Opinion
2012-12-19
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Jonathan ANDUJAR, appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Jennifer Hagan of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Jennifer Hagan of counsel), for respondent.
ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Aloise, J.), rendered June 11, 2009, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
However, over the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to elicit, from a detective, the statement of a nontestifying codefendant that the defendant was in the codefendant's vehicle on the night of the incident. As the People correctly concede, this violated the defendant's right of confrontation, secured to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ( see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177;see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176;Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224). This error was compounded when, on summation, the prosecutor argued that the codefendant's statement established the defendant's presence at the scene of the incident. Since the remaining evidence establishing the defendant's identity as one of the assailants was not overwhelming, the error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Douglas, 4 N.Y.3d 777, 779, 793 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 N.E.2d 796;People v. Hardy, 4 N.Y.3d 192, 198, 791 N.Y.S.2d 513, 824 N.E.2d 953;People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240–241, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787). Accordingly, a new trial is required.
Since a new trial is required, we note that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ruling that the People could impeach the defendant's credibility, should he testify, with questioning regarding his prison disciplinary record ( see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413;People v. Adams, 39 A.D.3d 1081, 1082, 835 N.Y.S.2d 498;People v. Porter, 305 A.D.2d 933, 934, 761 N.Y.S.2d 691; People v. Veneracion, 268 A.D.2d 363, 703 N.Y.S.2d 433).
The defendant's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination.