Opinion
D059954
12-06-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. XAVIER ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. SCN266226)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
A jury convicted defendant Xavier Adams of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true two special circumstances: the murder was committed while Adams was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a carjacking of a Chevy Impala within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), and the murder was committed while Adams was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery of keys within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The jury also found true the enhancement that Adams used a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The court sentenced Adams to life without the possibility of parole plus a one-year term for the weapon enhancement. On appeal, Adams contends the evidence was insufficient to support the true findings on the special circumstances.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The court also imposed a parole revocation fine, which Adams asserts should be stricken. The People concede this point. We accept the People's concession and order the parole revocation fine stricken. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 380.)
I
FACTS
A. Background
The victim, Charles Williams, owned a car refurbishing and customizing business in Oceanside, California. Customers would select a car, and pay in advance the costs of refurbishing, which provided Williams with the funds to finance the refurbishing and protected him against customers changing their minds. Williams outsourced some of his work to other businesses. Williams would not release a car to a customer until all of the work was completed.
During 2008 and 2009, Williams worked on restoring a 1970 Impala with the intention that his fiancée, Ashle Baker, would drive it. However, they decided to sell the car to finance their wedding and, in June 2009, Williams sold the Impala to Raphael Ramey. The work on the Impala was not then completed because of problems finding parts for the car. Ramey called Williams often to check on the progress. In mid-August 2009, Ramey also went to Eddie's Automotive, a business to which Williams outsourced some of his work and where the Impala was then located, to check on the status of the Impala. The owner's son, Eddie Gomez, testified Ramey appeared frustrated by the length of time it was taking to complete the work.
B. The Murder
On August 22, 2009, Williams had a scheduled appointment with Ramey. In the mid-afternoon that day, Ramey and Adams arrived at Eddie's Automotive. Ramey was visibly angry at Williams, and Mr. Gomez explained he was waiting for Williams to obtain the needed parts. Ramey cancelled the Saturday appointment with Williams.
On Sunday around 9:00 a.m., Ramey called Williams to discuss the Impala. After the call, Williams told Baker he needed to go into work to type up a shipping contract for the Impala, and drove to the shop in his Cadillac. Baker spoke with Williams on the phone around 12:30 p.m., but when she tried calling him hourly thereafter, he did not answer, which was unusual. Sometime between noon and 1:00 p.m., Ms. Dixon, who knew Williams, drove past the shop and saw Williams's Cadillac in the lot but did not see anyone.
Sometime around 1:15 p.m., Williams's sister and her boyfriend, Mr. Gooley, drove past the shop as Adams was walking toward the driver's side door of the Cadillac. Gooley, who recognized Adams because Gooley had given Adams a tattoo about a month earlier, made eye contact with Adams and waved, but Adams looked down without acknowledging Gooley.
Around 5:30 p.m., Dixon and some Marines again drove past Williams's business and saw his car was gone. Dixon stopped to let the Marines look at the cars through the gate, and one of them mentioned the gate was open. Dixon knew this was unusual because Williams always locked the gate, and she tried to reach Williams by phone but there was no answer. The Marines opened the gate and went inside the lot, followed by Dixon, and the group went to the back of the building. Dixon saw the garage door and the interior door to the bay containing the Impala were open, which was unusual. After the Marines admired the Impala, they looked through a window into the office and saw it was in disarray and there was blood everywhere. Dixon looked in and saw Williams's body on the floor. The Marines made Dixon leave the property and she called 911.
Baker, who had begun to worry, walked from home to the shop. When she neared the shop, she saw Williams's Cadillac, driven by Adams with Ramey riding in the passenger's seat, pass her. Baker ran the rest of the way to the shop but was stopped by two strangers, who told her "you don't want to go that way." By the time Baker arrived, police had cordoned off the area. Dixon, Gooley and Williams's sister were there but were in shock and unable to speak.
Police responded and cordoned off the area. Williams was lying on the office floor and was dead when paramedics arrived. The scene was "the bloodiest" death scene the deputy medical examiner had ever seen. The medical examiner testified Williams was killed by the effect of numerous stab wounds and blunt force trauma injuries.
C. Evidence of Defendants' Actions
Ramey and Adams were arrested the morning following the murder. The bulk of the evidence regarding their actions is taken from the statements they gave to police after their arrest.
At around 9:30 a.m. on the day before Williams was killed, and before he was scheduled to meet with Ramey about the Impala, Ramey and Adams went to a Wal-Mart store where Ramey purchased two 7-inch knives and two crowbars.
The afternoon before the murder, Ramey had a discussion with a gunnery sergeant (Sergeant Brown) about the Impala and Ramey's upcoming leave scheduled to begin the following day. Brown offered to change the dates for Ramey's leave, but Ramey declined because he already had family plans. Ramey then called Williams and turned the phone over to Brown. Williams explained to Brown that he did not want to be responsible for releasing the car before all the repairs were done. After Brown told Williams Ramey was scheduled to be deployed on September 18, Williams said the car should be done in two to three weeks and offered to split the costs with Ramey to ship the car to Houston. This appeared to upset Ramey, who said Williams had agreed to pay all of the shipping costs, and he told Brown he had no alternative plans for transportation during his scheduled leave.
Ramey and Adams went to Williams's shop together on the day of the murder. A few weeks earlier, Ramey told Adams he was angry and said, "I'm gonna get him." On the Thursday before the murder, Ramey told Adams that "we're gonna have some problems" if the Impala was not finished by Saturday, and Adams agreed.
Adams claimed he thought Ramey was going to just beat up Williams to speed up the work, but then admitted Ramey explained that if they merely beat up Williams and took his car, he would call police because he could identify them. Adams agreed with Ramey that having Williams's car would be "nicer," but expressed concern over whether anyone would believe Williams had sold the Cadillac to Ramey. Ramey said that, if the Impala was not finished, "I'm gonna get him. I'm gonna jack him," and Adams agreed.
On the morning of the murder, Adams and Ramey were driven to Williams's business shortly before noon by an unidentified person. Adams asked Ramey whether the person who drove them there knew they "pretty much are going to jack somebody right now," and Ramey assured him the driver did not know. After they were dropped off, Ramey met with Williams inside while Adams initially waited outside. Before going inside, Ramey told Adams that if he did not get what he wanted, Williams would not be able to walk out the door. While Adams waited, Ramey and Williams went back and forth a few times to check on the Impala.
However, Adams became aware Williams had again pushed back the date. Ramey came outside and told Adams, "[L]et's go in and get him." Adams asked if Ramey was sure he wanted to do that, and was worried how they would get back, telling Ramey, "I know you want to take his car, but . . . [d]on't you want your own car?" Adams also said to Ramey "[s]ay we do get away with this? . . . You take his car and or whatever and go back to Texas? . . . You ain't better come back up here with it . . . [s]o, how would you get back?" However, Adams then thought, "oh well, fuck it," and accompanied Ramey into the office prepared to back up Ramey.
Once back inside, Ramey started discussing the shipping arrangements with Williams, and then asked to use Williams's phone to call for a ride; he pretended to call for a ride, but instead dialed his own phone number around 1:00 p.m. Ramey then pulled out a knife and attacked Williams. Adams largely watched as Ramey attacked Williams, but admitted he stabbed Williams a few times. Williams fought back, but was eventually subdued by Ramey and Adams.
After Williams was subdued, Adams and Ramey rummaged through drawers and the Impala looking for keys but, after none of the keys fit the Impala, Ramey said, "Mother fucker, let's just take the [Cadillac]." They then found the keys for the Cadillac and drove away. They drove to a mall to buy some clothes for Ramey, and then drove to Fallbrook, where they stayed the night with someone off-base.
D. The Arrest and Search
Approximately eight hours after Williams's body was found, a detective called Adams and said the police needed to speak with him. Adams replied that he was in his barracks, then claimed he was in a friend's room, and then claimed he did not know where he was. He then hung up and the detective was unable to reestablish phone contact. However, individuals from Adams's military base directed detectives to an address in Fallbrook, where they saw Williams's Cadillac parked in front of an apartment complex. Detectives staked out the car until 8:30 a.m., when they saw Adams and Ramey leave the apartment complex and start to get into the Cadillac. Police detained Adams and Ramey and found the keys to the Cadillac on the ground near Ramey. Ramey, after being placed in the patrol car, told police the evidence was in the trunk.
Police looked in the trunk and found two bloody knives and some bloodstained clothing. In the back seat of the Cadillac, police found a large "sea-type" duffel bag, containing clothing and toiletries, that belonged to Adams.
II
ANALYSIS
Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on the special circumstances alleging the murder was committed while he was engaged in a robbery or a carjacking within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivisions (a)(17)(A) and (a)(17)(L).
A. Legal Principles
1. The Robbery Special Circumstance
"For a felony-murder special circumstance to apply, the felony cannot be merely 'incidental or ancillary to the murder'; it must demonstrate 'an independent felonious purpose,' not an intent 'simply to kill.' [Quoting People v. Albilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511; citation.] But even if a defendant harbored the intent to kill at the outset, a concurrent intent to commit an eligible felony will support the special circumstance allegation." (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 609, italics added.) Accordingly, to prove the robbery-murder special circumstance, the prosecution must prove the defendant "formed the intent to steal before or while killing the victim." (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 105; accord People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 255 ["[t]he sole intent required for the jury to find true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation is the intent to commit a robbery before or during the killing"].) Stated differently, although the courts have applied the rule in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 (disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3) to hold the felony-murder special circumstance is "inapplicable to cases in which the defendant intended to commit murder and only incidentally committed one of the specified felonies while doing so" (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608), the courts have also recognized that a "[c]oncurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance" and it is only when "the underlying felony is merely incidental to a murder that we apply the rule of [People v.] Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1." (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 903.)
2. Standards for Appellate Review of Sufficiency of the Evidence
" 'To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077.) Under this standard of review, which applies with equal force to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a special circumstance finding (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 790-791), " ' "[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' " (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933; accord, People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 104.)
Our standard of review is the same when the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 104.) "Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]" ' " (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054, quoting People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) Accordingly, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate issues of credibility (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27), but instead presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact and logical inference a trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) We may reverse only when it clearly appears that on no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.)
3. Analysis
We conclude there are facts and logical inferences from which a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams and Ramey, although also harboring the intent to kill Williams at the outset, concurrently harbored the intent at the outset of their trip to Williams's shop to commit an eligible felony (robbery and carjacking) within the meaning of the special circumstance allegation. (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 609.)
First, Adams's own statement to the detective provides an evidentiary basis for the true finding. Adams told the detective that, a couple of weeks before they went to Williams's shop, Adams and Ramey discussed that "[w]e were gonna jack him." Adams also told the detective that, the day before the murder, he and Ramey (on their trip to purchase weapons) discussed what needed to be done to Williams, and Ramey told Adams that "if we just beat him up and take his car . . . [Williams would be able to] just call the cops [because] he know[s] our faces." As part of that conversation, Adams also told Ramey that, "Yeah, you can have his car and go, that'll be nicer," but expressed concern over whether anyone would believe Ramey had obtained the car legitimately. Also, Adams told the detective that, while en route to Williams's shop on the day of the murder, he asked Ramey whether the person who was driving them there knew "we pretty much are going to jack somebody right now," and was assured by Ramey that the driver did not know their intention. Finally, Adams told the detective that, after Ramey spent a few minutes alone with Williams while Adams waited outside, Ramey came back out and said "let's go in and get him." Adams then asked Ramey, " '[H]ow [are] we gonna get back to the house?' I was like 'I know, I know you want to take his car, [but'] I go, 'Don't you want your car?' . . . I go, 'Say we do get away with this . . . . You take his car . . . and go back to Texas?' . . . 'You ain't better come back up here with it.' " However, despite these misgivings, Adams decided "oh well, fuck it," and they went inside and began their attack. All of Adams's statements were reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that he and Ramey also formed the intent to take the keys to and then steal Williams's car (despite Adams's doubts about whether Ramey could get away with it) before or concurrently with the time they began their attack on Williams.
The circumstantial evidence provides additional support for the inference drawn by the jury that Adams and Ramey harbored the intent to take either the Impala or the keys to enable them to steal Williams's car before or concurrently with the time they formed the intent to kill Williams. First, our Supreme Court has "stated that 'when one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.' " (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357, quoting People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688.) The theft of the Cadillac's keys, which facilitated the subsequent taking of the Cadillac, permits an inference the killing was for purposes of the robbery. Although Adams argues the theft of the Cadillac's keys, which enabled the subsequent taking of the Cadillac, should be deemed a "neutral factor" because that conduct could equally be viewed as an afterthought incidental to the murder, other circumstantial evidence further undermines this contention. The evidence showed Adams and Ramey went to the shop knowing they intended to harm Williams. However, they went without a car to transport either themselves or the gear they took with them (including a large "sea-bag" and the weapons) that they would need to make their subsequent escape. A reasonable jury could infer they were unconcerned with this lack of an escape vehicle because they intended to take either the Impala or Williams's Cadillac, which supports the inference they went to the shop holding the "[c]oncurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony [which] will support a felony-murder special circumstance [citation]." (People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 903.)
Adams relies principally on People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303 (disapproved on other grounds as stated in People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260) to support his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings on the special circumstances. In Thompson, the assailant entered the home and, although ostensibly demanding the victims' money, ultimately spurned all of the cash and jewelry proffered by the victims; additionally, although the assailant did take car keys from one victim, the assailant never used the keys to try to take the car. Instead, after spurning the valuables, the assailant said to the woman, "[y]ou know why I'm here and you know who sent me" and then shot the woman and her fiancé. (Id. at pp. 310-311, 324, fn. 27.) The woman testified she believed her estranged husband was "who sent" the assailant. (Ibid.) On that record, Thompson concluded the assailant "undeniably [intended] . . . primarily (if not exclusively) to [commit] a killing" (id. at p. 324), and therefore applied People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1 to reverse the special circumstance true finding. (Thompson, at pp. 324-325.) Thus, as our Supreme Court later observed, "in Thompson there was serious question whether the perpetrator had any intent to steal at all [citation]." (People v Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 791, italics added.) Here, unlike Thompson, property was taken and, unlike Thompson, the evidence amply supports the inference the intent to steal was formed in advance of the killing. Thompson has no application here.
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DISPOSITION
The parole revocation fine is stricken and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The superior court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and transmit a copy of it to the appropriate authorities.
McDONALD, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. HUFFMAN, J.