Opinion
March 16, 1971
Appeal from a judgment of conviction rendered August 3, 1970. Appellant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree after his motion to suppress certain evidence was denied. He contends on this appeal that a search of his premises violated his constitutional rights and, therefore, was illegal. At the suppression hearing it developed that the Schenectady police had received information that appellant was in possession of the fruits of recent burglaries. After the police ascertained that he was on parole, they contacted the New York State Division of Parole. Subsequently, a Parole Officer accompanied two Schenectady policemen to appellant's residence. No search warrant, nor warrant for parole violation was obtained. When appellant was advised by the Parole Officer that he had reason to believe he was in possession of stolen property and intended to search his premises, he at first refused to permit it. Upon being advised that such refusal constituted a violation of his parole and, under the circumstances, he would be arrested, appellant thereafter consented to the search. It resulted in the seizure of various items identified with the recent burglaries. He was then arrested as a parole violator and subsequently indicted on various charges of burglary, larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. Appellant had been released on parole prior to the completion of his sentence. As a parolee he was still in legal custody and under the control and supervision of the authorities. ( People ex rel. Natoli v. Lewis, 287 N.Y. 478.) One of the conditions agreed to by appellant as a parolee was that his person or premises could be searched at any time by a parole officer. The appellant is protected by the Fourth Amendment only against unreasonable searches. What is unreasonable depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. As a parolee appellant was subject to a search which might not be permissible in the case of one not under a similar disability. ( People v. Randazzo, 15 N.Y.2d 526.) In the instant case the Parole Officer, having received information that certain premises had been burglarized and that some of the contents were believed to be in the possession of appellant, had, in our opinion, reasonable grounds to search appellant's premises. ( People v. Santos, 31 A.D.2d 508, affd. 25 N.Y.2d 976.) Judgment affirmed. Herlihy, P.J., Staley, Jr., Cooke, Sweeney and Simons, JJ., concur.