Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS073457
McAdams, J.
Defendant Celestino Bernal was convicted by plea of one count of attempted armed robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664) and one count of false imprisonment by violence or menace (§ 236) arising out of an attempted armed robbery of a fast food restaurant. Defendant admitted personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd (a)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to eight years eight months in prison.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
The sentence was based on the middle term of two years for attempted robbery, plus the lower term of three years for the use of a firearm, plus three years for inflicting great bodily injury, and a consecutive eight month term (one third the midterm) for false imprisonment.
The court found that the restaurant owner was a direct victim of the crimes and ordered defendant to pay the restaurant owner $26,058.41 in victim restitution, plus interest at 10 percent per annum, to compensate the restaurant owner for expenses he had incurred in workers’ compensation claims that were presented by two of his employees who were injured in the robbery.
On appeal, defendant argues that the restitution order should not have included defense attorney expenses incurred by the restaurant owner in the amount of $5,300. He contends that the legal expenses are not economic losses caused by his conduct and are not recoverable because they “were caused by questionable outside lawsuits filed against an otherwise responsive business owner, most likely for general and emotional or punitive damage, not economic ones.” He asserts that these legal expenses are not authorized by the statutes governing victim restitution. We find no error and affirm the restitution order.
Facts
Around 2:56 a.m. on December 26, 2007, defendant knocked on the back door of a Carl’s Jr. restaurant where John Doe and his sister, Jane Doe, were working. The restaurant lobby was closed, but the drive-through window was open. Defendant said “delivery” several times and John Doe, who was accustomed to receiving deliveries at that time of night, opened the back door. Defendant pointed a gun at John Doe and demanded money. John Doe started walking toward the cash register, but defendant directed him to the office where the safe was located. John Doe told defendant he did not have access to the safe. Defendant demanded repeatedly that John Doe open the safe; John Doe kept telling him he could not open the safe. A struggle ensued and defendant struck John Doe several times on the head and face with the gun.
The male and female employees of the restaurant were referred to as “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” in the trial court. Their true names were redacted from the record.
Jane Doe heard a commotion and went to check on her brother. Defendant pointed the revolver at her and told her to get down on the floor. She complied. While defendant beat John Doe, Jane Doe escaped, ran to a gas station, and called the police. During the altercation, John Doe pulled the hood on defendant’s sweatshirt, which allowed the restaurant’s surveillance camera to capture a photograph of defendant’s face. Moments later, defendant ran out the back door.
John Doe was transported from the scene to Natividad Medical Center via ambulance. John Doe was initially treated for shock and complaints of dizziness. His injuries included a slight concussion and seven lacerations on his head and face, which ranged in size from two to five centimeters. Some of the lacerations were repaired with staples; some required sutures.
Both John Doe and Jane Doe filed workers’ compensation claims against their employer, Gary Vick, the owner of the Carl’s Jr. franchise where they worked. Vick was self-insured for workers’ compensation. John Doe was out of work for 27 days. Vick paid John Doe temporary disability benefits and covered his medical expenses, which included emergency room treatment, follow-up care, a psychological evaluation, and plastic surgery to revise his scars. The nature of Jane Doe’s injuries is not evident from the record. She did not claim any time off work. Her medical treatment included a trip to the emergency room, follow-up care at a local clinic, and a short course of physical therapy.
The probation report refers to Mr. Vick as the owner of the Carl’s Jr. franchise in the singular. The records from the workers’ compensation self-insurance administrator refer to the employer as “Gary & Becky Vick, Inc.” We shall hereafter refer to the employer as “Vick.”
Procedural History
Prior to sentencing, the probation officer contacted John Doe, Jane Doe, and Vick. Vick told the probation officer that his “[w]orker’s [c]ompensation” had paid John Doe for his lost wages and had paid all of John Doe’s and Jane Doe’s medical bills. The probation officer assumed that Avizent, Vick’s self-insurance administrator, was a workers’ compensation insurance company. The Avizent claims adjuster told the probation officer that Avizent would be filing a civil action against defendant for reimbursement.
At the sentencing hearing on November 20, 2008, the court determined that “Carl’s Jr.” was a direct victim of the crime and continued the matter to December 16, 2008, for further hearing on victim restitution. Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal.
Prior to the restitution hearing, the probation officer filed a supplemental report that stated that Vick was self-insured for workers’ compensation. In a letter to the probation department, Vick stated that he was self-insured and that “all of these losses will come directly from my account, and be deducted from my proceeds at year end.” It appears Avizent was Vick’s self-insurance administrator; the parties do not dispute that fact on appeal. Vick provided the court with documents summarizing the amounts paid on the claims of John Doe and Jane Doe on Avizent forms. According to the summaries, Vick paid $22,606.39 in benefits and expenses on John Doe’s claim and $3,452.02 in benefits and expenses on Jane Doe’s claim. The expenses included monies paid to the “Law Offices of Paul C.” to cover “defense attorney” expenses: $3,310 in John Doe’s case and $1,990 in Jane Doe’s case. Vick’s letter also stated that “[n]either of these two individuals have [sic] settled their injury claims and [both are] being represented by an attorney.” Vick expected to incur at least $10,000 in “additional costs” on the claims and asked the probation department to allow for those additional costs to be recovered.
It is not clear from the record whether this included attorney fees or costs or both. We shall therefore refer to these expenditures as “legal expenses” or “defense attorney expenses.”
Neither John Doe nor Jane Doe presented separate claims for victim restitution.
At the restitution hearing, defendant objected to the amounts paid for legal expenses. He argued that the legal expenses should not be included because “[t]here’s no lawsuit that I know of” and stated that the attorney costs were “kind of expensive, and I have no idea what those pertain to.” The prosecutor stated that the “victims who were in the store are represented in filing a Workers’ Compensation action against their employer, who is also a victim” and that the legal expenses were incurred by Vick to defend the claims by John Doe and Jane Doe. Defendant argued that Jane Doe was not injured and questioned whether her workers’ compensation claim was valid. However, he acknowledged that there might be a loss to the employer, “fighting... a spurious worker’s comp claim.”
The court held that if the employer is in a position where he has to defend against the claim with legal representation, then “that flows from the whole situation”; concluded that the amount claimed was reasonable; and awarded the full amount claimed by Vick ($26,058.41). Since the workers’ compensation actions had not resolved, the court retained jurisdiction over restitution.
On appeal, defendant challenges only the portion of the restitution award attributable to the defense attorney expenses.
Discussion
Legal Principles Governing Awards of Victim Restitution
“In 1982, California voters passed Proposition 8, also known as The Victims’ Bill of Rights.... Proposition 8 established the right of crime victims to receive restitution directly ‘from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer.’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652.) Proposition 8 added new article I, section 28 to the California Constitution, which at the time of the offenses in this case provided: “It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer.” (Former Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)
Former California Constitution article I, section 28 was amended by initiative measure (Proposition 9) on November 4, 2008. Former subdivision (b) was renumbered subdivision (b)(13) and the text of the subdivision was amended.
To implement Proposition 8, the Legislature enacted section 1202.4. Under that code section, the court must order direct victim restitution in “every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f); see also § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) The court “shall require” the defendant to make restitution “based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim... or any other showing to the court.... The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states them on the record.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) provides that “[t]o the extent possible, the restitution order... shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to” 11 enumerated categories of losses. The statutory list of economic losses that may be recovered as victim restitution is not exclusive. (People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 994.)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) sets forth the following illustrative list of economic losses that are recoverable as direct victim restitution: “(A) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible. [¶] (B) Medical expenses. [¶] (C) Mental health counseling expenses. [¶] (D) Wages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minor’s parent, parents, guardian, or guardians, while caring for the injured minor. Lost wages shall include any commission income as well as any base wages. Commission income shall be established by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period prior to the date of the crime for which restitution is being ordered, unless good cause for a shorter time period is shown. [¶] (E) Wages or profits lost by the victim, and if the victim is a minor, wages or profits lost by the minor’s parent, parents, guardian, or guardians, due to time spent as a witness or in assisting the police or prosecution. Lost wages shall include any commission income as well as any base wages. Commission income shall be established by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period prior to the date of the crime for which restitution is being ordered, unless good cause for a shorter time period is shown. [¶] (F) Noneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for felony violations of Section 288. [¶] (G) Interest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court. [¶] (H) Actual and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim. [¶] (I) Expenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the defendant, including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities and telephone service, deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses, clothing, and personal items. Expenses incurred pursuant to this section shall be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim. [¶] (J) Expenses to install or increase residential security incurred related to a crime, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, including, but not limited to, a home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks. [¶] (K) Expenses to retrofit a residence or vehicle, or both, to make the residence accessible to or the vehicle operational by the victim, if the victim is permanently disabled, whether the disability is partial or total, as a direct result of the crime.”
“Direct victims of crime have a statutory right to restitution on the full amount of their losses without regard to the full or partial recoupment from other sources (except the state Restitution Fund).” (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468 (Baker).)
Although section 1202.4 provides for full restitution of a victim’s economic losses, it “does not authorize direct restitution for noneconomic losses,” except in cases where the defendant has been convicted of lewd or lascivious acts performed on a minor. (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 656; § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) provides that economic loss for the purposes of victim restitution includes “[a]ctual and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.” Attorney fees that are recoverable as victim restitution include: (1) contingency fees paid by the victim to the victim’s attorney in a personal injury action to obtain a settlement from the defendant’s auto insurer (People v. Pinedo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1405-1406 (Pinedo); People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 876, 882-885 (Fulton); People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7; (2) fees incurred to obtain a civil judgment against the defendant for conversion (People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409-1411); and (3) fees incurred to prevent the sale of a defendant’s assets (People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525 (Lyon)). Whether “economic loss” under section 1202.4 includes an employer’s legal expenses to defend against its employee’s workers’ compensation claims when the employee’s injuries and the claim are the direct result of the defendant’s criminal activity appears to be an issue of first impression.
Standard of Review
“Generally speaking, restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only where an abuse of discretion appears. (People v. Fortune (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 790, 794....) Like most generalizations, however, this one can lead to errors if not applied with circumspection. No court has discretion to make an order not authorized by law, or to find facts for which there is not substantial evidence. A reviewing court will generally examine an issue of law independently of a lower tribunal’s ruling. [Citation.] Its determination on an issue of fact is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. [Citation.] The standard of review therefore depends on the nature of the question presented.” (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661, fn. omitted.) “The court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad and it may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole.” (Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.)
Analysis
Defendant argues that the legal expenses are not recoverable as victim restitution because they were not economic losses caused by his conduct. He asserts that the defense attorney expenses were “almost certainly directed at general damages, not economic ones.” Defendant reasons that since the employer (Vick) paid John Doe’s and Jane Doe’s medical bills and lost wages, the only other damages that the injured employees might seek in “debatable outside lawsuits” against Vick are general damages or punitive damages or a nuisance value settlement.
As noted previously, the statutory scheme provides that noneconomic damages such as compensation for pain and suffering are not recoverable as victim restitution except in cases where the defendant has been convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct against a minor. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F); People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 656.)
Neither the evidentiary record nor the statutes governing workers’ compensation support defendant’s assertion that the defense attorney expenses were incurred to defend claims for noneconomic damages or punitive damages or to negotiate a nuisance value settlement. We begin by noting that these types of damages are recoverable in civil actions for damages in tort, but not in workers’ compensation actions. The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the defense attorney expenses were incurred to defend administrative claims for workers’ compensation benefits that John Doe and Jane Doe (hereafter jointly Injured Workers) filed against their employer, Vick. Nothing in the record suggests that Injured Workers sued Vick or Avizent civilly. Moreover, workers’ compensation is Injured Workers exclusive remedy with regard to any claims they may have against Vick for their work-related injuries caused by defendant’s criminal activity. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, subd. (a); 3602.) Nothing in the record suggests that any of the exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule (Lab. Code, §§ 3602, 3706, & 4558) apply and defendant does not argue that any of the exceptions apply.
The workers’ compensation statutes limit the nature and the amount of the benefits that an injured worker may recover from his or her employer and do not allow compensation at all for certain elements of damages that may be recoverable in a tort action, like pain and suffering. (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Workers’ Compensation, § 259, p. 861, citing Jacobsen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1931) 212 Cal. 440, 447, superceded on other grounds by statute as stated in Sanstad v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 32, and West v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 711, 718.) Nothing in the workers’ compensation act authorizes recovery of punitive damages against an employer and nothing in the evidence suggests that the defense attorney expenses were incurred to resist claims for punitive damages or to effectuate a nuisance value settlement.
We also reject defendant’s suggestion that the defense attorney expenses were not recoverable as victim restitution because Vick was voluntarily providing workers’ compensation benefits to Injured Workers. It is not uncommon for injured workers to seek legal counsel in presenting workers’ compensation claims to their employers, even when the employer is providing benefits, because the injured workers do not understand or trust the workers’ compensation system or a legitimate dispute has arisen over the amount or nature of the benefits provided by the employer. That the employer voluntarily provides benefits does not preclude the employee from filing an application for adjudication of claim. In the vast majority of cases adjudicated before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), the employer has provided some benefits. Nonetheless, disputes arise over the amount of benefits, the entitlement to future benefits, or the nature or extent of any permanent disability.
The record does not disclose Injured Workers’ reasons for filing their applications to adjudicate their claims against Vick or the nature of the issues disputed before the WCAB. Although the record indicates that John Doe underwent scar revision surgery more than a year after the incident, it does not indicate whether those services were provided voluntarily by Vick or whether John Doe’s entitlement to the surgery was adjudicated before the WCAB. More importantly, once Injured Workers filed applications for adjudication of their claims before the WCAB, it was reasonable for the employer to retain counsel to defend those claims.
Citing People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 232-233, defendant argues that criminal “[d]efendants are not liable for expenses incurred by indirect victims like insurers” and that he should not be liable for the “apparent insurance defense expenses” in this case. In Birkett, the court held that an insurance company that suffers the consequences of crime only by paying the crime-related losses of its insured under the terms of an insurance policy is not a “direct victim” of crime as defined in the restitution statute and therefore is not entitled to restitution. (Id. at p. 245.) The defendant in Birkett had been convicted of auto theft. The insurers that sought restitution in Birkett insured the victims for property damage to their cars. (Id. at pp. 229-230.) The court explained that “the Legislature could rationally conclude that the criminal restitution scheme should always require the offender to pay the full cost of his crime, receiving no windfall from the fortuity that the victim was otherwise reimbursed, but that the rights of reimbursing third parties, aside from the state’s own Restitution Fund, should be resolved in other contexts.” (Id. at p. 246.) The court held that third parties “such as private insurers” “who had already reimbursed the victim were thus left to their separate civil remedies, if any, to recover any such prior indemnification either from the victim or from the [defendant].” (Ibid.)
In our view, this case is distinguishable from Birkett. The primary holding in Birkett is that a third party who reimburses the victim of a crime for economic losses is not a direct victim under the restitution statute. Here, the trial court found that the Injured Workers’ employer, Vick, was a direct victim of defendant’s criminal conduct and defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal. Moreover, Vick was not an insurance company. He was a self-insured business. Unlike the insurers in Birkett, Vick’s restaurant was the object of the attempted robbery. (People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084-1087.) Finally, unlike the insurers in Birkett who were contractually obligated to indemnify their policyholders, Vick was statutorily obligated to provide workers’ compensation benefits to his employees.
As we noted before, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) provides that “economic loss” for the purposes of victim restitution includes “[a]ctual and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.” Defendant contends the defense attorney fees were “not legal efforts to collect economic losses,” like the fees in Fulton and Lyon. He argues “instead, these attorney fees were caused by outside lawsuits not directed at economic damages” and that they “stemmed from efforts to fight compensation claims, generated by outside attorneys, seeking compensation on top of all the other allowable expenses the owner was already incurring in a good faith effort to make his employees whole.”
We agree that these fees are factually distinguishable from the attorney fees that were recoverable in Pinedo, Fulton, Maheshwari, and Millard. In each of those cases, legal expenses were incurred by a victim of crime to obtain damages from the criminal defendant in a civil action. Here, the legal expenses were incurred by a direct victim of the crime to respond to workers’ compensation claims filed by other direct victims of the same crime. Nonetheless, in our view, the defense attorney expenses are recoverable as victim restitution.
We begin by reviewing the court’s interpretation of section 1202.4 in Fulton. The Fulton court addressed the question whether a victim of crime may recover attorney fees incurred in a civil action against the defendant where the victim recovers both economic and noneconomic damages in a civil action against the defendant and it appears that a portion of the fees was incurred to recover noneconomic damages. As part of its analysis, the court construed the attorney fees provision in the restitution statute, stating: “Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) identifies attorney fees as an economic loss recoverable as direct restitution. The fees are expressly limited to those that are ‘[a]ctual and reasonable’ and those incurred in the recovery of damages the victim suffered as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. This subdivision further includes the phrase ‘and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.’ (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(H).) Viewed in context, the reference to ‘attorney’s fees and other costs of collection’ logically suggests the Legislature was viewing attorney fees as a cost of collection and was intending to permit the recovery of attorney fees that were incurred for ‘collection’ purposes. Although the subdivision does not expressly identify the object of that collection, it is only reasonable to infer it is the collection of restitution permitted under the statute.” (Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 883-884.)
The Fulton court continued: “The Legislature mandated that trial courts order restitution in an amount that will ‘fully reimburse’ the victim for economic losses, such as property damage and medical expenses, caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) However, a victim who suffers these economic losses would not be fully reimbursed if he or she was required to bear the expense of an attorney to recover for that damage. Recognizing this, the Legislature provided for the victim’s recovery of reasonable attorney fees incurred to collect economic damages. But the Legislature additionally made an express policy determination that noneconomic damages are not recoverable as restitution and therefore a victim will not be reimbursed for those losses. From this rule, it rationally follows that the Legislature did not perceive a need for a victim to recover attorney fees incurred to collect noneconomic damages in order for the victim to fully recover restitution under the statute.” (Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 884, fn. omitted.) The court held that “actual and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a victim as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct are recoverable as restitution, but they are limited to reasonable attorney fees incurred to collect restitution otherwise permitted under the statute.” (Id. at pp. 884-885.) The court also held that “when fees cannot be reasonably divided between the pursuit of economic losses as opposed to noneconomic losses, the victim is entitled to be fully reimbursed for all actual and reasonable attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 885.)
Fulton thus interpreted section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) as allowing the recovery of attorney fees as restitution where those fees were incurred to collect restitution otherwise permitted under the statute. In the case before us, the legal expenses (see footnote 5) were not incurred to collect restitution from defendant. However, as noted above, the types of economic losses enumerated in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), are illustrative only and are not exclusive.
“In examining the restitution statute, ‘[t]he intent of the voters is plain: every victim who suffers a loss shall have the right to restitution from those convicted of the crime giving rise to that loss.’ [Citation.] As a result, ‘the word “loss” must be construed broadly and liberally to uphold the voters’ intent.’ [Citation.] Because the statute uses the language ‘including, but not limited to’ these enumerated losses, a trial court may compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be the direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumerated in the statute.” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046.) “The test is not whether the victim’s legal fees arose directly from the criminal case, but whether they were a ‘determined economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.’ ” (Pinedo, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405-1406, citing former § 1202.4, subd. (g), now section 1202.4, subd. (f).)
In Lyon, the court held that legal expenses incurred to prevent the sale of a home in which the defendant held a $25,000 equity was “an ‘economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct’ and, accordingly, the proper subject of an order of restitution.” (Lyon, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) The court observed that the defendant had embezzled more than $600,000 from the victim and held that the victim’s response in attempting to preserve an asset that belonged to the defendant that would cover a small portion of that loss “was proper, necessary, and a logical result of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) Unlike Fulton, Pinedo, Maheshwari, and Millard, the attorney fees in Lyon were not incurred to obtain a damages award against the defendant.
In this case, Vick was statutorily obligated to provide workers’ compensation benefits to his injured employees, John Doe and Jane Doe. Moreover, his employees’ injuries and resulting workers’ compensation claims were a direct result of defendant’s criminal conduct. When the injured employees filed applications for adjudication of their claims, disputing the workers’ compensation benefits Vick provided, it was reasonable and necessary for Vick to retain legal counsel to respond to the applications and represent his interests before the WCAB. In addition to incurring liability for medical benefits and temporary disability benefits (and possibly permanent disability and future medical benefits), Vick incurred the defense attorney expenses. In this case the workers’ compensation claims and the resulting defense attorney expenses were “proper, necessary, and a logical result of [defendant’s] criminal conduct.” (Lyon, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) Under these circumstances, to deny Vick the cost of the defense attorney expenses is to fail to fully reimburse him for his economic loss. Defendant does not contend that the defense attorney expenses were not reasonable in amount. For these reasons, we conclude that the defense attorney expenses were properly included in the order of restitution and that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it awarded Vick his defense attorney expenses as victim restitution.
Disposition
The restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.