Opinion
F084871
05-15-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALFREDO ALDACO, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Brook A. Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF187052A. Chad A. Louie, Judge.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Brook A. Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Defendant Alfredo Aldaco contends on appeal that the evidence presented at defendant's suppression hearing failed to establish that the police officer had legal justification to stop defendant's vehicle. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 22, 2021, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on his person without being the registered owner of the firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c);count 1); possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded, operable firearm (Health &Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 2); being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3); misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health &Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 4); misdemeanor unlawful possession of a device used to inject or smoke a controlled substance (Health &Saf. Code, § 11364; count 5); and misdemeanor driving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 6).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
On October 25, 2021, defendant pled not guilty to all counts.
On April 1, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. On May 3, 2022, the trial court denied the motion.
On July 8, 2022, defendant pled no contest to count 3 (felon in possession of a firearm) with the understanding he would be sentenced to the midterm of two years in state prison.
On August 24, 2022, defendant was sentenced to two years in state prison pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
On August 30, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
FACTS
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 to challenge his initial traffic stop. The parties stipulated no warrant existed and that defendant had standing to raise the motion.
At the hearing on the motion, Bakersfield Police Officer Brent Moore testified that on July 30, 2021, he was driving a patrol vehicle in Kern County when he saw a vehicle drive past him in the opposite direction. He noticed it had tinted windows that made it difficult for him to see inside. The prosecution asked Moore, "Officer, when you-when you passed it initially, were you having difficulty seeing inside that vehicle?" Moore answered affirmatively. The prosecution then asked him, "And did you-were you able to tell whether or not light transmitted into that vehicle in a way that prevented you from seeing?" Moore replied, "It prevented me from seeing [into] it, yes." Moore then made a U-turn and stopped the vehicle.
He testified that as he approached the stopped vehicle on foot, he could not see the driver clearly through the front driver's side window. When asked whether he believed the tint was "like a factory-issued sort of glaze applied to [the] glass," he answered, "No. [The tint] was pretty dark." He stated that the tinting on the front driver's side window was "dark to the extent where I was-it was difficult to see inside the vehicle," explaining that the tinting was so dark he was unable to see the driver clearly and, "[his] view inside the vehicle was restricted." He stated that there was "a filament of tint on the outside or on the inside of the window that prevented light from entering the vehicle and illuminating the inside."
Defendant was driving the vehicle, and informed Moore that he did not have a valid driver's license with him. Defendant was searched, and 2.3 grams of methamphetamine and a glass pipe were found. The vehicle that defendant was driving was also searched. A loaded 9-mm pistol was found in the compartment that led from the rear seat of the vehicle to the trunk. An additional round of ammunition was found in the driver's door panel. Defendant told Moore that he purchased the firearm a few weeks prior and that he knew he was not supposed to possess it because he was a felon.
Defense counsel asked Moore whether he believed it was permissible for vehicles to have some degree of tint on the front windows. He responded, "I believe so. Maybe[,]" and he stated that he was not sure of the exact degree of legally permissible window tint. He testified "[the tint on the vehicle] restricted [his] view," into the vehicle. He stated that the sun had not set when he pulled defendant over and that it did not get dark until after the tow truck arrived, "[s]o the duration of the stop the sun was up." Moore further testified that he believed the tint on defendant's vehicle was aftermarket and violated the Vehicle Code.
Defense Case
Defendant's girlfriend, Jacklen Q., testified that she owned the vehicle defendant was driving when he was pulled over by Moore and that she had allowed defendant to drive it. She stated that she did not notice any aftermarket tinting on the windows when she bought the vehicle and she did not have window tinting installed during the time she owned it.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
Shortly after defendant's arrest, Jacklen directed a neighbor to take two photographs of her sitting inside the vehicle with the windows up. The court admitted the photographs into evidence as defense exhibits. Jacklen testified that the images were taken at 10:00 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. on a bright, sunny day.
After initial argument, the court indicated it was going to deny the motion, stating as follows:
"[United States v. Wallace (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 1216] is instructive. In that case, the officer-this is the Wallace case. The officer testified the window tinting on the front two windows, even during the daylight hours, was a heavy tiny where the occupant inside was at a harder degree to look into the vehicle. The Court stated we don't call upon the officers to be scientists or carry around and use burdensome equipment to measure light transmittance, nor do we expect them to discuss the sufficiency or insufficiency of the light transmittance as if they were an expert on the subject. Rather, if an officer forms an opinion in a common sense examination of a vehicle that light is obstructed in the fashion contemplated by the statute, such evidence will be sufficient to support conviction if the trial Court believes the officer.
"I did review the [People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602] case cited by defense counsel. It's a very short opinion. In that case, the officer didn't articulate with specificity that the windows of the vehicle in that case were made of illegally tinted rather than legally tinted glass. The officer in that case observed a Cadillac in the distance late at night as it drove by the highway liquor store and, again, as the car sped past him. In the context of the suspicious conduct he observed, [the officer] simply admitted that he didn't like the idea of the tinted windows, but there was no testimony it seems in that case where the officer further articulated what he observed to be the illegally tinted windows.
"This case is a bit different than that case. The case of Butler. And it seems to be more consistent with the Wallace case. In this case, the officer did testify with some specificity about what he observed. He indicated that he believed something had been applied to the windows, that being the front driver side window. He indicated that the tint was darkened to the extent that he could not see inside the vehicle. Although, on cross-examination, he did testify that he could see someone driving the vehicle. He testified that the tint on the front driver's side window prevented light from entering the vehicle, and his view was restricted. And this occurred at eight-around eight o'clock on July 30th before sunset. It was still light outside."
Discussing the photos of the vehicle taken by Jacklen's neighbor, the trial court responded, "I'm looking at Defense Exhibit A, which I'm holding up. This exhibit-when I look at this photograph, I can see-well, [Jacklen] testifies that she was sitting in the passenger seat [in the picture], and I can see a person sitting in the passenger seat, but I can't make out the details of the individual's face, nor can I really see if there's a driver seated. It looks like there may be someone in the driver's seat. It looks like they are probably [sic] is someone seated in the driver's seat. It looks like that person may be wearing a baseball cap in the driver's seat, but I can't really see anything else to say with certainty. It looks like the person in the driver's seat is sitting back further than the person in the passenger seat, but I can't make out any other details.
"This picture appears to be taken at pretty close range of the vehicle ... I'm going to find that the officer did articulate with specificity a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle being driven was in violation of the Vehicle Code, that having unlawful tinted front windows.
"There was testimony where the officer did articulate with specificity the reasons why he believed that it was in violation of that Vehicle Code.
"The motion is denied."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends his case must be reversed and the charges dismissed because the evidence at the suppression hearing failed to establish that Moore had legal justification to stop the vehicle defendant was driving because Moore did not offer specific articulable facts to form a basis for suspecting that the tinted windows fell outside permissible parameters or impaired defendant's vision while driving. The People argue the trial court properly denied defendant's section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. We agree with the People.
A. Law
The police may conduct a traffic stop if the circumstances show a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (People v. Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 734-735.) A reasonable suspicion requires a showing of specific and articulable facts that would cause a reasonable officer in a like position, drawing on the officer's training and experience, to believe a violation has occurred or is about to occur. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) Reasonable suspicion is" 'something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" '" but something less than the fair probability required for probable cause. (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 387.) The courts look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a particularized and objective basis for the officer's suspicion. (People v. Butler (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 160.) If an officer reasonably suspected a violation of a traffic law, the stop is lawful even if later investigation dispels that suspicion. (People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1149.)
The Vehicle Code prohibits the placement of material on a window that "obstructs or reduces the driver's clear view" through the window. (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (a)(2).) Further, the code states that "clear, colorless, and transparent material" designed "to block the sun's harmful ultraviolet A rays" may be affixed to the front side windows if the "material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent" and the "window glazing with the material applied meets [the federal] ... specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent ...." (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (d)(1)-(3); see also Veh. Code, § 26708.5.)
With respect to traffic stops for tinted windows, the mere fact of tinting cannot alone support a reasonable suspicion; rather, there must be "additional articulable facts suggesting that the tinted glass is illegal ...." (People v. Butler, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 602, 607; People v. Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, 9-10 (Hanes).) However, the courts also recognize that when enforcing the tinted window statute, officers need not be "scientists or carry around and use burdensome equipment to measure light transmittance"; rather, "based upon their training and experience with vehicles in general, [they] will be able to examine a suspect vehicle, look through the windows if possible, and form an opinion as to whether or not the tinting" violates the statute. (People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1292.)
" 'The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.'" (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
B. Analysis
Here, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, as they are supported by substantial evidence. In light of these findings, we agree with the People that Moore's stop of defendant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The record shows specific articulable facts that support Moore's reasonable suspicion that defendant's vehicle's windows were illegally tinted.
Moore testified that he noticed defendant's vehicle's windows were tinted as it drove by, restricting his view inside the vehicle. He described them as "pretty dark," and "dark to the extent where I was-it was difficult to see inside" during the daylight. He explained that he was unable to see the driver clearly and that the tinting prevented him from seeing into the vehicle, stating, "My view inside the vehicle was restricted .. tint on the outside or the inside of the window .. prevented light from entering the vehicle and illuminating the inside." Based on these observations, he assessed defendant's window tinting was a violation of the Vehicle Code.
These circumstances showed more than the mere existence of tinting, and justified a stop based on a reasonable suspicion formed by Moore based upon specific articulable facts that the tint failed to comply with the clear view and light transmittance standards defined in the Vehicle Code. (Hanes, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 10 [officer reasonably stopped vehicle for tint that "was so dark as to appear black and prevent the officer from seeing the occupants of the front seats"]; United States v. Wallace, supra, 213 F.3d at pp. 1217, 1220-1221 [officer reasonably stopped vehicle for" 'heavy tint'" that made it difficult to view occupants inside].)
Defendant also argues that because Moore's suspicion of illegal tinting was based on "only [Moore]'s brief glimpse of the window as the vehicle [defendant was driving] passed," Moore "clearly did not have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was breaking the law." The contention is unavailing because an officer observing a vehicle's windows prior to a stop will typically only have a view from the outside of the vehicle. The reasonable suspicion standard for a traffic stop is satisfied by this outside observation, even if further investigation ultimately determines the driver's clear view was not in fact reduced. (Hanes, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. at pp. 8, 10 [officer reasonably stopped vehicle for tint after he observed vehicle's window tinting as it drove by him in an intersection at 10 to 15 miles per hour].) Here, Moore stated he was able to observe that the windows' tint restricted his view inside the vehicle as it drove past him, describing the tint as "pretty dark," to the extent that when he got up close to the window after it was stopped, he still could not see clearly inside the vehicle. The trial court was entitled to credit this testimony, and to infer that Moore was able to ascertain that the view into the vehicle was obstructed due to the window tinting. We defer to this factual determination.
Defendant further challenges the reasonable suspicion finding because, "Moore clearly testified that he was not sure to what degree a driver's side window could be tinted under the ... Vehicle Code." However, it was not necessary for Moore to know the exact degree of permissible tint for him to establish reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop. Moore testified that he believed some degree of tint was legally permissible. However, he testified that he stopped the vehicle because he believed the tint exceeded the legal limit because it was "pretty dark" and "dark to the extent" it was restricting his view inside of the vehicle. These observations were sufficient to show the reasonableness of the traffic stop. (People v. Niebauer, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1292 [officers need not be "scientists or carry around and use burdensome equipment to measure light transmittance"].) The trial court also addressed the photographs showing the vehicle's window tint, stating, "I can't make out the details of the individual's face, nor can I really see if there's a driver seated. It looks like there may be someone in the driver's seat. It looks like they are [sic] probably is someone seated in the driver's seat. It looks like that person may be wearing a baseball cap in the driver's seat, but I can't really see anything else to say with certainty. It looks like the person in the driver's seat is sitting back further than the person in the passenger seat, but I can't make out any other details."
The trial court was entitled to make those factual determinations.
Moore did not testify to the mere fact of tinting of the windows. He testified to specific articulable facts on which he relied in forming his reasonable suspicion that defendant's vehicle's window tinting was in violation of the Vehicle Code, making Moore's stop of defendant reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
[*]Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.