Opinion
Case No. 8:19-cv-910-T-30JSS
2020-05-15
Raul A. PELAEZ as Limited Guardian of the Person and Property of John Poul Pelaez, ward and Michael Adam Conlon, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Lee Delton Gunn, IV, Scott A. Arthur, Gunn Law Group, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiffs. B. Richard Young, Joshua John Cecil Hartley, Megan Alexander, Mary C. Littlejohn, Young, Bill, Boles, Palmer & Duke P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
Lee Delton Gunn, IV, Scott A. Arthur, Gunn Law Group, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiffs.
B. Richard Young, Joshua John Cecil Hartley, Megan Alexander, Mary C. Littlejohn, Young, Bill, Boles, Palmer & Duke P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
JAMES S. MOODY, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE This cause is before the Court upon the parties’ motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 42, 43) in this insurance bad faith action. The Court has reviewed the filings, record evidence, and relevant law. The Court concludes that Defendant Government Employees Insurance Company ("GEICO") is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, the record is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not obtain an excess judgment as defined under Florida law. Second, even if the threshold matter of obtaining an excess judgment were met, the facts reflect that GEICO did not act in bad faith. Accordingly, final judgment will be entered in GEICO's favor.
FACTS
The material facts are not in dispute. The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the non-movants. Mesa v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. , 799 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs, Raul Pelaez ("Mr. Pelaez") as Limited Guardian of the Person and Property of John Poul Pelaez ward ("Pelaez") (collectively "the Pelaezes") and Michael Adam Conlon, Jr., ("Conlon") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed the instant common law insurance bad faith action against GEICO in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. GEICO then removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
The action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Friday, April 13, 2012, in Hillsborough County, Florida ("the accident"). Conlon, who was operating a Hyundai Accent owned by his mother, Vivian Cubero ("Cubero"), was making a left hand turn and crashed into a motorcycle that Pelaez was driving. At the time of the accident, GEICO insured Cubero under an automobile liability policy, number 4218462077, which provided bodily injury ("BI") coverage limits in the amount of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence and also provided separate property damage ("PD") coverage limits of $50,000 ("the policy"). Conlon was covered as an additional driver under the policy.
Conlon phoned GEICO from the scene of the accident and advised that his mother's vehicle was damaged and needed to be towed. At that time, Conlon did not report that there were any injuries. GEICO concluded that the accident was covered under the policy and made phone calls to both Conlon and Cubero in order to gather more information about the accident. GEICO informed Cubero that it was investigating liability for the accident. GEICO was unable to reach Conlon and left him a voicemail.
On April 16, 2012, the claim was assigned to GEICO claims examiner Robert Sundean ("Sundean"). That same day, GEICO received a telephone call from Pelaez's fiancé, Brianna Niemann ("Niemann"), who advised that she was unaware if Pelaez had an insurance policy for the motorcycle. Niemann also stated that she was working with two detectives who were investigating the accident and she provided their contact information.
On April 17, 2012, Sundean phoned Conlon and left him a message requesting a recorded interview. Sundean then called Pelaez and left him a message requesting a return call. That same day, Sundean phoned one of the detectives Niemann referenced (detective Sarff) and left him a message informing him that he wanted to discuss the investigation. Later that same day, GEICO conducted Conlon's recorded interview. During this interview, Conlon suggested that Pelaez may have been speeding on his motorcycle when he struck Conlon's vehicle. Conlon also stated that Pelaez lost consciousness and was air lifted to the hospital with unknown injuries.
The next day, April 18, 2012, Sundean sent letters to Cubero and Pelaez advising that he was the adjuster assigned to handle the claim. Sundean also sent a separate letter to Pelaez enclosing a HIPAA compliant authorization form, as well as an authorization to obtain leave and salary information. That same day, Sundean continued his investigation of the accident and learned that the posted speed limit at the scene of the accident was thirty-five (35) miles per hour. Sundean concluded that, based on the reported length of the skid marks from the motorcycle being sixty-seven (67) feet, the relatively low speed limit, the apparent high impact of the accident, and the fact that Conlon advised he was not issued a citation for the accident, Pelaez was likely speeding and that there may be some comparative negligence for the accident. Sundean left another message for detective Sarff. Sundean also spoke with Cubero who advised that she would send photos from the scene of the accident with the skid marks.
On April 23, 2012, GEICO received a letter of representation ("LOR") from attorney Jeffrey "Jack" Gordon, Esq., at Maney & Gordon, P.A. ("Gordon"), dated April 20, 2012, advising that he represented Pelaez in connection with the accident. The LOR requested GEICO send him statutory insurance disclosures, pursuant to Florida Statute § 627.4137. Also on April 23, 2012, Cubero emailed Sundean photos from the scene of the accident. Later on that same day, Niemann faxed Sundean a copy of the police report. The police report indicated that Conlon had failed to yield the right of way and that one of the witnesses to the accident stated that it did not appear as though Pelaez was driving the motorcycle at a high rate of speed, contradicting the information Conlon reported to GEICO. The police report also indicated that Pelaez sustained major injuries including head injuries and confirmed that he had been airlifted to St. Joseph's Hospital from the scene of the accident.
The next day, April 24, 2012, GEICO decided to proactively tender the full BI policy limits of $50,000 in an attempt to settle Pelaez's BI claim.
On April 25, 2012, Sundean phoned Gordon and left a message with his assistant, Heather Austin. Sundean told Austin that GEICO had made the decision to tender the $50,000 BI limits and that a GEICO field adjuster would deliver the check for the BI limits. Sundean also stated that GEICO needed to know the location of Pelaez's motorcycle so that GEICO could adjust Pelaez's PD claim. Upon receiving this message, Austin sent Gordon an email relaying this information, i.e., that GEICO would like to tender the $50,000 BI limits and that GEICO wanted to know the location of the motorcycle to get an estimate of the damage in order to settle the PD claim.
On April 26, 2012, a GEICO field adjuster, Lori Cassady ("Cassady"), hand-delivered the BI tender package to Gordon's office. The package had a cover letter that provided an index of the documents that were included in the package and requested that Gordon confirm receipt of the package contents: GEICO's check number N602054895, in the amount $50,000 (Fifty Thousand dollars), representing tender of the per person policy limit under Bodily Injury Liability coverage; GEICO's proposed release; a coverage limits disclosure letter; and a letter from Sundean. The check specifically stated that it was in payment of "[t]ender of the per person BI limits." The release contained the following language:
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of Fifty Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($50,000.00), the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged, the undersigned, John Pelaez, As A Single Individual, hereby releases and forever discharges Vivian Cuberoconlon, Michael Conlon, and all officers, directors, agents or employees of the foregoing, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, or assigns, none of whom admit any liability to the undersigned, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, on account of all injuries and damages, known and unknown, which have resulted or may in the future develop as a consequence of a motor vehicle accident that occurred at Countryway Blvd and Oaksbury in Tampa, Florida, on or about the 13th of April, 2012.
(Dkt. 42 at Ex. K).
The limits disclosure letter stated that the policy provided BI coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person and also provided $50,000 in separate PD coverage. Sundean's letter stated, in relevant part, that: "[n]ot all release forms precisely fit the facts and circumstances of every claim. Should you have any questions about any aspect of the release, please call me immediately. You may also send me any suggested changes, additions, or deletions with a short explanation of the basis for any changes you suggest; or if you have a release that you desire to use please forward it to me." (Dkt. 42 at Ex. K).
Also on April 26, 2012, GEICO sent Conlon a letter, advising him of the available coverage limits under the policy, the possibility that the claim could exceed his available coverage limits, that he would be liable for any judgment against him in excess of the policy limits, his right to obtain personal counsel, and his right to contribute towards settlement of the claim.
On April 30, 2012, GEICO received a letter from Gordon dated April 27, 2012. The letter requested that GEICO send him statutory insurance disclosures and stated that Gordon would allow GEICO to inspect the motorcycle.
On May 1, 2012, GEICO noted that it had tried numerous times to contact Gordon's office to try and ascertain the location of the motorcycle to adjust the PD claim. On May 2, 2012, Sundean wrote a letter to Gordon that included a notarized affidavit of coverage as well as a certified copy of the policy. The letter noted, in relevant part, that GEICO's auto damage adjuster "tried multiple times" to get in touch with Gordon's office to inspect the motorcycle to complete an estimate.
On May 4, 2012, Sundean phoned Gordon again and left him another message requesting a call back to obtain the location of the motorcycle for the PD claim. That same day, Gordon prepared a letter to GEICO rejecting its proactive tender of the $50,000 BI policy limits to settle Pelaez's injury claim. Gordon's letter accused GEICO of taking advantage of his clients. Specifically, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the proposed release was for "all claims" with no reservation for property damage and that "the only logical conclusion is that GEICO purposefully allows for its adjusters to use a release of ‘all claims’ form, even where only part of the coverage GEICO owes is paid." Gordon's letter also stated: "GEICO has attempted to take advantage of [his] clients by requiring them to execute a release of all claims in exchange for payment of less than all of the insurance benefits owed. It is for this reason that my clients reject the ‘proposed’ settlement offer." The letter stated that Gordon's clients instructed him to "proceed to suit and to take every action necessary to hold GEICO's insureds fully liable and to bring to light the way that GEICO unfairly does business." (Dkt. 42 at Ex. O) (emphasis in original).
On May 8, 2012, Sundean wrote Cubero a letter explaining that GEICO's efforts to settle Pelaez's claim were unsuccessful and, consequently, she may be served with a lawsuit.
On May 9, 2012, Sundean sent Gordon a letter acknowledging Pelaez's rejection of the BI tender and stating in relevant part:
It is unfortunate that your client, as well as yourself, believe the proposed Bodily Injury release also includes Property Damage. Not only is it our practice to keep the Bodily Injury claim separate from the Property Damage claim in each and every claim, but our policy contract also outlines this. A certified copy of the policy has been provided to your office. I am confused as to why both your client and yourself, as an attorney, would assume our tender offer of our insurer's $50,000.00 Bodily Injury limits also includes the Property Damage when GEICO has made multiple attempts by phone and by written correspondence to ascertain the location of your client's motorcycle to complete an estimate. We have yet to have received a call back with the motorcycle's location, let alone receive acknowledgement of our communication attempts.
As you should know, GEICO's release is a proposed release. Should you have any additional language or changes, please present the proposed changes for our review. We will still be awaiting the location of your client's motorcycle to complete an estimate and resolve the Property Damage claim.
(Dkt. 42 at Ex. Q).
Subsequently, Gordon's clients filed suit and GEICO assigned the lawsuit to the Law Office of Ellen Ehrenpreis and, thereafter, to T.R. Unice at Unice, Salzman, P.A., ("Unice") to defend Conlon and Cubero. During the litigation, GEICO was able to inspect the motorcycle and the PD claim was settled.
On December 14, 2017, before the case was submitted to the jury, the Pelaezes entered into a stipulated settlement agreement with Conlon and Cubero. Pursuant to the agreement: Pelaez settled his claim against only Cubero in exchange for a release of the $50,000 BI limits, Pelaez and Conlon agreed that a judgment would be entered against Conlon in the amount of $14,900,000, but that Conlon would not be personally liable for the judgment, nor would the Judgment be collectible against his personal assets or against his bankruptcy estate, and that the only way to seek satisfaction of the Judgment would be from insurance proceeds.
Pursuant to the stipulated settlement agreement, a stipulated Final Judgment was entered against Conlon. At the time that this stipulated agreement was entered into, GEICO was defending Conlon and Cubero, however, GEICO was not a party to the stipulated agreement or the Final Judgment, and GEICO did not agree to be bound by the stipulated Final Judgment. On January 4, 2018, Pelaez signed a full release of Cubero in exchange for the $50,000 BI policy limits. This bad faith action subsequently ensued against GEICO.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). "[I]f factual issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung , 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983). A dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Hoffman v. Allied Corp. , 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990). However, there must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question. Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
I. Florida Law on Bad Faith
Under Florida law, an insurer "has a duty to use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own business." Harvey v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 259 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez , 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980) ). This means an insurer must act "diligently, and with the same haste and precision as if it were in the insured's shoes, work[ing] on the insured's behalf to avoid an excess judgment." Id. at 7. Failure to satisfy this duty means an insurer has acted in bad faith.
In considering whether an insurer satisfied its duty, the Florida Supreme Court listed several specific requirements an insurer must fulfill: (1) insurers must advise insureds of settlement opportunities; (2) insurers must advise insureds on the probable outcome of litigation; (3) insurers must warn insureds of the possibility of an excess judgment; and (4) insurers must advise insureds of steps they might take to avoid an excess judgment. Boston Old Colony , 386 So. 2d at 785. And "[w]here liability is clear, and injuries so serious that a judgment in excess of the policy limits is likely, an insurer has an affirmative duty to initiate settlement negotiations." Harvey , 259 So. 3d at 7 (quoting Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 584 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ).
In determining whether an insurer acted in bad faith, the "totality of the circumstances" are considered. Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co. , 896 So. 2d 665, 680 (Fla. 2004). The issue, therefore, "is whether, under all of the circumstances, the insurer could and should have settled the claim within the policy limits had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for his interests." Id. at 679. Or, in other words, "the gravamen of what constitutes bad faith is whether under all the circumstances an insurer failed to settle a claim against an insured when it had a reasonable opportunity to do so." Contreras v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. , 927 So. 2d 16, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
While the issue of whether an insurer acted in bad faith is generally a question for a jury, courts can, in certain circumstances, conclude as a matter of law that an insurer is not liable for bad faith. Id. at 680 ; see also Cadle v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 838 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Where a judge concludes as a matter of law a plaintiff has not established her bad-faith case against an insurer, he must remove the case from the jury for decision."); Mesa v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. , 799 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2015) ("affirming district court's order granting summary judgment for insurer because there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that [the insurer] acted in bad faith.").
When considering if an insurer acted in bad faith, the focus of a bad faith case is on the conduct of the insurer in fulfilling its obligations to the insured. Harvey , 259 So. 3d at 7. Although bad faith requires more than mere negligence by an insurer, "negligence is relevant to the question of good faith." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). That said, "the conduct of a claimant and the claimant's attorney are relevant to determining the ‘realistic possibility of settlement within the policy limits.’ " Cousin v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 719 F. App'x 954, 960 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Barry v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 938 So. 2d 613, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ); see also Boston Old Colony , 386 So. 2d at 786 (considering the actions of the insured and claimant regarding opportunity to settle when ruling that the trial court properly granted an insurer's motion for directed verdict in a bad faith case).
Finally, to prevail in a bad faith case, there must be "a causal connection between the damages claimed and the insurer's bad faith." Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 903–04 (Fla. 2010) ; Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. , 630 So. 2d 179, 181–82 (Fla. 1994) ("[A] third party must obtain a judgment against the insured in excess of the policy limits before prosecuting a bad-faith claim against the insured's liability carrier."). If a plaintiff can show breach and causation, he can show injury. The amount of liability that exceeds the policy limits is the injury. United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Jennings , 731 So. 2d 1258, 1259 n.2 (Fla. 1999). It is this final point that the Court turns to first because it is a threshold issue. In other words, an excess judgment is required before the bad faith case can proceed.
II. Plaintiffs Did Not Obtain an "Excess Judgment"
GEICO argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no excess judgment in this case. The Court agrees. Causation is proved with an excess judgment, which is a judgment above the insurance policy limits. "Causation is a prerequisite for the claim: for an insured to bring a bad faith claim, the injured party must first win an excess judgment." Cawthorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 791 F. App'x 60, 64–66 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Cunningham , 630 So. 2d 179 at 181–82 ).
The Eleventh Circuit recently discussed three exceptions to the excess judgment rule that are deemed "functional equivalents" of an excess judgment under Florida law. Cawthorn , 791 F. App'x at 64-66 (citing Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 35 So. 3d 893, 899 (Fla. 2010) ). The first exception is called a Cunningham agreement, wherein the insurance company and the injured third party agree to try the bad faith claim first, and, if the jury finds no bad faith, the parties agree to settle for the policy limits. Cunningham , 630 So. 2d at 182.
The second exception is called a Coblentz agreement. Coblentz agreements arise when the insurance company fails to defend the insured and, in response, the insured and the injured third party agree to settle the suit and allow the injured third party to sue the insurance company on a theory of bad faith. Coblentz v. American Sur. Co. of New York , 416 F.2d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Steil v. Fla. Physicians’ Ins. Reciprocal , 448 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
The third exception occurs when an excess carrier incurs damages because the primary carrier acted in bad faith. In such cases, an excess carrier may bring a bad faith claim against a primary insurer "by virtue of equitable subrogation." Perera , 35 So. 3d at 900.
Here, none of the exceptions to the classic scenario of an excess judgment apply. The consent judgment is not a Cunningham agreement because, unlike in Cunningham , the insurer, GEICO, was not a party to the consent judgment. The consent judgment is not a Coblentz agreement because it is undisputed that GEICO did not neglect its duty to defend. Finally, the third exception does not apply because this is not a case of an excess carrier suing a primary carrier.
Instead of pointing to an exception, Plaintiffs argue that the consent judgment is an excess judgment. The Court disagrees. As the Eleventh Circuit held, "[a] judgment is a final decision—a verdict—reached by a factfinder. A judgment is an excess judgment when the amount of the verdict recovered by the injured party is greater than all the available insurance coverage. A consent judgment, on the other hand, is akin to a private contract, one that it is simply acknowledged and recorded by a court." Cawthorn , 791 F. App'x at 65-66 (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit further noted that if it adopted the argument that a consent judgment is tantamount to an excess judgment, "we would be carving out a fourth exception to the excess judgment rule." Id. The Eleventh Circuit aptly noted that:
Florida law protects insurance companies with the excess judgment rule. If consent judgments were enough to show causation, that protection would be eliminated. Insurers would not know whether an insured party and an injured party entered into a consent judgment as adversaries, at arm's length and in good faith, or as friends, making a strategic decision to undermine the insurance company's policy. Surely no court would eviscerate the well-established safeguards without paying any attention to the gravity of the decision.
Id.
Here, the record is undisputed that GEICO did not neglect its duty to defend, did not agree to be bound by the terms of the consent agreement/judgment, and was not a party to the consent agreement. Accordingly, GEICO is entitled to summary judgment because the existence of an excess judgment or its functional equivalent is not present here. Schultz v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. , No. 1:15CV172-MW/GRJ, 2018 WL 7185324, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2018) ("There was no excess judgment in this case, nor were there any of the widely recognized functional equivalents. Moreover, there is no reason to recognize Schultz's Agreement as a new type of functional equivalent (in fact, there is reason to hold otherwise). Accordingly, Geico has shown that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.").
III. GEICO Did Not Act in Bad Faith
Although the Court need not determine whether GEICO is entitled to summary judgment on its argument that it did not handle the insurance claim in bad faith, the matter is fully briefed and the parties would benefit from the Court ruling on this issue in case Plaintiffs choose to appeal this Order. The Court concludes that no reasonable jury could conclude that GEICO acted in bad faith in its handling of the claim.
Specifically, the record reflects that, upon being notified of the accident, GEICO expeditiously began its investigation and immediately determined that coverage was available for the accident. GEICO was given very little information about the accident and continued to investigate the accident by, among other things: attempting to contact the detective that was assigned the claim, taking Conlon's recorded interview, looking up the speed limit at the scene of the accident, speaking with both of its insureds, attempting to contact Pelaez regarding any injury claims he may have, and attempting to obtain photos from the scene of the accident. GEICO's initial investigation revealed that Pelaez was likely speeding at the time of the accident and there could be some comparative negligence for the accident.
GEICO continued to investigate, and, on April 23, 2012, GEICO first received a copy of the police report, which detailed that Pelaez had suffered serious injuries and contradicted the information Conlon had given GEICO regarding Pelaez's alleged speeding. The very next day, which was eleven (11) days after the accident, GEICO made the decision to tender the full $50,000 BI policy limits to settle Pelaez's BI claim. GEICO then called Gordon's office the day after to advise him that it wanted to tender the full $50,000 BI policy limits to settle the BI claim and that it also wanted to know the location of the motorcycle so it could inspect it and obtain an estimate in order to attempt to settle the separate PD claim.
Plaintiffs’ main argument is that the release was intentionally overly broad because it attempted to release all claims when the PD claim was still outstanding. The Court disagrees that this fact is enough to turn this matter over to the jury, especially under the totality of the circumstances. Notably, the letter from Sundean to Gordon specifically advised Gordon that the release GEICO included was proposed and that Gordon could send any changes, additions, or deletions, or send his own proposed release for GEICO to consider. In other words, GEICO stated a willingness to accept revisions to its proposed release, as well as a release drafted entirely by Gordon. As a matter of law, GEICO did not act in bad faith in sending the unsolicited proposed release with the tender of the $50,000 BI policy limits under the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant GEICO's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 42) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 43) is DENIED.
3. All other motions are denied as moot.
4. The Clerk is directed to enter Final Judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs.
5. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this May 15, 2020.