Opinion
Case No. CV 20-10066-JWH (KK)
02-23-2021
RONALD PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. DIANA MARSTEINER, ET AL., Defendant(s).
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Final Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable John W. Holcomb, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
I.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ronald Payne ("Payne"), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. ECF Docket No. ("Dkt.") 1. On December 14, 2020, the Court issued an Order Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend ("ODLA"). Dkt. 7. In response to the ODLA, Payne filed a notice that he "stands on the allegations in his complaint." Dkt. 9. For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends dismissing the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. COMPLAINT
On October 30, 2020, Payne filed the instant Complaint against Judge Diana Marsteiner; State Fund claims adjusters Jennifer Smith and Julie McCoy; State Fund attorneys John Dunk, Shirley Huang, and David J. Arnold; and State Fund Qualified Medical Examiner Mitchell Geiger (collectively, "Defendants") in their individual and official capacities. Dkt. 1. Payne alleges he "is litigating an injury in court with State Fund, the Judge and attorneys being sued are working in a California courtroom under the color of law, [t]he California Code of Regulations regulate this area, [and] the Claims Adjuster's and doctor being sued were working in collusion with the other named individuals for the purpose of denying [Payne] what he was legally entitled to." Id. at 5.
While Payne does not specify Judge Marsteiner's judicial position, it appears Judge Marsteiner may be an Administrative Law Judge with the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. See Attorney License Profile, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/209716 (last visited Feb 23, 2021).
According to the allegations in the Complaint, on October 26, 2016, defendant Smith informed Payne that State Fund would not pay his workers' compensation claim because State Fund was disputing the report of Payne's primary treating physician. Id. at 6. Payne later learned State Fund had not disputed the physician's report. Id.
On December 5, 2017, defendant Dunk stated defendant Smith was not available to testify at trial because she no longer worked at State Fund and negotiated a settlement with Payne, through Payne's counsel. Id. Payne later learned defendant Smith was, in fact, still employed by State Fund. Id.
In August 2018, Payne submitted a request for surgery from his primary treating physician to defendant McCoy. Id. Defendant McCoy, however, required Payne to first be evaluated by defendant Geiger, who Payne alleges had previously "falsified" three reports in favor of State Fund. Id. at 7. When Payne refused to appear for an evaluation by defendant Geiger, Payne alleges defendant Huang filed a "falsified" Petition to Compel in state court. Id.
While not entirely clear, it appears that at the hearing on the Petition to Compel, Payne alleges Judge Marsteiner "was engaging in some sort of surprise attack on [Payne] trying to catch [Payne] misstating the facts in any kind of way." Id. at 8. Payne alleges "he has been stuck in a legal quagmire for the last two years and denied Equal Protection and Due Process by State Fund attorney David J. Arnold and Judge Marsteiner by not responding to [Payne's] Petitions alleging specific fraud, and by both of them not responding in writing to [Payne's] Petitions then the legal process cannot play out, and as a result [Payne] remains in a legal quagmire and unable to resolve this issue, and [Payne] is being denied Equal Protection and Due Process." Id.
Payne seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants as well as "[i]njunctive relief from Judge Marsteiner in denying [Payne] Equal Protection and Due Process of the law." Id. at 9.
B. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 14, 2020, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued an ODLA, finding the Complaint was subject to dismissal because (1) Judge Marsteiner is immune from suit; (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars Payne's claims for monetary damages against defendant employees of "State Fund" in their official capacity; (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim against private parties not acting under color of state law; and (4) the Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Dkt. 7. Payne was granted twenty-one days from the date of the ODLA to (a) file a First Amended Complaint; (b) file a notice of intention to stand on the allegations in the Complaint; or (c) voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. Id. at 12-13.
On January 4, 2021, Payne filed a notice that he "stands on the allegations in his complaint." Dkt. 9.
On January 25, 2021, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed. Dkt. 12.
On February 16, 2021, Payne filed Objections to the original Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 17.
The Court issues the instant Final Report and Recommendation addressing Payne's Objections in footnotes one, two, and Section IV.A.
The matter thus stands submitted.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court has authority to dismiss a claim sua sponte and without notice "where the claimant cannot possibly win relief." Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the court's authority includes sua sponte dismissal of claims against defendants who have not been served and defendants who have not yet answered or appeared).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ("Rule 8"), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening purposes, a court applies the same pleading standard as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim "where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
"A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and a 'pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008). However, liberal construction should only be afforded to "a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), and a court need not accept as true "unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003).
If a court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if the plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009). ///
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. JUDGE MARSTEINER IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT
1. Applicable Law
Judges have absolute immunity to suits for monetary damages for their judicial acts. This immunity applies to state court judges in their individual capacity under judicial immunity and official capacity under Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Antoine v. Beyers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 n.10 (1993) (holding judges are immune in their individual capacity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (holding judges are immune in their official capacity). Administrative law judges also enjoy absolute immunity for actions taken in an adjudicatory role. Ungureanu v. A. Teichert & Son, No. CIV S-11-0316 LKK, 2011 WL 4862425, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) (citing Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 513-514 (1978); Howard v. Drapkm, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 852-853(1990)).
Moreover, "immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[.]" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[A judge] should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption."). Absolute judicial immunity exists "however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (upholding absolute immunity for a judge that allegedly ordered excessive force be used in arresting a suspect).
Section 1983 "prohibit[s] the grant of injunctive relief against judges for acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacities unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Weldon v. Kapetan, No. 1:17-CV-01536-LJO-SKO, 2018 WL 2127060, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2018), reconsideration denied, 2018 WL 2318040 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-16000, 2018 WL 8489334 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2018). "The phrase 'declaratory relief' in the current version of [Section] 1983 refers to the ability of a litigant to appeal[ ] the judge's order.'" Id. (citations omitted).
2. Analysis
Here, Payne appears to sue Judge Marsteiner for judicial acts during a civil lawsuit and seeks $75,000 in damages. Dkt. 1 at 9. The Complaint fails to allege facts showing Judge Marsteiner took nonjudicial actions against Payne or that Judge Marsteiner's judicial actions were taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority."); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) ("As long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies."). Hence, the claims for damages against Judge Marsteiner are barred by judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. See Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435 n.10; Stump, 435 U.S. at 364.
Additionally, Payne seeks injunctive relief against Judge Marsteiner "in denying [Payne] equal protection and due process of the law." Dkt. 1 at 9. To the extent this is a request for future injunctive relief, Payne fails to allege any facts demonstrating Judge Marsteiner violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Specifically, Payne alleges no facts that he was denied the opportunity to appeal Judge Marsteiner's decision. See Weldon, 2018 WL 2127060, at *4 (citing Sutton v. Nevada, No. 3:17-CV-00357 MMD VPC, 2018 WL 1081709, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-00357-MMD-VPC, 2018 WL 1077281 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2018) (citing Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying plaintiffs' claim against judge for injunctive relief because they "could have sought declaratory relief but failed to do so")). Hence, Payne cannot seek injunctive relief against Judge Marsteiner.
Accordingly, Payne's claims against Judge Marsteiner are subject to dismissal.
B. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS PAYNE'S CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT EMPLOYEES OF STATE FUND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
1. Applicable Law
"The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state." Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). As to state officials sued in their official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes state officials sued in their official capacity from claims for retrospective relief (including monetary damage claims) but does not immunize them from claims for prospective relief (such as forward-looking injunctive relief). Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. Analysis
Here, "State Fund" is a "'public fund enterprise' within the California Department of Industrial Relations, created for the purpose of ensuring that all California businesses may obtain mandatory workers' compensation insurance coverage." Randell v. Cal. State Comp. Ins. Fund, No. CIVS 07-2760-JAM-GGH (PS), 2008 WL 2946557, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 4906332 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2008) (citing Cal. Const. Art. XIV, § 4 (authorizing California Legislature "to create, and enforce a complete system of workers' compensation")); see also Cal. Labor Code § 56 (stating State Fund is a division of the Department of Industrial Relations); Cal. Ins. Code § 11773 ("The fund shall be organized as a public enterprise fund."). The Eleventh Amendment, therefore, bars Payne from pursuing claims that seek monetary relief against defendants Smith and McCoy, who are state employees, in their official capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169-70 (holding Eleventh Amendment bar "remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity").
The claims for monetary damages against defendants Dunk, Huang, Arnold, and Geiger in their official capacity are similarly barred to the extent they are also employees of State Fund.
Accordingly, Payne's claims for monetary damages against defendants Smith and McCoy in their official capacity are subject to dismissal.
C. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST PRIVATE PARTIES NOT ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW
1. Applicable Law
In order to state a claim for a civil rights violation under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a particular defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Courts "start with the presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action." Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999); Price v. State of Haw., 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law[.]"). Thus, private parties cannot generally be held liable under Section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A private party must be a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents in order to be sued under Section 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly held that a privately-retained attorney does not act under color of state law for purposes of actions brought under the Civil Rights Act." Briley v. State of Cal., 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977).
2. Analysis
Here, the Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against defendants Dunk, Huang, Arnold, and Geiger. To the extent defendants Dunk, Huang, and Arnold are privately-retained attorneys, they are not acting under color of state law. See Briley, 564 F.2d at 855. Payne's allegation that the attorneys are "working in a California courtroom," dkt. 1 at 5, does not demonstrate they are acting under color of state law. Similarly, defendant Geiger appears to be a private physician and, therefore, not acting under color of state law. In addition, Payne's conclusory allegation that defendant Geiger is acting in "collusion" with the other defendants does not establish she is acting under color of state law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
To the extent defendants Dunk, Huang, and Arnold are employees of State Fund, the claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Accordingly, Payne's claims against defendants Dunk, Huang, Arnold, and Geiger are subject to dismissal.
D. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
1. Applicable Law
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against deprivations of "life, liberty, or property." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty,' or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted). Due process analysis "proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient." Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (citation omitted).
"'A property interest in a benefit protected by the due process clause results from a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' created and defined by an independent source, such as a state or federal law.'" Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 1983)). "Although the underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such as state law,' federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (citations omitted). "[T]he root requirement of the Due Process Clause [is] that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected interest." Randell, 2008 WL 2946557, at *8 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). In order to state a Section 1983 equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated without a rational basis or discriminated against based on his membership in a protected class. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the requirements for Section 1983 equal protection claim based on membership in protected class); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (setting forth the standard for a "class of one" equal protection claim). /// ///
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, the Complaint is unclear as to the basis on which Payne alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Payne conclusorily alleges "Judge Marsteiner continually discriminates against [him] and den[ies Payne] his Constitutional right to Equal Protection and Due Process." Dkt. 1 at 8. Payne "contends that he has been stuck in a legal quagmire for the last two years and denied Equal Protection and Due Process by State Fund attorney David J. Arnold and Judge Marsteiner by not responding to [Payne's] Petitions alleging specific fraud, and by both of them not responding in writing to [Payne's] Petitions then the legal process cannot play out, and as a result [Payne] remains in a legal quagmire and unable to resolve this issue, and [Payne] is being denied Equal Protection and Due Process." Id. As to the remaining defendants, Payne merely alleges they "were working in collusion with the other named individuals for the purpose of denying [Payne] what he was legally entitled to." Id. at 5. However, despite the "timeline" of events set forth in the Complaint, Payne fails to describe any "Petition" or other document he has filed with Judge Marsteiner or served on defendant Arnold that has been handled in violation of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 6-8. Moreover, Payne's conclusory allegations of discrimination and collusion are not entitled to a presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. The Court, therefore, cannot discern the nature of Payne's claims or the facts alleged to support them. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), (d) (stating a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief and "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct"); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) ("[T]he short and plain statement must provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.").
Moreover, to the extent Payne's due process claim arises out of the ongoing litigation of his workers' compensation claim, he has failed to allege he has been denied a hearing on his right to payment. The only hearing Payne references is a hearing on his potential fraud claims against Judge Marsteiner and defendant Arnold. Hence, Payne has failed to allege he was denied a hearing before being deprived of "a significant protected interest," i.e. his right to workers' compensation payment. Randell, 2008 WL 2946557, at *8.
In addition, Payne's conclusory reference to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment fails to state a claim. Payne fails to allege facts showing Defendants treated him differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis or discriminated against him based on his membership in a protected class. In fact, Payne has not even identified any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently from him.
Accordingly, Payne's Fourteenth Amendment claims against all Defendants are subject to dismissal.
E. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
As discussed above, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Despite being given an opportunity to correct the specific deficiencies the Court identified in the ODLA, dkt. 7, Payne has failed to do so. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 22, 1992) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to correct previously identified pleading deficiencies, noting "before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively"). Rather, Payne declined to file an amended complaint and chose to "stand on the allegations in his complaint." Dkt. 9 at 1.
In light of Payne's failure to address the deficiencies in the Complaint, and because Payne has refused to file an amended complaint, leave to amend would be futile. See Pearce v. LA Cnty. Jail Peace Officer/Corr. Officer, No. CV 17-8092 JLS (JC), 2018 WL 3339646, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2018) (finding where plaintiff is "unwilling to draft a complaint that states viable claims for relief [the Court] deems such failure an admission that amendment is futile"). Hence, the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Ismail v. Cnty. of Orange, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ("[A] district court's discretion over amendments is especially broad 'where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint.'") (quoting DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)).
V.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended the District Court issue an order: (1) accepting this Final Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing Judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. Dated: February 23, 2021
/s/_________
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO
United States Magistrate Judge