Opinion
2012-02-7
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jorge ADOMS, Defendant–Appellant.
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Rebekah J. Pazmiño of counsel), for appellate. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Noah J. Chamoy of counsel), for respondent.
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Rebekah J. Pazmiño of counsel), for appellate. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Noah J. Chamoy of counsel), for respondent.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., ANDRIAS, DeGRASSE, RICHTER, ABDUS–SALAAM, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert A. Sackett, J.), rendered May 20, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of rape in the first and second degrees, rape in the third degree (three counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 15 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting expert testimony relating to child sexual abuse syndrome (CSAS). The expert's testimony provided a possible explanation, beyond the knowledge of the average juror, for the victim's delay in reporting repeated instances of sexual abuse occurring over a long period of time ( see People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084 [2000]; People v. Gilley, 4 A.D.3d 127, 128, 770 N.Y.S.2d 868 [2004], lv. denied 2 N.Y.3d 799, 781 N.Y.S.2d 299, 814 N.E.2d 471 [2004] ). Regardless of whether defendant expressly raised the issue of delayed disclosure, the jury may have been concerned that the delay impacted the victim's credibility. Furthermore, the expert did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony ( see People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465–66, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620 [2011], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 400, 181 L.Ed.2d 257 [2011] ).
Defendant did not preserve his arguments that the victim's explanation of the reasons for her delayed disclosure obviated any need for expert testimony, or that CSAS is not a scientifically valid theory. As alternative holding, we reject those arguments.
Defendant expressly waived his present claim that the court should have instructed the jury on the use of expert testimony ( see People v. Gonzalez, 99 N.Y.2d 76, 83, 751 N.Y.S.2d 830, 781 N.E.2d 894 [2002] ). As an alternative holding, we find that the absence of that instruction did not cause defendant any prejudice.