Opinion
F073040
02-17-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ACCREDITED SURETY & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
John Mark Rorabaugh and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel and Robert J. Taro, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 1479299)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ricardo Cordova, Judge. John Mark Rorabaugh and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel and Robert J. Taro, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Appellant appeals from a bail bond summary judgment and from the denial of its motion to extend the period during which the surety could surrender the criminal defendant or otherwise establish grounds to have the forfeiture of the bond vacated. Appellant contends the trial court failed to consider its motion on the merits and entered summary judgment prematurely. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant posted a bail bond for the release of a criminal defendant. The defendant failed to appear when required to do so and the bail was forfeited. Notice of forfeiture was mailed October 24, 2014. The 185-day period within which the defendant was required to appear in court or be taken into custody in order to have the bail forfeiture set aside and the bond exonerated (the appearance period) would have expired on April 27, 2015, without extension. (Pen. Code, § 1305, subds. (b), (c).) On April 23, 2015, appellant filed a motion to extend the appearance period under section 1305.4. The motion was supported by declarations regarding the efforts appellant had made to locate the defendant.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Our statutory references are to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the relevant events.
Respondent gave notice that it did not oppose an extension of the appearance period, but it requested the appearance period be extended only to October 24, 2015. On May 14, 2015, the trial court granted appellant's motion and extended the appearance period to Saturday, October 24, 2015. On Monday, October 26, 2015, appellant filed a second motion to extend the appearance period, and set it for hearing on November 30, 2015. It asserted the applicable statute permitted the court to extend the appearance period up to 180 days; because the first extension had extended the period only 163 days, the court could grant a further extension of 17 days, running from the date of the order granting the extension. Respondent opposed the motion, asserting the court could only grant one extension of up to 180 days, making the maximum appearance period 365 days. It asserted the trial court had already granted one motion and the 365 days from the date the notice of forfeiture was mailed (Oct. 24, 2014), had already expired (on Oct. 24, 2015), so no further extension could be granted. Respondent argued the court had no jurisdiction to grant a further extension.
On November 30, 2015, the trial court denied the second motion, finding it moot because the extension, if granted, would have expired November 10, 2015 (180 days from the initial extension order). It entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The trial court's order denying an extension of the appearance period is not itself appealable; it may be reviewed on appeal from the summary judgment, however. (People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 75, 79-80.) We review the denial of the extension motion for abuse of discretion; discretion is abused when the trial court's decision exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. (Id. at p. 80.) When the trial court's decision is based on an interpretation of a statute on uncontested facts, the matter presents a pure question of law and is subject to de novo review. (County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg National Ins. Co. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944, 949 (Williamsburg).)
II. Procedure for Entry of Bond Summary Judgment
"The term 'bail' refers 'to the undertaking by the surety into whose custody the defendant is placed that he will produce the defendant in court at a stated time and place.'" (Williamsburg, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) "The purpose of bail and forfeiture statutes is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to court orders and judgments. [Citations.] It does not have as a goal revenue for the state or punishment to the surety." (People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 725 (American Surety).) "Nevertheless, the 'bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.' [Citation.] Thus, when there is a breach of this contract, the bond should be enforced." (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657-658 (American Contractors).)
The statutes governing the forfeiture and exoneration of bail (§ 1305 et seq.) must be strictly construed in favor of the surety in order to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. (American Surety, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 725.) Their "'provisions must be carefully followed by the trial court, or its acts will be considered without or in excess of its jurisdiction.'" (People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 998-999 (U.S. Fire).) When the bail forfeiture statutes require "'a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, to follow a particular procedure, or to act subject to certain limitations, an act beyond those limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.'" (County of Orange v. Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1492.) This standard "'"compels us to protect the surety, and more importantly the individual citizens who pledge to the surety their property on behalf of persons seeking release from custody, in order to obtain the corporate bond."'" (U.S. Fire, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.)
When a defendant who has been released on bail fails to appear in court as required without a sufficient excuse, the trial court is required to declare bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) If the bail exceeds $400, the clerk must mail notice of the forfeiture to the surety and the bail agent within 30 days of the forfeiture. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) The surety then has 185 days from mailing of the notice of forfeiture to move to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on certain grounds, including appearance in court by the defendant or a showing that the defendant is in custody. (§ 1305, subd. (c); American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658.) After the appearance period expires, the trial court has 90 days to enter summary judgment on the bond. (§ 1306, subds. (a), (c); American Contractors, at p. 658.) If the trial court fails to enter summary judgment within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the bond is automatically exonerated. (§ 1306, subd. (c).)
The bond in this case was for $30,000. --------
Section 1305.4 allows the trial court to extend the original 185-day appearance period up to 180 additional days, on motion supported by a showing of good cause. (People v. Granite State Insurance Co. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 (Granite).) A motion to extend the appearance period that is timely filed within the appearance period "may be heard within 30 days after the expiration of that period, and the court may extend the 30-day period to hear the motion on a showing of good cause." (Ibid.) Summary judgment on the bond may not be entered while the motion for an extension is pending; filing of the motion for an extension postpones the first date on which summary judgment may be entered and a summary judgment entered while the motion is pending is premature and may be set aside when timely challenged. (U.S. Fire, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003; People v. Aegis Security Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1073, 1076.)
If the trial court grants the motion for an extension of the appearance period, it "may order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order." (§ 1305.4.) Under the unambiguous language of this provision, the extension runs from the date of the order granting the extension, not from the date of expiration of the initial 185-day appearance period. (U.S. Fire, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) The trial court, in effect, reinstates the appearance period and extends it. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 638, 649.) The language of section 1305.4 has also been interpreted to permit one extension totaling 180 days, rather than repeated extensions of time, each up to 180 days. (People v. Taylor Billingslea Bail Bonds (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199 (Taylor Billingslea); Granite, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.)
Our Supreme Court has recently clarified the manner in which extensions of the appearance period operate. In People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35 (Financial Casualty), bail was forfeited when the criminal defendant failed to appear as required, and notice of forfeiture was mailed to the surety and the bail agent. Without extension, the appearance period would have expired on February 25, 2013. Five days before the expiration date, the surety filed a motion to extend the appearance period pursuant to section 1305.4. On March 20, 2013, the trial court granted the motion and extended the appearance period to August 1, 2013. On August 1, 2013, the surety filed a second motion for an extension. The motion was heard and denied on August 26, 2013, in part because the trial court believed the total allowable extension time had run out. It entered summary judgment on the bond on September 4, 2013.
The court rejected the People's argument that the maximum total allowable appearance period was the 185-day original period plus 180 days of extension, for a total of 365 days, running from the notice of forfeiture. (Financial Casualty, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 43.) It noted that calculation was based on the decision in Taylor Billingslea, which was decided before an amendment to section 1305.4, which added language permitting extension motions to be heard within 30 days after expiration of the appearance period. Under the prior statute applicable in Taylor Billingslea, the motion had to be both filed and heard within the appearance period, so the date of the extension order could be no later than the date of expiration of the initial appearance period. (Financial Casualty, at p. 44.)
Extension motions now may be heard up to 30 days after the end of the appearance period, and the hearing may be continued to a later date for good cause. (Financial Casualty, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 44-45.) Under the plain language of section 1305.4, which allows the trial court to order an extension of up to 180 days "from its order," the extension period now runs from the date of the extension order rather than from the date of expiration of the original appearance period. (Financial Casualty, at pp. 45-46.)
The court agreed with Taylor Billingslea "that the 'order' referred to in section 1305.4's limit of extensions to 180 days 'from its order' is the first order extending the period, rather than any subsequent order, and that the total allowable extension is thus limited to 180 days from the date of the first extension order, regardless of how many individual extensions the court orders." (Financial Casualty, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 45-46, fn. 2].) The first extension was granted on March 20, 2013. "The maximum extension that could have been ordered was for 180 days from that date, ending on September 16, 2013. When the court heard the surety's second extension motion on August 26, 2013, therefore, it had the authority to order a further extension through September 16." (Id. at p. 46.)
III. Application to This Case
Appellant filed its first motion for extension requesting a 180-day extension. Respondent did not oppose the motion, but requested the extension be granted only until October 24, 2015, one year after the notice of bail forfeiture was mailed. This request was apparently based on Taylor Billingslea, which calculated a maximum total extension period of 180 days, running from expiration of the original appearance period. (Taylor Billingslea, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) When appellant filed its second motion for an extension of the appearance period, respondent opposed, arguing the trial court had jurisdiction to grant only one extension and the full 365 days that could be allowed (original 185 days plus a maximum 180-day extension) had already run on October 24, 2015.
The trial court correctly determined that the potential extension period expired on November 10, 2015, 180 days after the May 14, 2015, order granting an extension. Because the trial court lacked authority to grant a further extension on the date of the hearing (Nov. 30, 2015), it did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion.
IV. Prematurity of Summary Judgment
Appellant argues the trial court entered summary judgment prematurely, because it entered summary judgment on the same day it denied appellant's motion for an extension of the appearance period. Appellant contends the first day to enter summary judgment is the day after the motion for an extension is denied. It further contends the premature judgment is voidable and should be set aside as if it were never entered. Because the time period for entry of summary judgment has passed, any new summary judgment will be untimely. Therefore, appellant concludes the bond should be exonerated.
In light of Financial Casualty's observation that the extension period can run no longer than 180 days from the date of the first order for an extension, even if multiple extensions are requested or granted, we conclude the extension period ends no later than that date even if a motion for another extension is pending on that date. If a motion for another extension is pending on the date the full potential extension period expires, the day following that expiration is the first date on which the bail bond summary judgment may be entered.
We do not believe the commencement of the period for entering summary judgment may be postponed by the surety by filing a motion for a second extension and setting it for hearing after the full 180-day potential extension period has expired. While it would make sense for a motion to vacate the bail forfeiture, which is set for hearing after expiration of an extended appearance period, to postpone the time for entry of summary judgment, because the trial court may vacate the forfeiture on the hearing date and preclude entry of summary judgment, the same cannot be said of a motion for an extension of the appearance period, which is set for hearing beyond the last day extension is possible. Such a motion does not have the potential to result in an order that further extends the appearance period or precludes entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that, when a second or subsequent motion for an extension of the appearance period has been filed during the appearance period and set for hearing more than 180 days after the date of the first order granting an extension, "the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed" (§ 1306, subd. (a)) and summary judgment may first be entered when the 180-day period after the order granting an extension has passed without the forfeiture being set aside. The commencement of the period for entering summary judgment is not delayed by setting an untimely hearing of the motion.
Accordingly, we conclude the summary judgment was not prematurely entered, and appellant was not entitled to exoneration of the bond on the ground the summary judgment entered was voidable and any new summary judgment would be untimely.
DISPOSITION
The summary judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its costs on appeal.
/s/_________
HILL, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GOMES, J. /s/_________
SMITH, J.