Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD209179, Robert F. O'Neill, Judge.
BENKE, J.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Michael Araya of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460.)
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, Araya claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because it did not give effect to its own doubts as to Araya's guilt. As we explain more fully, the record shows the trial court did not entertain the serious doubts which would have permitted it to overturn the jury's verdict.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Redlinger's Testimony
On September 20, 2007, at about 10 p.m., Matthew Redlinger, a fraternity member and resident of a fraternity house (house) on the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU), saw Araya and his friend Bereket standing outside the house. When Redlinger asked if he could help them, Bereket answered he was waiting for his friend and inquired how to get into the house. After Redlinger explained the process to join the fraternity, Bereket then said that he and Araya had seen some "fine-ass" girls go into the house and wanted to know how they also could get into the house. Realizing Araya and Bereket just wanted to come in and party, Redlinger told them that the house was a private residence and they could not come in. Redlinger went inside the house and shut the front door while Araya and Bereket were still standing outside. The front door lock was broken so it could not be locked.
A few minutes later, as he was walking from his room to one of the upstairs bathrooms, Redlinger saw Araya standing on the stairs. When Redlinger confronted Araya, Araya pulled out a laptop computer from under his shirt while mumbling "I have" or "we have." Redlinger then asked where Araya obtained the computer and Araya pointed to Kevin Longeuay's room. Redlinger told Araya to return the computer to where he found it and Araya placed it on a coffee table in Longeuay's room. When Redlinger told Araya that the computer did not belong there and pointed to a dresser, Araya put the computer on top of the dresser. According to Longeuay's testimony, that was where he left his computer before he left the room. Araya then told Redlinger: "We are cool. You are not going to call the cops." Redlinger told Araya to leave the house and walked him outside where Bereket was still standing. Redlinger told both men to leave. After Araya and Bereket left, Redlinger called police.
Daniel Harrison, an SDSU police officer, picked up Redligner and took him to a campus parking lot where several men were detained. Before arriving at that location, Redlinger saw five men standing near another parking lot (Q lot), and identified Araya as the person he saw inside the house with the laptop computer.
B. Araya's Testimony
At trial, Araya testified John, his friend and an SDSU student, told him about a party on campus on the day of the incident and he decided to go to the party with Bereket. On the way to SDSU on foot, Araya saw an acquaintance who he identified as the "New York man" driving by and waived at him. The New York man stopped and offered to give Araya and Bereket a ride to SDSU and join them at the party.
Araya did not know John's last name although, according to Araya, he had known John for long time.
According to Araya, he initially met this New York man at a neighborhood laundry room. Araya said the New York man had recently moved to San Diego from New York but was originally from Kenya. Araya also said the New York man knew Araya's cell phone number but Araya knew neither his name nor where to find him.
When Araya, Bereket and the New York man arrived at SDSU between 7:20 to 7:25 p.m., Araya called John to meet up with him but John was no longer going to the party. However, the three men saw three girls walking by, followed them into the house and went upstairs to one bedroom where the party was going on. According to Araya, the three girls did not expressly invite the three men in but the three men "went along" with them without being stopped by anyone.
According to Araya, there were about six people (not including the three men and the three girls) in the room and they were drinking and yelling out loud over music. These six people recognized the three girls and did not react to the arrival of Araya, Bereket and the New York man.. About 15 minutes later, Araya saw the New York man leaving the room. Araya then stepped out from the room to go to the bathroom and saw the New York man running to the outside. Araya ran after the New York man and waited outside the house for 30 to 45 seconds until receiving a phone call from the New York man. On the phone, the New York man told Araya that he stole the laptop and wanted Araya and Bereket to leave the campus with him.
After Araya urged the New York man to return the laptop, the New York man agreed to bring back the laptop to Araya so Araya could return it. After the call, Araya went upstairs to get Bereket and both came downstairs together to wait for the New York man outside the house. Redlinger saw both men coming downstairs and told them that they had to leave the house. Redlinger followed both men outside and started talking to Bereket about joining the fraternity. The New York man called Araya again and told him that the laptop was hidden in the bushes. Araya recovered the laptop from the bushes and tucked it in underneath his shirt because he was afraid of being accused of stealing the laptop. Araya then approached Redlinger, who was outside the house, pulled out the laptop from underneath his shirt, presented the laptop to Redlinger and said that his friend stole the laptop but he was returning it. Redlinger told Araya to put the laptop back and Araya followed Redlinger's instructions. When Araya asked Redlinger if "everything was cool," Redlinger said everything was cool. Araya did not ask him to not call the police.
After leaving the fraternity house, Araya and Bereket noticed a very loud party in another house right down the street. Both men went inside but they did not know anyone. When Araya went outside to the Q lot to answer a phone call, he was arrested.
C. Officer's Testimony
Brian Weaver, an SDSU police officer, arrested Araya and drove him to the county jail. On the way to the county jail, Araya told Weaver: "Look at my face. I am innocent. I wasn't in that house."
Araya testified that he did not remember making these statements to Weaver.
DISCUSSION
Araya's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his new trial motion because it failed to "independently [weigh] the evidence, in effect acting as a '13th juror.' " (People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038, fn. 6.)
Araya relies on the trial court's statement at the time of sentencing: "And clearly the jury believed the evidence that was presented during the trial. They reached a decision. I may not have reached that same decision if it had been a court trial, but that's the way it is. I may have found he had the intent, and, again, I may have found it was just something else less than a felony, but more than an infraction, but I suggest we proceed [with sentencing]." Araya contends these remarks show that the trial court did not believe there was sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. We do not agree with Araya's interpretation of the trial court's remarks.
While it is the exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is the duty of the trial court to see that this function is intelligently and justly performed, and in the exercise of its supervisory power over the verdict, the court, on motion for a new trial, should consider the probative force of the evidence and satisfy itself that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633.) It has been stated that a defendant is entitled to two decisions on the evidence, one by the jury and the other by the court on motion for a new trial. (Ibid.) The axiom "the court sits as a 13th juror" means that the trial judge has had the same opportunity as the jury to observe the manner of the witnesses, and to decide upon their credibility, and it is his or her duty to see that the verdict is not clearly against the weight of the evidence. (See Green v. Soule (1904) 145 Cal. 96, 102.)
Importantly, in considering a motion for new trial, a trial court is "guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it. [Citation.] The trial court 'should [not] disregard the verdict... but instead... should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.' [Citation.]" (People v. Davis (1993) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524.) Just as importantly, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial, we are bound by the principle: "A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion. ' " 'The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that the action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." ' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
As Araya points out, in People v. Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d at page 634, the Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion in a trial court's failure to grant a new trial. In Robarge, after reviewing the testimony of the only witness who identified defendant positively, the trial court stated that there were inconsistencies in the witness's testimony that " 'were awfully hard for the Court... to believe.' " (Ibid.) The trial court also made other remarks which clearly showed the trial court disbelieved much of the witness's testimony and entertained serious doubts as to the validity of the witness's identification of the defendant. (Ibid.)
In People v. Robarge the trial court nevertheless indicated three times on the record that it believed it was bound by the contrary conclusion of the jury. Given the trial court's repeated statements as to both the witnesses' lack of credibility and its belief it was bound by the jury's findings, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court had misapprehended its role on a motion for a new trial. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court reversed with instructions that the trial court vacate its order denying the motion and reconsider the motion in accordance with the rules it had set forth.
In contrast, in People v. Davis the Supreme Court considered a record, which, although it contained statements which indicated the trial court felt bound by the jury's determination, contained other statements which affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court had exercised its independent judgment. In affirming the order denying the motion for a new trial, the court stated: "Although defendant isolates statements in which the trial court refers to the jury's verdicts, it is clear from the record as a whole that it did not regard itself bound by any of the jury's findings." (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
Here, the record with respect to the trial court's ruling on the motion for a new trial is not as complete as the records considered in Robarge and Davis. Unlike the trial court in Robarge, the trial court here made no statement categorically questioning the credibility of any prosecution witness. The record is also devoid of any statement by the trial court to the effect that it was disregarding its own doubts because it felt bound by the jury's determination. Admittedly, on the other hand, here there is nothing approaching the detailed factual analysis the trial court put on the record in Davis. Rather, what appears here is a relatively ambiguous statement from the trial court which does nothing more than express the obvious truth that the evidence presented at trial was subject to more than one interpretation. We are unwilling to infer from that ambiguous statement any misunderstanding by the trial court of its duty to independently review the record. Although helpful to us on appeal, neither Robarge nor Davis itself requires the sort of detailed factual analysis which appeared in Davis. Plainly, the absence of such detailed analysis does not give rise to any inference that the trial court misunderstood its obligation. Rather, we presume, as we must, that the trial court fully understood its duty in ruling on the motion for a new trial and discharged that duty. Thus, the record does not permit us to find any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., NARES, J.