Opinion
NO. 4-17-0794
02-08-2018
In re L.G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Deric Alford, Respondent-Appellant).
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County
No. 15JA23
Honorable John R. Kennedy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 In March 2015, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect and shelter care with respect to L.G., the minor child of respondent, Deric Alford. In July 2015, the trial court made the minor a ward of the court and placed custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In April 2017, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights. Following hearings in June and July 2017, the court found respondent unfit. In October 2017, the court determined it was in the minor's best interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
¶ 3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In March 2015, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect and shelter care with respect to L.G, born in January 2011, the minor child of respondent and Rae Carpenter. The petition alleged the minor was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) because she was subjected to an injurious environment when she resided with respondent and Carpenter based on her exposure to domestic violence.
¶ 6 The April 2015 shelter-care report indicated Carpenter contacted the police on March 30, 2015, to report a verbal altercation with respondent. Upon arrival, police found Carpenter, respondent, and Mesha Haynes, all of whom were intoxicated. The report indicated the trio "had been 'doing sexual acts together all night' and Ms. Carpenter got angry because [respondent] did something sexual with Ms. Haynes." Carpenter allegedly stabbed respondent three times and broke a window. Respondent and Haynes reported Carpenter picked up L.G. and dropped her on the floor. Police arrested Carpenter for aggravated domestic battery and endangering the life of a child, and L.G. was released to respondent. On March 31, 2015, the trial court issued a warrant of apprehension pertaining to L.G., and DCFS took protective custody of her on April 2, 2015, and placed her with her godmother.
¶ 7 The trial court found probable cause to believe the minor was neglected after respondent and Carpenter stipulated to temporary custody. The court entered an order granting temporary custody to DCFS.
¶ 8 In June 2015, the trial court found the minor was neglected based on an injurious environment. The dispositional report indicated respondent was 23 years old. Respondent had convictions for assault, burglary, damage to property, and larceny. He received a probation
sentence in 2011 for burglary and theft. He violated his probation in 2012 and was sentenced to 12 months in a work camp. He violated his parole in 2014 and was sentenced to six months in boot camp. He was released in January 2015.
¶ 9 In its July 2015 dispositional order, the trial court found respondent unfit and unable, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor, and the health, safety, and best interests of the minor would be jeopardized if she remained in the custody of respondent and/or Carpenter. The court adjudged the minor neglected, made her a ward of the court, and placed custody and guardianship with DCFS.
¶ 10 An October 2015 permanency report indicated respondent had not been in contact with his caseworker, and thus it was unknown where he was living, whether he was employed, or whether he had engaged in any services. The caseworker attempted to refer respondent for a substance-abuse assessment, but he had not signed the release forms. Respondent had not visited with L.G. since May 2015, and he had only three visits with her since the case opened. In its permanency order, the trial court found respondent had not made reasonable progress or reasonable efforts toward returning L.G. to the home, noting his whereabouts were unknown and he had not been involved with the case. In January 2016, the court entered a permanency order finding respondent had not made reasonable progress or reasonable efforts because he had "done nothing" and was incarcerated in the Department of Corrections. The March 2016 permanency order indicated respondent was still incarcerated. The court's July 2016 permanency order found respondent had not made reasonable and substantial progress toward returning L.G. to the home.
¶ 11 At the November 2016 permanency hearing, respondent failed to appear. The court found respondent had not made reasonable progress or reasonable efforts. The March 2017 permanency order included similar findings.
¶ 12 In April 2017, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of respondent and Carpenter. The State alleged respondent was unfit because he (1) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor to him during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (July 1, 2016, to April 1, 2017) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016)); (2) was depraved (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2016)); and (3) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2016)).
¶ 13 In June 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State's motion, and respondent appeared in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The State moved to dismiss the depravity allegation. Cassandra Carter, a foster care supervisor at the Center for Youth and Family Solutions (CYFS), testified she was assigned to L.G.'s case in February 2016. CYFS recommended respondent undergo services for substance-abuse, parenting, and domestic-violence counseling, but he did not participate. Respondent failed to maintain contact with Carter. She sent him letters but did not receive any responses. Respondent was released from prison in October 2016, but he did not contact Carter.
¶ 14 Shelby Moreland, a CYFS caseworker, testified she was assigned to L.G.'s case in April 2017. Since that time, she had no contact with respondent. On cross-examination, Moreland stated she performed a diligent search to contact respondent. However, the State's Attorney later informed her respondent was in the Champaign County jail. Moreland then sent a letter to the jail, but respondent did not respond.
¶ 15 Respondent testified he had been released from Graham Correctional Center in October 2016. While in prison, he served as a mentor in a parenting program and completed the course in August 2016. He also completed a three-phase drug program and an anger
management program. He attended church "a lot" and participated in a two-day parenting seminar. After being released from Graham Correctional Center and before being incarcerated at the Champaign County jail, respondent attempted to obtain information about his case by contacting the county clerk and Carpenter. While told of a court date, he could not attend because he was on house arrest. He stated he never received mail from any caseworkers while at Graham Correctional Center. At the time of the hearing, respondent was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center with a release date of 2022.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, respondent stated he appeared in court in April 2015 when L.G.'s case started. Prior to being arrested in October 2015, he had not completed substance-abuse treatment or any other services. Respondent stated he last spoke to L.G. in January 2017 and last saw her in July 2015.
¶ 17 Following a July 2017 hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit because of his failure to make reasonable progress and for failing to maintain reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility. The court stated respondent had "done well in completing services while incarcerated, but not while he's out." The court noted respondent had not engaged in visitation or services and had not been in regular contact with the caseworkers. The court found the State failed to prove Carpenter unfit.
¶ 18 An August 2017 best-interests report indicated L.G. was six years old and had been placed in a relative foster home. She was "well-bonded with her foster parent" and current on her immunizations. She participated in play therapy-counseling and visited with Carpenter. An October 2017 best-interests report indicated respondent was serving his sentence for burglary at Western Illinois Correctional Center and scheduled to be paroled in January 2022. The report indicated respondent had not completed recommended services and had not visited with L.G.
since May 2015. The report stated it was in L.G.'s best interests to return home to Carpenter's care, once Carpenter completed services.
¶ 19 In October 2017, the trial court conducted the best-interests hearing, and the State relied on the best-interests reports. Respondent testified he completed anger-management counseling and substance-abuse counseling in 2016. He also completed parenting services. He stated he wanted to remain in L.G.'s life and was willing to do "anything" asked of him. On cross-examination, he stated his projected parole date is January 2022.
¶ 20 The trial court noted Carpenter had the opportunity to regain custody of L.G., which meant there was "the potential at least for restoration of custody to a biological parent." The court found "most telling" the fact that respondent's projected release date was January 2022, when L.G. would be almost 11 years old. For the "vast majority" of L.G.'s life, respondent had not had an active role in parenting L.G., and waiting until he was released from prison offered "a potential for real detrimental impact on her ability to achieve permanency and just grow up." The court found it in L.G.'s best interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated. This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Respondent argues the trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 23 "Courts will not lightly terminate parental rights because of the fundamental importance inherent in those rights." In re Veronica J., 371 Ill. App. 3d 822, 831, 867 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (2007) (citing In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362-63, 751 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (2001)). Once the trial court finds the parent unfit, "[a]ll considerations yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." In re A.F., 2012 IL App (2d) 111079, ¶ 45, 969 N.E.2d 877. When
considering whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the trial court must consider a number of factors within "the context of the child's age and developmental needs[.]" 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016). These include the following:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least[-]disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child." In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072, 859 N.E.2d 123, 141 (2006).
See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (j) (West 2016).
¶ 24 A trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re B'yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41, 43 N.E.3d 139. A trial court's decision will be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence " 'where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence.' " In re Shru. R., 2014 IL App (4th) 140275, ¶ 24, 16 N.E.3d 930 (quoting In re Tasha L.-I., 383 Ill. App. 3d 45, 52, 890 N.E.2d 573, 579 (2008)).
¶ 25 In the case sub judice, the October 2017 best-interests report indicated L.G. was six years old and had been in the same relative foster-care placement since coming into care. She was doing well in her placement and "well-bonded with her foster parent." She was doing well in school, engaged in play therapy-counseling, and current on her immunizations. L.G. participated in weekly visits with her mother, who displayed appropriate parenting skills. L.G.'s foster parent supported the goal to return L.G. to her mother's home.
¶ 26 The report also noted respondent's history of incarceration. When he was released from prison in October 2016 and before he was incarcerated again in January 2017, he made no attempt to contact CYFS, failed to reengage in services, and did not visit with L.G. Although respondent participated in services while in prison, he had not completed a substance-abuse evaluation or participated in individual psychotherapy. Respondent visited with L.G. three times prior to his incarceration. Respondent is projected to be paroled in January 2022.
¶ 27 The evidence in this case indicated L.G. was doing well in her current placement, she was well-bonded with her foster parent, and her mental, physical, and educational needs were being met. In contrast, respondent had been absent for a great deal of her life and showed no interest in engaging in services or visiting L.G. when he was out of prison. While respondent argues his parental rights should have been preserved due to the goal of returning L.G. to her mother, such an argument is speculative.
¶ 28 Respondent's argument is essentially that he has finally started doing the things he should and, once released from prison, he will continue. It has frequently been said the best indicator of someone's future behavior lies in his or her past. True or not, perhaps it is worth recapping how this case proceeded to termination.
¶ 29 A three-hour domestic argument over three-way sex between respondent, L.G.'s mother, and another woman, in the presence of four-year-old L.G., ultimately led to L.G's mother's arrest for stabbing respondent multiple times. During the argument, the mother picked L.G. up and dropped her on the floor. The child was released to respondent, who was noted to be on parole at the time and did not know his child's last name.
¶ 30 Respondent's criminal history revealed 13 charges and 8 convictions. He was on parole at the outset of the case. From the time protective custody was taken on April 2, 2015, until the permanency review hearing on October 7, 2015, respondent had not participated in services, had no contact with his caseworker, and failed to provide information regarding his living arrangements. In addition, he had not seen the child since May 9, 2015, and had only three visits since case opening, although visitations were offered weekly.
¶ 31 During the life of the case, Carter attempted to get respondent set up with substance-abuse treatment, but he failed to sign necessary releases of information. She attempted referrals for counseling and domestic-violence classes, but he would not cooperate. She made numerous efforts to contact him by phone and mail without success.
¶ 32 By the time of the permanency review hearing of July 27, 2016, respondent was back in prison at Graham Correctional center for domestic battery and burglary, with a projected out-date of October 14, 2016. Upon his release, he did not contact his caseworker and made no effort to initiate services.
¶ 33 As of the date of the termination hearing—during which respondent was again incarcerated—he had yet to engage in or complete any service recommended by DCFS that was not part of the time he spent in prison while this case proceeded. Although he adamantly denied substance-abuse issues during his initial assessment with DCFS, at the time of the termination
hearing he was housed at Graham Correctional center because "it's a facility based off of drug treatment." Considering the fact it is well-known attendance in such programs leads to additional "good-time credit" in many instances, respondent's professed motives in seeking to remain a part of L.G.'s life are reasonably suspect.
¶ 34 In looking at L.G.'s best interests, the trial court focused on her need for permanency and concluded waiting for respondent to be released from prison would have a "detrimental impact" on her ability to grow up. Respondent notes his "earnestness in pursuing services" and his desire and willingness to play a role in L.G.'s life. However, his failure to complete the required services while out of prison, not to mention his current extended stay in the Department of Corrections, readily indicates he will be unable to parent L.G. in the near future. A young child like L.G. should not be required to put her life on hold while she waits for respondent to get out of prison and complete the necessary services. See In re A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522, 530, 575 N.E.2d 261, 267 (1991) (stating "[c]ourts must not allow the child to live indefinitely with a lack of permanence inherent in a foster home"). Considering the evidence and the best interests of the minor, we find the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 37 Affirmed.