Opinion
March 16, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lakritz, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On May 23, 1989, the defendant, allegedly under the influence of crack cocaine, killed his mother by repeatedly stabbing her in the face, arms, and upper body. On appeal, the defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel's failure to introduce expert testimony of the effects of crack cocaine on the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged.
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it must be determined whether the defendant was afforded meaningful representation at the time and under the circumstances of the representation (see, People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137). A defense counsel's "mere losing tactics" are not to be equated with ineffective assistance of counsel (People v Baldi, supra, at 146; People v Sanchez, 148 A.D.2d 760). Furthermore, as long as a defendant is afforded meaningful representation, the courts may not, aided by the wisdom of hindsight, second-guess matters of defense counsel's trial strategy (see, People v Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796, 799-800).
At bar, defense counsel's decision to focus on the weaknesses in the People's proof against the defendant and not to present an expert on crack cocaine intoxication constituted a legitimate trial strategy. It is apparent that counsel realized that there was no proof that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the killing. Despite this, counsel was able to adduce sufficient evidence through the cross-examination of the defendant's siblings to establish that the defendant was a heavy crack user, and he strenuously argued this contention during his summation (see, People v Eason, 160 A.D.2d 1018; People v Clark, 94 A.D.2d 846). Balletta, J.P., O'Brien, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.