Opinion
F075246
12-14-2018
In re A.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.J., Defendant and Appellant.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Matthew A. Kearney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JJD069987)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Judge. Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Matthew A. Kearney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2017, appellant was declared a ward of the juvenile court after the court found true that he had committed (1) residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ); (2) robbery (§ 211); (3) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and (4) battery with infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). Appellant was ordered to serve 80 hours community service, along with other terms and conditions.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Prior to the juvenile proceeding, appellant confessed to the commission of these crimes to a police officer while undergoing a custodial interrogation. He argues that the juvenile court prejudicially erred in allowing admission of his statements, which he contends were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). He further asserts that the court misapplied the presumption of his incapacity to commit at least some of the charged crimes. Finally, he contends substantial evidence does not support the court's implied finding of his capacity. We affirm.
Section 26 creates a rebuttable presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. (§ 26, subd. One; In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 231.)
BACKGROUND
Appellant did not present any evidence on his behalf. We summarize the relevant facts from the juvenile hearing. I. The Burglary And Assault.
In September 2016, appellant and his juvenile brother, T.M., broke into a residence in Visalia, California. The occupants, an elderly couple, were initially not home, but they returned while the juveniles were still inside the residence. The owners noticed that a screen had been removed from a bathroom window, which was open. There was a chair under that window, which had not been there before they left. The back door and the security door were open. These doors had been locked when the owners left. The husband entered the residence to investigate while his wife remained outside.
T.M. is not a party to the present appeal.
Inside the residence, the husband saw that things were in disarray. He yelled out, "You mother fuckers are in the house. You need to get the fuck out of here because I have a gun, and I'm going to shoot you." Inside the master bedroom, the husband discovered appellant hiding under the bed. After coming out from hiding, the husband and appellant got into a wrestling match. Appellant began to fight the husband. In response, the husband grabbed appellant's fingers and tried to break them by bending them backwards. Their altercation escalated when T.M. joined in and struck the husband on his face. A fight ensued involving all three. The husband heard T.M. say, "Don't beat up my brother" because he is "autistic." At some point, the husband grabbed a pair of blunted scissors. He used them to scratch T.M.'s arm. During the altercation, the husband was struck over the head with multiple objects, including a weighted toilet paper dispenser and a humidifier. At some point, he possibly fell unconscious. The two juveniles ran from the home. Emergency personnel responded to the scene and the husband was transported to the hospital. He suffered a concussion, along with other cuts and bruises to his head and face. Later that day, the owners realized that various objects were missing from their home, including a cell phone, a jar full of spare change, and phone chargers.
At the hearing, the husband confirmed that, while he did own a gun, he did not have it with him at the time of this crime. He yelled out about the gun because he was mad.
At the hearing, the husband admitted that he was trying to break appellant's fingers to stop appellant from hitting him. The husband said appellant was screaming when this happened.
No other evidence established or suggested that appellant is autistic.
Visalia police officer Jeff Dowling investigated the crime that same day. He found potential witnesses in the neighborhood. The following day, he showed a six-pack photo lineup to a neighbor who identified both appellant and T.M. as suspects she saw fleeing from the victims' residence on the day in question.
Dowling detained appellant, who was questioned at the police station. Appellant confessed to his involvement in this crime. He admitted that he and his brother entered the victims' residence through a bathroom window. They began going through cabinets and drawers until someone came home. They hid under the bed. Appellant was frightened because the male said he was going to shoot them. A male came in and saw him. According to appellant, the male grabbed them and pulled them out. A fight ensued. According to appellant, the male began to hurt him so he punched back in self-defense. Various items were thrown at the male, and the juveniles were able to get away. Appellant admitted to Dowling that they fled with a stolen cell phone taken from the residence.
During his interview, appellant also made statements showing he understood the wrongfulness of his actions. We discuss this police interview in greater detail below.
Appellant wrote an apology letter to the owners. He wrote, "Sorry for taking your phone." After interviewing appellant, Dowling recovered the stolen cell phone from appellant's mother. II. Appellant Is Identified In Court.
At the juvenile court hearing, the husband identified both appellant and T.M. as the two juveniles who broke into his residence and attacked him on the day in question. He identified appellant as the intruder who hid under the bed.
The neighbor testified at the hearing. She identified both appellant and T.M. as the two boys she saw fleeing from the victims' residence on the day in question.
DISCUSSION
I. The Admission Of Appellant's Statements To Dowling Was Harmless.
Appellant contends that the juvenile court prejudicially erred when it allowed his custodial statements to come into evidence. He asks this court to set aside the true findings of guilt on all charges.
A. Background.
During the juvenile court proceedings, appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude his statements to Dowling pursuant to Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436. A hearing occurred in which Dowling testified. Dowling said he interviewed appellant the day after this crime occurred. He spoke with appellant in an interview room at the police station. Dowling's partner had picked up appellant from school and transported him there. None of appellant's family members were present when this interview occurred.
Appellant's interview with Dowling was recorded and a transcript of it was moved into evidence. We summarize the relevant portions of this police interview, along with the court's ruling.
1. Appellant's interview with Dowling.
At the beginning of appellant's police interview, the following exchange occurred:
"[DOWLING]: Alright so again my name is Officer (unintelligible) requested that I be here. The burglary happened yesterday. So you have the right to remain silent do you understand that?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: So what that means is you don't have to talk to me and you can have your mom here if you want. And you have the right to talk to a lawyer and have them here if you want them to be present with you. And if you can't afford a lawyer one will be provided to you which means if you don't have money for one, we will give you a lawyer, okay. So I'm just gonna [sic] read everything from the start here so you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to your parent or guardian or lawyer. If you can't afford to hire one, one will be appointed to you and
will represent you at no cost to you if you wish one. Do you understand what I just said?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: Do you want to talk to me about what happened?
"[APPELLANT]: I mean well yeah.
"[DOWLING]: Okay so real quick but before that I have to ask you a couple more questions here.
"[APPELLANT]: Well is it possible that my mom can come[?]
"[DOWLING]: Sure, yeah. That's fine. Let me just throw this up here real quick and then we'll get your mom come before I get into the meat and potatoes of all this here, okay. Spell your first name for me."
Appellant spelled his name and said he was 12 years old. Dowling told another unidentified person to have someone call appellant's mom. Dowling stated that appellant "doesn't want to talk unless his moms [sic] here." Appellant said his mom did not work and she should be home. In response to Dowling's questions, appellant identified his school and teacher, and said he was in the seventh grade. The following exchange occurred:
"[DOWLING]: Okay. Okay, you know the difference between doing what's right and doing what's wrong?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: Okay. Give me an example of something that is right to do.
"[APPELLANT]: Hmm, open the door for an old lady.
"[DOWLING]: Yes, that's very nice. Open door for an old lady I like it. Okay give me an example of something that's wrong to do.
"[APPELLANT]: Burglary of someone's house.
"[DOWLING]: Okay. . . . What happens to you when you do something wrong?
"[APPELLANT]: You get in trouble.
"[DOWLING]: Okay, fair enough.
"[APPELLANT]: There are consequences.
"[DOWLING]: All righty do you know it's wrong to break into someone's house?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: And punch them? Okay.
"[APPELLANT]: Punch them?
"[DOWLING]: Mm-hmm.
"[APPELLANT]: (unintelligible) Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: . . . You know it was wrong to do that before yesterday?
"[APPELLANT]: Yes.
"[DOWLING]: . . . Did you know it's wrong to help someone else do that?
"[APPELLANT]: What do you mean?
"[DOWLING]: If someone breaks into a house and assaults the person that lives there and you help that person. Do you know it's wrong to help that person do that?
"[APPELLANT]: Well, yeah.
"[DOWLING]: Okay. If someone did this to you would it be wrong? If someone—if you went into your house and someone took your
stuff and then punched you while you were in your house would that be wrong if they did that to you?
"[APPELLANT]: Not if they were defending themselves.
"[DOWLING]: Right but it would be wrong though for them to be in the house and taking things from you?
"[APPELLANT]: Yes.
"[DOWLING]: Okay. Were you ever taught it's wrong to do that?
"[APPELLANT]: Yes.
"[DOWLING]: What we [sic] you talk about it being wrong?
"[APPELLANT]: That you got to do stuff that's right. And I'm like I understand what's right and wrong.
"[DOWLING]: Okay. Just gonna [sic] make sure. . . . Well I can't ask you any more questions until your mom gets here so we're gonna [sic] hang out, okay.
"[APPELLANT]: Okay. . . . Do you know how long she sleeps though[?]
"[DOWLING]: Okay well hopefully my partner will be able to wake her up.
"[APPELLANT]: I was like she's not.
"[DOWLING]: Well the phone doesn't even ring. They just went straight to voicemail."
These questions derive from In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 862 (Gladys R.). According to Dowling, he completed a Gladys R. questionnaire to determine if appellant knew the difference between right and wrong. Dowling said he had conducted hundreds of Gladys R. questionnaires, and it was normal to Mirandize a minor before asking those questions. If a minor invoked Miranda rights, however, Dowling would still ask these questions to determine if the minor knows the difference between right and wrong. On cross-examination, Dowling agreed that the Gladys R. interview is very important in establishing criminal liability.
While waiting, Dowling took some pictures of appellant. Appellant denied that he had any injuries. The following exchange occurred:
"[DOWLING]: . . . Any questions for me right now or anything?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
"[DOWLING]: What's [sic] you got?
"[APPELLANT]: Like what am I supposed to do like.
"[DOWLING]: Well I want to ask you some questions about what happened yesterday.
"[APPELLANT]: But what are they going to do?
"[DOWLING]: I'm sorry but what?
"[APPELLANT]: What are they going to do?
"[DOWLING]: Who are they? Like me?
"[APPELLANT]: Exactly.
"[DOWLING]: Well I don't know like I wanna [sic] ask some questions about what happened yesterday and that once I get some answers without then we'll figure it out.
"[APPELLANT]: . . . And where is my brother?
"[DOWLING]: He's in separate rooms [sic].
"[APPELLANT]: Oh.
"[DOWLING]: He's here. I just got done talking to him.
"[APPELLANT]: . . . And what are they going to do with me?
"[DOWLING]: I don't know. We need to talk to you first and then we'll make that decision.
"[APPELLANT]: And you guys talked to him already?
"[DOWLING]: Mm-hmm.
"[APPELLANT]: Everything?
"[DOWLING]: Yeah.
"[APPELLANT]: Like but you didn't talk to me about it.
"[DOWLING]: Well yeah because you said you wanted your mom here so we are waiting for your mom. Unless you want to change your mind but it's up to you.
"[APPELLANT]: I mean I don't want to stay in here all day.
"[DOWLING]: Sure.
"[APPELLANT]: I don't think my mom's [sic] can come anytime soon.
"[DOWLING]: Well it's up to you so if you want to talk we can talk along with your mom or without your mom. It's totally up to you.
"[APPELLANT]: We can talk, we can talk about it.
"[DOWLING]: Are you sure?
"[APPELLANT]: Yeah."
Appellant admitted that he was involved in the burglary the day before. He described how he and his brother entered the house through a window. He said, "the guy came" and told them "he was going to shoot us." Appellant was frightened, and he hid. According to appellant, he and his brother fought the guy, who was the aggressor. He said the guy cut his brother's arm with scissors. They then ran home.
2. The juvenile court's ruling.
In ruling on the motion, the juvenile court referred to the written transcript moved into evidence. The court noted that Dowling read the Miranda rights to appellant, who indicated that he understood them. According to the court, appellant never invoked his right to an attorney, even when asking for his mother to be present. Dowling stopped questioning appellant, who then indicated he was willing to talk. The court determined that appellant was advised of his Miranda rights, which were waived. The court did not see any concerns when Dowling asked the Gladys R. questions about knowing right from wrong.
Finally, the court found that no coercion occurred during appellant's police interview. To the contrary, Dowling was polite and there was no indication that appellant was uncooperative. Nothing showed that Dowling was abusive. The interview was very short, lasting about 20 minutes. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court denied appellant's motion to exclude his statements to Dowling.
B. Standard of review.
" 'The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily made.' [Citation.] 'Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances.' [Citations.] 'On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial court's legal determination and rely upon the trial court's findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.] The facts surrounding an admission or confession are undisputed to the extent the interview is tape-recorded, making the issue subject to our independent review. [Citation.]" (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176-1177.)
C. Analysis.
The parties dispute whether the juvenile court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. They disagree on numerous issues, including (1) whether appellant's request for his mother required Dowling to stop the interrogation; (2) whether appellant forfeited his assertion that his request for his mother was the equivalent of invoking both his right to counsel and his right to silence; (3) whether Dowling properly advised appellant of his Miranda rights; (4) whether appellant validly waived those rights; (5) whether coercion occurred; and (6) whether any error is harmless.
Before the juvenile court, appellant's counsel asserted that appellant "invoked his rights" and requested counsel when he asked if his mother could be present.
While there may be a dispute whether Dowling should have stopped the interrogation when appellant asked if his mother could be present, we agree with respondent that any presumed error in admitting appellant's statements is harmless. As such, we proceed directly to the issue of prejudice. (E.g., People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1015-1016 [finding it unnecessary to examine "complex constitutional question" because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) Based on this record, overwhelming evidence establishes both appellant's guilt, and his subjective awareness of the wrongfulness of his conduct.
1. Overwhelming evidence established appellant's guilt.
The harmless error test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) is used to review the erroneous admission of involuntary statements. (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86.) Chapman requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to the obtained verdict. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) "Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whether the error might have tainted its decision." (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86.) The issue is whether the verdict rendered " 'was surely unattributable to the error.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
A defendant's own confession is very probative and damaging evidence. (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296.) In the case of a coerced confession, as appellant alleges here, a reviewing court must "exercise extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless." (Ibid.)
In this case, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of appellant's statements was harmless regarding the juvenile court's true findings of guilt. Both the husband and a neighbor identified appellant in court as one of the two juveniles involved in these crimes. The husband testified that the two juveniles attacked him, which left him injured and possibly unconscious. The court rejected appellant's claim of self-defense (or defense of another). The court determined that the juveniles struck the husband on his head using a heavy object, resulting in serious bodily injury. In addition, the court determined that the juveniles went through "pretty significant effort" to enter the residence. They took a cell phone belonging to the victims, which Dowling recovered from appellant's mother. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the charges had been established.
Overwhelming evidence established appellant's involvement in these crimes. The juvenile court relied on the husband's testimony to reject the claim of self-defense. Appellant's statements to Dowling were unimportant in relationship to everything else the court considered in determining that the charges had been established. As such, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that any alleged error in admitting appellant's statements was harmless regarding the court's true findings.
2. Overwhelming circumstantial evidence established appellant's capacity to commit the charged crimes.
Appellant argues that the admission of his statements to Dowling was prejudicial regarding his capacity to commit the charged crimes as a minor under 14 years of age. He contends that the only evidence establishing his subjective awareness of the wrongfulness of his conduct was through his admissions. We reject these arguments.
Section 26 creates a rebuttable presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. (§ 26, subd. One; In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 231.) To defeat the presumption in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, "the People must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed." (In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
The Supreme Court has distinguished between the capacity determination under section 26, and the prosecution's separate burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 280-281.) A juvenile's capacity to commit a crime is not an element of the charged offenses. (In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 236.) "Rather, the presumption of incapacity operates to exempt the minor from legal responsibility. [Citations.]" (People v. Cottone, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 281.) A finding of capacity is a prerequisite before a minor under the age of 14 years may be adjudged a ward of the juvenile court. (In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 197; People v. Cottone, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 280.)
In this case, the juvenile court never expressly stated that it found clear and convincing evidence that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed. The court, however, found beyond a reasonable doubt that all charges had been established. Appellant was declared a ward of the court. As such, this record establishes an implied finding that the presumption under section 26 was overcome. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298 [affirming an implied finding that juvenile understood the wrongfulness of his conduct].)
A minor's knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the commission of the act itself. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.) However, a reviewing court may consider the crime's related circumstances, such as preparation, the method of its commission, and any concealment. (Ibid.) In addition, a minor's age, experience, conduct and knowledge may demonstrate a capacity to commit the charged crimes. (In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.) It is reasonable to expect that minors are more likely to appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts as they approach 14 years of age. (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
In this matter, appellant's age and prior experience, along with the attendant circumstances of these crimes, all rebut the presumption of his incapacity. Appellant, who was born in May 2004, was well over 12 years old when these crimes occurred. Prior to these charges, he had some limited exposure to the juvenile court system. Two days before this residential burglary occurred, appellant was placed on informal probation following a charge that he had possessed a B.B. gun on school grounds (§ 626.10, subd. (a)).
In committing these crimes, appellant and his brother entered the victims' residence through a window. They used a chair to remove a screen. The manner of entry into this home suggests they knew they were not invited. The manner of entry also shows planning. After gaining entry, the minors unlocked the back door and security gate, leaving them both open. This suggests preparation to flee if needed. When the husband entered the property, the juveniles hid. When found, the minors attacked the husband, injuring him and leaving him possibly unconscious. The juvenile court rejected appellant's claim of self-defense (or defense of another). The minors fled from the scene, taking a stolen cell phone with them. Appellant's flight strongly suggests he knew the wrongfulness of his actions. (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 379.)
Based on appellant's age, his status on informal probation, and the attendant circumstances of this crime, overwhelming circumstantial evidence established that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed. (See In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232 [a minor's age, experience, conduct and knowledge may demonstrate a capacity to commit charged crimes].) Appellant's statements to Dowling regarding his subjective knowledge were unimportant in relationship to everything else the juvenile court considered in determining that wardship was appropriate. It is beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of appellant's statements was harmless in this regard and this claim fails.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Misapply The Law And Substantial Evidence Supports The Court's Findings Regarding Section 26.
Appellant contends the juvenile court misapplied the law regarding whether he had sufficient capacity to commit assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). He also argues that the court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. He seeks reversal of these true findings.
A. Standard of review.
"In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jurisdictional finding, the issue is whether there is evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the finding. In making that determination, the reviewing court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the challenged order, resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of that order, and giving the evidence reasonable inferences. Weighing evidence, assessing credibility, and resolving conflicts in evidence and in the inferences to be drawn from evidence are the domain of the trial court, not the reviewing court. Evidence from a single witness, even a party, can be sufficient to support the trial court's findings. [Citations.]" (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450-451.) We must affirm if we find "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.]" (In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)
B. Analysis.
Focusing on the charges of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), appellant contends the juvenile court did not discharge its duty under section 26. He claims it is not clear how the court determined that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. Appellant notes that the husband threatened to shoot the intruders. Appellant contends he tried to defend himself and his brother. He argues the issue is not whether he understood it was wrong to assault the husband, but, rather, whether it was wrong to use self-defense in this situation. He asserts the facts were in dispute whether he acted in reasonable self-defense. He maintains that the evidence is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing proof that he knew the wrongfulness of his acts when he violated section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and section 243, subdivision (d).
We reject these arguments. Although the court never made an express finding that the presumption was overcome, this record establishes that an implied finding was made. As noted before, overwhelming circumstantial evidence supports the court's implied finding regarding appellant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.
The parties disagree whether appellant has forfeited this issue. We need not address forfeiture because this claim fails on its merits.
Regarding the charges of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), the husband testified that, after appellant came out from under the bed, the two juveniles began to fight with him. The husband said he fought back in self-defense. During the altercation, the husband was struck over the head with multiple objects. At some point, he possibly passed out. The two juveniles ran from the home. Emergency personnel responded to the scene and the husband was transported to the hospital. He suffered a concussion, along with other cuts and bruises to his head and face.
It was the juvenile court's role to determine the disputed issues of fact and make credibility determinations. The court determined that the juveniles acted in concert and "used force and violence" upon the husband. We will not reweigh this evidence on appeal or disturb the court's credibility determinations. (In re Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 450-451.)
Because the juvenile court rejected appellant's claim of self-defense, we likewise reject his argument that the issue is whether, when using reciprocal force, he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct in defending himself. In any event, this record contains substantial evidence, based on a clear and convincing standard, that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed. (In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.) --------
Based on this record, we disagree that the juvenile court failed to discharge its duty under section 26. Based on appellant's age, his status on informal probation, and the attendant circumstances of this crime, the People established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed. (See In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.) This evidence was reasonable, credible, and of solid value. As such, the presumption under section 26 was rebutted and this claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order appealed from is affirmed.
/s/_________
LEVY, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
FRANSON, J. /s/_________
SNAUFFER, J.