Opinion
Case Number 99 C 4131
September 28, 2001
Before me is Officer Carl Sam's second motion for summary judgment. Marjorie Pearson claims that Officer Sam stopped her car for no good reason and then, in an unprovoked act of aggression, painfully twisted her arm and grabbed her breast while she sat in the driver's seat. She brings excessive force, battery and respondeat superior claims against Sam and the City of North Chicago.
I previously denied summary judgment to allow plaintiff an opportunity to support her claim that Sam's acts were part of a pattern of harassment motivated by pre-existing personal animus. Plaintiffs allegation of harassment is based upon one prior encounter — a traffic stop in November 1998 during which Sam ticketed Pearson for speeding in a school zone. Occasionally, when Pearson has encountered Sam in the community, he has looked at her "harsh and mean," but the two have had no other interaction. Even if Sam did recognize the car as Pearson's when he made the stop (he says he did not), plaintiff does not challenge the legality of the stop, but rather the force used in connection with it. No reasonable trier of fact could find a pattern of harassment here. I now re-evaluate the qualified immunity defense with the benefit of a more detailed record.
The qualified immunity analysis is two-pronged. The threshold inquiry is whether a plaintiff has stated a valid constitutional claim. The second inquiry is whether the right was clearly established, that is, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001).
I find that plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim, though it is narrower in scope than she would have me find. To succeed on an excessive force claim under § 1983, Pearson must show an injury that resulted directly from a use of force that was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. The injury suffered was a sprained and bruised wrist requiring the use of a splint and an over-the-counter pain medication. Defendant cites cases holding that a de minimus injury obtained collateral to an arrest is an insufficient injury to state a claim under § 1983 so long as the officer did not act with a malicious motive. See e.g. Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, of course, the allegation is that Sam's actions were malicious — done solely to cause her pain and humiliation rather than to force compliance with his requests. There are other cases that suggest that an officer who maliciously inflicts an injury, albeit a slight one, may be found liable under § 1983. Moreover, the injury need not be physical. Emotional injuries are also alleged in the Complaint and supported by deposition testimony. The injury is sufficient to withstand summary judgment, so I turn now to the reasonableness of the force.
See e.g. Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that an injury is sufficient under § 1983 where defendant intentionally handcuffed plaintiff so tightly that plaintiff suffered injury to wrists); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for de minimus injury to arm where police acted reasonably, but suggesting that injury inflicted with malicious motive would be actionable).
There can be little doubt that Sam was entitled to use at least some force to induce plaintiff to cooperate with his requests. See Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2160 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) ("`the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it'"). In Illinois, a driver may not refuse an officer's request for a driver's license. See 625 ILCS 6/6-112. Pearson acknowledges that Sam asked for her license at least twice before he touched her wrist. It is undisputed that she met his repeated requests with demands that she be told what she had done to warrant the stop. [Pearson Dep. at 30]. Although plaintiff did not verbally refuse to give Sam her license, her actions could reasonably have appeared to be a refusal to cooperate.
While the offense for which Pearson was pulled over was a minor traffic violation, itself not signaling any threat to Sam's safety, her behavior may have put a reasonable officer on his guard. In addition to refusing to turn over her license, she locked her doors and fought Sam's attempt to remove her keys from the ignition. Even assuming that Pearson was genuinely motivated by fear of Officer Sam's intentions, a reasonable officer could have believed that she was attempting to flee the scene. In retrospect, it is possible that Sam could have avoided this whole incident by using less force and behaving in a more courteous manner. A police officer who behaves in a "grumpy and discourteous" manner when issuing a ticket, however, does not violate § 1983. Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 1997). Under the circumstances, it was not objectively unreasonable for Sam to hold Pearson's arm firmly in place. She may not recover damages for injury to her wrist.
This does not end the case as there is still the allegation that Sam fondled Pearson's breast. The allegation is not merely that Sam brushed against her breast while trying to restrain her, but rather that he "actually grabbed it with the palm of his hand" and held onto it — a tactic purportedly employed solely to harass. [Pearson Dep. at 40]. Clearly, such conduct is unlawful. I cannot say that a reasonable police officer could believe that it was lawful to gratuitously grab the private parts of a detainee at a routine traffic stop. Defendant denies that he touched Pearson in this way. Plaintiffs case is diminished by the fact that she did not report the fondling incident in her initial police report. Still, there is a dispute of material fact. Summary judgment remains inappropriate.
In my oral ruling on the first motion for summary judgment, I relied upon defendants' assertion that the allegation that Sam grabbed plaintiff's breast was not part of the claim of excessive force. I was mistaken. In fact, the Complaint did state that Sam grabbed Pearson's breast.
The motion for summary judgment [21] is granted in part and denied in part.