Summary
In Allen, the handcuffing was reasonable because it did not "involve the unnecessary, prolonged handcuffing of a suspect detained on reasonable suspicion after the threat justifying the use of the handcuffs had been neutralized."
Summary of this case from U.S. v. GlennaOpinion
Decided April 4, 1989
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Elbert C. Hinkson, J.
Stephanie T. Knowles and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney (Billie Manning of counsel), for respondent.
Three plain-clothes police officers, while on anticrime patrol in The Bronx, received a radio report of an armed robbery in progress at a nearby address. The report described the perpetrators as four black males armed with two guns apiece. Just moments after receiving this information and as the officers were approaching the crime scene, they spotted the defendant and three other black males running away from the direction of the robbery. Believing that defendant and his three companions might be the perpetrators, the officers exited their unmarked patrol vehicle, identified themselves and approached the four men for questioning. The four suspects then scattered and fled in different directions with defendant leading one of the officers on a chase into a dark alley. Before following defendant into the alley, the officer, concerned for his own safety, called for uniformed backup. When help arrived, the two officers proceeded into the alley and apprehended defendant who was apparently attempting to scale a wall. Defendant was then handcuffed and brought out of the alley into a brighter area so that he could be safely searched for weapons and questioned. Immediately after being handcuffed, but prior to any questioning, defendant spontaneously admitted his complicity in the robbery. Defendant later moved to suppress his statements, contending that he was under arrest as soon as he was handcuffed and that the arrest was not supported by probable cause since no inculpatory statements were made until after the handcuffs had been applied. Supreme Court denied the motion and defendant was subsequently convicted, upon a jury verdict, of two counts of robbery in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding, inter alia, that under the circumstances the handcuffing of defendant did not constitute an arrest. We agree and thus affirm.
In the circumstances presented, the police officers were entitled to handcuff defendant to effect his nonarrest detention in order to ensure their own safety while they removed him to a more suitable location to pat him down for weapons (see, People v Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14; People v Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267). Nothing in our precedents establishes a rule that the application of handcuffs will always be dispositive of whether the detention of a suspect on reasonable suspicion has been elevated into a full-blown arrest (People v Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; cf., People v Tirado, 69 N.Y.2d 863). Where, as here, police officers find themselves in a rapidly developing and dangerous situation presenting an imminent threat to their well-being, they must be permitted to take reasonable measures to assure their safety and they should not be expected "to await the glint of steel" before doing so (People v Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d, at 271, supra). This case does not present a situation in which the officers' initial use of handcuffs was gratuitous and not warranted by the threat confronting them (cf., People v Tirado, 69 N.Y.2d 863, supra). Nor does it involve the unnecessary, prolonged handcuffing of a suspect detained on reasonable suspicion after the threat justifying the use of handcuffs has been neutralized. Here, the poor lighting conditions prevailing in the alley, combined with the officers' reasonable belief that defendant might be armed, justified the limited use of handcuffs to prevent defendant from reaching for a concealed weapon while the officers were taking him to a safer location.
Finally, the determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the nonarrest detention of defendant involves a mixed question of fact and law and is supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, this issue is beyond our review (People v Jones, 69 N.Y.2d 853, 855; People v Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 477).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
I agree that the facts presented by this case do not require suppression. In light of the fact that the officers were acting during the course of a hot pursuit of an armed robbery suspect, which unavoidably led them into a dark alley, they were justified in handcuffing defendant for the limited purpose of facilitating a frisk to ensure their own safety. Since defendant's statement was made immediately and there is no indication that defendant was confined in handcuffs beyond the point that was necessary to enable the officers to complete a limited pat-down, there is no ground for disturbing the Appellate Division's finding that an arrest did not occur.
I cannot join the majority's memorandum opinion, however, because I find its language overly broad and its analysis insufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights. Use of phrases that evoke vivid images of police officers in danger may have some superficial appeal, but they ultimately only serve to obscure, rather than enhance, analysis. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Dunaway v New York ( 442 U.S. 200), in which the court rejected an attempt to distinguish between "arrests" and "custodial detentions for questioning," should make us particularly wary of terms like "nonarrest detention."
Moreover, although there are those rare situations such as this one (see also, People v Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14), in which the use of handcuffs is not necessarily the equivalent of an arrest, I am extremely uncomfortable with the majority's formulation, which suggests that a street encounter accompanied by the use of handcuffs may not be deemed an arrest in the future if the handcuffing is not "gratuitous" or "prolonged." In my view, the majority's unnecessary speculation about the use of handcuffs in other situations (see, majority opn, at 380) creates a very real risk that handcuffing will increasingly become an accepted practice in connection with the limited "stop and frisks" authorized by Terry v Ohio ( 392 U.S. 1), since, by definition, these citizen-police encounters are all characterized by the presence of an articulable threat to the officers' safety.
Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur in Per Curiam opinion; Judge TITONE concurs in a separate opinion.
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 N.Y.CRR 500.4), order affirmed.