Opinion
A156422
04-07-2020
In re ANTHONY N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY N., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1700634)
Anthony N. (minor) appeals the order committing him to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program (YOTP) at the county's juvenile hall. He contends the court lacked authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (a) to order the commitment because the county operates a less restrictive ranch program. Alternatively, minor contends that if the commitment is authorized, the court improperly delegated responsibility to the probation department to determine length of his commitment. We find no error and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Background
In May 2017, minor admitted that he had participated in an attempted robbery during which he told the victim that he had a "40" and gestured toward his waistband as if he had a gun. At the same time his accomplice removed the victim's iPhone from the victim's pocket. The juvenile court adjudged minor a ward of the court with no termination date, removed him from the custody of his parents, and committed him to the county's juvenile ranch program for six months.
On November 16, 2017, the Contra Costa County Probation Department filed a notice of probation violation. The notice alleged that minor had failed to attend school, left home without permission and that his whereabouts were unknown. On April 16, 2018, after minor admitted the alleged probation violation, the juvenile court continued minor as a ward of the court and committed him once more to the ranch for six months.
On November 19, 2018, the probation department filed a second notice of probation violation. The notice alleged minor was arrested for possession of a loaded semiautomatic firearm. On December 17, 2018, after minor admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation, the juvenile court continued the then 17-year-old minor as a ward of the court and committed him to the YOTP in juvenile hall "for a period not to exceed the maximum custody time of two years, 42 days or until the age of 21, whichever occurs first."
Minor timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion
1. Section 730 does not preclude minor's commitment to the YOTP.
Under section 202, subdivision (b), "[m]inors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter." Punishment includes "[c]ommitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch." (§ 202, subd. (e)(4).) Section 730, subdivision (a) similarly provides, "When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 602, the court may order any of the types of treatment referred to in Section 727, and as an additional alternative, may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp within the county, the court may commit the minor to the county juvenile hall."
Minor contends that the second sentence of section 730, subdivision (a) prohibits a commitment to juvenile hall if there is a ranch, camp, or forestry camp within the county. He argues that his commitment to the YOTP was statutorily unauthorized because Contra Costa County has a ranch. Minor acknowledges that the Second District Court of Appeal rejected this argument in In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522 (Calvin S.). He asserts that Calvin S. was wrongly decided and inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
In Calvin S., the court held that the second sentence of section 730, subdivision (a) "merely authorizes commitment to juvenile hall when one of the listed facilities would be appropriate but is not available." (Calvin S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 530.) Relying on section 202, subdivision (e)(4), and "a juvenile court's 'great discretion in the disposition of juvenile matters' in general," Calvin S. concluded that "the proper interpretation of the second sentence of . . . section 730, subdivision (a), is one that augments the juvenile court's flexibility in fashioning orders at disposition, rather than restricts it." (Calvin S., at pp. 531-532.)
We agree. In this case, minor had two prior placements at the county ranch and continued to violate his probation upon his return home. The court reasonably questioned whether his return to the ranch would be helpful at this point. Reading the second sentence of section 730, subdivision (a) as precluding his commitment to juvenile hall in these circumstances would unreasonably restrict the juvenile court's broad discretion to provide "care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with [minor's] best interest, that holds [him] accountable for [his] behavior, and that is appropriate for [his] circumstances." (§ 202, subd. (b).) Moreover, minor's construction of the statute is inconsistent with the rule that "juvenile placements need not follow any particular order . . . , including from the least to the most restrictive." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.)
Minor's reliance on In re Debra A. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 327 and In re Gerald B. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 119 is misplaced. As the court in Calvin S. acknowledged, while the interpretation of section 730, subdivision (a) in these prior opinions was "plausible" in isolation, it is no longer justifiable in light of section 202, subdivision (e)(4), which was enacted in 1984. (Calvin S., at p. 531.) Section 202 "contain[ed] a new statement of the purposes of the juvenile delinquency law, including, for the first time, 'a definition and statement as to the use of punishment' " and authorization of a commitment to juvenile hall. (Calvin S., at p. 531.) Given the change in law and the broad discretion afforded to juvenile courts to make dispositional orders, we agree with the interpretation of section 730 in Calvin S. and thus find that the court did not exceed its authority in committing minor to the YOTP.
2. The juvenile court did not delegate to the probation department its authority to determine the length of minor's commitment to the YOTP.
The trial court committed minor to the YOTP for a maximum period of 2 years, 41 days, or until age 21, whichever occurs first. The court directed him to "successfully complete all phases of the program, follow all treatment requirements, and obey all rules and regulations." The court rejected minor's argument that his commitment should be limited to 40 weeks, the length of time minors typically take to complete the program. On appeal, minor renews his argument that the court's "indefinite commitment" constituted an impermissible delegation to the probation department of the juvenile court's authority to determine when he successfully completes the YOTP. Minor acknowledges that his argument was rejected by Division Five of this Court in In re J.C. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 741 (J.C.) but argues that the decision was wrongly decided.
In J.C., the court acknowledged that "the probation officer ha[d] day-to-day supervision and control over" the minor while he was in YOTP, but held that there was no improper delegation because "the juvenile court . . . retains the ultimate authority to determine whether and when minor successfully completes YOTP." (J.C., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 745, citing & quoting In re Robert M. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185 [" 'Unquestionably, a ward placed in . . . juvenile hall . . . is answerable on a daily basis to those who operate the program, but that does not change the ultimate responsibility of the juvenile court for the ward's supervision and control.' "].) The court recognized that the juvenile court had "exercised that retained authority in scheduling a 'YOTP review hearing' seven months after disposition." (Id. at p. 746.) The court noted that "at the review hearings, minor may inform the juvenile court if he disagrees with the probation officer's assessment of his progress to date. In addition, at any time, minor (or his parents or attorney) can file a section 778 petition requesting the juvenile court modify the dispositional order. [Citations.] . . . [I]f minor contends the probation officer is unfairly assessing minor's performance in YOTP, this would appear to constitute a changed circumstance from the implicit assumption in the dispositional order that the probation officer will fairly assess minor's performance." (Id. at p. 747.)
Consistent with our prior unpublished decisions, we confirm our agreement with the reasoning in J.C. Contrary to minor's suggestion, our holding does not "ignore[] what actually happens in Contra Costa County's juvenile system" and does not "subordinate[] minors' due process rights to administrative convenience." We note, however, that unlike in J.C., at the dispositional hearing in this case the juvenile court did not schedule a YOTP review hearing. J.C. suggests and we agree that a proper exercise of supervisory authority in this context would entail a status review of the minor's progress in the YOTP within 10 to 12 months of the commitment. Timely review is particularly important in cases such as this where the maximum term of commitment extends well beyond the typical time for completion of the program. Thus, we will remand this matter for the court to exercise its supervisory authority over minor's progress in that program by scheduling a review hearing if it has not already done so.
Disposition
The matter is remanded with direction to the juvenile court to promptly schedule a review hearing if such a hearing has not already been scheduled or held. In all other respects, the dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/_________
POLLAK, P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
STREETER, J. /s/_________
TUCHER, J.