Opinion
22A-CR-689
08-23-2022
Justin Daniel Paxson, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Yvette M. LaPlante LaPlante LLP Evansville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court The Hon. Kelli E. Fink, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 82C01-2108-F6-4550
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Yvette M. LaPlante LaPlante LLP Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Chief Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2015, Justin Paxson was convicted of aggravated battery, and, in January of 2021, registered as a sex or violent offender in Indiana due to that conviction. At the time, Paxson was advised of the requirement that he report any change in residence within seventy-two hours. In June of 2021, it was learned that Paxson had not lived at the address he had listed in January since April. The State charged Paxson with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender. On the day of Paxson's trial, he moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that it alleged he was required to register due to a conviction for a sex offense when, in fact, it was due to a conviction for a violent offense. The trial court granted the State's motion to amend the charging information, trial proceeded, and the trial court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to eighteen months of incarceration. Paxson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to amend the charging information and that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In November of 2015, Paxson was convicted in Illinois of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. On January 21, 2021, Paxson registered his principal address with the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department ("VCSD"), as he was required to do as a sex or violent offender pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8. Ordinarily, Paxson would have signed his registration form, but VCSD had suspended the requirement due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Paxson was informed of the contents of the form by Post Commander Alyssa Nilssen, including the requirement that he report within seventy-two hours of any move. Paxson listed his address as 1038 Gum Street in Evansville, which is a transitional facility for men who have been released from incarceration or are participating in drug court ("the Facility"). On June 5, 2021, a VCSD detective visited the Facility and learned that Paxson had left in April of 2021 and was no longer living there.
[¶3] On August 23, 2021, the State charged Paxson with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender. On December 22, 2021, Paxson's bench trial was held, at the beginning of which he moved for dismissal on the basis that the charging information indicated he was required to register due to a conviction for a sex crime. Because Paxson had, in fact, been required to register due to a conviction for a violent crime, he alleged that he had been misled and that his defense had been prejudiced. The State moved to amend the charging information to include the language "or violent," which motion the trial court granted. Although the trial court offered Paxson the opportunity for a continuance, he declined, and the trial court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to eighteen months of incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
I. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Allowing the State to Amend the Charging Information
[¶4] Rulings on amendments or additions to a charge are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. White v. State, 963 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs "only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances" before the trial court. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). Reviewing courts will not second-guess a trial court's estimation of the facts and circumstances because the trial court "is in a better position to weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and draw inferences." Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 424 (Ind. 2007). Consequently, "great deference" is given to the trial court's ruling. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ind. 2010). We will affirm the trial court on any reasonable basis apparent in the record, even if that basis was not relied on by the parties or the trial court. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021). Paxson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to amend the charging information. The State counters that Paxson has waived any challenge he might have had to the trial court's decision by failing to accept the trial court's offer of a continuance and that he failed to establish prejudice in any event. In light of our preference to address claims on their merits, see, e.g., Butler v. State, 140 N.E.3d 870, 874 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied, we choose to address Paxson's claim directly.
[¶5] Under the circumstances, we conclude that Paxson has failed to show an abuse of discretion in this regard. Even substantive amendments to charges are allowed at any time provided they do not prejudice a defendant's substantial rights. Stafford v. State, 890 N.E.2d 744, 752 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). "These substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights." Id. The only question is if Paxson had a "reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges." Id.
[¶6] While it is true that the charging information alleged that Paxson had been "previously convicted of a sex crime," the caption identifies the charged crime as "FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OR VIOLENT OFFENDER" and lists the statute under which he was being charged as "I.C. 11-8-8-17(a)(1)[,]" which makes it a crime when "[a] sex or violent offender […] knowingly or intentionally […] fails to register when required to register under this chapter[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22; Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(1) (emphases added). Moreover, the probable-cause affidavit attached to the charging information states that Paxson was being charged with "Failure to Register as a Sex or Violent Offender" and, more importantly, clearly identifies the triggering conviction as "AGGRAVATED BATTERY OF A CHILD <13/GREAT BODILY HARM[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. Paxson also acknowledged before trial that he had been given the State's evidentiary case in discovery, which included VCSD's documents on August 20, 2021 (four months before trial); additional video recordings and documents on October 13, 2021; and certified documents regarding his Illinois conviction. The trial court was free to infer from all of the above that it was abundantly clear to Paxson that the State was going to attempt to prove that he was required to register due to a conviction for a violent crime. In any event, Paxson does not claim any actual confusion about what the State's case was going to entail, much less how he was prejudiced by it. Because Paxson has failed to establish that his substantial rights were prejudiced in any way, his claim fails.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶7] When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not "reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses," nor do we intrude within the factfinder's "exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence." Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2001). Rather, a conviction will be affirmed unless "no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but instead, "the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict." Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). When we are confronted with conflicting evidence, we must consider it "most favorably to the [factfinder's] ruling." Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005).
[¶8] In order to convict Paxson, the State was required to prove that he knowingly failed to register as required by Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(1). Chapter 11-8-8 requires sex or violent offenders residing in Indiana to register their principal residence's address with local law enforcement. Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-7(a), 11-8-8-8(a)(1). A person acts "knowingly" when they are aware of a high degree of probability that they are doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). Paxson contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that he failed to register while aware of a high degree of probability that he was failing to register.
[¶9] Mens rea "is almost inevitably […] a matter of circumstantial proof." Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 487 (Ind. 2012). A defendant's state of mind "may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case." McMiller v. State, 90 N.E.3d 672, 675 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Among the evidence admitted at trial was evidence that Paxson had visited the VCSD Operations Center on January 25, 2021; interacted with Commander Nilssen; and registered his residence as the Facility. Evidence that Paxson registered his residence and that he was informed of the requirement that he report a move within seventy-two hours is sufficient to prove that he was aware of that requirement.
[¶10] Paxson's argument that he did not knowingly or intentionally fail to register is based on the fact that he did not sign the registration form on January 25, 2021, and so, presumably, cannot be charged with knowledge of its contents. VCSD Detective Mike Robinson, however, testified that the VCSD did not take signatures from registrants at the time as a precaution against Covid-19 and that Commander Nilssen's signature and badge number written at the bottom of the registration form signified that she had informed Paxson, inter alia, of the requirement that he report any move within seventy-two hours. Paxson attempts to discredit Detective Robinson's testimony by noting that he did not "supervise" Commander Nilssen. Defendant's Br. p. 10. The credibility, force, and effect of Detective Robinson's testimony, however, were for the trial court to evaluate, and we will not second-guess those decisions on appeal. See, e.g., Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007) ("It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction."). Paxson's argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.
[¶11] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.