Summary
In Bloss the Court found that the defendant's conviction could not stand under the act because the Court had not construed the obscenity statute, in accordance with Miller, to proscribe such conduct.
Summary of this case from People v. NeumayerOpinion
Docket Nos. 53135-53137.
Argued November 6, 1973 (Calendar No. 1).
Decided April 29, 1975.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney and Donald A. Johnston III, Chief Appellate Attorney (Sherwin J. Venema, of counsel), for the people.
Robert E. Smith and Gilbert H. Deitch (John W. Piggott, of counsel), for defendant Bloss.
Amici Curiae: Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Jann C. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General.
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (by Bruce T. Leitman).
On June 25, 1973, the United States Supreme Court vacated our earlier judgment in People v Bloss, 388 Mich. 409; 201 N.W.2d 806 (1972). The Court remanded Bloss to us for further consideration in light of several new opinions that it issued on the subject of obscenity.
Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 U.S. 49; 93 S Ct 2628; 37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973); Kaplan v California, 413 U.S. 115; 93 S Ct 2680; 37 L Ed 2d 492 (1973); United States v 12 200-ft Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123; 92 S Ct 2665; 37 L Ed 2d 500 (1973); United States v Orito, 413 U.S. 139; 93 S Ct 2674; 37 L Ed 2d 513 (1973); Heller v New York, 413 U.S. 483; 93 S Ct 2789; 37 L Ed 2d 745 (1973); Roaden v Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496; 93 S Ct 2796; 37 L Ed 2d 757 (1973); Alexander v Virginia, 413 U.S. 836; 93 S Ct 2803; 37 L Ed 2d 993 (1973).
We are persuaded that defendant's conviction cannot stand for the reason that at the time he did the act complained of this Court had not construed the obscenity statute (as permitted in Miller) to proscribe such conduct.
MCLA 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1).
We are unanimously of the opinion that the Michigan statutes regulating the dissemination of "obscene" material as applied to juveniles and unconsenting adults are valid and enforceable.
We are divided as to whether such statutes can properly be construed by us without further legislative expression as proscribing the dissemination of "obscene" material to consenting adults. See Const 1963, art 1, § 5.
The conviction is reversed and the defendant is discharged.
T.G. KAVANAGH, C.J., and SWAINSON, WILLIAMS, LEVIN, and M.S. COLEMAN, JJ., concurred.
J.W. FITZGERALD, J., and the late Justice T.M. KAVANAGH took no part in the decision of this case.