Opinion
A122255.
6-26-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Douglas Anderson appeals from a judgment following revocation of his probation. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence to support the probation violation. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2005, defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. On November 6, 2006, the district attorney moved to revoke probation based on defendants arrest for assault, contempt of court, and various outstanding warrants. On December 15, 2006, defendant admitted the probation violation. The court reinstated him on probation on the original terms and conditions.
A week later, on December 21, 2006, the district attorney filed another motion to revoke probation on the ground that defendant was arrested for violating a stay away order. On January 10, 2007, defendant admitted the violation. The court reinstated defendant on probation on the original terms and modified the conditions to include a county jail term of 90 days.
On June 7, 2007, the district attorney filed a new motion to revoke probation, on the basis that defendant violated a stay away order and was in possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant admitted the violation on July 6, 2007, and was again reinstated on probation. On July 19, 2007, the district attorney filed a fourth motion to revoke probation based on defendants arrest for infliction of corporal injury to a cohabitant. Again, the court reinstated defendant on probation, modifying his conditions to include a county jail term of 48 days.
A fifth motion to revoke probation was filed on March 25, 2008. This motion was based on defendants arrest for infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and possession of drug paraphernalia. The motion was heard on April 18, 2008.
The following evidence was presented: About 3:45 a.m. on March 20, 2008, Officers Rain Daugherty and Robert Royer arrived at an apartment at 315 Hyde Street in response to a dispatch call indicating that an incident had occurred there at 3:30 a.m. From outside the building, Daugherty could hear an argument going on inside the apartment. The officers rang the doorbell to the apartment building and were admitted to it by Carlos Kinch. Daugherty saw William Forrester lying on a bed in the front room. Forrester was upset and had a bruise on his left eyelid. Forrester refused Daughertys offer of an ambulance. Daugherty then asked Forrester what happened. He told Daugherty that defendant, his boyfriend, had attacked him. In response to Daughertys inquiry about the nature of their relationship in regards to length of time and living situation, Forrester said that they had been living together for approximately one year.
Forrester then related that he and defendant had returned home at about 3:00 a.m. from a bar. Defendant became very angry and started shouting at him. Forrester tried to go to bed but defendant jumped on top of him and began to punch him in the face several times. Kinch, their roommate, pulled defendant off of Forrester. When Forrester said he was going to call the police, defendant ran out of the apartment.
Officer Johnny Vong testified that at approximately 8:00 p.m. on March 20, 2008, he went to 315 Hyde Street in an attempt to arrest defendant who was a suspect in a domestic violence case. Forrester answered the door to the apartment, and told Vong that defendant was in the kitchen. Vong arrested defendant, and in a search incident to that arrest, found a glass crack pipe in defendants left pant pocket.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Daugherty to testify about Forresters remarks to him when Daugherty arrived at the Hyde Street apartment. He argues that Forresters statements to Daugherty constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The trial court found Forresters statements were admissible as spontaneous statements under Evidence Code section 1240 (§1240). The court found that Forrester was upset, his statements described an event that had just happened, and he was still under the stress of the excitement when they were made. The court determined that although the statements were made in response to police questioning, the questioning was quite minimal, and Forresters statement was in response to just a general question about what happened.
A hearsay statement is within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule if it purports to describe or explain an act or condition perceived by the declarant and it was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the perception. (§ 1240; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 901 (Farmer), disapproved on another ground in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6.) A spontaneous utterance is one made without deliberation or reflection. (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 903.)
"The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under [section 1240] is . . . not the nature of the statement but the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance—how long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for example—may be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity." (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 903-904.) Whether a hearsay statement qualifies under the spontaneous utterance exception is a question of fact. (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.) The trial court must consider the statement on its own merits and is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter. (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 719 (Morrison).)
Here, the record shows that the police arrived on the scene about 15 minutes after Forrester called to report the incident. Daugherty found Forrester to be upset and to have suffered an injury to his eye. Daugherty did not extensively question Forrester, but simply asked him what happened. While more detailed questioning is likely to deprive the response of the requisite spontaneity (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 904), here, Daughertys inquiries about what happened and Forresters relationship to defendant were not suggestive and were limited to finding out about the incident and the identity of the perpetrator. It has long been recognized "that statements purporting to name or otherwise identify the perpetrator of a crime may be admissible where the declarant was the victim of the crime and made the identifying remarks while under the stress of excitement caused by experiencing the crime." (Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 719.) The evidence here supports the courts determination that Forrester was still under the stress of the excitement of the event in that the incident had just occurred when he called the police and Daugherty arrived within 15 minutes. (See People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 74 (Stanphill) [30-minute interval between the incident and the identification does not strip the statement of spontaneity].) On these facts, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Forresters statements were admissible under section 1240.
Defendant argues, however, that he was denied his due process rights at the revocation hearing because the prosecution failed to show good cause for not securing the presence of Forrester for confrontation. He acknowledges that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses does not apply to probation revocation hearings but asserts that he has a limited right of confrontation stemming from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 489.) He relies on People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1159-1161, where the court held that a defendants federal constitutional right to due process of law and his right of confrontation were violated when former testimony was admitted without any showing of good cause or evidence of the witnesss unavailability. The court, however, determined that the error was harmless due to the substantial evidence, apart from the preliminary hearing transcript, establishing that the defendant violated his probation. (Id. at pp. 1161-1162.)
In Stanphill, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pages 78-81, the court addressed the issue of whether the trial court is required to find good cause or apply a balancing test for admissibility of evidence falling within the hearsay exception for spontaneous statements. The court concluded that "spontaneous statements under section 1240 are a special breed of hearsay exception which automatically satisfy a probationers due process confrontation/cross-examination rights without the court having to find good cause for the witnesss absence under Arreola . . . . `The theory of the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule is that since the statement is made spontaneously, while under the stress of excitement and with no opportunity to contrive or reflect, it is particularly likely to be truthful. " (Id. at p. 81.) The court therefore held that the reliability and necessity inherent in spontaneous statements establishes the good cause for denying confrontation rendering a balancing test unnecessary. (Ibid.) We agree with the Stanphill court that the prosecutor was not required to further justify the admission of Forresters statements once it was established that they were spontaneous statements admissible under section 1240. Having already shown that the statements were trustworthy and likely to be truthful, no further demonstration of good cause was necessary. The court did not err in admitting Forresters statements under section 1240.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
REARDON, Acting P.J.
SEPULVEDA, J.