attempted robbery at his store, and found that one of the suspects was Dajon Baker. Kerry had bought the Postal Etc. from Dajon’s father two to three years prior to the attempted robbery.
The prosecutor argued a theory of aiding and abetting. The prosecutor asserted that the robbery of the Postal Etc. was planned, and defendant was the getaway driver. The prosecutor argued that there was evidence of a plan because the business was familiar to Dajon-it was not picked at random-and they found a vacant house’s backyard to use for their escape. The prosecutor argued that the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that defendant had dropped off the two men who robbed the store, waited for the two men to complete the crimes, and then helped them to flee the scene of the crimes.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support his convictions. Specifically, defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence that (1) defendant knew of the crimes, and (2) defendant specifically intended to assist the two men in the crimes. We disagree.
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘“reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.”’ [Citation.] ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ [Citation.] We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.)
Evidence of a defendant’s intent is seldom established by direct evidence; usually, it is inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crimes, i.e., circumstantial evidence. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 506-507.) The substantial evidence standard of review is the same for cases involving primarily circumstantial evidence. (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811.) “‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission... are principals in any crime so committed.” (§ 31.) “The mental state necessary for conviction as an aider and abettor, however, is different from the mental state necessary for conviction as the actual perpetrator. [¶] The actual perpetrator must have whatever mental state is required for each crime charged.... An aider and abettor, on the other hand, must ‘act with knowledge of the criminal purpose... and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122-1123; see also People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 116-117.) “[I]f a defendant’s liability for an offense is predicated upon the theory that he or she aided and abetted the perpetrator, the defendant’s intent to encourage or facilitate the actions of the perpetrator ‘must be formed prior to or during “commission” of that offense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039, italics omitted.)
For the reader’s reference, the following are the laws pertaining to the crimes with which defendant was found to have aided and abetted: A burglary is committed when a person enters a shop with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. (§ 459.) “‘Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.’ (§ 211.) ‘An attempted robbery requires a specific intent to commit robbery and a direct, ineffectual act (beyond mere preparation) toward its commission.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 24.)
We begin our analysis of the record with a determination of whether there is substantial evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrators. Maurice testified that he did not hear the two robbers speak to one another. Maurice also did not hear anyone yelling at the two men or honking a car horn. When the two perpetrators left the store, they both exited via the back door, and they both scaled the six-foot wall. Based upon the foregoing evidence, it appears there was a plan, prior to entering the store, for the two men to exit via the back and jump over the wall into the vacant backyard, because there was no communication during the robbery yet the men’s actions were synchronized.
Further, the record reflects that the wife of the store owner reported the robbery while the robbery was in progress, or just after the men left the store. Deputy Rhodes heard the dispatch about the robbery and exited the freeway. As Deputy Rhodes exited the freeway, he heard that a deputy in a helicopter had spotted a pickup truck leaving the area of the attempted robbery. Deputy Nelson arrived at the Postal Etc. within two minutes of hearing the dispatch. Deputy Nelson did not see anyone in the area around the six-foot wall.
The foregoing evidence reflects that the men who robbed the store left the area almost immediately after the attempted robbery. Based upon how quickly the men left the area of the Postal Etc., a juror could reasonably infer that the pickup truck was waiting for the men to exit the store.
Next, the record reflects that when the pickup truck was at the Toyota dealership, the men changed their clothes. The truck stopped in the back of the dealership, in an area reserved for storing used cars, as opposed to the front of the dealership where customers typically park. Inside the truck, Deputy Rhodes found two masks and a realistic looking toy gun. Deputy Nelson found a realistic looking toy gun next to the six-foot wall that the two men jumped over. Defendant was driving the truck when Deputy Rhodes stopped the truck.
The foregoing evidence reflects that the two men were not trying to hide the attempted robbery from defendant, because the tools of the attempted robbery-the masks, sweatshirts, and toy gun-were all in the pickup truck that defendant was driving. Additionally, the jury could infer from the foregoing evidence that defendant had knowledge of criminal activity having occurred because people do not typically stop at a car dealership to change clothes.
Accordingly, when the record is looked at as a whole, it appears defendant had knowledge of the plan to rob the Postal Etc. because (1) there was a plan in place before the robbery; (2) defendant waited for the two men to complete the robbery; and (3) defendant drove the men away from the scene of the crimes and allowed the men to store the masks and toy gun used during the robbery in the truck he was driving. Therefore, based upon the evidence detailed ante, it appears defendant was aware that the perpetrators were planning to rob the Postal Etc. As a result, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant had knowledge of the perpetrators’ criminal purpose.
Defendant asserts there is not substantial evidence that he had knowledge of the perpetrators’ criminal purpose because there was no evidence that (1) defendant was at the Postal Etc.; (2) picked-up or dropped-off the perpetrators; (3) had a conversation with the perpetrators; and/or (4) knew that the toy gun and clothing were in his car. Further, defendant asserts the evidence reflects he did not know about the crimes because (1) he was not present when one of the perpetrators changed clothes in the truck; (2) he cooperated with the police searching his truck; (3) the toy gun was in an area of the truck not visible to defendant; and (4) defendant was not acting abnormally or rushed when he stopped to use the restroom at the Toyota dealership.
“‘“[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, [then] the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 816.) Defendant’s argument points to evidence that the prosecution did not produce and evidence that supports contrary findings; however, these arguments will not support reversal of the judgment because, as set forth ante, the jury’s findings are supported by the record. Accordingly, we find defendant’s argument unpersuasive.
Next, we examine whether substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant had the intent or purpose of either committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense. The record reflects that defendant was driving the pickup truck when it was stopped by Deputy Rhodes. Maurice testified that defendant was not one of the two men who robbed the store. Additionally, the record reflects that the two robbers both ran out the back door of the store and scaled a six-foot wall. The two men quickly disappeared after scaling the wall.
From the foregoing evidence, the jury could infer that defendant was waiting in the pickup truck for the two men to complete the robbery, so that he could help them flee the scene of the crimes. The two men’s synchronized action of running out the back door and scaling a six-foot wall indicates that they knew a quick means of escape was waiting on the other side of the wall, i.e., defendant in a vehicle. Further, the evidence that the men disappeared quickly after scaling the wall supports the conclusion that defendant was waiting for the men. In sum, the swift disappearance of the perpetrators supports an inference that defendant had been waiting for the men to complete the robbery, in order to assist them with their escape. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant had the intent or purpose of either encouraging or facilitating commission of the burglary and attempted robbery.
Defendant argues that his presence at the scene of the crimes is not sufficient to support a conviction. We do not find this argument persuasive because there is much more evidence than defendant’s mere presence at the scene of the crimes. For example, defendant was found driving the perpetrators shortly after the attempted robbery; and the masks, clothes, and toy gun used during the attempted robbery were in the truck defendant was driving. Accordingly, it does not appear defendant was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time; rather, the evidence supports an inference that defendant actively tried to facilitate the perpetrators’ escape from the scene of the crimes.
Defendant analogizes his case to People v. Hill (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 287 (Hill). In Hill, the defendant, Ingram, was driving Hill and Bishop around Los Angeles. Hill and Bishop had discussed a plan to commit a robbery outside of the defendant’s presence. Bishop testified that there was no discussion of the robbery in the defendant’s presence. At one point, Hill instructed the defendant to stop the car. Hill and Bishop went inside a bar and robbed it; they were in the bar for approximately five minutes. Bishop testified that when he and Hill returned to the car, the defendant had shut off the engine and had fallen asleep. Hill woke up the defendant and instructed him to “‘pull away now.’” The defendant drove away with Bishop and Hill in the car. Bishop stated that the defendant turned on the car’s headlights, but Hill instructed him to turn the lights off. Bishop testified that there was no discussion of the robbery in the car, and that the defendant did not know anything about the robbery. Bishop stated that the gun used during the robbery was hidden behind the seat in the car. (Id. at pp. 288-289.)
A law enforcement officer testified that the defendant admitted seeing Hill’s gun on the night of the robbery, prior to robbery taking place. (Hill, supra, 77 Cal.App.2d at p. 289.) The officer stated that after driving around for awhile, when the car passed the bar Hill said, “‘Well, here we are.’” (Id. at p. 290.) The officer testified that the defendant claimed to have forgotten to turn the headlights on after leaving the bar, and that the defendant had seen Bishop in the backseat “fooling around” with something, but that the defendant claimed to not know what the object was. (Ibid.)
The appellate court looked at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and concluded that “nothing was established but a suspicion of [the defendant’s] guilt.” (Hill, supra, 77 Cal.App.2d at p. 292.) The appellate court reasoned, “The mere presence of the accused at the scene of the crime does not essentially establish his guilt as an abettor. Of course it is elemental that one who keeps watch during the commission of the crime to facilitate the escape of the criminal is guilty as a principal. But evidence of his mere presence without showing his preconcert with the actors is insufficient as proof of guilt.” (Id. at p. 294.) The appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction due to insufficient evidence. (Ibid.)
We find the instant case to be distinguishable from Hill, because, as set forth ante, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant had planned the robbery with the perpetrators because the perpetrators, without speaking to one another, scaled a six-foot wall, disappeared, and were later found in a truck driven by defendant. The jury could infer that defendant knew about the criminal plan when waiting in the truck, because the truck was stopped on the opposite side of a six-foot wall from the Postal Etc. If defendant believed he was waiting for the perpetrators to run an innocent errand, then he likely would not have parked on the opposite side of a six-foot wall. Consequently, the instant case is distinguishable from Hill, because the record supports the inference that defendant knew about the criminal plan prior to the crimes taking place and intended to help facilitate the perpetrators’ escape.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., CODRINGTON J.