Opinion
G062453
04-24-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOEL DAVID BAPTISTE, Defendant and Appellant.
Costanzo Law Firm and Frank Zeccola for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G. McGinnis, Alan L. Amann and Joseph Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 97WF2374 Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.
Costanzo Law Firm and Frank Zeccola for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G. McGinnis, Alan L. Amann and Joseph Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Appellant Joel David Baptiste was sentenced to life in prison following his conviction for special circumstances murder in 2001. In this appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.The contention is primarily based on procedural grounds. Appellant argues the trial court wrongly prevented him from introducing new evidence in support of his petition for resentencing. However, because section 1172.6 does not contemplate the presentation of new evidence at the prima facie stage of the proceedings, there was no procedural error. Furthermore, because the record of conviction proves appellant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, the trial court properly denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. We thus affirm the trial court's order.
That section was formerly housed in Penal Code section 1170.95, but in 2022 it was renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and the victim Steven Preston were once friends. However, their relationship became strained when Preston started dating appellant's sister Rebekah. Appellant did not like the way Preston treated Rebekah. He also suspected Preston was stealing from his family.
As appellant's anger grew, he often talked about robbing and killing Preston. However, rather than targeting Preston from afar, appellant planned to buddy up to him, so he would let his guard down and become more vulnerable.
The plan worked. On the evening of September 21, 1997, appellant and his friend Wayne Burleson lured Preston into a van by telling him they were going to steal car parts. As they were driving around, Burleson obtained a gun from the glove compartment and fatally shot Preston in the neck. Appellant then pulled over and took Preston's watch and other belongings and dumped his body down a freeway embankment.
Burleson had also dated Rebekah and had a strong dislike of Preston. He was tried separately from appellant.
The next day, after cleaning up the van, appellant helped orchestrate the sale of Preston's watch, from which he received $2,000. He was on the lam for about three years before being apprehended in Mexico and returned to the United States.
Appellant was charged with murder, along with attendant special circumstance allegations of felony murder, lying in wait, and financial gain. It was also alleged he was vicariously armed during the murder. At trial, the prosecutor conceded appellant did not shoot Preston. However, he argued appellant was guilty of first degree murder based on three different theories. First, appellant aided and abetted a premeditated killing. Second, appellant participated in a robbery during which Preston was killed. And third, the shooting was a natural and probable consequence of a conspiracy to commit robbery.
In addition to instructing the jury on these three theories, the trial court also gave CALJIC No. 8.80.1, which was geared toward the special circumstance allegations. Per that instruction, the jury was told: "If you find [] defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, you cannot find [any of] the special circumstance [allegations] to be true unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree." (CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)
In the end, the jury convicted appellant of first degree murder and found all the special circumstance allegations true. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus one year. On appeal, we reversed the financial gain special circumstance finding for lack of evidence but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Baptiste (May 22, 2003, G029003) [nonpub. opn.].)
On November 4, 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. In support of the petition, appellant submitted the transcript of Burleson's parole hearing. At the hearing, Burleson told the parole board that appellant had planned on murdering Preston for several months. However, it didn't look like he was actually going to go through with it while they were all driving around, so Burleson took it upon himself to shoot Preston. Asked what appellant did after the shooting, Burleson said, "He swerved [and] slammed on the brakes. I don't think he was expecting it." The prosecutor also minimized appellant's role in the shooting. He told the parole board that although appellant was more invested in killing Preston than Burleson was, appellant "actually ended up backing out before the murder was committed and thought twice about it and didn't do it."
In light of this evidence, appellant argued he was eligible for resentencing because he lacked the intent to kill. However, the trial court refused to consider the parole hearing transcript and instead adjudicated appellant's petition based solely on the record of his underlying conviction. Judging from that record, the court determined appellant was ineligible for resentencing because the jury found that, acting with the intent to kill, he aided and abetted Burleson in committing first degree murder during the course of a robbery, which constitutes felony murder under current law. Therefore, the court denied appellant's petition without an evidentiary hearing.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to consider the evidence adduced at Burleson's parole hearing and denying his petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. We disagree.
Appellant's claim is grounded in Senate Bill No. 1437. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-4 (SB 1437).) That law narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for the crime of murder in two important ways. First, it eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory by providing that "[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Second, SB 1437 reined in the felony murder rule so that it can only be applied in limited circumstances. Under current law, murder liability based on a killing that occurred during the commission of a felony can only be imposed on a person if: 1) he was the "actual killer," 2) he "was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree," or 3) he was "a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life[.]" (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3).)
SB 1437 also led to the enactment of section 1172.6, which is the procedural mechanism for challenging a murder conviction based on vicarious liability. To obtain relief under that section, the defendant must show 1) he was prosecuted for murder under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or some other theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime, 2) he was convicted of murder, and 3) and he would not be liable for murder today because of how SB 1437 redefined that offense. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing for relief, the trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At the hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is ineligible for resentencing because his conduct did in fact rise to the level of murder as redefined by SB 1437. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Otherwise, the defendant is entitled to vacatur and resentencing per the terms of section 1172.6.
In People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), our Supreme Court ruled the bar for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing is very low, and the trial court's role in determining whether that bar has been cleared in a given case is quite limited. (Id. at pp. 970-972.) While the trial court may consider the underlying record of conviction, judicial factfinding is not allowed. (Ibid.) Indeed, Lewis emphasized the trial court "should not engage in 'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 972.) However, if the record of conviction conclusively establishes the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the trial court should deny his petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 971.)
Although appellant recognizes the record of conviction is pertinent in determining whether he made a prima facie showing for resentencing, he argues it is not the exclusive source of information bearing on that issue. Rather, he claims he was entitled to present new evidence in the form of Burleson's parole hearing transcript to establish his eligibility for resentencing. But by its terms, section 1172.6 only allows the parties to present new evidence at the evidentiary hearing stage of the petition process. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) It does not contemplate the presentation of new evidence at the prima facie stage. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The wording of the statute - which is the primary indicator of legislative intent (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056) -simply does not support appellant's position. And we are not at liberty to rewrite the statute. (Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 392.)
Nevertheless, appellant argues it is unfair and illogical to bar new evidence at the prima facie stage but allow it at the evidentiary stage. As he puts it, "If a petitioner is not permitted to allege and reference the new . . . evidence at the prima facie stage, the prima facie motion could never be granted on the basis of that evidence - and the evidence would never make it to the evidentiary hearing in the first place."
However, the Legislature's restriction on the use of new evidence makes sense, given the limited nature of the prima facie inquiry. While judicial factfinding is part of the evidentiary hearing stage of the resentencing process, it has no place at the prima facie stage, where the trial court's job is simply to determine whether the defendant's allegations can hold up against the readily ascertainable information in the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-972.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to consider appellant's new evidence.
That does not mean appellant is without a remedy to pursue his new evidence claim. Notwithstanding section 1172.6's limitations, other statutes allow the introduction of new evidence, including section 1473, which governs petitions for writ of habeas corpus. (See People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 702.)
Turning to the merits, the law is clear that if the record of conviction negates the defendant's eligibility, the trial court may properly deny his petition without proceeding to the evidentiary phase of the resentencing process. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) More particularly, a denial is proper at the prima facie stage if the record of conviction conclusively establishes the defendant was convicted of murder on a theory of liability that was unaffected by SB 1437. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971972; People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931.)
Such is the case here. In convicting appellant of special circumstances felony murder, the jury not only found the murder occurred during a felony. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.80.1, it also found that appellant 1) harbored the intent to kill, and 2) aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted Burleson in the commission of first degree murder. Those findings are sufficient to satisfy the current requirements for felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2). Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
In arguing otherwise, appellant faults the trial court for failing to consider the fact he was only 20 years old at the time Preston was murdered. Appellant contends his age was relevant to determine whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life during the robbery, for purposes of section 189, subdivision (e)(3). However, as we have explained, eligibility for resentencing at the prima facie stage turns on the trial court's assessment of the record of conviction, not its assessment of the factual circumstances surrounding the underlying murder.
Moreover, section 189, subdivision (e)(3) was not the statutory basis on which the trial court relied in denying appellant's petition. Rather, the denial was based on section 189, subdivision (e)(2), which applies when the defendant, acting with malice, aids and abets first degree murder during the commission of a felony. Therefore, the trial court was not remiss for failing to factor appellant's age into its decision.
For the same reason, the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698 is of no assistance to appellant. In that case, the court refused to give preclusive effect to a jury's determination the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, which would have rendered him ineligible for resentencing under section 189, subdivision (e)(3). The court did so because the major participant and reckless indifference requirements in that provision had undergone considerable judicial refinement since the jury had rendered its verdict in that case. (Id. at pp. 715-718.)
But, as the trial court properly recognized here, Strong has no bearing on appellant's eligibility for resentencing. That's because section 189 subdivision (e)(2), not subdivision (e)(3), governs his eligibility. Because the record of conviction conclusively establishes all of the elements for felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), appellant has no right to resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying appellant's petition for resentencing is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. DELANEY, J.