Summary
In Pedersen v. Hennepin County, No. 03-4890, 2005 WL 715934 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2005), the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff, who had been released on bail, claimed that her 10-12 hour out-processing detention violated her due process rights.
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Civ. No. 03-4890 (JNE/SRN).
March 26, 2005
Seth M. Colton, Esq., Lommen, Nelson, Cole Stageberg, P.A., on brief, for Plaintiff Jennifer Johanna Pedersen.
Toni A. Beitz, Esq., Hennepin County Attorney's Office, on brief, for Defendants Hennepin County, Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan, Chief Deputy Michele Smolley, Inspector Thomas Merkel, and Former Inspector Richard Estensen.
ORDER
Jennifer Johanna Pedersen (Pedersen) brought this three-count action against Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan, in his official capacity and individually, and Hennepin County (collectively, Defendants) as a result of her alleged prolonged detention at the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center (ADC) in July 2000. Pedersen alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, she alleges statelaw claims for violation of the Minnesota Constitution and false imprisonment. The case is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion in part and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
A § 1983 suit against an employee in his official capacity is deemed to be a suit against the employer only, which in this case is Hennepin County. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999).
In her responsive memorandum, Pedersen consented to the dismissal of three of the four individual Defendants originally named in her Complaint: Michele Smolley, Thomas Merkel, and Richard Estensen. Accordingly, the Court dismisses these Defendants with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2000, Pedersen was arrested when the sign she was carrying during a protest allegedly caused a police horse to stall and the police officer riding that horse to fall. Pederson was charged with assault on the officer and the police horse. Upon her arrest, she was brought to the ADC, where she was admitted at approximately 2:30 p.m. On July 26, 2000, Hennepin County Judge Thorwald Anderson issued a finding of probable cause and ordered that Pedersen continue to be detained pending further proceedings on $1000 bail.
On July 27, 2000, Pedersen made her first appearance in court between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. The presiding judge ordered that Pedersen be released without bail and advised Pedersen that she had the option of being released directly from the courtroom or to return to the ADC for outprocessing. Pedersen elected to return to the ADC for outprocessing because she did not want to walk out of the courtroom in jail clothes, even though she previously had been informed by other inmates that, in general, ADC processing was slow.
Pedersen and Defendants give two very different accounts of the facts underlying this action. The disputed facts are recited here, unless otherwise indicated, in the light most favorable to Pedersen. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). They are not binding factual determinations.
Pedersen returned to Quad 3 in the ADC before lunch, which on July 27 was served between 10:38 a.m. and 11:05 a.m. At that point, she returned to her cell, and at 7:20 p.m. was brought down from her cell for release. Pederson completed all necessary paperwork at that time. Plaintiff asserts that she was not actually released until shortly before 9:00 p.m.
In sum, according to Pedersen, outprocessing took ten to twelve hours. She claims that this was unreasonable and a violation of her constitutional rights.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must look at the record and any inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and must identify "those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to respond by submitting evidentiary materials that designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A. Section 1983 Claims
In Count One of her Complaint, Pedersen asserts claims under § 1983 against Hennepin County and Sheriff McGowan.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred," the first step in analyzing any § 1983 claim "is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Pedersen argues that her ten to twelve hour detention following the court's order that she be released violates her right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that Pedersen's claim is properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process test, not the Fourth Amendment unreasonableness test.
Defendants spend considerable time in their brief arguing that Pedersen's probable cause hearing was timely. Pedersen does not disagree. Indeed, the judicial probable cause finding occurred within 48 hours of Pedersen's arrest, which falls within the presumptive reasonableness standard established in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Pedersen does not offer any evidence of unreasonable delay to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Defendants' argument that the Fourth Amendment did not require an earlier court appearance.
Generally, "[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing [the plaintiff's] claims." Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (quotations omitted). Thus, if the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit source of protection against Defendants' behavior in this case, the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment must be used to analyze Pedersen's claims. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). If, however, the Fourth Amendment does not provide an explicit source of protection, the substantive due process "shocks the conscience" test ought to be applied. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
The Fourth Amendment covers only "searches and seizures." See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 843. No party suggests that there was a search in this case, and Pedersen has not made any showing that she was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement . . ., but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989). More precisely, a seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. . . ." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). Pedersen cannot and does not suggest that she was returned to the ADC involuntarily as a result of an officer's use of physical force or show of authority. The judge who ordered her release gave her the option of leaving immediately from the courtroom or returning to the ADC for outprocessing. She voluntarily chose to return to the ADC. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Pedersen was not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this case, the Court concludes that the substantive due process test under the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper guide for analyzing Pedersen's claims. The core concept of due process is protection against arbitrary action. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845. When executive action is implicated, "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Id. at 846 (quotations omitted). Thus, "the due process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm." Id. at 848. To be actionable as a violation of substantive due process, the executive action must shock the conscience. Id. at 846; see also Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 718 (8th Cir. 2004). In cases such as this, where actual deliberation is practical, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her plight. Davis, 375 F.3d at 718.
Pedersen relies principally on three Eighth Circuit cases in support of her argument in opposition to summary judgment: Davis, 375 F.3d at 703; Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2001); and Slone v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1993). In Davis, during a hearing at which Davis was present, a state court judge ordered Davis to be immediately released from custody. 375 F.3d at 706-07. Nevertheless, Davis was returned to jail and, despite his repeated protestations to his continued incarceration, was not released until fifty-seven days after he had been ordered released. Id. at 708-09. The Eighth Circuit held that Davis had a right to submit his substantive due process claim to the jury. Id. at 718-19.
In Young v. City of Little Rock, police officers mistook Young for another person, arrested her and transported her to a local county jail. 249 F.3d at 732. Before the end of the day of the arrest, officers came to believe they had the wrong person. Id. Nevertheless, the jail decided to keep her overnight Saturday and Sunday until a judge could "decide what to do" on Monday. Id. She was strip-searched during the weekend. Id. On Monday, the presiding judge recognized that Young was the victim of mistaken identity and ordered that she be released. Id. After county officials received the release order, they put Young in a holding cell for 30 minutes and then transported her back to the county jail. Id. In the course of transporting her, they chained her to other prisoners. Id. She was held at the county jail for an additional two and one-half hours, during which time county officials strip-searched her in front of five or six other people. Id. at 736. The Eighth Circuit held that the pre-court-appearance conduct was protected by official immunity, id. at 735, but that the defendant's conduct after receiving the release order was shocking, id. at 736. The Eighth Circuit, therefore, upheld the jury's verdict against the City for its post-release-order conduct, citing a documented process of administrative foot-dragging that was characterized by gross indignities. Id.
In Slone v. Herman, a sentencing judge suspended Slone's prison sentence and placed him on probation for five years. 983 F.2d at 108. Slone was, however, detained for almost eight additional months because the Department of Corrections did not believe that Slone's release was lawful. Id. at 108-09. The Eighth Circuit held that Slone's continued detention deprived Slone of his liberty and that "a person's liberty is protected from unlawful state deprivation by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 110.
Although these cases clearly stand for the general proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment is potentially violated where a criminal defendant is detained for even thirty minutes after being ordered released, see Davis, 375 F.3d at 713, Pedersen's claims nevertheless fail as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the Court is not convinced that the cases upon which Pedersen relies are applicable where, as is the case here, the plaintiff voluntarily chooses to return to the detention center for outprocessing after being given the option of leaving directly from the courtroom. In fact, in Young, the Eighth Circuit suggested that failing to give the plaintiff precisely this option was a factor in its determination that the defendants' conduct was constitutionally unacceptable. See Young, 249 F.3d at 736 ("The City says it was not practical to release her at that time, because she was still in jail clothing (an orange jumpsuit). We think the jury could reasonably conclude that this aspect of the problem could have been left up to the plaintiff.").
Second, considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Defendants' conduct in this case is not conscience-shocking. See Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 388 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, Pedersen was detained for ten to twelve hours, not fifty-seven days as in Davis, or eight months as in Slone. Unlike the plaintiff in Young, Pedersen was not strip-searched, chained to other prisoners, or subjected to any other invasive procedures after the court ordered her released. These factual differences are important. As the Supreme Court noted in County of Riverside v. McLaughin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), there will be delays caused by paperwork and logistical problems. Id. at 56. According to Defendants, processing an arrestee into and out of the ADC can require considerable time and effort, particularly when there is a high volume of bookings. The ADC was designed for processing 28,000 bookings per year, but in 2000, processed 49,051 bookings. Moreover, on July 27, 2000 — while understaffed — the ADC received 116 inmates into the facility and processed appearances on 229 criminal cases for 133 ADC inmates who had been transported to and from downtown Minneapolis and three suburban courts. In addition, deputies were required to take two inmates to the hospital. Simply put, delay was inevitable. Pedersen's subjective expectation that she would be released sooner than ten to twelve hours after her court appearance does not create a constitutional entitlement, especially in light of the fact that other inmates previously informed her that ADC processing was slow.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pedersen, for the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Defendants' conduct does not shock the conscience and that Pedersen has not demonstrated that her substantive due process rights were violated. Because Pedersen has failed to demonstrate that her constitutional rights were violated, Pedersen's § 1983 claims against both Hennepin County and Sheriff McGowan must be dismissed. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 146-47 (1979) (holding that if the plaintiff has not been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws, there is no claim cognizable under § 1983); Hayes, 388 F.3d at 675 (holding that in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against an officer in his individual capacity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer's conduct deprived her of constitutional rights). Cf. Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Where there is no underlying constitutional violation, the presence or absence of policies which permit the use of excessive force is quite beside the point.") (quotations omitted).
B. State Law Claims
In Counts Two and Three of her Complaint, Pedersen asserts Minnesota state-law claims for violation of the Minnesota Constitution and false imprisonment, respectively. As there is no diversity of citizenship in this case and the federal claims have been dismissed, the basis for the Court's jurisdiction over these state law claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000), which permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the claims that fall within the district court's original jurisdiction. A district court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when "all claims over which it has original jurisdiction" have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Franklin v. Zain, 152 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claim pursuant to § 1367(c)(3)). Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The state courts of Minnesota, rather than federal courts, should rule on issues of Minnesota law. See id. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over, and dismisses without prejudice, Pedersen's remaining state-law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 11] is GRANTED IN PART consistent with this Order.
2. Count I of Pedersen's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Counts II and III of Pedersen's Complaint [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.