Opinion
C085426
10-30-2018
In re A.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.V., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JDSQ1700093)
A.V. (the minor) appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional order reaffirming his status as a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and vesting discretion in his probation officer to potentially require him to serve up to 135 days in the juvenile hall as part of the minor's commitment to a camp rehabilitative program. The minor argues the juvenile court should have confirmed compliance with section 241.1 (a procedure for addressing dual jurisdiction in dependency and delinquency court) prior to his dispositional hearing and "the juvenile court's order imposing a condition of probation on [the minor] suspending or staying a 135-day[] commitment in the juvenile hall that can be summarily enforced by the probation officer is an unlawful stayed or suspended commitment and must be stricken." (Emphasis Omitted.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The minor was originally adjudged a section 602 ward of the court on February 27, 2017. Thereafter, in early March 2017, a section 300 dependency petition was filed concerning the minor (then age 16), and child protective services (CPS) took the minor into protective custody. In response, the probation department moved to modify the terms of the minor's probation to remove him from his home and place him in foster care, which the juvenile court granted on March 13, 2017. The minor remained in the foster home where he had been originally placed by CPS, until he ran away, resulting in a section 777 probation violation petition.
On April 13, 2017, the minor's section 300 dependency petition was dismissed. The only reason the parties have identified for this dismissal appears in a probation report, which states: "On March 6, 2017, a referral for general neglect was substantiated in Napa County; a new case was opened and the minor and his sister were placed in confidential foster homes. . . . [D]ue to the minor['s] status as a ward of the Court pursuant to section 600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, his portion of the case was closed."
There is no April 13, 2017, order in the appellate record, supporting that it was the dependency court, and not the juvenile delinquency court, which ordered the section 300 petition dismissed.
On May 26, 2017, a supplemental wardship petition was filed in Napa County alleging two violations of Penal Code section 211, two violations of Penal Code section 422 and one violation of section 777. The People's section 707, subdivision (a)(1) request to transfer this petition to adult court was denied. Later, the minor admitted to committing one of the robbery allegations and the probation violation, and the case was transferred to Yuba County for disposition.
At a disposition hearing, the minor's counsel objected to the remedial commitment term suggested in the probation report on the basis that it allowed probation "to administer punishment without a waiver or bringing it back to court . . . ." The People explained the potential remedial commitments were part of the Maxine Singer Youth Guidance Program, and participation in the program was in the minor's best rehabilitative interests compared to the alternative of a full commitment in juvenile hall. Thereafter, the court continued the minor as a ward, including his previous terms and conditions of probation. The court also ordered in pertinent part that the minor be "committed to The Maxine Singer Youth Guidance Center for a period of time not to exceed one year, with the probation officer authorized to release [him] upon successful completion of the program. [¶] [The minor] may be remanded to Tri-Counties Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility for remedial programs for a period not to exceed 30 days while participating in the Maxine Singer Youth Program, as is—as necessary by behavior, in accordance with the program and administrative procedures. [¶] And I will add the 135 days in the hall,[] which is no intent for [the minor] to go back and do that, but if [the minor] should be committed upon remedials, then that time will go towards the hall time. And upon successful completion of the camp, [the minor] will be done. Any time outstanding would be suspended."
We understand the Tri-Counties Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility to be the juvenile hall.
The minor timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Section 241 .1 Report
The minor argues "there was insufficient evidence presented, prior to [the minor's] disposition hearing in Yuba County Superior Court, to show that the joint assessment mandated by . . . section 241.1 had been prepared or presented to the juvenile court prior to the court's order dismissing [the minor's] dependency petition." (Emphasis omitted.) We conclude the procedural posture of the case ultimately relieves the delinquency court from any duty to investigate the adequacy of the section 241.1 inquiry conducted by the dependency court. The minor's dependency case in Napa County was dismissed before the supplemental wardship petition, that lead to the disposition order that is the subject of this appeal, was filed in Yuba County.
Section 241.1, subdivision (a) provides a process for resolving questions of dual jurisdiction between delinquency and dependency courts: "Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol described in subdivision (b), initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor. Any other juvenile court having jurisdiction over the minor shall receive notice from the court, within five calendar days, of the presentation of the recommendations of the departments. The notice shall include the name of the judge to whom, or the courtroom to which, the recommendations were presented." (See also California Rules of Court, rule 5.512.) The section 241.1 issue shall be determined by the juvenile court facing the problem of dual jurisdiction. (In re Joey G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 343, 348; In re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1013.) "On appeal, we presume the trial court performed its duties in a regular and correct manner absent a clear showing to the contrary." (In re Amber D. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 718, 724.)
Here, it was the dependency court in Napa County that faced the problem of dual jurisdiction because the section 300 dependency petition was filed after the minor had already been adjudicated a section 602 ward of the court. (In re Joey G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 348.) Whether the dependency court in Napa County complied with its section 241.1 duties prior to its subsequent dismissal of the section 300 petition is not revealed by the record for this appeal, which is taken from the disposition of subsequent delinquency proceeding in Yuba County. What is clear is that after the Napa County court dismissed the dependency matter before it, there was no longer an issue of dual jurisdiction. If the minor disagreed with the Napa County dependency court's determination and dismissal of his dependency case (which apparently occurred on April 13, 2017), his recourse was to appeal from that dismissal. (See In re Marcus G., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1014-1015 [reversal of termination of dependency order and remand for determination whether juvenile delinquency court complied with § 241.1 duty].) He cannot raise the issue from an appeal of a later disposition order related to a subsequent delinquency petition. B. The Probation Order Allowing Remedial Tune-Ups
The parties have not argued, and we need not decide, whether complaints concerning compliance with section 241.1's procedures would have been cognizable in an appeal from the juvenile court's order modifying the terms of his probation to remove him from his mother's care and place him within the CPS foster home. (§ 800, subd. (a).) This appeal is not from the modification order, which occurred in March 2017.
The minor argues "the juvenile court's order imposing a condition of probation on [the minor] suspending or staying a 135-day[] commitment in the juvenile hall that can be summarily enforced by the probation officer is an unlawful stayed or suspended commitment and must be stricken." (Emphasis Omitted.) He charges the court made two unlawful orders: (1) "that [the minor] 'may be remanded to Tri-Counties Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility for remedial programs for a period of time not to exceed 30 days while participating in the Maxine Singer Youth Program, as is—as necessary by behavior, in accordance with program and administrative procedures;' " and (2) the order adding 135 days in juvenile hall, which the court did not intend the minor to serve, but against which the minor would receive credit for any "remedials."
Section 730, subdivision (a) authorizes the commitment of a section 602 ward to a "juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp . . . ." (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(h)(4) ["If the child was declared a ward under section 602, the court may order treatment or commitment of the child under section 730 or 731"].) In so doing, "[a] juvenile court does not lose direct supervision over a juvenile committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer by a camp placement. (See . . . §§ 880, 881.)" (In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1208.) Rather, it may "impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (§ 730, subd. (b); see In re Ronny P., at pp. 1207-1208 [recognizing juvenile court's authority to impose a minimum period of confinement as part of camp placement order].)
" 'An appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court's broad discretion over probation conditions absent an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] We grant this broad discretion so that the juvenile court may serve its rehabilitative function and further the legislative policies of the juvenile court system. . . . Thus, "[a] condition of probation which is [legally] impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court." ' [Citation.]" (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246.)
Here, the juvenile court exercised its discretion and ordered placement of the minor in the Maxine Singer Youth Program for a period not to exceed one year. It also separately imposed a commitment to juvenile hall (the Tri-Counties Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility) of up to 135 days as part of the Maxine Singer Youth Program, which would be suspended upon successful completion of the program.
The minor does not challenge that the juvenile court was authorized to commit him to juvenile hall; in fact, he requested a one-year commitment to juvenile hall instead of participation in the Maxine Singer Youth Program. Rather, he argues the juvenile court's order amounted to an unlawful stayed or deferred sentence that could be imposed by probation without adjudication. However, we do not view the contemplated "remedials" as improper punishment for unadjudicated probation violations. Rather, they are part and parcel to participation in the minor's rehabilitation through the Maxine Singer Youth Program at the discretion of the probation officer and according to that program's administrative procedures.
This conclusion is supported by these programs sharing "custodial" status that is credited against the minor's maximum term of confinement. The Maxine Singer Youth Program is a custodial camp program, where the minor is "physically confined" for purposes of section 726, subdivision (d) and the minor cannot be held there beyond the period of maximum confinement. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1), (5).) The remedial stays in the juvenile hall (Tri-Counties Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility) also qualify as "physical confinement." (§ 726, subd. (d)(5).) Thus, both commitments are to institutions with interrelated programs where the minor is "confined" and receiving credit towards his maximum term of confinement. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1), (5).) Therefore, we reject the minor's unsupported characterization of the Maxine Singer Youth Program as "an out-of-custody ranch or camp program." (Italics added.)
The minor's maximum term of confinement is five years two months.
These circumstances are distinguishable from the minor's authorities that involve summary changes to a minor's disposition as reflected in automatic commitments to (1) the California Division of Juvenile Justice (formerly the California Youth Authority) upon failure of a different placement (see, e.g., In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147-1149 [invalidating automatic imposition of previously stayed commitment to Division of Juvenile Justice upon camp failure]) or (2) juvenile hall commitments upon the occurrence of a specific violation of probation terms (see, e.g., In re Gerald B. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 119, 126-127 [invalidating automatic juvenile hall commitments for unauthorized absences from school]).
The minor has failed to convince us the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to a rehabilitative camp program with the possibility of custody in juvenile hall, as part of the camp program, for a period of time less than his maximum term of confinement. This falls within the juvenile court's rehabilitative powers authorized by section 730. (See, e.g., In re Ricardo M. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 744, 751-752 [approving discretionary commitment to juvenile hall of between five to 20 days at the discretion of the probation officer].) We do not read the juvenile court's order as authorizing an automatic commitment to juvenile hall for any remaining term, if the minor were to fail to successfully complete the Maxine Singer Youth Program, and thus, we are unconvinced that the probation order committing the minor to serve up to 135 days in juvenile hall is unlawful.
III. DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/_________
HULL, Acting P. J.
/S/_________
MAURO, J.