Opinion
C084207
08-17-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDREA ROSE ARMSTRONG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15F07754)
Following a jury trial, defendant Andrea Rose Armstrong was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) and driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and causing bodily injury (§ 23153, subd. (b)) with sustained allegations of personally inflicting great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and causing bodily injury to more than one victim (§ 23558). The trial court sentenced her to a seven-year state prison term.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying her Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) motion to exclude a statement she made to the police while in the hospital. Finding defendant was not in custody when she made the statement, we shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Crime
On the night of July 3, 2015, Shawna V. met defendant at defendant's home. They planned to go out that night with Alex M., and Gabriela B., who arrived at defendant's house at around 11:00 p.m. Alex M.'s friends, the brothers Michael and Jeremy Vega were there as well. They all drank alcohol at defendant's house before deciding to go to a bar in downtown Sacramento. Alex M. was the designated driver and the Vega brothers went in a separate car.
Defendant, Gabriela B., and Shawna V. all drank several shots of alcohol at the bar. All three were drunk. They went to a strip club after the bar closed. No one had alcohol at the club, because it did not serve alcohol after 2:00 a.m. Alex M. and defendant began arguing there, and the group decided to leave. Defendant called another friend on her cell phone to pick her up so she could continue partying. The argument between defendant and Alex M. continued as the party left the club and went outside. Alex M. took defendant's cell phone to prevent her from calling her friend.
Defendant, Gabriela B., Shawna V., and Alex M. got into Alex M.'s car. Alex M. drove, defendant sat in the front passenger seat, Shawna V. was in the back seat behind defendant, and Gabriela B. sat in the middle back seat. Alex M. held defendant's cell phone in his left hand as he drove down Folsom Boulevard at about 50 miles per hour.
Defendant was very intoxicated; she screamed at Alex M. to return her cell phone and grabbed for it. Shawna V. saw defendant next grab the steering wheel and pull at it, causing the car to crash into a tree. Gabriela B. was not looking in the direction of the steering wheel at the time and did not see what caused the accident.
At the scene of the accident, Shawna V. could not tell the responding deputies what caused it. --------
Alex M. testified that defendant tried to grab her cell phone from him, and when he refused to give it back, she struck him on the arm. Alex M. lost control of the car and panicked, stepping on the gas instead of applying the brakes, which caused his car to hit the tree. In a letter written on September 30, 2015, Alex M. stated that the accident was caused by him being very tired and delusional. In a January 9, 2016, letter, Alex M. stated that he was very tired that night, and hit the tree when defendant yelled to him that there was an animal on the road.
At the scene of the accident, Alex M. told a deputy that while he was arguing with defendant in the car, defendant became angry and grabbed the steering wheel, causing the accident. He repeated this version to another deputy who gave him a ride home.
After interviewing Alex M., Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Steven Gonzales went to the hospital where defendant was transported. He contacted defendant in the emergency room. When he identified himself to defendant, she responded, "It's my fault. It's my fault. It's my fault." Defendant was crying but regained her composure in about five minutes, and then resumed speaking with Deputy Gonzales. She related the events of the evening, and stated she had seven or eight shots of rum and a couple of mixed drinks at the bar. When they were not allowed in the strip club, Alex M. and defendant's friends wanted to go home but she did not. When they got in the car, Alex M. took the cell phone from her and held it in his left hand as he drove. She could not reach her phone, so defendant grabbed the steering wheel and yanked it to the right and held onto it for a few seconds as she tried to get the phone from Alex M. This caused the car to crash.
Defendant told Deputy Gonzales the crash was her fault and she wanted him to take her to jail. He smelled a very strong odor of alcohol on her breath, and her eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Defendant consented to a blood draw for testing. The blood was drawn at 6:09 a.m. tested at 0.10 percent alcohol. A woman of defendant's weight would have had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent at 3:24 a.m.
Shawna V. suffered a broken wrist that required surgery, a broken pelvis, a gash on her chin that required plastic surgery, and a broken tooth. She was hospitalized for seven days and spent 14 days in a rehabilitation center. Gabriela B. sustained a broken nose that required two surgeries and needed stitches for a laceration around her eye. Alex M. suffered some bruising but did not need any medical attention.
The Defense
Defendant's testimony of the events up to leaving the strip club was generally consistent with that of the other witnesses. Alex M. took defendant's cell phone after they left the club but before they entered the car. She was still intoxicated when the group got in Alex M.'s car. As Alex M. drove, defendant leaned over and tried to grab the phone from his hand. Alex M. blocked defendant with his arm; she got upset and persisted in trying to retrieve her phone. Defendant recalled leaning over trying to get her cell phone, and, when she looked up, screaming as the car veered off and crashed. Defendant never grabbed the steering wheel, although she did grab at Alex M. She hit Alex M.'s arm before the accident, but could not recall how hard. When defendant told Deputy Gonzales the accident was her fault, she meant that it had been caused by her argument with Alex M.
The Miranda Hearing
Deputy Gonzales was the sole witness at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress her statement. He responded to the scene of the accident at 3:24 a.m. Defendant was one of the car's four occupants at the scene. She was taken to the hospital before he had a chance to speak with her. About half an hour after his arrival, Deputy Gonzales went to the hospital to speak with defendant. He arrived wearing his uniform, and found defendant being attended to by staff in the emergency room.
Defendant was wearing a neck brace and appeared to be in pain. He introduced himself as a sheriff's deputy and made eye contact with defendant. She replied by stating repeatedly, "It's my fault, it's my fault, it's my fault." He began to talk to her when she regained her composure about five minutes later. She then related the events of the evening to Deputy Gonzales, going out with her boyfriend and friends, getting drunk at the bar, not being allowed into the strip club because she was too drunk or belligerent, wanting to continue to party while the others preferred to go home, Alex M. taking her phone from her, and defendant yanking the steering wheel and causing the crash when she tried to get her phone back. Defendant said the crash was her fault.
Defendant was not in handcuffs when she spoke with Deputy Gonzales. He did not draw his weapon, raise his voice, or order defendant to tell him what happened. The interview took about 45 minutes because it took place during breaks in defendant's medical treatment. He never gave medical personnel directions on defendant's treatment, and would step aside when she was being treated. Deputy Gonzales did not arrest defendant at the end of the interview, but he did tell her that he would be requesting a warrant for her arrest.
Deputy Gonzales spoke to Alex M. before the interview with defendant. He had a good idea of how the collision occurred from Alex M.'s statement and the statements of other witnesses. Deputy Gonzales spoke with defendant in a good faith effort to get statements from all of the car's occupants. He did not get an arrest warrant after speaking with Alex M. because he first wanted to get statements from all of the car's occupants.
The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding defendant's initial statement, made after Deputy Gonzales identified himself, that it was her fault, was a spontaneous utterance. It noted Deputy Gonzales never drew his gun and the fact that he was armed did not render the interview custodial. The fact that the deputy did not order medical staff around and waited for pauses in treatment favored a finding that the encounter was not custodial. His subjective motivation in interviewing defendant was irrelevant. The court concluded defendant was not in custody when she made her statements and denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying her Miranda motion. We disagree.
To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda court held, "suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. [Citation.]" (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 107 [133 L.Ed.2d 383, 391].) "The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, [and] to relieve the ' "inherently compelling pressures" ' generated by the custodial setting itself, ' "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist." ' " (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 433 [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 330], fns. omitted.) The People may not use statements obtained in violation of Miranda to establish guilt. (Id. at p. 429 .)
We apply federal standards in determining whether the government elicited a defendant's statements in violation of Miranda. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440.) In determining whether a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 476.) We independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395 (Moore).)
Miranda warnings are required only when the suspect is in custody. (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 [128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298].) An interrogation is custodial when the suspect is placed under arrest or his freedom of movement is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) Whether an interrogation is custodial is an objective inquiry. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 270 [180 L.Ed.2d 310, 322].) The United States Supreme Court has held the inquiry involves two discrete questions: " '[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave[?]' " (Id. at p. 270 .)
Federal courts have identified some factors which guide our analysis: (1) where the questioning occurred, (2) the number of officers present, (3) the degree of physical restraint placed on the defendant, (4) the length and manner of the questioning, and (5) whether the defendant was told she did not need to answer the questions. (United States v. Crooker (1st Cir. 2012) 688 F.3d 1, 11; United States v. Hinojosa (6th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 875, 883.) The California Supreme Court has similarly stated that all the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant in determining whether a defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda, including the location, length, and form of the interrogation and whether any indicia of arrest were present. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 395; see People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403 (Pilster) [listing the following indicia of custody for Miranda purposes: (1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning].)
Deputy Gonzales was the only officer present when defendant was questioned. He used a normal conversational tone when questioning her. Defendant was not in the police station, but getting treatment in the emergency room. While the encounter lasted 45 minutes, it took this long because the questioning took place only during breaks in treatment. Uninterrupted questioning of greater length has been held not to be custodial. (See Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 131, 135-136 [over two hours]; People v. Spears (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1, 26 [75 minutes].) Deputy Gonzales did not interfere defendant's treatment or direct medical personnel in any way. (See Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-1404 [whether officer "dominated and controlled the interrogation" is relevant to custody question].) Finally, defendant was not arrested at any point during the questioning, even though Deputy Gonzales informed her at the conclusion that he would be seeking an arrest warrant.
The relevant factors here all support the conclusion, that a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances could have terminated the questioning at any time. The trial court's findings that Miranda was not violated because defendant's initial statement was not the product of interrogation and her subsequent statements were not made while in custody are correct.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Mauro, J. /s/_________
Renner, J.