Opinion
January 17, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Joseph Cerbone, J.).
Defendant contends that the jury charge on reasonable doubt impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. The charge, viewed as a whole, conveyed the proper standard. The court's singular statement that the jurors " must be in a position to furnish their reason if asked to do so" by a fellow juror, did not impose an "affirmative obligation" on the jurors "to supply concrete reasons `based upon the evidence' for [an] inclination to acquit" (People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251, 252), "and in no way reduced the People's burden of proof" (People v Johnson, 196 A.D.2d 765, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 926). Nor do we find error in the court's description of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would make a "reasonable person * * * hesitate to act" (see, People v. Quinones, 123 A.D.2d 793).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.