Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-3774 SECTION: "R" (2)
September 12, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
The defendant moves to partially dismiss several of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
I. Background and Procedural History
For nearly eighteen years, defendant Goodwill employed plaintiff as the One Stop Manager and the Vice President of Career Development. Goodwill terminated plaintiff's employment on June 5, 2001. Plaintiff then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 1, 2002, alleging both age and race discrimination. The EEOC rejected plaintiff's charge. On September 24, 2002, the EEOC issued plaintiff a right-to-sue letter.
Plaintiff filed suit against Goodwill on December 20, 2002. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that Goodwill subjected her to discrimination, harassment, and ridicule; that she was intentionally overlooked for promotions; that she was improperly discharged on June 5, 2001; and that she has been "black balled" due to her wrongful discharge. Plaintiff alleges that Goodwill's actions resulted from race, color, and age discrimination in violation of federal law, Louisiana law, and both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. Plaintiff also asserts a claim of loss of consortium on behalf of her family, who suffered as a result of her wrongful termination.
On February 4, 2003, Goodwill filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for insufficiency of service of process and lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. : 12(b)(1) and 12(b) (5). On February 27, 2003, plaintiff amended her complaint to cure the defect in subject matter jurisdiction. She then cured the defect of insufficiency of service of process by requesting that Goodwill execute a waiver of service of summons.
Plaintiff initially pleaded only diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Both plaintiff and defendant are, however, Louisiana citizens.
Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act, LA. REV. STAT. § 23:302 et seq. ("LEDA"). Defendant asserts that it is not an employer as defined in the statute or, in the alternative, because plaintiff's claim has prescribed. Goodwill also moves to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional claims under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions because it is a private, non-profit corporation and not a state actor. In addition, Goodwill moves to dismiss plaintiff's loss of consortium claims on the theory that no statute under which plaintiff might recover provides for such relief.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The Court may take judicial notice of EEOC documents as a matter of public record when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Cinel v Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1994). Any reference to EEOC documents, therefore, does not convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Chadwick v. Layrisson, No. 98-3518, 1999 WL 717628, *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Claims under State Law
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Goodwill discriminated against her because of her race, color, and age in violation of applicable Louisiana statutes. Plaintiff's state law discrimination claims arise under LEDA, LA. REV. STAT. § 23:302, et seq. Defendant asserts that LEDA does not apply to Goodwill because Goodwill, as a nonprofit corporation, does not fit within the LEDA statutory definition of "employer." Defendant further asserts that even if it were subject to liability under LEDA, plaintiff's claim has prescribed.
Under LEDA, an employer may not discriminate against any individual "with respect to his compensation, or his terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332. Revised Statute § 23:312 provides that the above restrictions apply to the employee's age as well. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:312. Under LEDA, an employer is defined as
a person, association, legal or commercial entity, the state or any state agency, board, commission, or political subdivision of the state receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee . . . This Chapter shall not apply to the following: . . . (b) Employment of an individual by . . . any nonprofit corporation. . .
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:302(2)(b) (emphasis added). On its face, LEDA's definition of "employer" specifically exempts nonprofit corporations from the statute. Courts that have considered LEDA's definition of "employer" under section 23:302(b) have strictly construed the term and have held that nonprofit corporations are indeed exempt from LEDA's provisions. See Jackson v. Xavier Univ., No. Civ. A. 01-1659, 2002 WL 1482756, at *6 (E.D. La. July 8, 2002).
Plaintiff claims that Jackson is distinguishable from her case but has failed to explain how. Goodwill is a nonprofit corporation, and plaintiff does not dispute this fact. Indeed, plaintiff merely avers that Goodwill nevertheless should be subject to liability pursuant to LEDA for its alleged intentional violation. This argument is meritless. Plaintiff makes no showing to convince this Court to deviate from the plain language of the statute excluding nonprofit corporations from coverage.
See Ex. A, attached to Mem. Supp. Def.'s Partial Mot. to Dismiss.
See PL's Mem. Opp. Def.'s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, at 3.
See Id. at 3, 5.
Accordingly, plaintiff's claims under the Louisiana Discrimination in Employment Act are dismissed. The Court need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff's claims under LEDA have prescribed.
B. Plaintiff's Claims under the United States and Louisiana Constitutions
Plaintiff also asserts that she is entitled to relief for Goodwill's wrongful actions under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. Plaintiff's complaint cites to no provision in the United States Constitution that would entitle her to relief. The parties' briefs assume that plaintiff relies on the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With regard to the Louisiana Constitution, plaintiff specifically relies on article I, sections 3, 7, 12, 20, and 24. Defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under either constitution because she has not alleged, nor can she prove, any state action.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive its citizens of the equal protection of the laws. It is a well-settled tenet of federal law that state action is a condition precedent to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment"). As noted above, Goodwill is a private, non-profit corporation. Plaintiff has alleged no state action in her complaint, nor has she alleged that Goodwill may qualify as a state actor. Although the Court recognizes that at times private entities may, for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, be considered state-actors, there is no evidence of such a situation here.
Even were the plaintiff to base her claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she has failed to state a claim. For a cause of action to exist under § 1983, plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that she was deprived of a right or interest secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Doe v. Rains County Indep. School District, 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has failed to allege that the deprivation of her rights occurred under the color of state law. Plaintiff merely remarks in her opposition that the "under the color of state law" argument is inapplicable to her Title VII claim. Although this Court agrees that state action is not a prerequisite to a Title VII claim, it is a condition precedent to a suit in federal court for a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
With regard to the Louisiana Constitution, plaintiff relies on article 1, sections 3, 7, 12, 20, and 24. Section 3 provides that:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations . . .
LA. CONST., art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). Courts agree that section 3 "does not create a cause of action against a private individual or a company." Smolensky v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ. A. 99-1849, at *9, 2000 WL 341031 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Hornsby v. Enterprise Transp. Co., 987 F. Supp. 512 (M.D. La 1997)); See also Baynard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 399 So.2d 1200 (La.Ct.App. 1981). Plaintiff does not dispute that Goodwill is a private company. Therefore, section 3 of the Louisiana constitution creates no cause of action against Goodwill.
For the same reason, plaintiff's causes of action under sections 7 and 20 also fail. Section 7 states that " [n]o law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. . . ." LA. CONST., art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). Section 20 states that " [n]o law shall subject any person to euthanasia, . . . cruel . . . or unusual punishment. . . ." LA. CONST., art. I, § 20 (emphasis added). Because these articles plainly apply to acts done under the color of law, sections 7 and 20 on their face require state action to state a claim for relief. See Smolensky v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ. A. 99-1849, at *9, 2000 WL 341031 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Hornsby v. Enterprise Transp. Co., 987 F. Supp. 512 (M.D. La 19997)). Plaintiff has failed to assert state action, and her claims under sections 7 and 20 of the Louisiana Constitution must therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff also fails to assert a claim under the plain wording of section 12 of Article I. Section 12 provides that "[i]n access to public areas . . . every person shall be free from discrimination based on race. . . ." LA. CONST., art. I, § 12. As the term is defined, "`access' means the `ability to enter, . . . [to] pass to and from, . . . to obtain or make use of." Robertson v. Burger King, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 78, 82 (E.D. La. 1994) (citing Becnel v. City Stores Co., 675 F.2d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1982)). Nowhere in plaintiff's complaint does plaintiff allege a denial of access. For this reason alone, plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
Plaintiff also fails to state a cause of action under section 24 of article I. Section 24 provides that "[t]he enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained by the individual citizens of the state." LA. CONST., art. I, § 24. Plaintiff cites to no authority, nor has the Court found any, that would entitle her to relief under this section.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' claims under the United States and Louisiana Constitutions are dismissed.
C. Plaintiff's Loss of Consortium Claim
Plaintiff's remaining claims arise under Title VII and the ADEA. In addition to her own claims under these statutes, plaintiff asserts a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of her family. The defendant argues that derivative claims are not cognizable under Title VII or the ADEA. This is correct.
Title VII protects employees from employment discrimination and provides a cause of action to the employee only. Title VII does not grant derivative claims to the family of the employee who has suffered the employment discrimination. See Jackson v. Entergy Operations, No. Civ. A. 96-4111, at *7 n. 49, 1998WL 101690 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 1998); Reed v. Chemlink, Civ. A. No. 90-3942, at *6, 1991 WL 161475 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 1991); see also Franz v. Kernan, 951 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1996). Therefore, plaintiff cannot bring a loss of consortium claim on behalf of her family under Title VII. See Poree v. Lakewind E. Apartments, Civ. A. No. 93-3446, at *1, 1994 WL 705430 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 1994).
Neither may plaintiff's family bring a loss of consortium claim under the ADEA. It is well-settled in this Circuit that the ADEA provides only "legal or equitable" relief. General damages are not available. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1990); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court is aware of no authority in this Circuit, and the plaintiff has cited to none, that authorizes an employee's family to recover loss of consortium damages under the ADEA. See Dowlearn v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., No, Civ. A. 97-2787, at *4-5, 1997 WL 767721 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1997). Other federal district courts have held that the ADEA will not support a derivative claim for loss of consortium. See Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., 907 F. Supp. 590, 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Reed v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 170, 171-72 (E.D. Wis. 1989). As stated in Reed, if Congress had wished to provide for derivative claims under the ADEA, it could easily have done so. 704 F. Supp. at 172. See generally Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 532-34 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). This Court agrees. For this reason, plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium under the ADEA is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act, the claims under the Louisiana and United States Constitutions, and the claims for loss of consortium.