Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01-CV-0854-P.
August 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 28, 2004 and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 16, 2004. After careful consideration of the motions and applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and DENIES Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case is before the Court following a remand by the Fifth Circuit. See Pegram v. Honeywell, 361 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2004). In light of this remand, the Court hereby considers Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's discharge claim.
In light of the procedural posture of this case, the Court hereby allows Defendants to file this second summary judgment motion and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.
Plaintiff, an African-American male, began working for Defendants in August 1991. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 3.01-3.02; Pl.'s App. at 1.) Plaintiff was originally hired as an Original Equipment Manufacturer ("OEM") Account Manager. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 3.01; Pl.'s Resp. at 1; Pl.'s App. at 1.) In 1995, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Total Plant Account Manager ("TPAM"). (Pl.'s App. at 14-15.) In August 2000, Plaintiff was again promoted to the position of TPAM in the power industry, or the Industrial Automation and Control ("IAC") division. (Pl.'s App. at 16-17; Pl.'s Resp. at 1-2.) Plaintiff contends he was the only African-American employee who held a TPAM position in Dallas during his tenure, and that there are no African-American employees in the TPAM position in Honeywell's eastern region. (Pl.'s App. at 2.)
Honeywell underwent a reorganization of its IAC division in the fall of 2000. (Defs.' App. at 56-57, 112-13; Pl.'s Resp. at 2.) This reorganization affected who supervised Plaintiff's employment. After the reorganization, Pegram reported to David Spencer, the division's Regional Sales Manager for Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. (Defs.' App. at 56-57, 114, 130-31, 137, 203.) Spencer reported to the Solutions Sales Director for the eastern sales region, Guy Grumbles. (Defs.' App. at 56, 108-09, 111; Pl.'s Resp. at 2.)
Between August 2000 and December 2000, Pegram worked as a TPAM in Honeywell's IAC division. During that period, Pegram, whose job involved sales, had a yearly sales quota in the amount of $3-4 million. (Pl.'s App. at 126.) According to Plaintiff, between August and December 2000, Pegram had sales of $6.89 million. (Pl.'s App. at 127.)
However, Defendants claim that in December 2000, Spencer decided to transfer Pegram to the position of Service Account Manager ("SAM") after conducting a review of Pegram's prior experience at Honeywell. (Defs.' App. at 57-59.) According to Pegram, Grumbles and Spencer told him in December 2000 that he was going to be transferred to a SAM position and replaced by Dick Watt, a Caucasian male. (Pl.'s App. at 3, 24.)
The SAM position that Pegram moved into also included small project sales, leading some to describe Pegram's first position after the IAC TPAM as a "hybrid SAM" position. (Defs.' App. at 58-59, 70-71, 137-42, 155-56.) Around the first of February 2001, Spencer told Pegram that he would be assuming purely SAM duties. (Defs.' App. at 59.)
In February 2001, Pegram attended a SAM training workshop in Houston. (Defs.' App. at 59-60.) Raul Zapeda led the workshop. (Defs.' App. at 59.) Spencer attended parts of the workshop and observed what he considered to be Pegram's lack of attention to the training. (Defs.' App. at 59.) When Spencer asked Zapeda what he thought of Pegram's attitude during the training sessions, Zapeda reported he did not think Pegram was engaged in the process. (Defs.' App. at 59-60.) During the workshop, Plaintiff expressed to Spencer, Grumbles and others that he "was not comfortable" in the SAM position and was unwilling to continue in the SAM position. (Pl.'s App. at 25, 36; Defs.' App. at 58-60, 73, 100, 141, 151-153, 208, 232.) Plaintiff admits that on more than one occasion, he told Spencer, Grumbles, Pearson, and Zapeda that he was "not comfortable" in his SAM position. (Pl.'s App. at 25.)
After one of the training sessions, Pegram approached Spencer and expressed concerns about his role as a SAM and his ability to make his quota. (Defs.' App. at 59.) Pegram explained that he did not want to be a SAM. (Defs.' App. at 60.) He wanted to continue working as a TPAM. (Defs.' App. at 60.) But Spencer advised Pegram that there were no open TPAM positions in his region at that time. (Defs.' App. at 60.) Spencer suggested to Pegram that Pegram try to locate a TPAM position elsewhere in the company and Spencer also offered to try to find a TPAM position for Pegram himself. (Defs.' App. at 60, Pl.'s App. at 30.) Pegram tried to find another TPAM position during January, February and March 2000. (Pl.'s App. at 31-32.) Pegram contends that Grumbles told him there were open TPAM positions, but that he would not be considered for them. (Pl.'s App. at 31.)
According to Defendants, Spencer was concerned that Pegram's unwillingness to be a SAM would negatively affect his performance and his ability to make his sales quota. (Defs.' App. at 60.) For these reasons, Spencer was reluctant to keep Pegram in that position indefinitely. (Defs.' App. at 60.) Spencer decided to remove Pegram from the SAM position on March 30, 2001 if he had not found another position at Honeywell by that date. (Def.'s App. at 60.)
On March 12, 2001, Spencer wrote a memorandum he intended to give to Plaintiff stating that "I have to move forward quickly to fill your position. . . . [I] have not been successful in finding you a TPAM job elsewhere. I hope that you are able to quickly locate a job that will make you happy, however in parallel I will be looking for a candidate to assume your position and responsibilities by the end of this month, 3/31/01." (Defs.' App. at 62.)
Around this same time, Pegram agreed to meet with Spencer, Grumbles, and Linda Pearson of Human Resources on Houston on March 14. (Pl.'s App. at 97.) Pegram believed that the purpose of the meeting in Houston was to discuss his transfer to another TPAM position. (Pl.'s App. at 30-31.)
On March 14, 2001, Plaintiff, Spencer, and Pearson met in Houston to discuss Pegram's employment situation. (Defs.' App. at 60-61, 87-88, 186-87.) Spencer told Plaintiff the substance of the March 12, 2001 memo, that is, that his employment with Honeywell would end on March 30, 2001 if he did not find another position he considered acceptable. (Defs.' App. at 60.) Spencer also explained that, to his knowledge, there were no TPAM positions available. (Defs.' App. at 60-61, 88, 161-64, 187.)
Pegram contends he was fired at that March 14 meeting. (Pl.'s App. at 4.) Defendants maintain that Pegram's employment with Honeywell ended on March 30, 2001. (Defs.' App. at 60-61.) Pegram's charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC on April 1, 2001 states that Pegram was discharged on March 31, 2001. (Pl.'s App. at 215.)
On March 27, 2001, Spencer wrote an email to Human Resources regarding Pegram's upcoming termination date. (Pl.'s App. at 213.) Spencer wrote that he had not seen any documentation of the meeting with Pegram and wanted to make sure they had put "something in writing to avoid possible legal issues etc . . . Thanks again for everyone's support with this touchy issue and hopefully this Friday we will have a clean break with Mr. Pegram." (Pl.'s App. at 213.)
Pegram contends that throughout his tenure at Honeywell, Pegram was not allowed to interface with CEOs and COOs of large companies. (Pl.'s App. at 13.) He alleges that if an account rose to that level, it would be transitioned to a Caucasian. (Pl.'s App. at 13.) Plaintiff also complains that he was not allowed training opportunities or admission to the Honeywell MBA program because of his race. (Pl.'s App. at 13, 61-62.) Pegram also claims he was subjected to racial comments during his tenure at Honeywell. For example, Pegram describes a conversation with Grumbles in early January 2001 about Pegram's transfer to the SAM position, in which Grumbles said "`Ron, you're lucky to even be part of the solutions group considering your background and where you came from.'" (Pl.'s App. at 53.) Shortly thereafter, Pegram attended a meeting in Tulsa where employees were laughing and joking about how one of their customers refused to allow blacks into his plant. (Pl.'s App. at 3.) Pegram alleges that he was silent, at which point one of his co-workers asked what was wrong and suggested they could have fun by listening to Richard Pryor jokes together. (Pl.'s App. at 3.)
DISCUSSION
To survive a summary judgment motion on his § 1981 termination claim, Plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Pegram v. Honeywell, 361 F.3d 272, 281 (5th Cir. 2004). Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff can demonstrate race discrimination through circumstantial evidence that gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This pretext method of proof requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) is qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by a person who is not a member of the protected class. Id. After the prima facie case is made, the defendant must articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If this is done, then the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant's proffered reasons are false and are a pretext for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
A plaintiff can also withstand summary judgment if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant's reason for his action is only one of the reasons for his conduct, and another `motivating factor' is that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 03-10803, 2004 WL 1427046, at *5 (5th Cir. June 25, 2004). If a plaintiff demonstrates that his race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate, then the defendant has the burden of proving the same decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus. Id. If the defendant fails to carry that burden, the plaintiff prevails. Id.
Assuming that Pegram has established a prima facie case with regard to the discharge, Defendants contend that he cannot produce legally sufficient evidence that Honeywell's stated reason for his discharge is a pretext for race discrimination. Defendants contend that the reason for Pegram's termination was Pegram's dissatisfaction with his transfer. (Defs.' Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff complained to Grumbles, Pearson, Zapeda and Spencer that he was "uncomfortable" in his position as a SAM. (Pl.'s App. at 25.)
The Court finds that several of Pegram's allegations, taken together, raise a question of fact as to whether Defendants' reasons for terminating Plaintiff were merely pretextual. First, the evidence indicates that while employed as a TPAM, Plaintiff excelled in his position and exceeded his sales quota by more than double. See Pegram, 361 F.2d at 285. Plaintiff also received a positive performance review for his performance as a TPAM as late as February 2001. (Pl.'s App. at 202.) Furthermore, Spencer demoted Plaintiff from the position of TPAM to SAM. The Fifth Circuit has held that a fact issue exists as to whether Defendants' reasons for transferring Plaintiff were pretextual. See Pegram, 361 F.3d at 285. A finding by the jury in favor of Plaintiff on this issue could be relevant to the termination issue.
Pegram also alleges that Spencer took SAM accounts away from Pegram while refusing to lower his quota, thereby setting Plantiff up to fail in this position. (Pl.'s App. at 36-37.) Pegram also contends that while employed as a SAM, Defendants refused to pay Pegram commissions he earned as a TPAM — instead awarding them to Grumbles and Spencer. (Pl.'s App. at 27-28.) When Pegram began looking for another TPAM position within the company, Grumbles told Plaintiff there were TPAM positions open, but Grumbles would not consider Plaintiff for any of those positions. (Pl.'s App. at 31.) Additionally, while at the March 2001 meeting in Houston, Spencer stated that Pegram could not handle the TPAM position even though Plaintiff had far exceeded his quota. (Pl.'s Resp. at 15; Pl.'s App. at 49, 127, 145-46.)
The Court finds that all this evidence, taken together, and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, creates a fact issue as to pretext.
Although Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to raise a fact issue sufficient to withstand summary judgment, a great deal of Plaintiff's evidence is not probative of pretext or discrimination. Plaintiff enumerates twenty-two pieces of "evidence showing that Pegram was terminated because of his race." (Pl.'s Resp. at 14-16.) The Court cannot consider most of this evidence for a variety of reasons.
For example, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' refusal to allow Pegram to participate in the MBA program is evidence of discrimination. However, Plaintiff fails to present any connection between the refusal and Plaintiff's race. (Pl.'s App. at 14); See Moore v. Eli Lilly Co., 819 F.2d 812, 819 (5th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff must establish the existence of discrete facts that show some nexus between the employment actions taken by the employer and the employee's race).
Plaintiff also alleges that he was subjected to certain racial comments that are evidence of discrimination. (Pl.'s Resp. at 14-16.) To constitute probative evidence, race-related comments must have a temporal nexus to the employer's decision and generally must be attributable to a person involved in the decision-making process. See Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991). Pegram explains that during a conversation with Grumbles in early January 2001 about Pegram's transfer to the SAM position, Grumbles said "`Ron, you're lucky to even be part of the solutions group considering your background and where you came from.'" (Pl.'s App. at 53.) On its face, this statement is too vague to be accepted as evidence of discriminatory animus. See Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379.
Pegram also describes a meeting he attended in Tulsa where employees were laughing and joking about how one of their customers refused to allow blacks into his plant. (Pl.'s App. at 3.) Pegram alleges that he was silent, at which point one of his co-workers asked what was wrong and suggested they could have fun by listening to Richard Pryor jokes together. (Pl.'s App. at 3.) This statement is not probative evidence of discrimination because it was made by Plaintiff's colleagues, not by any person principally responsible for Pegram's termination. See Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379.
Pegram contends that Grumbles stated in 1995 that if an interviewee did not do well in a job, he'd be sleeping under a bridge next to a black man. (Pl.'s App. at 51-52.) This statement was made in 1995 — six years before Plaintiff's termination. (In fact, Plaintiff received promotions after this comment was made). This alleged comment is too remote in time to be probative of discrimination. See Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379. While some of these comments may be highly inappropriate, none are evidence that Pegram was terminated because of his race.
Finally, Plaintiff argues in his brief that Grumbles and Spencer had a "practice" of refusing to allow African-Americans to hold TPAM positions. Plaintiff points to the facts that there are no African-American TPAMs or sales managers at Honeywell, that Spencer has never hired or promoted an African-American employee, and that Spencer has no African-American employees working for him. (Pl.'s Resp. at 14-16; Pl.'s App. at 128-29, 99-100, 105-07.)
For statistical evidence to be probative of discriminatory intent, the evidence must compare the relevant portion of the employer's work force with the qualified population in the relevant labor market. See Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff's data is statistically meaningless, because Plaintiff has provided no specific context against which to measure these brief facts and no statistical analysis to support his argument.
Although Plaintiff has presented certain evidence that is not probative of pretext, he has presented enough probative evidence to raise a fact issue as to pretext. Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is SO ORDERED.