Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FWV702331 Raymond L. Haight III, Judge.
Rodger Paul Curnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Angela M. Borzachillo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
A jury found defendant Ronnie Darnell Anderson guilty of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) The jury found true the allegations that defendant (1) personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and (2) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered (1) two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subd. (b)); (2) a prior violent felony conviction that resulted in a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (a)); and (3) two prior felony convictions that resulted in prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a determinate term of 25 years and a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant makes four contentions. First, defendant asserts that the evidence against him does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Second, defendant contends that the trial court erred by including “witness certainty” in the jury instruction related to eyewitness identifications. Third, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the topic of circumstantial evidence. Fourth, defendant contends that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on the law related to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 14, 2007, the victim was working at an Arco gas station in Ontario. At approximately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., defendant entered the store at the Arco gas station. The victim recognized defendant because defendant shopped at the gas station store “every other day or so” for approximately a month and a half. While in the store on September 14, 2007, defendant was wearing a black baseball cap and a black long-sleeved shirt. After selecting a 24-ounce can of beer, defendant approached the register. Defendant placed the can on the counter, near the register. The victim picked-up the can, in order to scan it. The victim scanned the can, and then noticed that defendant was holding a silver semi-automatic gun.
Initially, the victim thought the gun was a joke, because defendant was a regular customer of the gas station. While pointing the gun at the victim, defendant motioned, with his head, in the direction of the cash register. At that point, the victim realized that defendant was serious. The victim stared at the gun. Defendant stepped backwards and said, “[This is] not a joke.” Defendant shot the gun. The victim told defendant to relax and assured defendant that he was going to give him the money in the cash register, but the victim panicked and could not open the cash register. Defendant shot the gun a second time. The police found one bullet hole in a cabinet behind the counter.
Defendant pulled the top portion of gun (the slide) towards him, and a bullet fell out of the gun onto the counter. Defendant said, “‘Fuck, ’” picked up the can of beer, and left the store. Defendant did not pay for the beer. The interaction, from the moment defendant placed his beer on the counter until defendant walked away, lasted approximately three minutes. The store’s video surveillance system captured the incident from three different angles. After defendant left, the victim pressed the store’s alarm.
The victim told the police that defendant often came to the store with a female friend, and that defendant almost always walked to the store. The victim told the officers about an incident in which defendant tried to purchase a beer after 2:00 a.m., and the victim was unable to sell defendant the alcohol. The morning after the robbery, the police showed the victim 84 photographs of people who matched the robber’s description, but the victim did not see defendant among the men in the photographs. The police showed the victim many photographs because the victim believed that he knew the robber, so the police believed that their best lead was to show the victim many photographs of people in the area that matched the robber’s description. Approximately three weeks later, the police showed the victim another photographic line-up. The victim picked defendant out of the line-up. When the victim picked defendant’s photograph, the victim was 100 percent sure that defendant was the person that robbed the store. While testifying at defendant’s trial, the victim twice confirmed that he was still 100 percent sure that defendant was the person who robbed the store.
The police were unable to find defendant’s fingerprints on the bullet that fell from the gun, or the bullet casings. The police did not attempt to lift fingerprints from the counter, because in the video surveillance it did not appear defendant had actually touched the counter; the police did not attempt to lift fingerprints from the refrigerator, or the store’s entry door, because other people had touched the items after defendant.
DISCUSSION
A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for robbery does not meet the substantial evidence standard. We disagree.
“A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is satisfied. [Citation.] Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding.” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.)
“‘Robbery is the taking of “personal property in the possession of another against the will and from the person or immediate presence of that person accomplished by means of force or fear and with the specific intent [to] permanently... deprive such person of such property.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 608.)
The first element of the statute is the action of taking. The victim testified that defendant walked out of the store with a beer, and defendant did not pay for the beer. The foregoing testimony is reasonable and credible, and therefore constitutes substantial evidence that defendant took the beer.
The second element of the statute is personal property. Personal property includes “goods or chattels.” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 461, abrogated by statute on a different point as explained in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1186.) The victim testified that defendant took a beer from the store without paying for it; beer is a good. Accordingly, based upon the victim’s testimony, there is substantial evidence that defendant took personal property.
The third element of the robbery statute requires that the personal property be in the possession of another. We note that for purposes of robbery, employees of a store who are not in actual possession of the store’s property are considered to have constructive possession of the store’s property. (People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 794.) The victim testified that defendant took a beer from the store while the victim, a store employee, was present. The employee had constructive possession of the beer, because it was the store’s property. The foregoing is substantial evidence that defendant took the beer from the possession of another.
The fourth element of the statute requires that the personal property be taken against the will of the possessor. The victim testified that defendant pointed a gun at him, and shot the gun twice. The victim testified that he panicked, and he pressed the alarm after defendant left the store. The foregoing is substantial evidence that defendant took the beer against the victim’s will, because a trier of fact could infer from the evidence that the victim did not want to give defendant the beer.
The fifth element of the statute requires that the property be taken from the person or immediate presence of the victim. As set forth ante, the victim testified that defendant took the beer while the victim, a store employee, was present in the store. Defendant took the beer after placing it on the counter in front of the victim. The victim’s testimony is reasonable and credible, and therefore constitutes substantial evidence that defendant took the beer from the immediate presence of the victim.
The sixth element of the robbery statute is force or fear. The victim testified that defendant pointed a gun at him, and shot the gun twice. The victim testified that he panicked, and he pressed the alarm after defendant left the store. The foregoing is substantial evidence that defendant took the beer by force or fear, because the use of the gun was a show of force, and the victim panicked, which reflects fear. The victim’s testimony is reasonable and credible, and therefore constitutes substantial evidence that defendant took the beer by force or fear.
The seventh element is the specific intent to permanently deprive the possessor of the property. The victim testified that defendant exited the store with the beer. When defendant pointed the gun at the victim, defendant said, “[This is] not a joke.” The evidence reflects that three weeks after the robbery, the victim selected defendant from a photographic line-up; there was nothing indicating that defendant tried to return the beer during the three-week period. A trier of fact could infer from the foregoing evidence that defendant intended to permanently deprive the store of the beer since defendant kept the beer and said he was not joking during the incident. Consequently, the foregoing is substantial evidence that defendant specifically intended to permanently deprive the store of the beer.
In sum, there is substantial evidence supporting each element of defendant’s robbery conviction. Consequently, we conclude that defendant’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence.
Defendant contends that substantial evidence does not support his robbery conviction because the evidence identifying him as the robber consisted of (1) the eyewitness testimony of the victim; (2) a video recording of the robbery; and (3) a video recording of defendant shopping in the store on the day prior to the robbery. Defendant asserts that he was not the person who was reflected in the video robbing the store, and therefore, the only “hard evidence” against him is the eyewitness testimony of the victim. Defendant asserts that eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliable.
When reviewing a record for substantial evidence, we do not resolve issues related to credibility. Rather, we affirm the judgment “‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis what[so]ever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) The victim testified that he recognized defendant because defendant shopped at the Arco store “every other day or so” for approximately a month and a half. When the victim picked defendant’s photograph from the line-up, the victim was 100 percent sure that defendant was the person that robbed the store. While testifying at defendant’s trial, the victim twice confirmed that he was still 100 percent sure that defendant was the person who robbed the store. The victim’s testimony that he recognized defendant and could identify defendant as the robber is reasonable and credible. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence in the record that defendant was the person who robbed the store. Consequently, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that eyewitness’s identification may be unreliable.
Next, defendant asserts that there was no evidence corroborating the victim’s identification of defendant. For example, defendant points out that the dark clothes worn by the robber were not found in defendant’s possession at the time he was arrested. As set forth ante, the testimony of a single witness can satisfy the substantial evidence standard. (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the evidence is insufficient because the victim’s testimony constitutes the primary means of identifying defendant as the robber.
B. WITNESS CERTAINTY
Defendant contends that he was denied due process because the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 315. Defendant asserts that the instruction was erroneous because it asked the jury, when determining whether the prosecution proved defendant was the robber, to consider how certain the victim was when he identified defendant the robber. Defendant argues that the instruction lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof because the victim’s certainty that defendant was the robber does not directly correlate with the accuracy of the identification. We disagree.
CALCRIM No. 315, as given to the jury in the instant case, read: “You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony.
The People contend that defendant invited the alleged error by requesting the trial court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 315. Additionally, the People assert that defendant forfeited the alleged error by not objecting to the jury instruction at the trial court level. We decline to resolve this issue on these grounds. Instead, we address the merits of defendant’s contention. (People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786 (Valli); § 1259.)
“Since principles of due process protect the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt [citation], an instruction to the jury which has the effect of reversing or lightening the burden of proof constitutes an infringement on the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. [Citations.]” (People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 679-680.)
We apply the de novo standard of review. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) Specifically, “‘[i]n considering a claim of instructional error we must first ascertain what the relevant law provides, and then determine what meaning the instruction given conveys. The test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in a manner that violated the defendant’s rights.’ [Citation.] We determine the correctness of the jury instructions from the entire charge of the court, not from considering only parts of an instruction or one particular instruction. [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 13.)
CALCRIM No. 315 informs the jury that it should consider whether the eyewitness was confident in his identification; it does not tell the jury that eyewitness testimony is reliable or otherwise trustworthy; it does not tell the jury what weight to assign to the eyewitness’s confidence; and the instruction reminds the jury that the prosecution has the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In sum, it appears that the instruction presents the factor of witness certainty in a neutral manner, and therefore, it is unlikely that the jury believed that the certainty of the victim’s identification equated with accuracy or reliability. (See People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1141 [factors should be listed in a neutral manner].) In sum, the trial court did not err.
Defendant asserts that CALCRIM No. 315 permitted the jury to infer that the victim’s certainty in his identification equated with an accurate identification. Defendant does not parse the words of CALCRIM No. 315 to explain which words in the instruction resulted in the alleged misstatement of the law. Rather, defendant concludes that the instruction is incorrect and cites a case from the Supreme Court of Georgia to support his conclusion. The case cited by defendant is Brodes v. State (2005) 279 Ga. 435 (Brodes).
In Brodes, the jury was instructed that one of the factors it could consider in assessing the reliability of the witnesses’ identifications was the witnesses’ level of certainty in their identifications. (Brodes, supra, 279 Ga. at p. 436, fn. 1.) The Georgia Supreme Court analyzed whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could use the witnesses’ level of certainty in assessing the reliability of the eyewitnesses’ identifications. (Id. at p. 436.) The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that instructing the jury to use the witnesses’ level of certainty in their deliberations was prejudicial error. (Id. at p. 442.) The Supreme Court noted that the defendant presented expert testimony of a psychologist who stated that “there is not a good a relationship between a witness’s level of confidence in his identification and the accuracy” of the identification. (Id. at p. 438.) The Supreme Court analyzed other cases that concluded the accuracy of a recollection does not correlate with the recollector’s confidence. (Id. at p. 441.) The Supreme Court reasoned, “In light of the scientifically-documented lack of correlation between a witness’s certainty in his or her identification of someone as the perpetrator of a crime and the accuracy of that identification, ... we can no longer endorse an instruction authorizing jurors to consider the witness’s certainty in his/her identification as a factor to be used in deciding the reliability of that identification.” (Id. at p. 442, fn. omitted.)
We do not find defendant’s reliance on Brodes to be persuasive, because our Supreme Court has concluded that a jury instruction concerning eyewitness identification should bring the factors related to the identification to the jury’s attention, but that any explanation of those factors, such as the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy, should be “left to argument by counsel, cross-examination of the eyewitnesses, and expert testimony where appropriate.” (People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1143, fn. omitted.) In sum, our Supreme Court has issued a decision on this matter, and we are obligated to follow our high court’s precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Therefore, we are not persuaded by the Brodes opinion.
C. REASONABLE DOUBT
Defendant contends that the reasonable doubt instruction (CALCRIM No. 220) is constitutionally deficient. Defendant argues that the instruction (1) should instruct the jury to consider the lack of prosecution evidence, as well as the evidence presented, when determining a defendant’s guilt; and (2) impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defense. We disagree.
CALCRIM No. 220, as given to the jury in this case, read: “The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant just because [he has] been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.
The People contend that defendant forfeited the alleged error by not objecting to the jury instruction at the trial court level. We decline to resolve this issue on the ground of forfeiture. Instead, we address the merits of defendant’s contention. (Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 786; § 1259.)
1. LACK OF EVIDENCE
First, defendant contends that CALCRIM No. 220 should instruct the jury to consider the lack of prosecution evidence, as well as the evidence presented, when determining a defendant’s guilt.
As set forth ante, we examine the instructions to determine whether the relevant law was correctly conveyed to the jury. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525.) In making this determination, we consider the specific challenged language, the instruction in its entirety, and whether the instruction, so understood, correctly states the applicable law. (Ibid.)
CALCRIM No. 220 instructed the jury to “impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial.” The instruction further informed the jury that “[u]nless the evidence proves the defendant[] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, [he is] entitled to an acquittal.” (CALCRIM No. 220.) The instruction did not prohibit the jury from considering the lack of prosecution evidence. Rather, it is implied that the jury may consider the lack of evidence if the People fail to present evidence regarding an element of the crime.
We note that CALCRIM No. 220 succeeds CALJIC No. 2.90, which has been upheld as constitutional as phrased. (People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1068.) CALJIC No. 2.90 provides, “A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether [his] guilt is satisfactorily shown, [he] is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.”
CALCRIM No. 220 parallels CALJIC No. 2.90 in that it does not explicitly discuss the concept of lack of evidence. In sum, CALCRIM No. 220 is not erroneous due to a failure to direct the jury’s attention to a lack of prosecution evidence.
Defendant asserts that CALCRIM No. 220 is problematic because it uses affirmative terms, rather than negative terms, to describe reasonable doubt. Defendant cites to the commentary of CALCRIM No. 220 to support his position. The CALCRIM No. 220 commentary provides, “The primary changes [between CALJIC No. 2.90 and CALCRIM No. 220] are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the affirmative rather than in the negative.” As discussed ante, CALJIC No. 2.90 did not explicitly discuss the concept of lack of evidence. Consequently, we do not find defendant’s comparison between the two instructions to be persuasive.
2. SHIFTING OF THE BURDEN
Defendant contends that CALCRIM No. 220 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Defendant focuses on the following phrase in the instruction: “‘compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial.’” Defendant argues that this phrase requires the defense to produce evidence of defendant’s innocence.
As set forth ante, we do not read phrases of instructions in isolation. (People v. Smith, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 13.) CALCRIM No. 220 explained to the jury that the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Specifically, the instruction provided, “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based upon the clear language of the instruction—explaining that the prosecution bears the burden of proof—we conclude that CALCRIM No. 220 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense.
D. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the topic of circumstantial evidence (CALCRIM No. 224), because the prosecutor relied primarily on eyewitness testimony. We disagree.
CALCRIM No. 224, as given to the jury in this case, read: “Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.
The People contend that defendant invited the alleged error by agreeing that the trial court should instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 224. Additionally, the People assert that defendant forfeited the alleged error by not objecting to the jury instruction at the trial court level. We decline to resolve this issue on these grounds. Instead, we address the merits of defendant’s contention. (Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 786; § 1259.)
A claim that the trial court erred by instructing on inapplicable laws is reviewed de novo. (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1089, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)
“A trial court is obliged to instruct, even without a request, on the general principles of law which relate to the issues presented by the evidence.” (People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1410.) The effect of the foregoing rule is that a trial court must refrain from instructing on principles of law that are not relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Armstead (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 784, 792.) Circumstantial evidence, “‘is that which tends to establish the fact in dispute by proving another, and which, though true, does not of itself conclusively establish that fact, but which affords an inference or presumption of its existence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146, 152.)
During the prosecution’s closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the jury could infer defendant had the intent to permanently deprive the store of the beer, based upon the evidence that defendant left the store with the beer after holding the victim at gunpoint. The prosecutor further argued, “And we have just circumstances that are way more than just a coincidence.” The prosecutor compared the video of defendant in the store on the day before the robbery with the video of the robbery, and argued that defendant was the person who robbed the store, because (1) both videos show defendant walking to the store from the north; (2) defendant’s height is the same in both videos; (3) defendant took similar actions both days, such as walking directly to the refrigerator to get beer; and (4) walking away from the store in the same direction.
In sum, the prosecutor used circumstantial evidence to support the eyewitness’s identification of defendant, and to prove defendant’s intent. Consequently, the jury needed to be informed of the laws related to circumstantial evidence, because circumstantial evidence was an issue in the trial. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the topic of circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, we note that defendant cited his own circumstantial evidence in order to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. For example, during closing argument, defendant’s trial counsel argued that defendant was innocent because (1) he did not try to flee or resist arrest; and (2) when police searched defendant’s residence, they did not find a gun or the dark clothing worn by the robber. In sum, circumstantial evidence was an issue presented during the trial, and therefore the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the topic of circumstantial evidence.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the topic of circumstantial evidence because the prosecution’s case did not substantially rely on circumstantial evidence. It appears defendant’s argument relies on the following rule: “[T]he general sufficiency of circumstantial evidence instruction... is required to be given by the court on its own motion where the case rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351, fn. omitted.)
When the parties and the trial court were discussing jury instructions, the following exchange took place:
“[The Court: CALCRIM No.] 224, circumstantial evidence, sufficiency of [the] evidence. When we were discussing it informally you had indicated, [defendant’s trial counsel], that you agreed that’s the instruction that should be given as opposed to [CALCRIM No.] 225.
“[Defendant’s trial counsel]: Yes.
“The Court: Since this is basically a who-done-it and mental state is not the issue, ... I’ll give [CALCRIM No.] 224.”
It is unclear from this record if the court gave CALCRIM No. 224 sua sponte, or if one of the parties suggested that the instruction be given. Consequently, we are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on the rule related to the trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct the jury.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J., KING, J.
“In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions:
“● Did the witness know or have contact with the defendant before the event?
“● How well could the witness see the perpetrator?
“● What were the circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, obstructions, distance, [and] duration of observation[?]
“● How closely was the witness paying attention?
“● Was the witness under stress when he or she made the observation?
“● Did the witness give a description and how does that description compare to the defendant?
“● How much time passed between the event and the time when the witness identified the defendant?
“● Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a group?
“● Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendant?
“● Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the identification?
“● How certain was the witness when he or she made an identification?
“● Are the witness and the defendant of different races?
“● [Was the witness able to identify other participants in the crime?]
“● [Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a photographic or physical lineup?
“● Were there any other circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to make an accurate identification?
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.”
“A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
“In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, [he is] entitled to an acquittal and you must find [him] not guilty.”
“Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.”