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Peavy v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jun 18, 1986
179 Ga. App. 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)

Opinion

72231.

DECIDED JUNE 18, 1986.

Child molestation, etc. Sumter Superior Court. Before Judge Blanks.

John V. Harper, for appellant.

John R. Parks, District Attorney, for appellee.


Appellant was tried before a jury on an indictment which charged him with one count of child molestation and one count of incest. He was found guilty as to both counts. Appellant appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered on the jury's verdict.

1. Appellant enumerates the trial court's denial of his motion for directed verdict as to the child molestation charge. Appellant urges that his motion should have been granted because the State's evidence failed to show that he had committed an act of child molestation against the victim within the applicable statute of limitations.

The crime of child molestation is a felony, and prosecution must be commenced within four years after commission of the crime. OCGA §§ 16-6-4; 17-3-1 (c). A prosecution commences with the return of an indictment, not with the onset of trial. Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625 ( 216 S.E.2d 839) (1975). See also McLamb v. State, 176 Ga. App. 727 ( 337 S.E.2d 360) (1985). "`The date of the offense need not be proved with preciseness, but only that it occurred during the period of limitation. [Cit.] It may be established by circumstantial evidence. [Cit.]' [Cit.]" McLamb v. State, supra at 727-728. The indictment in the case at bar was returned on May 28, 1985. Our review of the record shows sufficient evidence, including testimony by both the victim and her younger brother, to authorize a finding that appellant committed several acts of child molestation against the victim, some within one or two years of the date of the indictment. There was no error in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal. McLamb v. State, supra.

2. Appellant enumerates the denial of his motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of incest, urging that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of that crime. However, our review of the record shows sufficient evidence, including out-of-court statements of the victim admissible under Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858 ( 286 S.E.2d 717) (1982), to authorize the jury to find appellant guilty of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). See generally Wynne v. State, 139 Ga. App. 355 (1) ( 228 S.E.2d 378) (1976).

Judgments affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.

DECIDED JUNE 18, 1986.


Summaries of

Peavy v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jun 18, 1986
179 Ga. App. 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
Case details for

Peavy v. State

Case Details

Full title:PEAVY v. THE STATE

Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Jun 18, 1986

Citations

179 Ga. App. 397 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
346 S.E.2d 584

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It follows that the error in the jury charge was harmless.Peavy v. State, 179 Ga. App. 397(1) ( 346 S.E.2d…