Opinion
1999-04205
Submitted May 31, 2002.
June 25, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gerges, J.), rendered April 29, 1999, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Erica Horwitz of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman, and Valerie L. Forbes of counsel), for respondent.
Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, STEPHEN G. CRANE, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People's certificate of readiness was valid (cf. People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337). Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the amount of time chargeable to the People is less than six months (see CPL 30.30[a]; cf. People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 207). Accordingly, his speedy trial motion was properly denied (see People v. Coulter, 240 A.D.2d 756, 757).
The hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence (see People v. Private, 259 A.D.2d 504; People v. Douglas, 254 A.D.2d 367, 368; People v. Wilson, 225 A.D.2d 568; People v. Ellison, 222 A.D.2d 693, 694).
Under the circumstances, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to give an expanded identification charge. A detailed identification charge is not necessarily required, and the identification charge, as given, accurately stated the law (see People v. Knight, 87 N.Y.2d 873, 874; People v. Washington, 209 A.D.2d 733, 734).
The trial court properly determined that the "merger doctrine" did not operate to preclude a conviction of unlawful imprisonment (see People v. Armstrong, 250 A.D.2d 618; People v. Goines, 122 A.D.2d 73; People v. Brown, 112 A.D.2d 1087).
Moreover, the defendant was not deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137).
The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05) or without merit.
FLORIO, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, KRAUSMAN and CRANE, JJ., concur.