Opinion
357766
08-18-2022
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK ANTHONY ABBATOY, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Berrien Circuit Court LC No. 1997-403846-FC
Before: Rick, P.J., and Boonstra and O'Brien, JJ.
PER CURIAM
In October 1997, a jury convicted then-17-year-old defendant, Mark Anthony Abbatoy, of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), for the beating death of the victim, Connie DePalma. Defendant carried out this beating with his codefendant, Anthony DePalma, who was the victim's son. Defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), but that sentence was reconsidered as a result of MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, and the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208-209, 136 S.Ct. 718; 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). Upon reconsideration, the trial court declined to reimpose a sentence of LWOP and, following a hearing, resentenced defendant to 40 to 60 years' imprisonment. Defendant now appeals that sentence as of right.
After defendant appealed, our Supreme Court released People v Boykin,___Mich___; ____N.W.2d____(2022) (Docket Nos. 157738; 158695). There, our Supreme Court held that, when sentencing juvenile defendants to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial courts must consider a juvenile defendant's youth, and must treat that youth as a mitigating factor. Id. at___; slip op at 1. The Court added, however, that a trial court need not "articulate on the record how a defendant's youth affected the decision." Id.
Having reviewed the trial court's opinion, it is not apparent that the trial court considered defendant's youth at the time of the offense when resentencing defendant, and even if the court did, it is not apparent that the court treated defendant's youth as a mitigating factor. Accordingly, although the trial court was not required to articulate on the record how defendant's youth affected its decision, we nevertheless vacate defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Boykin.
On appeal, defendant raises other issues that we will address because they are likely to reoccur on remand. First, we address defendant's argument that the evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion that defendant inflicted the fatal blows to the victim. Second, we address defendant's argument that he could not be sentenced to a longer sentence than his similarly situated codefendant, DePalma. Defendant raises a third argument-that the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors when it resentenced defendant-but we decline to address this argument in light of our holding that defendant must be resentenced.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of the beating death of the victim on May 7, 1997, in Bridgman, Michigan. According to trial testimony, on that afternoon, defendant was with DePalma. They were both 17 years old. Earlier in the day, defendant told DePalma that he planned to run away to California, and DePalma suggested that they steal his mother's car and drive there. DePalma went into his house and stole the victim's car keys, then went to a nearby restaurant with defendant to discuss their plan. Assuming that the victim would immediately call the police when defendant and DePalma took her car, the two planned to knock her out with a shovel so they could be farther away before the authorities were notified of the theft. With this as the plan, defendant and DePalma returned to DePalma's house and found the victim in the garage. Defendant hit the victim in the head with a shovel three times, and she fell down to the ground. Believing the victim was knocked out, defendant left the garage, but then heard a noise and realized that the victim had gotten up and went into the house. Defendant chased after the victim, kicked down the door to the house, and followed the victim upstairs, where he saw her on the phone. Afraid she was calling 911, defendant ripped the phone off the wall, then repeatedly hit the victim on the head with the shovel until she fell to the floor. Defendant maintained at both his trial and the Miller hearing that the victim was still breathing when he left her. At defendant's trial, he testified that he laid the shovel next to the fallen victim and went downstairs, and told DePalma that if he wanted his mother dead, he would have to do it himself. According to defendant, after that, DePalma went upstairs, and returned a short time later with the shovel. The forensic pathologist at defendant's trial testified that the victim's cause of death was cranial cerebral trauma (severe head injuries). The victim suffered 10 lacerations on the back and top of her head, and three of those wounds penetrated her skull.
Defendant and DePalma were tried at the same trial with separate juries. They were both convicted of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to LWOP.
In 2016, following the release of Miller and Montgomery, the prosecution moved to resentence defendant to LWOP under the procedures outlined in MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. After holding a two-day Miller hearing, the trial court denied that motion and scheduled a resentencing hearing. At that hearing, the trial court resentenced defendant to 40 to 60 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
DePalma was resentenced by a different trial court judge to 27 to 60 years' imprisonment. He was released in September 2020.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion." People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 131; 917 N.W.2d 292 (2018). A trial court's sentencing decision is an abuse of discretion if it violates the principle of proportionality, which requires the sentence imposed "be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." Skinner, 502 Mich. at 131-132 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 137 n 27.
III. BOYKIN
In People v Bennett, 335 Mich.App. 409, 413-414; 966 N.W.2d 768 (2021), this Court explained the process for resentencing a defendant who was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a juvenile:
Anticipating that the United States Supreme Court would give Miller retroactive effect, Michigan's Legislature designed a system for resentencing all prisoners serving life without parole who were under the age of 18 when they committed the offense. In those cases, the resentencing court must select either life without parole or a term-of-years sentence. Prosecutors seeking imposition of a life-without-parole sentence are obligated to file a motion specifying the grounds for imposing that punishment. The resentencing court then must hold a hearing to consider the juvenile sentencing factors set forth in Miller and other relevant information, including the defendant's record while incarcerated. The court is additionally obligated to specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances considered by the court and the court's reasons supporting the sentence imposed. If the court elects a term-of-years sentence rather than life without parole, the court shall sentence the individual to a term of imprisonment for which the maximum term shall be not less than 60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years. [Quotation marks and citations omitted. See also MCL 769.25a; MCL 769.25.]
If the court elects to impose a term-of-years sentence, "[t]here are no sentencing guidelines to guide a trial court's exercise of discretion within" the minimum-term range of 25 years to 40 years. People v Wines, 323 Mich.App. 343, 350; 916 N.W.2d 855 (2018), rev'd in part on other grounds 506 Mich. 954 (2020). In place of sentencing guidelines, resentencing courts should be guided by the sentencing objectives provided in People v Snow, 386 Mich. 586, 592; 194 N.W.2d 314 (1972). Wines, 323 Mich.App. at 352. In Snow, 386 Mich. at 592, the Michigan Supreme Court directed a sentencing court to consider the following objectives: (1) the reformation of the offender; (2) protection of society; (3) the disciplining of the wrongdoer; and (4) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.
This was the state of our caselaw when the trial court resentenced defendant. Following defendant's resentencing, however, our Supreme Court released Boykin, Mich. at; slip op at 13, in which it held "that in all sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial courts are to consider the defendant's youth and must treat it as a mitigating factor." In other words, when the trial court was deciding the minimum-term range of defendant's term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, it was not only required to consider the Snow objectives, but also defendant's youth at the time of the offense, and that was to be treated as a mitigating factor.
Having reviewed the transcript from the resentencing hearing, it is not apparent that the trial court considered defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances. See Boykin, Mich. at ____; slip op at 11 ("[W]e hold that consideration of youth and its attendant circumstances is also required by this state's sentencing jurisprudence."). The trial court focused almost exclusively on the horrific nature of defendant's crime, and nothing about that discussion suggested that the trial court was considering defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances.
While the trial court referenced defendant's age at one point in its ruling, that reference was fleeting. The court stated:
If you-if your mother had had you 22 weeks before she did we would [not] be here today. You would have been 18 years of age and you wouldn't have had the right to a Miller hearing. But we are where we are. And I understand the Supreme Court had to set a dark line and that benefits some people and it doesn't benefit others.
Perhaps highlighting the moving target that lower courts face when trying to resentence juvenile defendants under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, we note that the sentiment expressed by the trial court in this statement appears to no longer be accurate in light of our Supreme Court's recent holding in People v Parks,___ Mich, ___; ____N.W.2d (2022) (Docket No. 162086); slip op at 35-36 (holding that it is unconstitutional to impose a mandatory sentence of LWOP on an 18-year-old defendant, and that such a defendant is entitled to the "full protections of MCL 769.25 and our caselaw").
From this, it appears that the court was merely observing defendant's age, not taking defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances into consideration for purposes of sentencing defendant. Even if this conclusion is wrong, the trial court's statement certainly does not suggest that it was considering defendant's youth as a mitigating factor, as Boykin requires. See Boykin, ____Mich at ____; slip op at 1. The court was, at best, making a neutral observation about the fact that defendant's age allowed him the benefit of a Miller hearing.
Accordingly, on the basis of our conclusions that (1) the trial court did not consider defendant's youth when sentencing defendant to a term of years under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, and (2) to any extent that the court did consider defendant's youth, it did not treat defendant's youth as a mitigating factor, we vacate the trial court's sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Boykin.
IV. ACCURATE INFORMATION
Despite our holding remanding the case, we address defendant's arguments raised on appeal that are likely to arise again during his resentencing. First, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by sentencing defendant on the basis of inaccurate information because the record does not support the court's conclusion that defendant inflicted the injuries that resulted in the victim's death. We disagree.
A defendant is entitled to be sentenced "on the basis of accurate information." People v McGraw, 484 Mich. 120, 131; 771 N.W.2d 655 (2009). If a defendant's sentence is supported by inaccurate information, resentencing is required. People v Jackson, 487 Mich. 783, 792; 790 N.W.2d 340 (2010).
Defendant asserts that the trial court's statement that defendant "inflicted the majority of the blows and caused the death of this victim" was inaccurate. Although the police officer who testified on behalf of the prosecution at defendant's Miller hearing testified that he could not determine who issued the blow that resulted in the victim's death, there is evidence in the record supporting the trial court's conclusion that defendant inflicted a majority of the blows that resulted in the victim's death.
The evidence presented both at trial and during these proceedings portrayed a horrific attack and killing. Defendant admitted that he hit the victim in the head with the shovel three times in the garage, then followed her into the house, ripped the phone off the wall while the victim tried to call for help, and hit her in the head with the shovel until she fell to the floor. Defendant specified that he hit her with the shovel her until she passed out. The forensic pathologist who testified at defendant's trial described the gruesome wounds that the victim suffered, and explained that the victim would have fallen down and been unable to get up and walk after several of the blows that penetrated her skull. He explained that it was possible that she was still breathing and exhibited other vital signs for approximately 10 minutes after the injuries, even though she would have been beyond saving at that point. Therefore, it is possible that the victim was still breathing when defendant stopped hitting her, as defendant testified, but she would later have died as a result of defendant's attack regardless.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court did not consider the testimony from defendant's trial when resentencing defendant. This argument is premised on the fact that the trial court did not state that it had reviewed the record from defendant's trial when resentencing defendant. The trial court had obviously reviewed the record from defendant's trial, however, because the court clearly stated at the Miller hearing that it had reviewed the trial transcripts in preparation for that hearing, and the trial transcripts were admitted as exhibits at the Miller hearing, along with the police reports, autopsy report, and laboratory report. Regardless, at defendant's resentencing on remand, the trial court can alleviate defendant's concerns by specifying what documents it reviewed in preparation for the resentencing.
Moreover, defendant admitted that he never saw DePalma hit the victim with the shovel, and blood was only found on defendant. The police recovered the shirts worn by defendant when he attacked the victim, and they were covered in blood. On the other hand, when DePalma was apprehended, he was wearing the same clothes as he was wearing the day before (according to defendant's description), and he did not have any blood on him. Likewise, police found blood in the car only in the passenger seat, where defendant was sitting.
In light of this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that defendant inflicted the majority of the blows that resulted in the victim's death. For clarity, however, we note that, on remand, the trial court is not bound by its finding that defendant "inflicted the majority of the blows and caused the death of this victim," and is free to make contrary findings if it so chooses.
V. SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence with a minimum term that was 13 years longer than the sentence imposed on DePalma because they are similarly situated codefendants. We disagree.
Simply put, based on the trial court's findings, defendant is not similarly situated to DePalma. The sentencing court in DePalma's case determined that DePalma did not inflict the injuries that led to the victim's death. The trial court here found that defendant "inflicted the majority of the blows and caused the death of this victim"-a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence submitted for the reasons explained above. If these differing conclusions persist on remand, it is not necessarily unreasonable for defendant's sentence to be different than DePalma's. Accordingly, defendant's argument that he must necessarily be resentenced to the same sentence as DePalma is without merit.
Defendant's sentence is vacated, and we remand for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Michelle M. Rick Colleen A. O'Brien
Boonstra, J. (concurring).
This case is "Exhibit A" in demonstrating why our Supreme Court's recent decision in People v Boykin, ____Mich ____; ____N.W.2d (2022) (Docket Nos. 157738; 158695), is unworkable in the real world. Boykin obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the law, and fails to give clear direction either to trial courts or to this Court.
In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that "trial courts must consider a juvenile defendant's youth" and "must treat it as a mitigating factor" when sentencing a defendant in the circumstances before us. Id. at ____; slip op at 1, 10. In the next breath, however, the Court held that "trial courts need not articulate their bases for considering an offender's youth" and that there is "no basis for requiring trial courts to articulate on the record how a defendant's youth affected the [sentencing] decision." Id. at____, slip op at 4. The Court remanded the underlying cases to the Court of Appeals for it to determine "whether the sentencing courts properly considered defendants' youth as a mitigating factor." Id. The Court did so despite the fact that the trial court in at least one of the two underlying cases clearly did consider the defendant's youth and articulated more on the record than even the Supreme Court's new Boykin standard requires. Yet, the Supreme Court-while ostensibly requiring no articulation by the trial court-opined that the trial court's statements "appear to only represent a small portion of the record established by the sentencing court" and that "whether these statements and the totality of the record established by the trial court comply with our requirement that a trial court consider youth to be a mitigating factor is a close question deserving of additional appellate review." Id. at ____; slip op at 12.
There were two lower court cases that were consolidated for purposes of appeal: People v Boykin, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2018 (Docket No. 335862), and People v Tate, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 20, 2018 (Docket No. 338360).
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. at, slip op at 6, citing People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich. 453, 471; 902 N.W.2d 327 (2017). A trial court's sentencing decision is an abuse of discretion if it violates the principle of proportionality, which requires that the sentence imposed "be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 131-132; 917 N.W.2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "An abuse-of-discretion standard recognizes that there may be more than one principled outcome and the trial court may not deviate from that principled range of outcomes." Boykin,____ Mich. at____, slip op at 6, citing People v Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 269; 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003).
Just days after Boykin was decided, we are now faced with the quandary that Boykin created. The trial court in this case clearly was aware of defendant's youth and provided its proportionality analysis as part of its sentencing determination. The trial court even provided some articulation on the record-more than even Boykin requires-of its consideration of defendant's youth as part of this analysis. On appeal, we are now tasked with assessing-under Boykin- whether the trial court abused its discretion by not properly considering defendant's youth as a mitigating factor in its proportionality analysis. And we are required to make that assessment based on the trial court's statements and the "totality of the record established by the trial court," id. at, slip op at 12, even though-under Boykin-the trial court was not required to make any record on this issue.
The Supreme Court in Boykin stated that "[s]entencing juvenile defendants who were convicted of first-degree murder is an exceptionally daunting task for trial courts." Id. at, slip op at 7. Now, post-Boykin, the task is even more "exceptionally daunting" id., as trial courts will be obliged to grapple with Boykin's self-contradictory descriptions of what trial courts are-and are not-obliged to do.
And the task now before this Court is beyond "exceptionally daunting," id; it is indeed inherently impossible. Our review is for an abuse of discretion. Id. at, slip op at 6. Our review also is-as it must be-based on the trial court record. Id. at, slip op at 7. Yet the trial court was not required (and even today would not be required under Boykin) to articulate anything on the record about how its consideration of the defendant's youth affected its sentencing decision. Id. at, slip op at 4, 12, 13. So, there simply is not-and cannot be-any way for us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion-unless, perhaps, the trial court had sufficiently articulated that which Boykin explicitly does not require it to articulate (in which case there clearly would not be an abuse of discretion).
The abuse of discretion standard is, of course, highly deferential to the trial court. See, e.g., Babcock, 469 Mich. at 269 ("At its core, an abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome. When the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court's judgment.") (citation omitted); Skinner, 502 Mich. at 134-135, quoting Gall v United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41; 128 S.Ct. 586; 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) ("[C]ourts of appeals must review all sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard."). Given that there is such a high bar to finding an abuse of discretion, the correct answer-particularly where, as here, the trial court clearly took defendant's youth into consideration-may be for us to conclude that there is an insufficient basis in the record on which to find that the trial court abused its discretion. But the scenario before us in this case is precisely the scenario that was presented in Boykin with respect to the Tate defendant, and the Boykin Court still remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of its earlier conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion.
I note that the Supreme Court in Boykin said-in a footnote:
[N]othing in this opinion deprives trial courts of the discretion to articulate how an offender's youth or the Miller factors apply to that particular offender's sentence. Rather, articulating how the court considered the defendant's youth when fashioning an appropriate sentence enhances an appellate court's ability to review the proportionality of that sentence.Boykin, Mich. at n 9, slip op at 12 n 9. In my judgment, this footnote may reflect the true objective of Boykin. That is, Boykin effectively will require trial courts to articulate on the record how the defendant's youth applies to a particular sentence, but without the Supreme Court having to find a basis-either in statute, in the United States or Michigan Constitutions, or in the caselaw-for requiring it to do so.
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly held that "[n]one of these sources of law expresses such a requirement." Id. at, slip op at 10.
In my judgment, Boykin serves only to muddy the proverbial waters. It will leave trial courts scratching their heads about how to conduct sentencing proceedings for juvenile defendants receiving term-of-years sentences. And it leaves this Court with an impossible standard for evaluating such sentences on appeal. If the Supreme Court wishes to extend Miller to new settings, it should simply do so-openly and transparently. It should not do so vaguely and impliedly, telling trial courts one thing while simultaneously hinting that the opposite will be required in order for their sentences to be upheld on appeal.
Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
Because this Court is bound by Boykin, I concur in the majority's decision to vacate defendant's sentence and to remand for resentencing-so that the trial court may endeavor to provide whatever as-yet-undetermined amount of articulation may prove to pass muster on appeal, even though Boykin ostensibly does not require it. I also concur in the balance of the majority's analysis.